



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

St Gabriel's Hall, Oxford Place, Manchester
Student Accommodation (9,477sqm)

FOR: McLaren Property

VERSION A: 9th June 2022

REFERENCE: 2022/0179/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

St Gabriel's Hall, Oxford Place, Manchester

2022/0179/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The following areas have been identified as a concern and should be addressed (see section 3.3 for more details).

- Defensible space should be provided to ground floor apartment windows.
- Slot windows should be protected from damage.
- Access control and physical security of the buildings should be carefully considered.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Rusholme area of Manchester, which lies to the South of Manchester city centre.

The site is roughly rectangular, and the boundaries are defined by the rear of Melrose Apartments on Hathersage Road to the North, to the West the site is bound by a vacant villa, to the South the site boundary is defined by Oxford Place, and to the West the site is bound by Devell House (apartments).

The site is located within the Victoria Park conservation area and is in close walking distance to University of Manchester, Manchester Royal Infirmary, and Rusholme to the South.

The site currently features a number of buildings, including St Gabriel's Hall and Woodthorpe, which are to be retained. The building where last used for student accommodation.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2021 to 30th April 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
65	40	96	486	226	64	19	99	13	54

- 2.1.1 Over the last 12 months, the general volume of recorded crime has been high, particularly levels of violence, domestic burglary, vehicle crime and theft - reflecting the site's location on the edge of the city centre, close to University and Hospital campuses and the high concentration of student accommodation in the surrounding area. Students tend to be more vulnerable to crime due to a number of factors including their age, lifestyle, income, tenure, employment status, occupancy and accommodation type. The majority of crime is concentrated towards the west of the proposed site, along Oxford Road, where the majority of privately rented student accommodation, bars and shops are located. A hotspot of offences has also occurred to the north where the hospital is located.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments
Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).

- 2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.
Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.

- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments
Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.

- 2.2.4 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.
Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.

2.3 Risk Factors





The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary

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- Anti-social behaviour
 - Neighbour disputes
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
 - Unauthorised access to private spaces
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **61% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **107% higher** than Greater Manchester and **112% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **34% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **82% higher** than Greater Manchester and **248% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **22% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **60% higher** than Greater Manchester and **95% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **49% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **145% higher** than Greater Manchester and **198% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on a Wednesday and Friday during the evening (5pm – 11:59pm). Offenders are likely to target properties during the evening when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified. Offences are also likely to peak between 5pm-6pm when residents are returning home from work/university and discovering the property has been burgled.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and door using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as "unknown" it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Posing as a legitimate visitor/resident and by means of insecure doors/ forcing entry, gain access

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Monday and Saturday during the afternoon and into the evening. Vehicles parked within close proximity to the city centre, and around hospital sites, are likely to be left unattended, out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for the offender.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development includes the retention of two of the existing buildings on the site (St Gabriel's Hall and Woodthorpe) and two new building blocks. The buildings will be used for student accommodation and will feature a number of apartments as well as cluster flats.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed new build building footprints at ground floor level are relatively simple and contain no areas of potential concealment.
- 3.2.2 There will be a large amount of secure bicycle parking in secure enclosures at the rear of the site, allowing residents to secure their bicycle on site.
- 3.2.3 The resident's amenity space on the lower floors of St Gabriel's Hall overlooking the surrounding landscaped areas of the development, allowing residents using these spaces to observe the surrounding areas and detect any inappropriate use.
- 3.2.4 The two parking spaces provided will be well overlooked from the buildings and public realm.
- 3.2.5 The site is presently vacant, and this can give rise to antisocial and criminal behaviour, such as fly-tipping, loitering, drug/alcohol consumption, and criminal damage/graffiti. The redevelopment of the site will allow the site to be used legitimately and this will benefit the security of surrounding sites.
- 3.2.6 On the day of my site visit I noticed that Oxford Place was well used by pedestrians and those in vehicles. Those passing the site will contribute to passive surveillance of the site which will deter offenders from operating.
- 3.2.7 The development will be staffed at all times by a concierge/security team. The presence of staff on site will allow any incidents to be responded to swiftly and will deter offenders from operating in the area.
- 3.2.8 The majority of existing windows and doors will be replaced due to their current poor condition. This will allow security rated products to be installed and improve the security of the existing buildings.
- 3.2.9 The vehicular gates into the site will be closed and locked the majority of the time unless in use. Residents, staff, and visitors to the site will use an adjacent pedestrian gate to gain access to the site.

-
- 3.2.10 The number of residents at the site will mean that it will be continuously busy and well used, which will deter offenders from targeting the site if they perceive they will be seen or identified.
 - 3.2.11 Ground floor apartment windows on the new buildings will be fixed lights which will prevent resident from leaving them insecure which could allow any offender to gain entry, or reach in, to steal property.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Ground floor windows should have some form of defensible space to prevent them from being easily accessible which could generate nuisance for residents. Defensible space can be provided by a low boundary treatment, planters, or dense shrubbery, or similar. Any opening lights that area easily accessible should be restricted in opening to 100mm. If windows are required to open further for ventilation purposes, then a manual override is permitted but it should re-engage when the window is subsequently closed.
- 3.3.2 Slot windows at lower ground floor level on St Gabriel's Hall should be fixed lights or have restricted opening. Some protection should be afforded to these windows to prevent them from being accidentally, or maliciously, damaged. This could be provided by a low boundary, planting, or decorative window bars/grilles.
- 3.3.3 Existing site boundaries should be inspected for damage and replaced/repaired where necessary.
- 3.3.4 Planting behind the low wall to the front of the site should be retained where feasible to provide a natural barrier to entering the site.
- 3.3.5 It is proposed that the site boundary to the East of the development will be defined with hedges/shrubbery. It is highly recommended that established hedges be used so that access cannot easily be gained into the site from the adjacent property. It is recommended that a fence, or similar, is installed behind the planting whilst it establishes to restrict access, which can then later be removed.
- 3.3.6 Planting and hard landscaping in the grounds surrounding the apartment buildings should be carefully considered so that it does not generate antisocial behaviour, to the detriment of legitimate users. Low planting should not exceed heights of 1000mm, and tree canopies should not fall lower than 3000mm to allow good sightlines. Seating areas should be positioned where they can be easily seen from the buildings.
- 3.3.7 Pedestrian routes through the development should be illuminated so that they can be safely used by residents in the evening and at night when it is dark. The main communal entrances and external doors should be illuminated. The two car parking spaces at the front of the site should be illuminated.
- 3.3.8 The pedestrian gate into the site should operate on an access control system with a video intercom for visitors.
- 3.3.9 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the buildings should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- 3.3.10 Doors/gates into cycle stores should operate on an access control system, operated with resident's key card/fob. Access into cycle stores should be restricted to genuine users rather than every resident of the building/block. All resident's amenity spaces and staff only areas should operate on an audible access control system.

4 Physical Security

The following recommendations are made on this understanding and should apply to all new and replacement features introduced as part of the proposed development. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants / users will be dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site security presence and / or monitored alarms / CCTV.

All new-build elements should be constructed in accordance with the following standards in order to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems

- BS 6799 for wireless systems

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrances
 - Communal areas
 - Bicycle stores
 - Circulation cores
 - Amenity space
 - Staff only areas
 - Parcel rooms

4.6 Bicycle Parking Areas

- ☐ Doors in to the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners)..
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ It is essential that good sightlines are maintained throughout the development to allow residents and visitors to actively survey the area for potential threats. Low level planting should not be in excess of 1000mm in height and tree crowns should fall no less than 2400mm to aid sightlines and natural surveillance.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Doors within the basement parking area should be illuminated with a dedicated lighting source.
- ☐ Elevations of the building should be illuminated.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.
- ☐ Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service, and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained, and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
- 5.1.3 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24-hour concierge / security patrols.
- 5.1.4 Communal / amenity space. Areas of public open space have the potential to attract nuisance and anti-social behaviour. The robust management of such spaces is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. All communal or amenity areas not under the ownership of individual residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space is not detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
06/04/2022	Emma Sandham	CIS application received
09/06/2022	Ben McNally	Meeting

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
Z0-SHP-A180-RP-XX-STAGE 2	Accommodation Schedule	April 22	P01
10349-SHP-Z0-A-G100-PL-01-001	Proposed Site Plan – First Floor Plan	26/04/22	P05
10349-SHP-Z0-A-G100-PL-02-001	Proposed Site Plan – Second Floor Plan	26/04/22	P05
10349-SHP-Z0-A-G100-PL-03-001	Proposed Site Plan – Third Floor Plan	26/04/22	P05
10349-SHP-Z0-A-G100-PL-04-001	Proposed Site Plan – Fourth Floor Plan	26/04/22	P05
10349-SHP-Z0-A-G100-XP-00-001	Existing Site Plan – Ground Floor Plan	26/04/22	P02
10349-SHP-Z1-A-G200-EL-XX-001	Proposed North and East Elevations	26/04/22	P01
10349-SHP-Z1-A-G200-EL-XX-002	Proposed South and West Elevations	26/04/22	P01
10349-SHP-Z1-A-G200-EL-XX-003	Proposed Inside East and Inside West Elevations	26/04/22	P01

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		