



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Former Vasa Club, 283 White Moss Road,
Manchester, M9 6NZ

8 Apartments and 28 Houses

for: AIY Limited

version A: 18th March 2022

URN: 2022/0026/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Former Vasa Club, 283 White Moss Road, M9 6NZ

2022/0026/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes / security additions advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to expose any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime within the proposal.

Overall, the proposed scheme has been found acceptable in principle, but further consideration of some aspects is required as stated in section 3.3 of this report in order to gain our full support for this development at planning stage. These include:-

- Access to maisonettes
- Boundaries
- Cycle / bin storage arrangements

Our support for this scheme is subject to the above issues being satisfactorily addressed, as described within the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Michael Craig DipLD CMLI

DfS Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site, shown red on plan, lies in the Blackley district of north Manchester, about 0.5km south of the local retail centre at Victoria Avenue. Significant features of the neighbourhood include a fire station, health centre and Dam Head Park with children's play area.

The site is located at the junction of 2 important roads. Rochdale Road is a major arterial route into central Manchester and is very busy at peak times. White Moss Road provides a link to the Dam Head estate and is also used by some traffic avoiding congestion on Rochdale Road. A bus stop is located adjacent to the site, opposite the health centre. An area of wooded amenity space adjoins that north eastern boundary.

The site is currently unused with the vacant buildings of its former use still in place. It has been subject to criminal damage and there is also evidence of vehicle crime and fly tipping. There is a significant change in ground levels in and around the site.



Site viewed from White Moss Road




Dense vegetation and accumulations of rubbish on northern boundary




Bus stop, post box and utility installations adjacent to site



Boundary with fire station



Rochdale Road frontage



Amenity area adjoining the north eastern boundary

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2021 to 31st December 2021.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
62	<5	44	221	23	10	5	26	10	<5

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the general volume of recorded crime is high, particularly the levels of domestic burglary and violence, reflecting the site's location with of a largely residential area. Less serious wounding, domestic burglary and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded offences taking place in the area, with the majority of offences taking place along White Moss Road and the surrounding residential streets..
- 2.1.2 Vehicle crime in the local area is 40% above the national average rate, with theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle being the most commonly occurring types of vehicle crime. Offenders have smashed glazing to cause damage, as well as gain access to vehicles and steal items. Offenders have also removed vehicle registration plates or vehicle parts and have damaged vehicle paintwork/bodywork.
- 2.1.3 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with particular hotspots occurring to the south-east (around / off Haverfield Road) and to the west (around / off Hill Lane). Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded types of less serious woundings, with offences often involving domestic disputes and incidents between known associates.
- 2.1.4 Domestic burglary has occurred throughout the local area, with offenders predominately targeting the rear of properties, as these are often less over looked thus reducing natural surveillance in the area. Offenders have mostly used the method of lock snapping in order to gain access.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the address.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to BS PAS 24 or equivalent security standard (see section 4) - these doors are very difficult to force open. Front doors (& garage doors) should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the street, rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions can be witnessed. Effective secure boundary treatments should be installed to enclose private garden space at the rear of properties.

- 2.2.2 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors (mostly to the front doors of the property)

Possible Solution - All ground floor windows should include key-operated locks and opening restrictors. Unauthorised access to the rear of the dwellings should be deterred by the erection of robust boundaries, and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes to the rear of the properties. Side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear windows are only accessible to residents. Secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided. Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key. Front gardens should include defined boundaries to discourage offenders from approaching the doors.

- 2.2.3 Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear windows are only accessible to residents.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **18% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **107% higher** than Greater Manchester and **196% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **23% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **93% higher** than Greater Manchester and **106% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **39% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **12% lower** than Greater Manchester and **31% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **56% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **20% lower** than Greater Manchester and **40% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Monday and Friday, during the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Offenders often target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the address.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements, gain access to the garden shed.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Wednesday and Sunday during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target vehicles during the early hours of the morning as they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises clearance of the site and construction of 34 dwellings in a mix of houses and maisonettes. Properties are arranged in terraces facing Rochdale Road and White Moss Road. A gated rear parking court is accessed between houses off White Moss Road.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring legitimate activity to a currently-vacant site that is a generator of disorder. Redevelopment with housing and population of the site should help to create a sense of ownership and responsibility, and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will help to improve natural surveillance along parts of White Moss Road and the public park opposite.
- 3.2.3 The development does not appear to include any gable-end walls directly abutting streets or other public space.
- 3.2.4 Houses and apartments will have windows of routinely-occupied rooms on the front elevation (at ground floor level) which helps to maximise informal surveillance opportunities of the adjacent public realm.
- 3.2.5 The principal entrance to all the new houses and some apartments is located on the front elevation and should be clearly apparent on approaching the dwellings. Front doors will not be recessed, so that a potential offender on the doorstep can be easily observed from the street and neighbouring properties.
- 3.2.6 The parking court at the rear of the properties is enclosed within a secure boundary and is accessed by vehicular gates off White Moss Road and a pedestrian gate off Rochdale Road. Access to the parking court must be robustly secured, controlled and maintained, in order to prevent unauthorised access. The entrance should be fitted with a high-speed automatic gate or Bi-folding gates (reducing the potential for tailgating). Access should be operated by a specific resident key fob / proximity reader with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' & 'out'), reducing the opportunity for criminals to gain access and escape. An additional access-controlled side gate / door for pedestrians / cyclists should be incorporated beside the vehicular gates.
- 3.2.7 Plans indicate that the houses / maisonettes will be set back from the back of footpath along the streets providing a strip of defensible space. Front garden spaces should be well-defined using low walls and / or fencing, hedging and changes in surface materials, in order to identify the space as private and discourage unauthorised access to property and short-cutting across corner plots.
- 3.2.8 Space is available within the enclosed rear gardens of each house to accommodate waste bins, avoiding the need for free-standing bin stores in front of the houses where they could provide potential hiding places and targets for criminal damage.
- 3.2.9 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The site lies in an area where rates of domestic burglary are above the local and national average levels. The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Access to apartments at rear. The location of entrances to some apartments at the rear of the properties off the communal parking area, creates a significant security risk. Any visitors and delivery staff will need to be given access to this space which could otherwise be restricted to residents / site managers only.

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- 3.3.2 Site Boundaries. Front and rear garden spaces should be separated by fencing and gates – this division should be located as close as possible to the front elevation of the dwellings. Fencing / railings or walls adjacent to public or communal space intended to create a secure boundary should be a minimum height of 2.1m. Particular attention should be given to detailing wall / railing combinations, and the junctions of the different styles and heights of boundary treatment to avoid inadvertently creating a step or ladder feature which could compromise the integrity of the site boundary, and possibly require retrofitting of unsightly security features. Fencing on undulating land should be carefully installed to maintain the minimum height and avoid creating crawling space beneath. Fencing directly adjoining space used by vehicles should be protected from accidental damage that could undermine its security. Front garden boundary treatments should be designed to discourage sitting which could generate nuisance for residents, particularly in close proximity to the bus stop on White Moss Road.
- 3.3.3 Level changes / regrading. The developer should be careful not to allow any ground modelling required to accommodate the new building, nor any retaining structures or terrace features, to facilitate climbing aids that would allow easy access into otherwise secure areas, onto upper floors of the building or undermine boundary fencing to neighbouring properties. This is crucial in the detailing of junctions of high and low walls / fences and where they interface with other boundary treatments. Fence panels on sloping ground must have a maximum gap of 100mm.
- 3.3.4 Bin collection spaces. These should be managed to ensure that bins are returned to dwellings following collection – this should not be left to individual residents. Bins form targets for criminal damage, used to provide climbing aids / hiding places. The design of these collection spaces should not include features that could provide potential climbing aids over the site boundary nor block sight lines.
- 3.3.5 Cycle storage. This should be located within a secure enclosure with access is restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the site. Racks within the enclosure should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels, and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).
- 3.3.6 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness - this should include the access road. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation.
- 3.3.7 Management and maintenance of communal facilities / spaces. The robust management of such features is essential as poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in section 4 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- Front and rear doors to houses, including external doors to maisonettes, must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- French / double doors and any folding or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- Front doors to houses and maisonettes should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Windows

- Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including any internal doors in to garages and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Boundaries

- Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and / or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.

- Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels / sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- Gates in to the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
 - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
 - A key operable deadlock
- If residents are likely to use these gates when leaving their property, then the gates must be lockable from both sides.
- Secure boundaries should be formed of 2100mm high walls / close-board panelled fencing / railings (with no mid-rails that could aid climbing). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps / gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the rear parking area must be certified to one of the following standards:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
 - PAS 68: 2013

4.6 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- Lighting in parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 lux with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- Lighting to pedestrian routes through the site should be in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting to public areas (footpaths and roads) should be evenly distributed and not create areas of shadowing or pooling. Any low level lighting should be positioned to avoid creating glare.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- The even distribution of lighting can be affected by growth of existing / proposed trees, and the position of new light sources should be carefully considered in relation to anticipated growth characteristics of the vegetation, and adjusted as necessary to achieve the required spread.

4.7 Other

- Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of houses only, not in the private areas. Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- There have been incidents involving metal theft from the area. Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and metal pipework and wiring should not be visible.
- Any garden sheds must be securely fixed to a concrete foundation and the shed door fitted with a certificated 'Sold Secure' Silver Standard padlock, hasp and staple (coach bolted through the shed structure). The shed door should be at least 44mm thick so that the door can be locked into the doorframe using either a mortise deadlock or mortise sash lock certificated to BS 3621: 2007.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and any CCTV is not impaired.
- 5.1.3 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
18/01/2022	Paul Butler Associates	CIS instruction received
27/01/2022	Paul Butler Associates	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
10/03/2022	AIY Limited	Payment received
17/03/2022	N/A	Site visit
18/03/2022	Paul Butler Associates	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A647_SK_52F	Proposed Site Plan - houses	June 21	
A647_P_100	Proposed Site Plan	Dec 21	
A647_P_210	Apartment Type 1A and 2A plans	Dec 21	
A647_P_310	Apartment Type 1A and 2A elevations	Dec 21	
A647_P_410	Apartment Type 1A and 2A section	Dec 21	
A647_P_211	Apartment Type 1B and 2B plans	Dec 21	
A647_P_311	Apartment Type 1B and 2B elevations	Dec 21	
A647_P_411	Apartment Type 1B and 2B section	Dec 21	
A647_P_230	House Type 3A plans	Dec 21	
A647_P_330	House Type 3A elevations	Dec 21	
A647_P_430	House Type 3A section	Dec 21	
A647_P_240	House Type 4A plans	Dec 21	
A647_P_340	House Type 4A elevations	Dec 21	
A647_P_440	House Type 4A section	Dec 21	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French / double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk