

Draft

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Great Northern Warehouse

Apartments, Retail, Offices and Leisure

For: **GNW Developments Limited (UK)**

Version A: **26/08/22**

Ref: **2015/1104/CIS/03**

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Great Northern Warehouse

2015/1104/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- Secure cycle store provision
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti
- Pedestrian access into the multi-storey car park

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application subject to the design team suitably addressing the recommendations contained in the report (Sections 3.3, 4 & 5), and will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

e: david.maher@gmp.police.uk

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Contents

1 Visual Audit 5

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis 6

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.3 Residential Risk Factors

2.4 Office Risk Factors

2.5 Retail Risk Factors

2.6 Leisure Risk Factors

2.7 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

2.8 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

2.10 Non-Domestic Burglary Office Facilities: Risk Analysis

2.11 Theft Office Facilities: Risk Analysis

2.12 Non-Domestic Burglary Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

2.13 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

2.14 Non-Domestic Burglary Leisure Facilities: Risk Analysis

2.15 Theft Leisure Facilities: Risk Analysis

3 Layout Appraisal 18

3.1 Proposed development

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

3.1 Public Realm influences over crime patterns

3.2 Changes Needed and Recommendations

3.3 Counter Terrorism Response

3.4 Counter Terrorism Recommendations

4 Physical Security (Residential) 23

4.1 Doors

4.2 Windows

4.3 Glazing

4.4 Alarms

4.5 Access Control

4.6 Boundaries

4.7 Landscaping

4.8 Lighting

4.9 Other

5 Physical Security (Non-residential) 25

5.1 Doors

5.2 Shutters

5.3 Windows

5.4 Glazing

5.5 Alarms

5.6 Access Control

5.7 Lighting

5.8 CCTV

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

6 Management & Maintenance 26
7 Construction 27
8 Useful References 27
8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Appendix

A Contact register 28
B Associated Documents 28
C CIS Version History 28
D Glossary 29

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site lies on the east side of Deansgate, and is bound by Great Bridgewater St to the south, Watson St to the east and Peter St to the north.

The existing development accommodates several established uses including a multi-screen cinema, casino, car parking and retail/leisure uses. The site is located west of M/cr Central convention centre in an area where the night-time economy is popular and centred on Peter Street. Great Northern Tower, an apartment building, lies immediately to the east of the Complex on Watson Street.


At the southern end of Watson St & Great Bridgewater St a large new residential & commercial development is under construction; Viadux.

The Complex comprises 4 main elements: Great Northern Square, a public realm space, lies at the northern edge of the site; Great Northern Warehouse, a grade II* listed building is at the centre of the site and houses the casino, food and beverage outlets with the upper floors let as a multi-storey car park. Deansgate Terrace, a continuous terrace of two and three storey commercial units facing Deansgate, with upper floor units at the rear facing an elevated street that connects the warehouse to Great Bridgewater Street; and, a modern 'leisure box' extension to the warehouse occupying the southern half of the complex, which is occupied by a cinema and further multi-storey parking. There is a footbridge connecting the leisure box to an elevated pathway connecting to Deansgate-Castlefield tram stop via the western side of Manchester Central.

There are several pedestrian entry points into the multi-storey car park off Great Bridgewater St & Watson St.




1 – View towards site off Peter St.


2 – View along Deansgate.



3 – Existing under-croft vehicle & service access off Watson St.




4 – New commercial & residential development under construction.



5 – Stepped pedestrian access off Deansgate.


8 – View North along Watson St.


7 – Recessed cycle parking adjacent to multi-storey car park.


6 – Recessed to multi-storey car park.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2021 to 30th April 2022.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
17	80	200	1272	1153	100	36	324	44	93

2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high; however, the proposed site is located within Manchester City Centre. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded crimes within the local area. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings are mostly taking place to the north of the proposed site, around Deansgate, Peters Street and Princess Street, where St Peters Square is located. The assaults in the area are mostly taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period, which is when licenced premises have a larger attendance and are open for longer periods. The assaults are mostly carried out by unknown offenders.

2.1.3 Vehicle crime in the local area is mostly taking place around Byrom Street, Liverpool Road and Lower Mosley Street. Theft from a Motor vehicle is the highest occurring vehicle crime with smashed glazing being the most common entry point to the vehicle. The area in which vehicle crime has occurred has a large number of car parking facilities and on street parking, which increases the number of opportunities for offenders.

2.1.4 Thefts have occurred around the north and south of the proposed site, around Deansgate/ Castleford Metrolink stop to the south and around Peters Street and Deansgate to the north, where pickpocketing has been most commonly used to obtain goods. Thefts have also occurred around the licenced premises in the area, with mobile phones and purses/ wallets being taken.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 **Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property.**

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 4.4).

