



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Change of use of upper ground floor to a bar
AT Northspring, Cavendish House, Chapel Walks, Manchester

FOR: Chapel Walks GP Limited

VERSION A: 11.10.22

2019/0720/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

The scheme has been well considered from a crime prevention perspective and will add further activity and interest to this part of the commercial core of the city. There are no significant issues to address but understanding listed status of the building, we recommend that wherever possible:

- employ Security Industry accredited, door staff on weekend evenings;
- customer entry and exit be restricted to the main entrance on Pall Mall.
- the means of escape door be secured and fitted with an audible alarm that alerts staff when it is open;
- the new, inner-lobby doors should meet a recognised security standard;
- the means of escape/refuse route is secured with a door that meets a recognised security standard;
- the security of retained external doors is reviewed and consideration be given to adding British Standard mechanical and electronic locks as necessary;
- the office and cellar doors are appropriately secure;
- if any outdoor seating is proposed, it is appropriately managed when in use and removed at an appropriate time of the evening;
- an appropriate operating policy is produced, and adherence to it is subject to a planning condition; and,
- CCTV cameras and an intruder alarm are fitted;

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will request that a condition be included to require the developer to make reasonable efforts to address the recommendations and physical security specification contained within this report.

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Consultant

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
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1 The Site and Surroundings

The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, part of Cavendish House, edged in red on the plan, is located at the corner of Pall Mall and Chapel Walks in the commercial core of Manchester City Centre and in the King Street Conservation Area. Pall Mall is lightly-trafficked, a pedestrian-friendly, one-way street and it connects Chapel Walks with Market Street, to the north. Vehicle traffic is primarily limited to those used for servicing premises in the network of streets south of Market Street. With the exception of the neighbouring Princes Chambers there is little active frontage to premises Pall Mall. Chapel Walks connects Marsden Street to the east with Cross Street to the west. The southern part of the street is closed to traffic in the evening in the immediate vicinity of the site there is a steady flow of traffic during the day which given the right-angle turn in the road and on-street parking provision can be congested. Office uses dominate the area around the site but there are also hotels, retail, leisure, food and beverage, a place of worship, and upper-floor residential uses nearby.


Looking south along Pal Mall past Motel One towards the site from the corner of Norfolk Street




A view of Chapel Walks from the corner of Pall Mall



The Chapel Walks elevation of Cavendish House, a grade II listed building



Pall Mall looking towards Market Street with Cavendish House on the left



The Pall Mall elevation of the proposed development taken from Chapel Walks



The Pall Mall elevation of the proposed development looking towards Chapel Walks



Cavendish House is a 4-storey, Grade II listed building with frontages to Chapel Walks, Pall Mall and Back Pool Fold. The development site is limited to the eastern part of the upper ground floor and is accessed from Pall Mall via a series of steps and double doors. This part of the upper ground floor has arched windows on the Pall Mall and Chapel Walks elevations. There is a means of escape door, which also serves the upper floors, at the north-eastern corner of the building. Sam's Chop House, a pub restaurant, occupies the lower ground floor of Cavendish House; its entrance is located at the corner of Chapel Walks and Back Pool Fold. Following grant of planning permission in 2020, the remainder of the building is undergoing a roof top extension and refurbishment for office use. Along with an entrance of Back Pool Fold, the stepped entrance on the Chapel Walks elevation will provide access to the offices. There are several security measures visible on the exterior of the building including lighting, discreet CCTV cameras and ornate iron railings installed to protect the glazing on the lower ground level windows of Sam's Chop House.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

The data below relates to crimes recorded between 1st July 2021 and 30th June 2022, committed within 500m of the site.

All crime

Domestic burglary	Non-domestic burglary	Criminal damage	Use, or threat, of violence	Theft - including shoplifting	Robbery	Drug offences	Theft from motor vehicle	Theft of motor vehicle	Bicycle theft
35	204	339	3529	3117	294	322	226	35	172

