



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Talbot Mill, Ellesmere Road

187 No. Apartments

FOR: Capital and Centric (Adored) Ltd Phoenix

VERSION A: 27th May 2022

REFERENCE: 2004/1593/CIS/03

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Talbot Mill, Ellesmere Road

2004/1593/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The following areas have been identified as a concern and should be addressed (see section 3.3 for more details).

- Lower ground floor windows should be security rated and restricted in opening.
- Access control and physical security of the buildings should be carefully considered.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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1 Visual Audit



The site is located in the Castlefield Conservation Area on the South-Western fringe of central Manchester. This area has been subject to significant regeneration in recent years with traditional industrial functions being replaced with residential and commercial uses.

The site is bounded by a short branch off the Bridgewater Canal and recently built apartment buildings.

Parking is in high demand in the neighbourhood partly due to its proximity to the city centre and the high density of dwellings in the area, together with limited on-street spaces.

Adjacent vacant plots. Some of the nearby sites are not well maintained and exhibit obvious signs of neglect, with accumulations of litter and damaged infrastructure. Vacant buildings in the area have been targets for criminal damage which can generate further abuse.

The site currently comprises a complex of former mill buildings which are partly occupied by small commercial or industrial enterprises.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2021 and 31st March 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
40	22	61	348	105	34	11	122	16	22

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is low for Manchester with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime being the highest recorded crimes. Whilst these crimes have been the highest recorded in the local area, they are still below the average crime rate for Manchester.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding has taken place throughout the local area, with a concentration of offences occurring along Bridgewater Way, around Cornbrook Metrolink station, located to the southwest of the proposed site, and to the north of the site around Regent Road. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings, with domestic disputes and incidents between known associates most reported.
- 2.1.3 Theft from motor vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle offences taking place in the local area. Offenders are targeting securely parked vehicles and using implements to break glazing in order to access personal belongings stored within the vehicle. Offenders have also removed vehicle registration plates and used devices to override the locking mechanism, as well as scratched paint work on the vehicle causing criminal damage.
- 2.1.4 Theft offences have taken place throughout the local area, particularly along public transport routes. Offenders have targeted insecure bags stored on seats or floors of public transport vehicles. Offenders have also targeted parcels stored within communal areas of apartment buildings or front doors of properties.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments
Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).
- 2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.
Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.
- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments
Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.
- 2.2.4 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.
Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **63% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **53% lower** than Greater Manchester and **51% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **67% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **54% lower** than Greater Manchester and **13% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **71% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **62% lower** than Greater Manchester and **54% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **32% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **13% higher** than Greater Manchester and **37% higher** than England & Wales.


2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Thursday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening (2am – 8pm). Offenders often target properties during the day as residents are likely to be away, working, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for the offender. The risk of domestic burglaries also increases during the late evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors
- Entering an apartment complex by means of tailgating residents/ insecure doors and gaining access to communal areas.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Thursday and Saturday during the afternoon (1:30pm – 4pm). Offenders often target vehicles during the day as they are likely to be left unattended for long periods of time, out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises conversion of the former mill buildings and construction of new-build blocks to provide a total of 187 no. apartments. A central communal courtyard will provide an external amenity area.
- 3.1.2 Pedestrian access will be off Ellesmere Street and Worsley Street. Vehicular access to the central courtyard is via the existing tunnel off Ellesmere Street.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring additional legitimate activity to a currently underused site. Redevelopment with housing and repopulation of the site should help to generate a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The site boundary is largely well-defined by buildings and entry / exit points are limited, so monitoring of access can be focussed on a few places (see also item 3.3.8).
- 3.2.3 The footprint of the building exposed to the public realm is relatively simple and free of deeply recessed or otherwise concealed areas that could provide cover for antisocial activity and impede informal surveillance.
- 3.2.4 Many of the flats will have routinely occupied rooms overlooking the communal courtyard areas and adjoining streets, which will help to increase natural surveillance of the area.
- 3.2.5 Windows of lower ground floor flats on elevations facing the communal parking area include a defined strip to discourage casual access.
- 3.2.6 Doors to individual apartments will be positioned flush with the corridor walls.
- 3.2.7 Cycle storage for residents is in a secure room within the buildings. Access to cycle stores should be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Cycle theft is a significant problem. Racks within the room should allow bikes to have both wheels and the frame secured.
- 3.2.8 The internal courtyard contains some concealed areas and entry to this space will be restricted, using access-controlled gates flush with the Ellesmere Street elevation of the building. The courtyard will be

fully enclosed, and normal access to it will only be available through the building or access-controlled gates.

- 3.2.9 The lower ground floor windows on Ellesmere Street will be protected with a balustrade installed at street level, reducing the potential for offenders to gain access to this space.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Arrangements for delivery of post should not require postal delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential blocks. Any mailboxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a “through-the-wall” arrangement allowing external delivery / internal collection
- 3.3.2 The scale of the proposed development requires subdivision so that occupiers only have access to the zone where they live and do not have unrestricted entry to all residential floors / corridors. Access to communal facilities such as the bike store and bin store should be separated from residential corridors. Arrangements for admission of visitors should be considered, so that they are only able to access their intended destination zone.
- 3.3.3 Refuse and servicing functions should be capable of being carried out without compromising the overall security of the site perimeter. Ideally, the residential bin store area should allow collection staff to access the bins without needing to enter the internal secure areas. It is not acceptable for bins to be left on the public roads / pavements for extended periods or overnight.
- 3.3.4 Lower ground floor windows on Ellesmere Street should be certified to BS PAS 24 and should be restricted in opening to 100mm. Window restrictors can be capable of being manually overridden if required for ventilation.
- 3.3.5 It is essential that all the physical security measures listed in section 4 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following recommendations are made on this understanding and should apply to all new and replacement features introduced as part of the proposed development. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants / users will be dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site security presence and / or monitored alarms / CCTV.

All new-build elements should be constructed in accordance with the following standards in order to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. The entrance should also be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor, lower ground floor, and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Curtain Walling

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any secondary glazing installed should utilise a product approved by Secured by Design (see www.securedbydesign.com for details of suppliers / installers).
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Main Entrance doors and gates
 - Vehicular entrance gates / shutters
 - Secondary entrance doors off internal lobbies
 - Bin stores
 - Cycle stores
 - Doors separating different zones of the buildings
 - Staff-only areas

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ All areas of communal open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Lighting to public / communal areas (including footpaths and roads) should be evenly distributed and not create areas of shadowing or pooling. Any low-level lighting should be positioned to avoid creating glare.
- ☐ Lighting to parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.

- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [stairs](#), [lift lobbies](#), [cycle stores](#), [bin store entrances](#), [gates into communal areas](#).

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The designer must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.
- 5.1.2 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

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- 5.1.3 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service, and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained, and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
- 5.1.4 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24-hour concierge / security patrols.
- 5.1.5 Communal / amenity space. Areas of public open space have the potential to attract nuisance and anti-social behaviour. The robust management of such spaces is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. All communal or amenity areas not under the ownership of individual residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space is not detrimental to its surroundings

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible, and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
06/04/2022	Eithne FitzGerald	CIS enquiry
14/04/2022	Eithne FitzGerald	CIS application confirmed
23/05/2022	Eithne FitzGerald	Progress update
24/05/2022	Eithne FitzGerald	Revised plans received
26/05/2022	Various	Teams meeting to discuss changes

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
Pre App 01	Pre App 01 Talbot Mill	May 2022	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		