



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

302B Barlow Moor Road, Chorlton

38 Apartments

for: Rusholme Garden Investments

version B: 30th March 2022

URN: 2021/0648/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

302B Barlow Moor Road, Chorlton-cum-Hardy

2021/0648/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Major Design Changes Not Required

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. In general, the proposed scheme has been found acceptable and can be supported at planning stage, but further consideration of some minor aspects is advised, as stated in section 3.3 of this report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



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


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1 Visual Audit

The site, shown red on plan, lies in the Chorlton area of south Manchester, about 0.75km from the main district centre. The neighbourhood around the site includes residential and commercial premises, areas of public open space and community facilities.

Access to the site is off Barlow Moor Road along a section of road passing between a petrol filling station and drive-through restaurant. The neighbouring office building and other local premises generate demand for car parking in the vicinity. Some nearby properties have no discernible boundaries and there is no barrier to access around them. Un-secured bins can be useful to offenders and can help scaling otherwise secure boundaries. The residential development on the north eastern side of the site was given approval in 2003 and concerns were raised about the access route at the time. A stream runs along the southern boundary and separates the site from Chorlton Park, an area of public open space which is accessible at all times. A well-used allotment site adjoins the eastern boundary.

The site is currently occupied by a single storey building housing a social club.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2020 to 30th November 2021.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
17	<5	29	108	42	13	<5	29	<5	15

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is low for Manchester, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime being the highest recorded crimes taking place. These crime types are common in residential areas.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding has taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences taking place to the north of the proposed site, around along Barlow Moor Road and to the south of the proposed site, around the local school and Metrolink stop. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious wounding, with offences involving domestic disputes and incidents between known associates.
- 2.1.3 Theft is high in the local area with offenders targeting insecure bags within the local schools and property belonging to businesses around Beech Road and Barlow Moor Road.
- 2.1.4 Theft from a vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime taking place in the Chorlton area. The majority of offences have taken place to the east with a hotspot occurring along Sandy Lane. Offenders have smashed glazing in order to gain access to the vehicle, as well as exploit insecure doors and remove vehicle registration plates with tools.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- 2.2.2 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to prevent tailgating by intruders. The main entrances should be located in a highly visible position and well-lit to deter offenders from trying to break-in. Apartment doors should not be positioned in recesses and should be readily visible along the internal corridors. Additionally, where postal deliveries are made to an internal rack of mailboxes, a double door entry system should be used, and the secondary door set should also be certified to recognised security standard and include a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system (N.B it is advised that postal / delivery personnel should not have free access inside the block). French windows / sliding doors opening on to insecure space at ground level should be avoided.

- 2.2.3 Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards. All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear windows are only accessible to residents.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **77% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **60% lower** than Greater Manchester and **43% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **56% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **31% lower** than Greater Manchester and **26% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **72% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **59% lower** than Greater Manchester and **40% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **75% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **55% lower** than Greater Manchester and **21% lower** than England & Wales.


2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Wednesday and Sunday during the late evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties in the evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashing glazing in windows and doors using implements,
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements gain access to the garden shed.
- Posing as a legitimate tradesperson and entering the property.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Monday and Sunday during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target vehicles in the evening when vehicle owners are unlikely to have sight of their vehicle, reducing the risk for the offender of being identified.

All data used within the report is correct, give or take 8%, due to updates with our I.T systems

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises demolition and clearance of all the existing structures on the site and construction of a block of 38 apartments with accommodation over 4 levels, including under-croft car and cycle parking.
- 3.1.2 Vehicular access to the site is from a side road off Park Place.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 Many of the flats will have routinely occupied rooms overlooking the communal areas and adjacent public realm, which may help to increase natural surveillance around the site and communal areas around the new block.
- 3.2.2 The layout of internal lobbies and corridors is relatively free of projections or recesses that could impede sight lines. Doors within communal corridors should contain a glazed element to improve informal surveillance. Inclusion of mirrors can help to improve sight lines at corners along corridors inside the building. Internally, the individual apartment doors will be located flush with corridor walls, reducing potential for concealment within communal parts of the buildings.
- 3.2.3 The parking area and external amenity area will be bounded with fencing and gates to create a secure enclosure. Pedestrian gates should include self-closing devices which automatically lock on closure. Gates providing access to the site should have access controls which are operable by residents only. Gates to allow visitor entry should also be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system.
- 3.2.4 The vehicular entrance should have high-speed automatic bi-folding gates (to reduce the potential for tailgating), certified to LPS 1175. The car park gates should be operated by fob or swipe card, both on access and egress (i.e. no automatic egress). Any internal release for the pedestrian gate should be located where it cannot be reached from outside the fence line.
- 3.2.5 The bin store and cycle storeroom are located within the building, and access to them can be controlled / restricted, thus reducing the potential for theft and criminal damage. Cycle stands should enable bikes to be secured by the frame and both wheels. The bin store should be a secure, lockable enclosure with access restricted to residents, building managers and possibly refuse collection staff, in order to avoid abuse of the enclosure and the bins. Loose bins should not be left in communal areas or on the street for prolonged periods or overnight.
- 3.2.6 The steps leading to the pedestrian entrance could provide some potential cover / shelter for intruders these have been gated in line with the outer elevation of the building to reduce the risk of concealment.
- 3.2.7 A separate gate is included to provide access to the under-croft parking area for cyclists / pedestrians without the need to fully open, reducing opportunities for tailgating.
- 3.2.8 A comprehensive lighting scheme is proposed which will allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for larger vehicles.
- 3.2.9 Residents' mailboxes are located so that delivery staff do not require admission to the internal areas of the block. Ideally a "through-the-wall" arrangement should be adopted, allowing external deliveries and internal collection of mail. Mailboxes should be of a standard approved by Secured by Design.
- 3.2.10 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can appear hostile and increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Routes from the entrance gate off Park Place to the internal communal access doors should be clear and lead people directly where they need to go, and away from the ground floor windows of individual apartments.
- 3.3.2 Car parking generally. There is already high demand locally from business staff and customers of nearby commercial / leisure premises. Competition for parking spaces can cause confrontation that often results in antisocial or criminal behaviour, and the developer must make adequate provision for the anticipated parking requirement, both for residents and their visitors.
- 3.3.3 External elevations generally. Canopies / cladding / facing materials should not provide external aids to climbing that could allow an intruder to gain access to the upper floor windows. The detailing of the façades and the relationship between the building and any other external landscape features / street furniture will need to be carefully planned to avoid introducing this kind of vulnerability.
- 3.3.4 CCTV. It is strongly advised that a comprehensive CCTV system is installed to cover the most vulnerable parts of the site, such as cycle store, lobby, mailboxes and communal entrance points (see section 4.10).
- 3.3.5 Graffiti on surfaces. Expanses of blank wall exposed to public areas should be formed of a graffiti-resistant surface or have a resistant coating applied at the outset to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings
- 3.3.6 Communal facilities. The robust management of such features is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.7 Local ambiance. The developer should engage with neighbours and partners to endeavour to improve the context of the site and access to it, e.g. removal of accumulated rubbish on neighbouring premises, trimming / pruning of vegetation, minor repairs and upgrading of damaged structures, removal of potential climbing aids from around the site.
- 3.3.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in Section 4 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. At times when the entrance is not staffed, the communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- Where a secure entrance lobby are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead.
- Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- Any doors to internal storage / offices / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621 / 8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- Internal doors / frames to cycle and refuse stores should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electronic lock controlled by resident key-fob. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.
- Any external escape-only doors should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

- If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Access Control

- Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas / doors should operate on access control:
 - Residential communal entrance doors
 - Bin stores
 - Cycle store
 - Car park entrance doors
 - Internal doors off entrance lobby to stairwell / corridors
 - Doors from car park into stairwell.
 - Pedestrian gates

4.6 Boundaries

- New, secure boundary treatments should generally be a minimum of 2100mm high with rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing (with no mid-rails that would aid climbing) and gates, minimum height of 2.1m. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels / gates. Careful detailing of the interface with the stream is required to prevent intruder access around the end of the fence line.
- Pedestrian gates should include self-closing mechanisms and should automatically lock on shutting. Operation of gates should be restricted to residents, using fob-activated access controls. The pedestrian gates should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access to the internal amenity / yard area. It is recommended that upper floor residents then be required to admit visitors in person at the communal entrance to the building off the amenity / yard area. Exit / release buttons should be located where they cannot be reached from outside the fence line.
- Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels / sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.7 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).

- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 Parking Area / Under-croft

- Inward opening automatic gates, roller shutters or grilles to parking areas must be certified to one of the following standards:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
 - PAS 68: 2013
- Lighting to under croft parking areas should display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%.
- Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes / directions clearly signed.
- Electronic car park exit gates should not be on an induction loop (open automatically). All gates to car parks should be fob-in and fob-out.
- Pedestrian gates into car parks should also be fob in and fob out only.

4.10 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances to building, lobby, stairs, cycle store, bin store entrances / gates into parking area / mailboxes.](#)

4.11 Other

- Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- The mailboxes should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures).
- Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews / exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
- 5.1.3 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place.
- 5.1.4 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
08/12/2021	Urbane Forms	CIS instruction received
09/12/2021	Urbane Forms	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
20/12/2021	Rusholme Garden Investments	Payment received
02/02/2022	N/A	Site visit
18/02/2022	Urbane Forms	CIS version A issued
28/02/2022	Urbane Forms	Revised information received
30/03/2022	Urbane Forms	CIS version B issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Design and Access Statement	15/11/21	
(0-)06C	Location Plan		
(0-)19C	Site plan		
(0-)20C	Lower Ground Floor Plan		
(0-)21C	Ground Floor Plan		
(0-)22C	First Floor Plan		
(0-)23C	Second Floor Plan		
(0-)24C	Third Floor Plan		
(0-)25C	Fourth Floor Plan		
(0-)30B	Park and Allotments Elevations		
(0-)31B	Park Place and Car Park Elevations		
(9-)01B	External Works		
21,11,15 -18001,3.01	External Lighting Strategy	04/12/21	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Revisions to Section 3, title page, summary and appendix following receipt of updated information	30/03/2022

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French / double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk