



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

JUNCTION OF SWALLOW STREET & SIDDALL STREET,
LEVENSHULME, MANCHESTER

CHANGE OF USE TO 14 no. RESIDENTIAL APARTMENTS & LOWER
GROUND FLOOR CO-WORKING OFFICE SPACE (80sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Pinnacle Estates

VERSION A: 24/05/2022

REFERENCE: 2022/0178/CIS/01

Junction of Swallow Street & Siddall Street, Levenshulme, Manchester

URN: 2022/0178/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security additions/improvements required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is only considered acceptable if the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The vulnerable lower ground floor office and apartment windows along Siddall Street/Swallow Street must be protected by full-height, ornate railings/bars or balustrades to provide a visual deterrent and protect them from nuisance/anti-social behaviour, kicking/criminal damage and unauthorised access, as well as provide a degree of privacy for residents. The existing larger upper ground floor window opening to the Siddall Street elevation of the building should be reduced in size, so that the cill of the window is at a high level, to match the adjacent upper ground floor windows.
- Secure enclosure and access-controlled, self-closing/locking gates to external yard to control access to the residential apartments and co-working office space, with no bins or materials left immediately adjacent to the wall along the alleyway that could aid climbing.
- Given that the lower ground floor co-working office space will only be staffed on a part-time basis and will be for the use of residents of the scheme/neighbouring buildings, access must be robustly controlled to ensure unauthorised access is prevented and the space does not foster anti-social or criminal behaviour. It is highly recommended that the use of the co-working space is managed through a membership scheme – with users registering their details before being allowed access to use the facilities. The use of manual key code locks is not recommended

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies at the junction of Swallow Street and Siddall Street in the Levenshulme area of south-east Manchester.

It is currently occupied by a part two/three storey commercial building with a small external yard (enclosed with a high wall and railings/gates to the Swallow Street frontage). The building was last occupied by a timber and plumbing supplier, but is now vacant.


To the east of the site is a derelict commercial property fronting onto Stockport Road (A6) – the main arterial route through Levenshulme. The site on the opposite side of Swallow Street is vacant and enclosed with timber hoardings, meaning the site benefits from limited levels of overlooking/surveillance from this direction. There are terraced/mews residential properties to the west and north, fronting onto Siddall Street.

There is a side/rear alleyway to the immediate east and north of the site serving the commercial premises along Stockport Road and the terraced residential properties fronting onto Siddall Street. The alleyways feature a large amount of fly-tipping, graffiti and retro-fitted security measures (such as shutters, grilles and barbed wire), indicating the presence of crime and anti-social behaviour.

Terraced residential properties front directly onto the street, meaning their front elevations are not protected by any defensible space – leaving windows/doors exposed to nuisance, anti-social behaviour, unauthorised access (if left insecure) and attack. On such terraced streets, resident's vehicles must be parked on-street as they cannot be parked within the curtilage of the dwellings – leaving them exposed to damage/attack. Rear communal alleyways can also leave terraced dwellings vulnerable to unseen rear access. Many of them in the locale have been fitted with high communal alleygates as a result, but not the alleyways immediately surrounding the scheme.

The door openings to the building, accessed off the external yard (off Swallow Street) are secured with shutters and many of the high level ground floor and first floor windows have been secured with external grilles – indicating issues with damage and unauthorised access have been experienced in the past.

There are also nearby commercial premises that have been heavily fortified with shutters, grilles, anti-ram barriers and barbed wire. Such overt, retro-fitted security measures can be effective but can also be visually intrusive and increase the fear of crime.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2021 to 31st March 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
56	6	56	301	69	13	7	66	16	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime within the local area is high, as is the density of development in the locale. The most prevalent types of recorded crime have been less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft. Occurrences of domestic burglary and criminal damage are also high.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences occurring to the east of the proposed site, around/off Stockport Road. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded types of woundings taking place, particularly domestic incidents and incidents between known associates. Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded types of vehicle crime occurring primarily of the residential streets to the east and south of the site. Offenders have removed vehicle registration plates and have smashed windows/exploited insecure doors to gain access to vehicles and steal items from within them. In the case of recorded thefts, offenders have targeted wheel clamps belonging to the Council and local businesses - removing cash and items from within premises. Items belonging to individuals (particularly bags and mobile phones) have also been targeted.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement report relates to a proposed residential and office scheme, the more detailed analysis below will concentrate on local domestic burglary and vehicle crime, as well as use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2017.




- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **11% higher** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **43% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **47% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **42% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **20% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **52% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (km), Manchester and Greater Manchester




- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **43% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **25% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **8% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **10% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole, **48% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **80% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Domestic Burglary – Time Range





Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Wednesday, but is relatively consistent across the week (slightly lower on Thursday).
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of domestic burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. At night, when it is dark and streets typically have lower levels of footfall, activity and natural surveillance than during the day, offenders perceive a lower risk of being witnessed or detected.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have either been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure (particularly front doors) – often without being noticed.
 - Windows have also been forced open or exploited when left insecure, but to a lesser extent.
 - Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain entry.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.




- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Thursday and Sunday and during the early hours of the morning - when it is dark, streets are quiet and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed. Vehicles parked within open communal areas or on-street, where they are publicly accessible and sometimes cannot be easily/directly overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the enclosed curtilages of individual properties or within secure garages.

2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against office premises, recorded in the Manchester area.





- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night/into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.



- 2.5.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:
- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries against Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
 - A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
 - Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
 - Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them.

2.6 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against office premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.6.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours/staffing levels.

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- 2.6.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out. Purses/wallets, cash, mobile phones and other items of technology (such as laptops) were the most frequently stolen items.

2.7 General Risk Factors

- 2.7.1 **Residential:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

- 2.7.2 **Offices:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.8 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.8.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting local residential properties and Manchester office premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Local Residential:** Doors have been targeted most frequently and have either been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure (particularly front doors) – often without being noticed.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment blocks before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block

should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed. All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset, to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents.

- **Local Residential:** Windows have also been forced open or exploited when left insecure, but to a lesser extent.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Windows to accessible elevations should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and to offer them some protection from attack and nuisance/anti-social behaviour. Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties.

Any private spaces to the sides/rears of dwellings should be robustly enclosed (see Section 4.5), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of the buildings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).

- **Local Residential:** Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points.

- **Manchester Offices:** Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- **Manchester Offices:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property

Possible Solution – There should be a robust access control system in place to ensure that callers to office buildings are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Sections 5.1). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- **Manchester Offices:** Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 5.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

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- **Manchester Offices:** Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to change the use of the existing building to form 14 no. residential apartments and a lower ground floor co-working office space for residents of the building and residents in neighbouring buildings.
- 3.1.2 The lower ground floor co-working office space will be open 9.00am to 5.30pm and will be accessed via steps down from the external yard and through a dedicated external entrance door entirely separate from the residential portion of the building (accessed through a fob/key pad controlled gate off Swallow Street). The space will include a number of desk spaces, a lounge/café area, a meeting room, a W/C and store, with window openings at street level onto Swallow Street and Siddall Street. The facility would be staffed for a minimum of 3 mornings a week.
- 3.1.3 The residential apartments will also be served by a dedicated external entrance door off the yard area, accessed through a separate fob/key pad controlled gate off Swallow Street. There will be 2 no. apartments at lower ground level (with window openings at street level to Siddall Street) and 3 no. apartments at upper ground level (with high level window openings onto Swallow Street, Siddall Street, the yard space and the alleyway to the north). There will also be 3 no. apartments at first, second and third floors respectively. The residential portion of the scheme will also be served by a bin store at ground level (with external entrance doors onto the alleyway to the east) and a bike store at first floor level.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The principal gated entrances to the scheme will be located in prominent positions and will benefit from natural surveillance from the public realm. The residential and co-working office elements of the scheme will have their own dedicated gate/door entrances, preventing confusion/conflicts and opportunities for criminals to exploit.
- 3.2.3 The majority of the proposed apartments will be provided well above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.4 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the scheme, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The lower ground floor office and apartment windows along Siddall Street and Swallow Street will benefit from no defensible space, leaving them fully exposed to the public realm and vulnerable to nuisance/anti-social behaviour, damage (particularly from kicking given their low cills) and unauthorised access, as well as a lack of privacy for residents and office workers. These windows must be protected by full-height, ornate railings/bars or balustrades (see opposite for examples) - to provide a visual deterrent and protect them from



nuisance/anti-social behaviour, kicking/criminal damage and unauthorised access, as well as provide a degree of privacy for residents. When residents do not feel comfortable or feel unduly overlooked from the street, they can often leave curtains/blinds shut 24/7 - impacting upon levels of surveillance over the public realm and activity along the street frontages of the building. It is preferable for any such bars/balustrades to be fixed within the window reveal, with no gaps/steps that could inadvertently create climbing aids to upper floor windows. The windows themselves must also be security-certified and laminated (see Sections 4.2/4.3 & 5.2/5.3) and should ideally be non-opening, or have only small opening lights (fitted with opening restrictors and key operated locks). The upper ground floor windows will also front directly onto the street/alleyway, but will have high cills – making them harder for offenders to reach. Although protective bars/balustrades should not be required, they should still be security-certified, contain laminated glazing and be non-opening/have only small opening lights fitted with opening restrictors and key-operated locks (again, see Sections 4.2 & 4.3). The existing larger upper ground floor window opening to the Siddall Street elevation of the building should be reduced in size, so that the cill of the window is at a high level, to match the adjacent upper ground floor windows.

- 3.3.2 The ground level residential and sunken lower ground level office entrances to the building will be located some way off the street, off the narrow external yard area. This leaves them partially hidden from view from the street and potentially vulnerable to attack unseen. Access to the apartments and the office space should be independently secured with access-controlled gates off Swallow Street (see Sections 4.1/4.5 & 5.1 for more information). The entrances themselves should be formed by security-certified, single-leaf doorsets secured with electrically operated multi-point locks, capable of being operated via a robust electronic access control system (see Sections 4.1/5.1). Consideration should also be given to a secure system for postal deliveries to the apartments (again, see Section 4.1). The high wall to the external yard area directly abuts the adjacent side/rear alleyway off Swallow Street, which currently features a large amount of fly-tipping, graffiti and retro-fitted security measures. The bins and dumped materials currently along the alleyway could form a climbing aid over the wall and into the external yard. The wall along the alleyway should be sufficiently tall enough to deter scaling (see Section 4.5) and there should be no bins or materials left immediately adjacent to the wall which could aid climbing.
- 3.3.3 Given that the lower ground floor co-working office space will only be staffed on a part-time basis and will be for the use of residents of the scheme, as well as residents of neighbouring building, access must be robustly controlled to ensure unauthorised access is prevented and the space does not foster anti-social or criminal behaviour (see Section 5.1). It is highly recommended that the use of the co-working space is managed through a membership scheme – with users registering their details before being allowed access to use the facilities. Ideally, the gate and entrance doors to the office space should be controlled by a fob or swipe card issued to members. This would be a more secure method of entry than manual key code locks, as communal codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed. If key code entry must be used, electronic key codes must be unique to each member and there must be robust controls in place to ensure that key codes are only used by authorised members. Fobs, swipe cards or unique key codes must be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented.
- 3.3.4 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents, staff and visitors.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ The pedestrian gate to the frontage of the yard (off Swallow Street) should be self-closing and self-locking, operated by resident key-fob. It should also be controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set within each apartment), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access through the gate. The release mechanism on the internal side of the gate should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the gate. Further information relating to the design of the gate itself can be found within Section 4.5.
- ☐ The main communal entrance doorset to the building (off the external yard) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. It should be single-leaf, self-closing and controlled by means of an audio entry phone system linked to each apartment, so that residents can let visitors into the building once they have passed through the pedestrian gate described above.
- ☐ Postal delivery arrangements should ideally allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If not, secure postboxes should be located within the external yard, to allow for deliveries to them without providing access to all floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ The external doors to the bin store (off the rear alleyway), as well as any external doors to the plant room, must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. They should be of steel construction, with no visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvred doorsets are available if required (search for certified products at <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search>).
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ The internal doorsets to the lower ground floor bin store and the first floor cycle store should also be security-certified to one of the standards above, with an electrically operated lock controlled by resident/staff key-fob.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows should be security-certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that all lower ground and upper ground floor level windows are fixed (i.e. non-opening). Any opening lights must be small, key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ The lower ground floor level residential apartments windows must be treated/protected as described within Section 3.3, in order to deter nuisance/anti-social behaviour, damage and unauthorised access, as well as provide some privacy for residents.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All lower/upper ground floor (and ideally first floor) glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting canopies/window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, street furniture, bins etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows or over boundaries.
- ☐ Any louvres to refuse stores of plant rooms should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment should have an intruder alarm fitted to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems, or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

Alarms should be linked to contacts on apartment entrances and PIR detectors should cover all lower/upper ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The wall to the external yard along the adjacent side/rear access alleyway should be 2400mm in height. If problems are experienced with offenders gaining access, anti-climb measures could be used along the perimeter wall if absolutely necessary (such as <https://www.defendastrip.com/>).
- ☐ The street frontage of the external yard should be secured with 2100-2400mm high self-closing/locking pedestrian gates, operated as described within Sections 4.1 & 5.1. The access routes to the apartment entrance and the co-working office entrance should be separated by 2100mm high railings.
- ☐ There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls/bollards etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.



4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting must also be provided to the external yard and all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or up to upper floor windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Other

- ☐ The residential cycle store should include stands that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Physical Security (Co-Working Office)

5.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ The pedestrian gate to the frontage of the yard (off Swallow Street) should be self-closing and self-locking, operated by staff and member key-fob/swipe card or unique member key code. The release mechanism on the internal side of the gate should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the gate. Further information relating to the design of the gate itself can be found within Section 4.5.
- ☐ The dedicated external entrance to the lower ground floor co-working office space should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, secured with an electronically operated multi-point lock (permitted under the security certification of the product) controlled by staff and resident/member key-fob or unique member key code.
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used should be fully auditable (i.e. allowing the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Fobs, swipe cards and unique member key codes must be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented.
- ☐ The internal door to the store within the office space should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and capable of being deadlocked when required/not in use.

5.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows should be security-certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that all lower ground level windows onto Swallow Street/Siddall Street are fixed (i.e. non-opening). Any opening lights must be small, key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ The lower ground level windows onto Swallow Street/Siddall Street must be treated/protected as described within Section 3.3, in order to deter nuisance/anti-social behaviour, damage and unauthorised access.

5.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any internal walls between the residential portion of the building and the lower ground level office space should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

5.4 Alarm

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the co-working office space outside of its operational hours, linked to contacts on the door and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert a security patrol team or the keyholder).

5.5 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting must also be provided to the external yard and the external door, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or up to upper floor windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

5.6 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all external facades, the main entrance gate/door and internal circulation spaces*.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the co-working office space must be prepared and remain in place for its day-to-day running. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff/users should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of the office space, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Management of membership/access to the co-working office space, including the issue and withdrawal of fobs/swipe cards/unique key codes;
 - Management of any deliveries (servicing activities should not require any doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, boundaries/gates, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 6.1.2 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers, monitors/televisions etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.3 The upkeep of any residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Repairs to communal areas (e.g. access controls, boundaries/gates, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Litter/graffiti removal
- 6.1.4 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
30 th March 2022	Paul Butler Associates	Receipt of CIS instruction form & existing/proposed floor
7 th April 2022	Paul Butler Associates	Quote issued & request for additional info
13 th to 19 th April 2022	Paul Butler Associates	Receipt of revised proposal/plans & email correspondence re: floorspace of proposed co-working café
20 th April 2022	Paul Butler Associates	Revised quote issued & confirmation of instruction/fee
10 th May 2022	Pinnacle Estates	Request to amend invoice – co-working café should be changed to office space
13 th May 2022	Paul Butler Associates & Pinnacle Estates	Email sent requesting more info re: LGF office space
18 th May 2022	Paul Butler Associates	Receipt of amended plan & info re: LGF office space
18 th May 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
-	Location Plan	-	-
A619_P_021	Existing GF Plan	March 2022	-
A619_P_022	Existing Mezzanine Plan	March 2022	-
A619_P_023	Existing 1F Plan	March 2022	-
A619_P_024	Existing 2F Plan	March 2022	-
A619_P_100A	Proposed LGF Plan (SUPERSEDED)	March 2022	A
A619_P_100A	Proposed LGF Plan (with boundary/gate annotations)	March 2022	A
A619_P_101	Proposed UGF Plan	March 2022	-
A619_P_102	Proposed 1F Plan	March 2022	-
A619_P_103	Proposed 2F Plan	March 2022	-
A619_P_104	Proposed 3F Plan	March 2022	-
A619_P_105	Proposed Roof Plan	March 2022	-
A619_P_300	Proposed South Elevations	March 2022	-
A619_P_301	Proposed East Elevations	March 2022	-
A619_P_302	Proposed Context Elevations	October 2021	-
A619_P_400	Proposed Section AA	March 2022	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk