



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land Bound by the Boulevard and the Avenue
76 Apartments and Healthcare (1,226sqm)

For: **Southway Housing Trust**

Greater Manchester Police

Version B: **11/04/22**

design**for**security

Ref: **2021/0599/CIS/01**

Land Bound by the Boulevard and the Avenue

2021/0599/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- Secure cycle store provision

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application subject to the design team suitably addressing the recommendations contained in the report (Sections 3.3, 4 & 5), and will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	5
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	6
	2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors - Residential	
	2.4 Risk Factors – Healthcare Facilities	
	2.5 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester	
	2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
	2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary (Healthcare): Risk Analysis	
	2.9 Theft (Healthcare): Risk Analysis	
	2.10 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	14
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security (Residential).....	17
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.6 Lighting	
	4.8 Other	
5	Physical Security (Non-residential)	19
	5.1 Doors	
	5.2 Windows & Shutters	
	5.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	5.4 Alarm	
	5.5 Lighting	
	5.6 CCTV	
	5.7 Landscaping	
	5.8 Other	
6	Management & Maintenance	22
7	Construction	22
8	Useful References	22
	8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	23
B	Associated Documents.....	23
C	CIS Version History	23

D	Glossary	24
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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.


The proposed site is located in the West Didsbury district on the out-skirts Manchester city centre. The site is situated within an existing mixed use area with commercial offices, education and residential uses; Didsbury Point. The development site is bounded by the car park of the adjacent Didsbury High school, residential properties to the north and the Boulevard to the north.

To the west the area is mainly residential with pockets of commercial activity. Historically the housing stock is predominately populated with private low rise housing to the east of the site. However over the last two decades significant redevelopment has changed the local population demographic to a more private young professional mix.


The site is currently vacant open space which has been fenced off. Vehicle access into the site is via The Avenue.

The site is situated off Princess Park Way. The Withington Metrolink Tram stop leading to the East Didsbury or M/cr city centre is approx. 350m north of the site.


Generally the area is very well managed & maintained. Pedestrians can traverse the area from Princess Rd to the Boulevard that said there are limited signs of ASB across around the area.



7 – View towards Didsbury High school.



6 – Boundary between car park & proposed site.



5 – Existing boundary between the existing residences and the site.




1 – View north east across the site.



2 – Existing commercial building on the Boulevard.



3 – Mixed use building opposite the Boulevard.



4 – Shared communal residential gardens.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2021 to 31st December 2021.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
13	8	13	63	12	<5	<5	24	6	10

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is relatively low for Manchester with less serious wounding, domestic burglary and vehicle crime being the highest recorded offences taking place in the local area. The proposed site is located just off Princess Road, which is major transport route connecting the City Centre and the South of Manchester. Across the way from the site, to the west, is a large cemetery, crime in this area is extremely low due to the low volume of footfall and large open space. Around the School which is located across the way from the proposed site and the private hospital located to the south. The crimes taking place in the local area are common in residential suburbs.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Residential:** Possible Solution - All individual apartments should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.
- 2.2.2 **General:** Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
Possible Solution - Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.
- 2.2.3 **General:** Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.
Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.
- 2.2.4 **General:** Forcing open shutters using implements and tools in order to gain access to the doors and windows located beneath.
Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.
- 2.2.5 **General:** Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Ensure that rubbish and loose material is removed from the areas around the site. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.
- 2.2.6 Offenders posing as legitimate service users to gain access and steal staff property
Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).
- 2.2.7 Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building or fit-out. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Portable equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular visitor access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

2.2.8 Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them

Possible Solution –

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period





2.4 Risk Factors – Healthcare Facilities

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Safety of medical records and drugs
- Theft of personal belongings (patients and staff)
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to private space/restricted areas
- Robbery and attacks on staff, patients and members of the public
- Arson
- Bicycle theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period.

2.5 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **76% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **59% lower** than Greater Manchester and **41% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **72% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **56% lower** than Greater Manchester and **53% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwelling is **83% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **75% lower** than Greater Manchester and **63% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **65% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **36% lower** than Greater Manchester and **11% lower** than England & Wales.

2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Monday and Wednesday during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access. Lock snapping has been a common method.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Friday and Saturday during the early hours of the morning (3am - 6am). Offenders often target vehicles in the early hours of the morning when it is dark and owners are unlikely to be insight of their vehicle, creating a low risk opportunity for the offender(s). Theft from motor vehicles has been the highest recorded vehicle crime, whereby offenders are smashing glazing and using implements to override the locking mechanism. The M.O's are common in residential areas.

2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary (Healthcare): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against healthcare facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Saturday during the early hours of the morning into the late morning. Offenders are likely to operate at these times when staff are busy tending to patients and they can attempt to gain unauthorised access to restricted areas/rooms to steal property unnoticed.

2.8.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Posing as a legitimate visitor, gaining access to restricted areas by means of insecure doors, and tailgating staff.
- In entry points recorded as "unknown", it is likely that offenders have targeted insecure doors.

2.9 Theft (Healthcare): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against healthcare facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at hospitals in Manchester remains consistently high across the week, but is slightly lower on Wednesday and Saturday. The risk of theft at hospitals in Manchester is highest during the day, peaking between 12.30pm and 5pm. During these times, hospital sites are at their busiest, with patients attending appointments and members of the public visiting friends and family. This allows offenders to gain anonymous access to hospital sites. Bags, cash, mobile phones and IT equipment belonging to patients and staff are the most routinely stolen items.

2.10 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

- 2.10.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

- 2.10.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder on and around the site are as follows:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood where significant developments are planned or under construction, the result of which will be greater levels of activity and footfall on the streets around the site with an increase in passive surveillance from residents and staff of the planned developments. The public realm will improve and street lighting and light spilling from buildings that are likely to be occupied well into the night area; will make the neighbourhood feel safer for pedestrians.

- 2.10.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located within an area where there is a high volume of recorded crime. Criminals are already attracted to this area and may exploit other criminal opportunities.
- the absence of regular street activity or passive surveillance for much of the day and night leaves the buildings and vehicles parked on the site, and pedestrians passing through the area, vulnerable to criminal and anti-social activity.
- the buildings that currently occupy the site and several in the vicinity are of poor quality. All of the buildings on the site have also been secured with unsightly security features, such as steel

plate, window grilles and roller shutters; graffiti has also been daubed on several walls. Poor quality and insensitively fortified buildings can have a negative effect on a locality, making passers-by fearful or uncomfortable. Poor environments can also embolden offenders who may sense that a lack of care of the environment means that their actions are less likely to be challenged. Environmental decay can also deter investment in a neighbourhood.

- The site lacks defensible, leaving walls exposed to the passing public. This is likely to have contributed to the range of security measures installed and the presence of graffiti on exposed walls.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal seeks to develop a space which had been vacant for a number of years.
- 3.1.2 The development will have a doctors surgery and pharmacy at ground floor level providing street level activities and a community facility.
- 3.1.3 The proposal will provide 76 apartments across a mix of types and bedroom numbers.
- 3.1.4 Amenity spaces for residents will provide secure cycle parking, residents lobby space and courtyard gardens.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed building forms the final phases of the Didsbury Point Master plan, utilising the temporary made ground. The redevelopment of the site will provide an interesting and diverse use offering an employment opportunity, further residential opportunities and a community facility in the form of a doctors surgery & pharmacy.
- 3.2.2 The building provides ground floor activity in the form of residential entrances, office and reception space, commercial/retail use and in-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent public realm.
- 3.2.3 The footprint of the building facing onto the public realm is relatively simple and free from deeply recessed or concealed areas.
- 3.2.4 The proposed building clearly defines the different uses of the building and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.
- 3.2.5 The foyer/reception zone provides the opportunity for good levels of security at a central control point for the commercial/office space.
- 3.2.6 The internal layout of the building appears capable of being divided into identifiable zones, allowing separation of accessible and restricted areas. The access-control strategy adopted for the development should be capable of confining movement into and through the building, thus allowing staff and visitors to only enter parts of the site to which they have legitimate reason to be present. Access permissions should be fully auditable and regularly reviewed.
- 3.2.7 Current drawings show cycle parking for residents is contained in a dedicated room off the ground floor via the private resident entrance. Entry into this space should be strictly limited via the access controlled system under the building management system ensuring only genuine cyclists can gain access. Racks within the cycle stores should allow bikes to be locked by the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com).
- 3.2.8 The car parking has been well laid out, avoiding potential hiding spaces for intruders.
- 3.2.9 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Given the levels of vehicle crime and theft of cycles in the local area, access to the proposed vehicle and cycle parking areas must be robustly secured, controlled and maintained, in order to prevent unauthorised access. The vehicular entrance to the car park should be fitted with a high-speed automatic vehicular gate/s, operated by key fob/proximity reader with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out') so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and

escape (see Section 4.5). The location of the gate/s should not create a publicly accessible sheltered recess within the building line that may foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour etc. The pedestrian gate into the foyer should be self-closing and should also be fob-in and fob-out, for the use of office workers only. The cycle store and refuse stores should also be enclosed and fitted with security-certified, fob-controlled doors to prevent unauthorised access/theft.

- 3.3.2 Zoning. The building should be capable of zoning which would restrict access within the site and thus if an intruder does manage to enter, their movements are restricted. All rooms containing facilities for residents should have access controls managed by the building operators. The scale of the proposed development requires subdivision so that residents only have access to the zone where they live and do not have unrestricted entry to all residential floors.
- 3.3.3 Residential post/parcel/grocery room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal or grocery delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential block beyond the GF reception space. Postal workers should not be given unfettered access to the entire building as this could potentially leave apartments and residents vulnerable. (see Section 4.1 for more information).
- 3.3.4 The residential stair and lift cores in the block will require access control allowing only building staff and residents' access beyond the reception space to upper floors, in order to create a secure lobby area.
- 3.3.5 The development's entry gates must be visually attractive, tall and robust to deter climbing and withstand attempts at criminal damage.
- 3.3.6 The entrance gates must be:
- be fitted with an electronic lock with a holding force of around 4500N;
 - be self-closing and locking upon closure.
- 3.3.7 The communal entrance doors to the residential buildings must be:
- certified to a suitable security standard.
 - be fitted with an electronic lock that forms part of the door certification.
- 3.3.8 be self-closing and locking upon closure
- 3.3.9 The proposed soft landscaping areas around the building and the main entrance should not restrict views and natural surveillance. The landscaping should be carefully designed so that low planting is used that does not inhibit views of the building.
- 3.3.10 Doors into drug stores, or rooms where personal records are stored, should be certified to BS PAS 24. The door should be alarmed when the building is closed. Controlled drugs should be secured in a BS 2881 storage cabinet. Doors into drug or record stores should operate on auditable access controls.
- 3.3.11 Corridors in the building where clinical, treatment, or staff rooms are located should be restricted to staff. Patients should wait within the waiting areas/rooms provided and be allowed access to the corridor required by a member of staff (physically, or remotely).
- 3.3.12 The building should include adequate provision for the secure storage of staff personal belongings.
- 3.3.13 The building should be covered with a monitored alarm system, so that the building can be alarmed when not in use.
- 3.3.14 The building and car parking should be illuminated during the hours of darkness (see Section 4.8).
- 3.3.15 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and visitors
- 3.3.16 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme as a whole. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The vehicular and pedestrian access and egress points to the hub should be secured with automatic 2100-2400mm high gates. Ideally, the vehicular gates should be sliding. If not, any double gates should overlap when closed and should be capable of being forced open. They should operate as quickly as is safely possible, in order to reduce the opportunities for tailgating/unauthorised access. The pedestrian gate should be self-closing/locking and any internal release button/mechanism should not be capable of being reached or operated from the public side of the fence line. The gates should be controlled on access by resident/staff key-fob/proximity reader or via an audio access-control system for visitors (linked to individual office suites or the main reception of the building). Ideally, there should be no automatic egress (i.e. access control 'out' through the vehicular gates via staff key-fob, a token/ticket issued from within the building or controlled remotely by reception staff).

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
- Main Entrance doors
 - Secondary entrance doors off internal lobbies
 - Bin stores
 - Cycle stores
 - Staff-only areas
 - Communal roof garden

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ All levels of the car park should be adequately and uniformly lit (in accordance with BS 5489, see table opposite), avoiding any areas of pooling/shadowing and supporting any CCTV system installed. Light coloured walls and ceilings can help reflect lighting and create a safe and non-threatening environment.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should also be installed to all external doors and gates/barriers.
- ☐ To assist with the spread of lighting under the car park deck, the surface materials should have a light-coloured finish.

Table L1: Lighting requirements for multi-storey/enclosed car parks

Areas	Av. lux	Min. lux	Uniformity
Parking bays and lanes	75	50	0.6
Ramps, corners and junctions	150	75	0.5
Vehicular entrances/exits	75 (night) 300 (day)	n/a	n/a
Pedestrian areas (stairs, lobbies etc)	100	50	0.5
Open roof level	30	10	0.33

Please Note:
 •The Av (average) lux is the maintained average horizontal illuminance on the floor
 •The Min (minimum) lux is the minimum horizontal illuminance at any location
 •Reference should be made to BS 5489 part 9, for further information and guidance
 •There may be scope for compromise on the above levels due to external factors

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The

remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [foyer](#), [stairs](#), [lift lobbies](#), [landings](#), [cycle stores](#), [bin store entrances](#).