2.2.2 **Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them.**

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- *security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;*
- *where the size limits the availability of certified shutters, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings.*

2.2.3 **Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly front doors and fire exit doors) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the premises.**

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

2.2.4 **Broken glazing in windows and doors.**

Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, grilles or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection–

2.2.5 ***General:*** Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

2.2.6 ***General:*** Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.2.7 ***General:*** Forcing open shutters using implements and tools in order to gain access to the doors and windows located beneath.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

2.2.8 ***General:*** Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Ensure that rubbish and loose material is removed from the areas around the site. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

2.2.9 ***Commercial/Retail:*** *Posing as a legitimate customer and entering restricted areas by means of insecure doors and tailgating employees.*

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

2.2.10 ***Café/Restaurant:*** Theft of personal property from tabletops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

2.2.11 ***Office:*** Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure storerooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building or fit-out. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Portable equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular visitor access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

2.3 Residential Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

Domestic burglary

Theft from gardens, sheds or garages

Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Theft of, or from, vehicles

Bogus callers and distraction burglary

Anti-social behaviour

Neighbour disputes

Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

Unauthorised access to private spaces

Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Office Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

Burglary

Violence towards staff

Theft of personal belongings at work

Criminal damage to property and vehicles

Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

Arson

Cycle theft

2.5 Retail Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

Commercial burglary

Cash robbery

Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating

Shoplifting

Employee theft

Theft of customer / staff property

Criminal damage to property

2.6 Leisure Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

Unauthorised access to non-public areas

Criminal damage to property and vehicles

Violence towards staff and other users

Cycle security

Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

Controlled access (staff/user only)

Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)

Employee theft

Theft of personal belongings at work


Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.7 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.


Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester




Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Manchester, and Greater Manchester



2.7.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **71% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **63% lower** than Greater Manchester and **62% lower** than England & Wales.

2.7.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **100% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **172% higher** than Greater Manchester and **420% higher** than England & Wales.

2.7.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwelling is **48% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **94% higher** than Greater Manchester and **136% higher** than England & Wales.


2.7.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **257% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **488% higher** than Greater Manchester and **614% higher** than England & Wales.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.8 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary dwelling – Day Range



Burglary dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.8.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Tuesday during the early hours of the morning (3:30am – 5:30am). Offenders often target properties in the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.8.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property

Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Offenders posing as legitimate residents/visitors and entering restricted areas through insecure doors or tailgating residents.


In cases where the entry point has been recorded as unknown, offenders have typically targeted insecure windows and doors.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range




2.9.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening. Vehicles parked within close proximity to the city centre, and around hospital sites, are likely to be left unattended, out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for the offender.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.10 Non-Domestic Burglary Office Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.


Office Burglary – Day Range



Office Burglary – Time Range



Office Burglary – Point of Entry



2.10.1 Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night / into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.10.2 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries committed in Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.

A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.


Shutters have been prised open to target doors and windows behind them.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.11 Theft Office Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Office Theft – Day Range



Office Theft – Time Range




2.11.1 Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours / staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.12 Non-Domestic Burglary Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.


Retail Burglary – Day Range



Retail Burglary – Time Range



Retail Burglary – Point of Entry



2.12.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.12.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.

Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.

Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.


Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.13 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Retail Theft – Day Range



Retail Theft – Time Range




2.13.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable


2.14 Non-Domestic Burglary Leisure Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.


GM Leisure Facilities Burglary – Day Range



GM Leisure Facilities Burglary – Time Range



GM Leisure Facilities Burglary – Point of Entry



2.14.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.14.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.

The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.


Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.15 Theft Leisure Facilities: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

GM Leisure Facilities Theft – Day Range



GM Leisure Facilities Theft – Time Range



2.15.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday, but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 Trilogy Real Estate ('the Applicant') will be submitting an application for Full Planning Permission and Listed Building consent to facilitate the delivery of:

- circa 750 residential units (Use Class C3);
- approximately 221,338 sq. ft of office use and c. 58,437 sq. ft of leisure uses, including retained areas in the existing Great Northern Warehouse and Deansgate Terrace;
- 945 car parking spaces (including EV spaces); and
- 138,456 sq. ft of public realm and 64,874 sq. ft of private external residential amenity.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The redevelopment of the site will provide interesting and diverse uses offering an employment opportunity and another interesting piece of architecture within the city centre.

3.2.2 The building provides ground floor activity in the form of residential entrances, office and reception space, commercial/retail use and in-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent public realm.

3.2.3 The footprint of the building facing onto the public realm is relatively simple and free from deeply recessed or concealed areas.

3.2.4 The proposed building clearly defines the different uses of the building(s), and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.

3.2.5 The main public realm circulation routes appear obvious, leading people directly to where they need to go. The proposals are intended to integrate with surrounding circulation routes.

3.2.6 The foyer/reception zone provides the opportunity for good levels of security at a central control point for the commercial/office space.

3.2.7 The internal layout of the building(s) appears capable of being divided into identifiable zones, allowing separation of accessible and restricted areas. The access-control strategy adopted for the development should be capable of confining movement into and through the building, thus allowing staff and visitors to only enter parts of the site to which they have legitimate reason to be present. Access permissions should be fully auditable and regularly reviewed.

3.2.8 The car parking has been well laid out, avoiding potential hiding spaces for intruders. This report recommends careful consideration to review and reduce the number of existing open pedestrian access routes into the car park at street level.

3.2.9 The proposal will seek to create a connected community through enhancing existing routes and links across the public realm and to new developments; in doing so this will allow economic growth for the area through the proposed developments and forge new links. The new development will encourage emerging new businesses and communities to develop within and around the proposed site thus supporting the future development and growth of the site and surrounding area.

3.2.10 The proposed site will see the redevelopment of the area which, in places has been a generator of anti-social behaviour and criminal activity. Particularly the existing car parking.

3.2.11 The proposals should provide good levels of ground floor activity; in-turn the building uses will offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent community space and public realm.

3.2.12 The redevelopment of the area will provide an interesting and diverse uses; offering opportunity for new communities alongside existing ones; also providing interesting and safer public realm with a chance to create an exciting destination.

3.2.13 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

3.1 Public Realm influences over crime patterns

3.1.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

3.1.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- being located on well-trafficked streets and overlooked by routinely occupied buildings. the site is subject to surveillance by local businesses and residents as well as passers-by on foot and in cars. The casual observations by residents and passers-by may deter some offenders.
- the site is well connected to the core of the city centre. Pedestrian routes are generally busy during the daytime, particularly that they pass along Peter Street to Deansgate, and include commercial spaces with largely 'active' frontages and regular pedestrian flows, especially during the working day.

3.1.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder and the fear of crime, these include:

- A development in this location, is very likely to attract the interest of criminals should they become aware of it whilst going about their everyday activities. Opportunists, criminal damage to buildings, theft and vehicle crime are all likely to affect a development on this site.
- vacant buildings and plots of vacant land in the vicinity of the site sometimes attract those intent on criminal damage (e.g. smashing glazing and graffiti), burglary and theft (particularly metals).
- A site wide management strategy should work in tandem with existing and new bar/restaurant and leisure uses. Door staff should be present to monitor queues and keep them flowing when appropriate, as patrons enter and leave the premises.

3.1.4 The design and layout of the public realm surrounding the blocks should be carefully considered. It should not include any hard/soft landscaping features that may impede surveillance opportunities or foster loitering/gathering, nuisance, anti-social behaviour or misuse. The following issues should be addressed with the public realm/landscaping strategy (also see Section 4.7):

The proposed public realm features and any changes in ground levels, with step/ramp features to accommodate them. Such features can sometimes impede surveillance opportunities and provide features that can be mis-used. These features, as well as benches and any other hard landscaping features, should be designed to deter and withstand any such treatment and to maximise surveillance opportunities of/from them.

Public realm furniture items should be robust to sustain constant daily use and form part of the management and maintenance regime. Damaged features which are not tended to over a period of time can lead to further decline and respect for the area.

In particular, the potential to foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues at night. The central public realm area will benefit from levels of footfall, activity and will rely on passive surveillance from the residential properties overlooking this area. The area must be well-lit and designed to maximise surveillance opportunities and eliminate hiding places. Any windows or doors adjacent to these areas may also need additional protection.

3.1.5 Any cycle parking areas located throughout the public realm area should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied areas.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

3.1.6 The long-term redevelopment of the area should seek to address and remove the concealment and shelter provided by structures and improve visual links between spaces, green spaces, bridges, buildings and adjacent streets / premises.

3.1.7 The development of this public realm space would encourage further significant pedestrian footfall in the area, with people spending longer in the area, rather than it simply being passed through as part of a journey from A to B. The aspirations of the plans also seek to extend the use of this space beyond event times.

3.1.8 Engagement at the very early RIBA stages has previously proven to afford those involved in the development the opportunity to 'build-in' protective measures, which often results in more aesthetically pleasing, cost-effective measures in the long-run.

3.2 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.2.1 The proposals provide the opportunity to address and reduce the number of pedestrian open access points into the multi-storey car park around the 'leisure box'. Currently there are several locations providing direct and unfettered access from street level into the car parking areas. The existing car park is well managed with patrols and CCTV monitoring however this does not deter an opportunist from committing crime and anti-social behaviour within the car park, this M.O is reflected in the crime analysis.

3.2.2 The junctions between any newly formed traffic free/controlled pedestrianised zones and existing traffic roads should be carefully considered. Maintenance of newly installed control measure (rising bollards, lighting, gates and all access control features), should be incorporated into the management & maintenance procedures.

3.2.3 As the proposed public spaces and plots are developed consideration needs to be given towards external lighting. The proposals are to incorporate a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination evenly around the space without areas of shadowing or pooling and work coherently with the wider security requirements of the site such as CCTV.

3.2.4 Consideration for safe bicycle storage should be embedded within the landscape design. Short-stay cycle parking stands should be located where they can be readily observed. The location of cycle stores within proposed buildings should consider the position, inherent physical security and safety of cyclists using the facility.

3.2.5 The layout appears generally free of obstacles to vision allowing people to see and be seen within the area and maintains sight lines across the site. Planting and street furniture has been aligned to avoid creating potential hiding places and avoids blocking sight lines. However, the choice of trees and other plant species should allow some visible permeability through the canopies and foliage so that people cannot be concealed within the public spaces.

3.2.6 Street furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.

3.2.7 Access beyond the reception lobby should be controlled so that intruders cannot easily reach restricted parts of the building. Access to the stair core and lifts from the entrance lobby should require passage through access-controlled turnstiles or doors. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in / around the entrance lobbies.

3.2.8 All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Access to plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only). Where the upper floor office areas are subdivided into smaller individual units, each suite of offices should be capable of separation with their own individual access controls.

3.2.9 Glazing to proposed elevations along or in close proximity to crowded pedestrian spaces/routes should incorporate laminated glass (see section 4.3 for further detail).

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

3.2.10 The development's residential entry gates must be visually attractive, tall and robust to deter climbing and withstand attempts at criminal damage.

3.2.11 The residential stairs and lift cores in the blocks will require access control allowing only building staff and residents' access beyond the reception space to upper floors, in order to create a secure lobby area.

3.2.12 The cycle store doors or gates should be self-closing and self-locking. There should be distinction between residents' cycle parking and public parking with the subterranean store.

3.2.13 Due to the complex nature of the scheme in terms of the mix of uses within the development, the architecture and signage should clearly direct visitors to the appropriate apartment entrance or communal entrance door.

3.2.14 The entrance gates must be:

- be fitted with an electronic lock with a holding force of around 4500N;
- be self-closing and locking upon closure.

3.2.15 The communal entrance doors to the residential buildings must be:

- certified to a suitable security standard.
- be fitted with an electronic lock that forms part of the door certification.
- be self-closing and locking upon closure.

3.2.16 The gates (at night) and doors (all times) should be secured and the locks activated with a programmable fob.

3.2.17 An intercom system should be installed at each gate (night-time use) and entrance doors. There should be an audio-visual link to each apartment (and concierge), to enable residents or staff to vet visitors prior to releasing the gate or door locking mechanism and allowing *bona fide* visitors entry into the development or lobby. Residents should meet visitors in the lobby areas before being escorted to the relevant apartment.

3.2.18 Means of escape doors must be security-rated and be self-closing and locking upon closure.

3.2.19 Post. Reception and distribution of post within the building should be considered. Incoming post and deliveries should be processed at one single point, in an area that can be easily isolated. Post rooms should not be located close to main exit routes as this could affect prompt evacuation.

3.2.20 Current drawings do not indicate a location for show cycle parking and changing for building users. Dedicated and separate rooms for the commercial uses and residential elements should be incorporated into the proposed development. Entry into these spaces should be strictly limited via the access-controlled system under the building management system ensuring only genuine cyclists can gain access. Racks within the cycle stores should allow bikes to be locked by the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com).

3.2.21 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme as a whole. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

3.3 Counter Terrorism Response

3.3.1 Due to its location and function, it is considered that this development should be protected from a potential terrorist attack. The following recommendations are intended as a guide to the developer to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack on the proposed building, its contents and the people using it and the adjacent public areas. Implementation of any of the suggested measures is not a guarantee of comprehensive protection.

3.3.2 By its nature, the purpose, form, and location of any attack is difficult to predict, and the information provided is based on the current level of risk as assessed by Counter Terrorism Policing.

3.3.3 It is recommended that the developer refer to the 'Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure' (www.cpni.gov.uk) for specific advice and guidance on how the building and its operation can be effectively safeguarded. Alternatively, we would recommend seeking the advice of an appropriately

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

skilled organisation from the Register of Security Engineers and Specialists (RSES), further information can be found at https://www.rses.org.uk/.

3.3.4 Nothing within the Crime Impact Statement shall be construed to contradict or inhibit compliance with the law or building codes. Where advice is given that may affect fire regulations, the client must review their procedures and contact the relevant bodies as they may require modification to conform to these standards.

3.4 Counter Terrorism Recommendations

3.4.1 **New Public Realm:** This development remodels existing public realm and creates new areas with pedestrian only access. These locations, and any others that are created as the plan develops, could be vulnerable to a vehicle as a weapon attack (VAW). It is recommended that a RSES consultant is engaged early in the planning stages, who will conduct a vehicle dynamic assessment (VDA) and advise on suitable hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) products to mitigate that threat.

Useful CPNI and NaCTSO advice documents can be found here –

- VAW attacks | NaCTSO
- Hostile Vehicle Mitigation | CPNI

3.4.2 **Glazing:** scenario are caused as the result of flying glass in public areas. It is advised that all new public areas should be fitted with laminated glazing. Any existing glazing in new public areas should be reviewed, and consideration given to it either being replaced with laminated glazing or have anti shatter film (ASF) fitted.

3.4.3 Useful CPNI and NaCTSO documents can be found here –

- Windows and glazed facades | Protect UK
- Improve-the-blast-resistance-of-glazing.pdf (cpni.gov.uk)

3.4.4 **Access Control:** From a counter terrorism and crime reduction perspective it is important to have effective access control between public and non-public areas of buildings. This prevents unauthorised access to a potential attacker. The Great Northern Warehouse is a multi-use venue where this potential will exist, and it is advised that an access control strategy is considered in the design.

3.4.5 Useful CPNI and NaCTSO documents can be found here –

- Access control | NaCTSO

3.4.6 **CCTV:** CCTV is an effective prevention and investigative tool, in both a counter terrorism and crime prevention scenario. The building/area will already have CCTV coverage, but as the development progresses providing new public realm areas eg the new thoroughfare between Deansgate and Watson Street, the coverage should be continually reviewed.

3.4.7 Useful CPNI and NaCTSO documents can be found here –

- CCTV | CPNI
- CCTV | Protect UK

3.4.8 **CTSA Contact:** Please contact the CTSA for further advice on the recommendations contained within this supplement, or any other counter terrorism issues.

- Simon McNulty: 07824 080856
- simon.mcnulty1@gmp.police.uk

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob allowing secure entry and exit.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within the vicinity of crowded places should incorporate laminated glazing. Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate 6mm outer pane and at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass. It is recommended that glazing to elevations adjoining pubic areas or evacuation routes should also be laminated.
- ☐ All new glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) should incorporate at least one pane of a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems

BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:

All external doors where regular staff access is required.

Doors separating internal zones / lobbies

Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)

Cycle store

4.6 Boundaries

☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:

LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2

STS 202: Issue 3, BR2

Sold Secure Gold

PAS 68: 2013

☐ Any courtyard apartment windows to the garden courtyard elevations of the podium that will not front onto the front garden spaces described above must be protected by defensive planting beds. The windows themselves should preferably have as high cills as possible and be non-opening. If not, they should have only small opening lights fitted with opening restrictors to avoid providing opportunities to criminals.

☐ Boundary treatments to gardens adjacent to apartments should be designed to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them, which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.

4.7 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

4.8 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).

☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

5.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:

  LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1

  STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

5.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

5.4 Glazing

- ☐ All glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.5 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

5.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

  All external doors where regular staff access is required.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Doors separating internal zones / lobbies

Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)

5.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

5.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas

6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

Produced by Greater Manchester Police
Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

Litter removal

Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)

Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
12/05/22	Deloitte LLP	CIS application submitted
17/05/22	Deloitte LLP	Client confirmation
12/07/22	Deloitte LLP	Scheme presentation
16/08/22	DfS	Site visit
23/08/22	GMP CTSA	CTSA Scheme presentation
26/08/22	DfS	DRAFT CIS completed & issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	GF Site Plan	17/05/22	
	Residential Podium Plan	17/05/22	
	Amenity Floor Plan	17/05/22	
	10422 - 29.06.22 Pre_App	20/07/22	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

Copyright reserved by The Chief Constable