- 2.1.1 There were 8,172 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is extremely high but is typical for a neighbourhood within city centre Manchester, particularly one where there is a thriving retail and night-time economy.
- 2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:
- the use, or threat, of violence – 43%
 - theft (including shoplifting) – 38%
 - vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 3%
 - criminal damage – 4%
 - drug offences 4%
 - robbery – 4%
 - burglary - 3%
- 2.1.3 Crimes involving the use or threat of violence and theft occurred throughout the area analysed, but there were concentrations at and near licensed premises on Deansgate, Peter Street and Withy Grove, where large numbers of people congregate. Offences mostly occurred over the weekend period, and during the late evening and early hours of the morning, which reinforces the consumption of alcohol being a significant factor in determining when and where such crimes occur.
- 2.1.4 Incidents of theft have taken place throughout the area, with hotspots at Piccadilly Gardens, at retail premises on Market Street and in the Arndale Centre, at food and drink premises. As well as shoplifting, offenders used pick-pocketing and distraction techniques to steal mobile phones, bags, purses, and wallets.
- 2.1.5 The five streets/places where the most crimes were recorded were:
- Piccadilly, (including Piccadilly Gardens)
 - Market Street
 - Arndale Centre
 - Peter Street
 - Deansgate
- 2.1.6 There were no crimes recorded on or at premises on Chapel Walks and just three on Pall Mall, two of which involved bicycle theft and the other involved the threat of violence. All three were street-based crimes.



2.2 Crime at licensed premises in Manchester

The data below relates to crimes recorded between 1st January 2019 and 31st December 2019, committed within the city of Manchester.


- 2.2.1 In the year preceding the pandemic, there were over 2,700 crimes recorded at licensed premises in the City of Manchester, around 80% of which occurred at premises in the city centre. The breakdown of recorded crimes was as follows:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 48%
- theft - 39%
- burglary - 6%
- criminal damage – 4%
- other – 3%
- robbery – 1%

Burglary





- 2.2.2 The risk of burglary is greatest on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, and is lowest on Friday. Risk increases greatly in the early hours of the morning.



- 2.2.3 The most common means of breaking and entering is by forcing doors, often means of escape doors on side and rear elevations of premises. Windows have also been forced open and glazing within windows, and glazed panels within doors, has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also forced roller shutters and posed as customers before targeting unsecured doors to restricted, staff-only areas, where stock and staff property has been taken.

Theft



- 2.2.4 The risk is greatest over the weekend period, and in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and opportunities to commit theft are greater. Customers are relaxed and easily distracted, and offenders are likely to go unnoticed. Handbags, purses/wallets, cash, and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table-tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and

distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.3 Modus operandi used in committing burglary and theft at food and drink premises in Manchester and measures to reduce risk

2.3.1 Offenders posing as legitimate customers gaining access to staff only areas to steal property

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining access to staff only areas:

- access control systems should be considered to secure sensitive areas of the premises – e.g., staff rest rooms, management office and storerooms;
- staff should be required to wear an appropriate form of clearly visible ID and/or a company uniform;
- all doors separating public areas, from staff only areas should be monitored by CCTV; and,
- small lockers should be provided for staff to secure their personal effects within a secure staff room.

2.3.2 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- where possible external doors should be certified to PAS 24 or LPS 1175sr2 security standard or doors should have a solid core and be fitted with British Standard/Secured by design accredited locks;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn light. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed; and,
- CCTV should be installed to record activity within and around exterior of the premises, particularly the entrance and escape doors.

2.3.3 Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows or to reduce the risk of criminal damage to glazing:

- glazing to doors and windows should include laminate glass, which is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and unlock doors or windows or to create a hole large enough to climb through; and,
- window frames should be certified to the PAS 24 standard, fitted with key operated locks and opening restrictors, and shutters fixed to protect vulnerable areas of glazing.

2.3.4 Theft of personal property e.g., from the tabletops, or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

To minimise the risk of personal property theft:

- provide Chelsea clips or hooks under tables to allow customers to secure bags; and,
- use rounded backed chairs, which make it difficult on which to hang bags or jackets.



2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the immediate vicinity of the site Chapel Walks/Pall Mall is relatively crime-free;
- Cavendish House and neighbouring buildings are of a high quality and the streetscape is well-maintained, with no indicators of neglect and deterioration on and in the immediate vicinity of the site. Poorly maintained, poor quality environments are often an indicator that committing certain types of crime can be largely risk free;
- passive surveillance and activity generated by passing pedestrians, workmen engaged in refurbishing this and neighbouring buildings, and staff and customers coming and going from neighbouring premises is likely to deter some criminal activity;
- equally, passive surveillance of residents of the apartments on the upper floors of the buildings on Chapel Walks may deter some criminals;
- windows on the lower ground floor of Cavendish House are protected with steel bars, whilst the windows and entrance doors of the upper ground floor are elevated above street level. Windows are difficult to reach and therefore less likely to be targeted, and the stepped entrances provides a degree of separation between the door and the street, making them less prone to casual acts of vandalism.
- an intruder alarm and CCTV are fitted in and on the building;
- both the Chapel Walks and Pall Mall benefit from good street lighting; and,
- Sam's Chop House is extremely well-managed and tends not to attract customers who may offend.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located within the core of the city centre, where crime levels are very high;
- the absence of active street-frontage on this part of Pall Mall contributes to the lack of street activity and passive surveillance
- unless particularly well-managed, licensed premises often attract offenders. Offenders are likely to observe the site as it develops and be aware of, and potentially exploit, any criminal opportunities;
- the presence of a cluster of commercial refuse bins on the western side of Cavendish House, at Back Pool Fold, detracts from the generally high-quality environment. The bins are vulnerable to abuse including arson, criminal damage and use in committing damage to neighbouring buildings and vehicles; and,
- the listed status of the building may influence the acceptance of some security measures by the planning authority

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves changing the use of an L-shaped part of Cavendish House comprising the eastern and northern parts of the upper ground floor of the building to a bar. Other than the installation of signage, there will be no alterations to the outside of the building.
- 3.1.2 The existing, stepped entrance on Pall Mall will be the only customer entrance. A draft lobby is included comprising glazed doors. The original timber outer doors will be retained. In order to comply with fire regulations, the outer doors are required to be locked open during trading hours,
- 3.1.3 Internally, a bar will be installed on the western wall, opposite the customer entrance. There will be banquette seating to the perimeter walls, a small 'snug', high stool seating at the bar, and some 'loose tables throughout the remainder of the space.
- 3.1.4 The cellar, office and w.c.'s will be located at the back of the premises.
- 3.1.5 A refuse store will be created within the premises close to the escape route utilising the emergency exit door to remove refuse when appropriate.
- 3.1.6 The opening hours have not yet been determined and external seating has not been included in the scheme.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will secure a use for this floor in this important, listed building.
- 3.2.2 There are only a limited number of licensed premises in the vicinity.
- 3.2.3 Other licensed premises in the vicinity are largely unaffected by criminal activity.
- 3.2.4 The proposed nature of the business and high quality and design is such that it is very unlikely to attract customers who may engage in aggressive or criminal behaviour.
- 3.2.5 The plans indicate most customers will be seated. Venues with large capacities and with low ratio of seating to customers tend to be more difficult to manage and more susceptible to violence. Bars that cater for mainly seated customers tend to attract few crime and disorder issues and, where positively managed, are unlikely to generate problems that might require a Police presence to resolve.
- 3.2.6 A management office is included in the plans.
- 3.2.7 Refuse will be securely stored within the premises.
- 3.2.8 Public transport and taxi ranks are located close-by.

3.3 Recommendations to improve security and safety at the premises

Door staff and entry

- 3.3.1 Consider employing Security Industry accredited door staff on weekend evenings.
- 3.3.2 Customer entry and exit should be restricted to the main entrance on Pall Mall. The means of escape door should be secured and fitted with an audible alarm that alerts staff when it is open.

Securing the premises

- 3.3.3 Any new, external doors, including the door connecting the premises to the means of escape/refuse route, should be certified to a recognised security standard, e.g., PAS 24, STS202 or LPS 1175.
- 3.3.4 The security qualities of retained, external doors should be assessed and, where appropriate, replaced with security-rated doors or fitted with additional British Standard or Secured by Design accredited locks.

Electronic security

- 3.3.5 A CCTV system should be installed and should include cameras capable of monitoring both external doors, all internal spaces, the refuse store corridor and the w.c.'s/cellar/office lobby.
- 3.3.6 The existing intruder alarm should be assessed for effectiveness and, if necessary, replaced with one that complies with the Secured by Design Alarm Standard.

Management office

- 3.3.7 The office should be very secure. It should be fitted with a security-rated door or a 44mm, solid-core door with at least one British Standard or Secured by Design accredited mechanical or digital lock, (preferably two). The door should also include a viewer so that staff can vet others prior to opening it and be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.8 CCTV recording equipment should be located in the office.
- 3.3.9 Staff should be able to store personal belongings in the office whilst at work.

Cash handling

- 3.3.10 A safe which meets the LPS 1163 standard should be installed in the office.
- 3.3.11 Chute deposit safes should be considered for use at each till point or an alternative management practice employed, one which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

Cellar

- 3.3.12 The cellar should be secure. It should be fitted with a security-rated door or a 44mm, solid-core, door with at least one British Standard or Secured by Design accredited mechanical or digital lock. The door should be self-closing and self-locking,

Signage

- 3.3.13 Signs should be erected to inform the public of: the name of the venue; the hours of opening and variations in opening times of, for example, any pavement seating; direct customers to the appropriate entrance; deter customers from entering restricted areas; requesting customers to leave in an orderly manner to reduce disturbance to nearby residents; and, inform customers of the use of CCTV on the site.

Outdoor seating

- 3.3.14 Outdoor seating is encouraged when it will be well-managed. It can stimulate activity and interest in an area and adds 'eyes on the street', helping to curb anti-social and criminal activity.
- 3.3.15 If excessive noise and disturbance is created by customers, nearby residents may call on the assistance of the Police to intervene. Consequently, in the interests of the amenity, the hours of opening any outdoor seating should be restricted to minimise late-night disturbance to neighbouring residents.
- 3.3.16 Pavement seating should be enclosed with barriers where possible and routinely supervised by staff. Barriers should be designed or placed in such a way as to minimise the risk of passers-by stealing customer belongings. Furniture should be securely stored when not in use.
- 3.3.17 'Chelsea Clips', Grippa™ clips, or simple hooks should be fitted to the underside of tables inside and outside the premises to allow customers to secure bags or jackets while keeping it in view/close to their person.

Operating policy

- 3.3.18 An 'operating policy' should be drawn up, which includes:
- a plan for the management of the outdoor seating, if any;
 - a procedure for making the premises secure after customers have left so that counting and securing the takings can be carried out in a secure environment;
 - a procedure for staff leaving and securing the premises so that staff safety is not compromised;
 - security (door policy; door staff; staff training; CCTV cameras - monitoring and recording facilities, and their locations; intruder alarm; and cash storage/management);
 - fire safety, including clearing designated escape routes of all obstacles;
 - noise management; and,
 - servicing and waste management arrangements, avoiding the disposal of glass late at night and early in the morning, when nearby residents may be disturbed.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Any new, external doors to the premises, and one of the doors connecting the premises to the means of escape/refuse route must be certified to the BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2 security standards.
- ☐ Ideally, retained external doors should have at least two British Standard/Secured by Design accredited locks fitted.
- ☐ The glazed, inner, lobby doors should meet the BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2 security standards
- ☐ The office and cellar doors should be security-rated door or be 44mm, solid-core doors with at least one British Standard or Secured by Design accredited mechanical or digital lock, (preferably two). The doors should also include a viewer so that staff can vet others prior to opening it and be self-closing and self-locking.

4.2 Glazing

- ☐ The glazing in the lobby doors, and any new glazing installed in the external doors and windows, should incorporate a pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g., 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356.

4.3 Intruder alarm

- ☐ The intruder alarm should have contacts on the external doors and the door to the means of escape corridor with PIR detectors covering each of the floor areas. It is recommended that the alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, Police or to a security patrol team).

4.4 Panic alarm

- ☐ A panic alarm should be installed at the premises with panic buttons fitted under the bar and in the office so that staff can alert other staff members that assistance is required.

4.5 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should be installed, with cameras monitoring activity inside and around the premises. The following points should be considered when planning a CCTV strategy:
 - ☐ Cameras should be placed to maximise the potential to capture clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would include: [the Pall Mall elevation with particular focus on doors, the entrance, the bar, and seating areas - internal and any external, till points, means of escape/refuse route, and the lobby between the rear lobby \(office, cellar and w.c.'s\).](#)
 - ☐ Recording equipment must be housed in the office or images may be recorded off site by a suitable monitoring company.
-

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
01.07.22	Dan Whitney, Sixteen Real Estate	Request for crime impact statement
08.08.22		Site visited
10.08.22	Dan Whitney, Sixteen Real Estate	Drawings received
29.09.22	Dan Whitney, Sixteen Real Estate	Updated drawings and DAS received
11.10.22	Dan Whitney, Sixteen Real Estate	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
003	Design & Access Statement	27.09.22	
1814 P(120)	Ground floor plan	Feb 2019	H
M867 001	Location plan	Sept 2022	
M867 002	Existing ground floor plan	Sept 2022	
M867 010	Proposed ground floor plan	Sept 2022	

Changes to the scheme may require Design for Security to review the recommendations within the report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		11.10.22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk