



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Bridgewater House, Chester Road

53 No. Apartments

FOR: Watch This Space (Jembrana) Limited

VERSION B: 18^h July 2022

REFERENCE: 2007/1245/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Bridgewater House, Chester Road

2007/1245/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The following areas have been identified as a concern and should be addressed (see section 3.3 for more details).

- Ground floor windows that directly abut the pavement should be afforded with defensible space or appropriate protection from antisocial behaviour and criminality.
- Access control, postal delivery, and physical security of the buildings should be carefully considered.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors	
	2.4 Crime Rate Comparison	
	2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	9
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	10
	4.1 Doors (Houses)	
	4.2 Doors (Apartments)	
	4.3 Windows	
	4.4 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.5 Alarms	
	4.6 Access Control	
	4.7 Boundaries	
	4.8 Landscaping	
	4.9 Lighting	
5	Management & Maintenance	12
6	Construction	12
7	Useful References	13
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	14
B	Associated Documents.....	14
C	CIS Version History	15


1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located on the edge of the Manchester city centre area.

The site is roughly rectangular, and it is bound by Chester Road to the North, to the East by Great Jackson Street, to the South by Silvercroft Street, and to the West by Crown Street.

The site is currently occupied by Bridgewater House and a small associated surface car parking area. The site boundaries are currently defined with hoarding, palisade fencing, and blockwork walls.

The site is positioned in an area with considerable residential development, including Crown Square adjacent to the West



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2021 and 30th April 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
33	22	91	516	360	25	18	256	27	32

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is relatively high, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft being the highest recorded crimes. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are mostly taking place to the northeast of the proposed site, around Deansgate metrolink stop and Royce Road. The assaults in the area are mostly taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period, which is when licenced premises have a larger attendance and are open for longer periods. The assaults are mostly carried out by unknown offenders.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime in the local area is mostly taking place around Great Jackson Street and Bridgewater Viaduct and to the north around Bridgewater Street. Theft from a Motor vehicle is the highest occurring vehicle crime with smashed glazing being the most common entry point to the vehicle. The area in which vehicle crime has occurred has many car parking facilities and on street parking, which increases the number of opportunities for offenders.
- 2.1.4 Thefts have occurred around the north and east of the proposed site, around Deansgate/ Castleford Metrolink stop and to the north around Liverpool Road, where pickpocketing has been most commonly used to obtain goods. Thefts have also occurred around the licenced premises in the area, with mobile phones and purses/ wallets being taken.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access to apartments

Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).

- 2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.

Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.

- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments

Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.

- 2.2.4 Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements to access the doors/windows behind

Possible Solution - Any shutters should conform to a recognised security standard such as LPS 1175 SR 2.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **72% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **64% lower** than Greater Manchester and **63% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **50% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **32% lower** than Greater Manchester and **31% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **61% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **48% lower** than Greater Manchester and **37% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **28% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **111% higher** than Greater Manchester and **156% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Tuesday and Thursday during the afternoon (1pm - 5pm) and early hours of the morning (12am – 4am). Offenders often target properties during the day when residents are likely to be away at work, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified. Offenders also target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be identified.

2.5.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Offenders posing as legitimate residents/visitors and entering restricted areas through insecure doors or tailgating residents.
- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as unknown, offenders have typically targeted insecure windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Saturday during the afternoon (12pm – 4pm) and evening (6pm – 11:59pm.) Vehicles targeted have mostly been parked on streets and private car parks. During the evening it is often dark with less footfall in the area, the offender perceives that there is less of a risk of being caught/ identified.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is for the restoration and conversion of the abandoned Grade II listed building (Bridgewater House) to accommodate 20 no. 1 and 2 bedroom apartments and the redevelopment of the car park area to provide a 4-storey newbuild development comprising 33 no. 1 and 2 bedroom apartments.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Access into the inner courtyard will be restricted to residents, reducing the potential for criminals and those antisocially minded accessing this space to the detriment of residents.
- 3.2.2 Gates into the inner courtyard are visually permeable which will allow residents/visitors to view any threats before entering or leaving this space.
- 3.2.3 The main communal entrance will be positioned in the internal courtyard where it can be easily viewed by residents.
- 3.2.4 Lightwells on the Silvercroft Street elevation will be protected with a low boundary treatment.
- 3.2.5 Bicycle parking will be provided for visitors within the main courtyard area, these will be Sheffield stands allowing both wheels and the frame to be locked.
- 3.2.6 The visitor bicycle stands are positioned where they can easily be viewed from surrounding apartments.
- 3.2.7 Bins will be stored in the secure internal courtyard area, reducing the potential for misuse.
- 3.2.8 The development site is located on the prominent junction of Chester House and Great Jackson Street where it will be subject to passive surveillance from those passing by on foot and in vehicles.
- 3.2.9 There are several large residential developments in this area which will contribute to high levels of footfall in the area which will potentially deter criminals from operating.
- 3.2.10 Gardens will provide a defensible space buffer for ground floor apartments on Chester Road, preventing members of the public passing the fronts of properties which could cause disturbance to residents, or facilitate criminal/antisocial behaviour.

- 3.2.11 The proposed development will help to enliven the street scene on Chester Road and Great Jackson Street, helping to provide useful natural surveillance of the local area – deterring criminals and those antisocially minded.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme. Bridgewater House is a Grade II listed building and it may not be possible for these standards to be adhered to – if this is the case we would recommend that an alternative standard is used or mitigating security feature are included.

- 3.3.1 The apartment building directly abuts the public footway at Great Jackson Street and Silvercoft Street, which could leave residents vulnerable to being targeted by criminals or becoming victims of antisocial behaviour. Ideally, these apartments should have some form of defensible space (i.e. low railings or shrubbery) preventing offenders or those antisocially-minded from targeting windows on these elevations. If defensible space can't be provided then window cills should be a minimum height of 1500mm from ground level and be protected ornate grilles, railings or bars to deter abuse. These windows must be certified to BS PAS 24, glazing must incorporate a laminated pane rated as P4A under EN 356 and opening restrictors should be provided to restrict opening to 100mm.
- 3.3.2 Access into the internal courtyard area and into the communal areas of the building should operate on an access control system, with a video intercom for visitors.
- 3.3.3 Gates, and adjacent boundaries, should be to a minimum height of 1800mm and of robust construction. The design of the gate/boundary should be carefully considered so that they cannot be easily climbed (exposed hinges and mid-rails should be avoided). These gates should operate on access control and there should be a video intercom for residents.
- 3.3.4 How post is delivered should be carefully considered so that postal workers are not permitted unfettered access to the entire development. Post should be delivered to mailboxes in a secure postal lobby rather than to letterboxes in the apartment doors.
- 3.3.5 Most ground floor apartments will have external front entrance doors. These doors (and those of the proposed houses) must be certified to BS PAS 24 (or a similar burglary resistant standard) and have a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, so that they cannot be opened from the outside if left insecure. Any glazing in ground floor doors must be certified to P1A under BS EN 356 (laminated glazing) so that it cannot be easily damaged/smashed to gain entry.
- 3.3.6 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.7 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, or LPS 2081 SRA
- ☐ Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.

-
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
 - ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors (internal and external) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ External apartment entrance doors should not be capable of being opened externally without a key. These doors should have a fixed external handle or a split-spindle.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

- Communal entrances
- Communal areas
- Circulation cores

4.7 Boundaries

- ☐ The fronts of properties accessed from Bridgwater Street should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ It is essential that good sightlines are maintained throughout the development to allow residents and visitors to actively survey the area for potential threats and planting should be carefully considered particularly near the building entrance.

4.9 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Cool white metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives.
- ☐ A Uo value of 0.4 is highly recommended to ensure an even distribution of light, if this cannot be achieved then the Uo should not fall below 0.25.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Elevations of the building should be illuminated.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors

Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
16/11/2022	Vasilis Apostolakeas	CIS Instruction confirmed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Design and Access Statement	27/06/22	
100	Site and Location Plan	20/06/22	B
101	Existing Lower Ground Floor		
102	Existing Ground Floor		
103	Existing First Floor		
104	Existing Attic Floor		
105	Existing Roof Plan		
106	Existing Chester Road Elevation		
107	Existing Crown Street Elevation		
108	Existing Silvercroft Street Elevation		
109	Existing Courtyard Elevation		
110	Existing Great Jackson Street Elevation		
111	Proposed Ground Floor	20/06/22	C
112	Proposed First Floor Plan	20/06/22	C
113	Proposed Second Floor Plan	20/06/22	B
114	Proposed Third Floor Plan	20/06/22	B
115	Proposed Roof Plan	20/06/22	B
116	Proposed Chester Road Elevations (Listed Building)	20/06/22	A
117	Proposed Crown Street Elevations (Listed Building)	20/06/22	A
118	Proposed Silvercroft Street Elevations (Listed Building)	20/06/22	A
119	Proposed Courtyard Elevations (Listed Building)	20/06/22	A
120	Proposed Great Jackson Street Elevations (Listed Building)	20/06/22	A
121	Proposed Front Elevations (New Build)	20/06/22	B
122	Proposed Courtyard Elevations (New Build)	20/06/22	A
123	Proposed Sections AA & BB (New Build)	20/06/22	A
124	Proposed Combined Elevations (1 of 2)	20/06/22	B
125	Proposed Combined Elevations (2 of 2)	20/06/22	A
126	Section CC (Existing and Proposed)	20/06/22	A
127	Section DD (Existing and Proposed)	20/06/22	A
128	Section EE (Existing and Proposed)	20/06/22	A
129	Contextual Elevation (Chester Road)	20/06/22	A
130	Contextual Elevation (Great Jackson Street)		
131	Strip Out (Lower Ground Floor)	20/06/22	A

132	Strip Out (Ground Floor)	20/06/22	A
133	Strip Out (First Floor)	20/06/22	A
134	Strip Out (Attic Floor)	20/06/22	A
135	Typical Window Details	20/05/22	A
136	Typical Wall and Cornice Interaction	20/05/22	A
137	Typical Floor and Ceiling Detail		
138	Sealed Shut and Boarded Over Original Doors		
139	Bin Store Details	20/06/22	A
140	Window Survey		
156-173	Ceiling and Cornice Survey		
174	Typical Entrance Door Details		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		