4.8 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

5.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors (single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be designed without visible external ironmongery and should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and signed as such to prevent misuse.
- ☐ If the main entrance to the centre is to be formed by sliding doors, these cannot be certified to the above standards. Any sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+) and should incorporate laminated glazing, have multi-point locking (preventing sliding and lifting) and be protected by a shutter (certified to LPS 1775 SR2) out-of-hours.
- ☐ The Pharmacy cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset (see above). A time-delay safe, certified to LPS 1183, is also advised. Access to the cash office, reception and staff room should be controlled via staff fob or swipe cards (not numeric keypads).
- ☐ All internal doors/frames to studios, individual offices, stores and plant areas should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock, so that they can be secured when unoccupied. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

5.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any external shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and would be less visually intrusive.

5.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ The construction of any areas of potentially 'accessible' roofing should also be carefully considered to prevent criminal intrusion. Certificated lightweight roof systems are available to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, expanded metal or welded mesh should be incorporated between the skins of double-skinned roof coverings or within the roof space.
- ☐ Any louvres should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach any upper floor windows or roof areas. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available (e.g. <http://www.securedbydesign.com/members/premier-ss-ltd/>).

5.4 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

5.5 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all access roads, pedestrian routes and parking areas within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

5.6 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an **acceptable standard** that will allow for **identification** of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

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- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrance lobby/reception area, all circulation spaces (both external and internal), and all parking areas; including cycle stands (monitored at the reception desk).

5.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

5.8 Other

- ☐ The cycle parking area should include 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). There should be no shelter provided, which may foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/downloads>.
- ☐ Any external bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ There must be no features of the building envelope which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.
- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Toilets themselves can give rise to crime and anti-social behaviour issues and the following issues should be considered:
 - Avoid areas where items such as drug paraphernalia can be hidden (e.g. suspended ceilings). Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work, etc. should be used. Services where possible should be accessed from outside the facility.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening. This will aid gaining access to collapsed persons. Opaque panels can be used to great effect to ensure no persons are collapsed inside, whilst preserving privacy. This measure discourages drug taking and facilitates staff checks. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 20 centimetres from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Provide hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- ☐ Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
17/11/21	Euan Kelly Property Solutions	CIS application submitted
10/01/22	Euan Kelly Property Solutions	Client confirmation
10/01/22	Euan Kelly Property Solutions	Design Team presentation
27/01/22	DfS	Site visit
04/02/22	DfS	CIS completed
11/04/22	DfS	CIS revised

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
8845-BA-XX-XX-DR-A-(01)000	Site Location Plan	13/12/21	P3
8845-BA-XX-XX-DR-A-(01)001	Existing Site Plan	13/12/21	P1
8845-BA-XX-XX-DR-A-(05)001	Elevation Sheet 1	13/12/21	P6
8845-BA-XX-XX-DR-A-(05)002	Elevation Sheet 2	13/12/21	P12
8845-BA-XX-XX-DR-A-(06)001	Section Sheet 1	13/12/21	P3
8845-BA-XX-XX-DR-A-(06)002	Section Sheet 2	13/12/21	P3
8845-BA-Z1-1F-DR-A-(04)011	First Floor GA	13/12/21	P12
8845-BA-Z1-2F-DR-A-(04)012	Second Floor GA	13/12/21	P9
8845-BA-Z1-3F-DR-A-(04)013	Third Floor GA	13/12/21	P9
8845-BA-Z1-4F-DR-A-(04)014	Fourth Floor GA	13/12/21	P10
8845-BA-Z1-5F-DR-A-(04)015	Fifth Floor GA	13/12/21	P10
8845-BA-Z1-6F-DR-A-(04)016	Sixth Floor GA	13/12/21	P10
8845-BA-Z1-7F-DR-A-(04)017	Seventh Floor GA	13/12/21	P9
8845-BA-Z1-8F-DR-A-(04)018	Roof Floor GA	13/12/21	P9
8845-BA-Z1-GF-DR-A-(04)001	Proposed Site Plan	13/12/21	P7
8845-BA-Z1-GF-DR-A-(04)010	Ground Floor GA	13/12/21	P14

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Revision made in accordance with email 30/03/22	11/04/22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk