



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Demolition of existing building and structures, and redevelopment of site for Purpose Built Student Accommodation (PBSA) uses (*Sui Generis* use class) comprising 197 no. bedroom units, with ancillary amenity space, a ground floor 'community hub' (proposed for Use Classes F2(b), E(b), E(eiii), E(f)), and associated landscape works and infrastructure

AT The Gamecock, Boundary Lane & Booth Street West, Manchester

FOR: Curlew Alternatives Eighth Property LP

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION C: 17th August 2022

design**for**security

2007/1181/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

The scheme has been well considered from a crime prevention perspective and will add activity, natural surveillance and interest to this part of Hulme. Design for Security are happy to support the proposals.

Positive aspects of the scheme include:

- a Management Plan has been produced and is included in the planning submission; it sets out how security and maintenance issues will be addressed, (including several of the recommendations set out elsewhere in this report) ;
- there will be a staff presence during the day and remote, round-the-clock, security to monitor the facility;
- the density of development will generate significant level of street activity as residents and visitors come and go;
- the orientation of buildings and uses within will promote activity and surveillance in the most appropriate areas;
- the location of the residents' and community hub entrances are appropriately located on Booth Street West;
- the location of the reception desk is suitable to allow staff to monitor activity at the entrance;
- a suitable space has been identified for safe storage of parcels and mail;
- a range of residents' amenity spaces and facilities are proposed; and,
- a very secure cycle store will be provided.

To improve the scheme from a crime prevention perspective, include:

- a crime awareness/prevention information pack for residents;
- appropriate access controls at relevant doors to control access into and through the building;
- security certified doors and glazing throughout;
- a good quality CCTV system and complementary lighting; and,
- measures to prevent unauthorised parking on the forecourt or on the space at the rear of the development.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application and seek the inclusion of a condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The photographs and plan below show the development site and its surroundings. This rectangular, 0.086 hectare, site, edged in red on the plan, is located at the junction of Boundary Lane and Booth Street West in Hulme a short distance south of the city centre. The site also lies within 'Corridor Manchester', an innovation district with a concentration of knowledge-intensive organisations and businesses including the universities, hospitals, creative arts and Manchester Science Park, as well as some 42,000 residents and other supporting services and transportation. Cooper House, a ten storey apartment building managed by The Guinness Partnership lies to the south of the site; its car park is situated to the east of the site and is accessed from Boundary Lane via a service road on the south side of the pub. West of the Cooper House car park is the Foyer, a mixed development comprising health care, and commercial uses on the ground floor with four floors of flats above. Facing the site across Booth Street West and behind an area of landscaped amenity space is Hopton Court, a nine storey block of flats. On the western side of Boundary Lane modern two, three and four storey residential units face the site.





The site is occupied by the Gamecock pub and associated car park, yard and landscaped periphery




The pub ceased trading several years ago and the building has been the target of anti-social behaviour



A service road on the south side of the pub allows access to the secure car park of Cooper House as well as the pub car park



The Cooper House apartment building looms large over the site to the south



Hopton Court apartments face the site across Booth Street West



Apartments and houses on the western side of Boundary Lane opposite the site

The development site itself is occupied by a vacant, part-single, part-two storey two storey public house with living accommodation above and a small yard, enclosed by a high wall and barbed wire, at its south-eastern corner. The pub sits centrally on the site with a small car park to the west, which is accessed via the service road that also serves the car park to Cooper House. There is a band of landscaping on the north side of the site. A series of steel posts has been erected around the northern, southern and western boundaries of the site. The western, Cooper House site, boundary is defined with a tall, steel railing. There are three mature trees on the Boundary Lane edge of the site; I understand that two are subject to a Tree Preservation Order. Planning permission was granted on appeal in 2008 for the erection of an eight-storey building containing 42 apartments and associated parking. In 2012 an application to erect a 48 unit student accommodation building was refused permission.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 and 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime summary



Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
15	34	70	224	130	65	6	32	16	131

- 2.1.1 In the period analysed, there were 816 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood in which the site is located which, when compared with other neighbourhoods within Manchester, is significantly higher than the average number of crimes. The stand-out crimes in this neighbourhood are those involving the use or threat of violence, robbery and theft, particularly bicycle theft.
- 2.1.2 The biggest concentrations of crime were around the junction of Booth Street and Oxford Road, the Stretford Road and Cambridge Street junction, and in and around the Manchester Aquatic Centre on Oxford Road. Comparing all streets in the neighbourhood, most crimes were recorded as having taken place on Oxford Road (around one third of all incidents), followed by Booth Street East/Booth Street West, where there were 101 incidents (largely Booth Street East), and Cambridge Street/Higher Cambridge Street (45 crimes).
- 2.1.3 The most commonly recorded crime, 42% of all incidents involved the use or threat of violence (including robbery). Theft, including bicycle theft, accounted for 32% of all crime in the neighbourhood. Vehicle crime accounts for only 8% of the total volume of crime recorded in the neighbourhood; there were no particular concentration of such crimes. Bicycle theft is a particular issue on Oxford Road, especially in the vicinity of the Aquatics Centre and at within the university campus.



2.2 Crime rate comparison

2.2.1 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and across England & Wales

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.





- 2.2.2 The rate of burglary per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **82% lower** than the Manchester rate, **69% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate, and **56% lower** than the rate for England and Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of wounding crimes per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **the same as** the Manchester rate, **57% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **68% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.




- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **41% lower** than the Manchester rate, **15% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **27% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.5 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **43% lower** than the Manchester rate, **3% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **80% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Burglary: risk analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary is low but is greatest in the middle of the week. Friday is the most common day for a burglary to be committed. The timing of burglaries fluctuates greatly through the day.



- 2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** The most frequently targeted points of entry were doors, with offenders applying bodily force to gain entry or smashing the glazing in glazed panels. In a number of cases, offenders gained entry to properties where doors or windows were left unsecured.

2.4 Vehicle crime: risk analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is greatest on a Monday and falls away as the week progresses. Most offences occur during the late afternoon and into the early evening.

2.5 Modus operandi used by offenders in committing burglary and theft in Manchester & measures to reduce vulnerability

2.5.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools to drill locks

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

2.5.2 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- communal entrance doors to apartments should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing.
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e. a small front garden enclosed with a 1000mm high fence. A degree of separation between public and private space can act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are then less willing to cross from public to clearly defined private space. Such boundary definition can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to property; and
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors. Light suggests a dwelling is occupied and highlights the actions of intruders.

2.5.3 Windows have been prised open by offenders

To minimise the risk of prising windows open:

- all ground floor windows should include key operated locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to the rear of the dwellings should be controlled by the erection of robust boundaries and locking gates. Pedestrian routes alongside the rear boundaries should be avoided. As a means to break and enter dwellings, offenders are more likely to target windows on secluded side or rear elevations.

2.5.4 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development; and,

- access to rear gardens should be restricted with the installation of high fencing and locking gates.

2.5.5 Bikes were stolen from cycle stores and when secured to railings or street furniture

To minimise the risk of bicycle theft:

- provide convenient, secure cycle parking in a secure store within the building, or in an external store, which has self-closing, self-locking doors or gates, and is only accessible to residents in possession of a programmable access control fob.

2.6 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.6.1 Features of the physical environment can influence criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.6.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site currently and in the future are as follows:

- the number of acquisitive crimes (burglary, theft and vehicle crime) where residential property is targeted is quite low - the burglary rate is particularly low;
- the presence of residents in the apartments and houses in the vicinity of the site offer a reasonable prospect of passive surveillance over the public realm and the development site; and,
- other than graffiti affecting the Gamecock building itself, there are few signs of neglect in the immediate neighbourhood - neighbouring residential properties are very well maintained.

2.6.3 There are also some features of the locality that might facilitate crime and disorder, and the fear of crime and reduction in residential amenity, these include:

- the overall volume and nature of crime, particularly violent crime, theft and robbery in the vicinity of the site are a concern;
- the site is prominently located at the junction of two well-trafficked streets - pedestrian and vehicle traffic is likely to include offenders who will quickly become aware of any opportunities to exploit opportunities presented by the redevelopment or target individuals coming and going from the site;
- the southern edge of the site is relatively secluded and an area where offenders may seek to exploit;
- neighbourhoods with a concentration of student accommodation can, due to the pattern of behaviour of students, for example, socialising and returning to their accommodation late at night when neighbouring residents are sleeping, lead to a reduction of the amenity of settled residents; and,
- there is pressure for tariff-free on street parking in this neighbourhood. A development lacking in on-site, secure parking (and displacement of vehicles that currently park on the site) may lead to greater pressure on scarce parking spaces in the surrounding streets and beyond, and an increase vehicle-related crime in the neighbourhood.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves the demolition of the Gamecock pub, the clearance of all other structures on the site and the removal of all trees, followed by the construction of purpose-built-student accommodation.
- 3.1.2 A 10-storey (including ground floor), largely, brick building is proposed, which will occupy around three quarters of the site; there will be a narrow forecourt of the northern, Booth Street West, edge of the site and a similar space separating the building from the access to Cooper Court at the southern edge. In total, 197 no. bedroom units set out across the upper floors are proposed - a combination of 1 bed studios, 3 bed Threedios, and cluster flats with 9 and 10 bedrooms per cluster.
- 3.1.3 On the ground floor of the building there will be the following:
- resident's entrance door and entrance lobby - to be located centrally on the Booth Street West elevation;
 - reception desk and administration office and facilities;
 - main circulation lift lobby;
 - a community hub, with entrance door also on the Booth Street West elevation;
 - residents gym/amenity;
 - post room;
 - cycle store;
 - bin store; and
 - plant rooms.
- 3.1.4 Planning consent is sought for a range of uses for the community hub, including a meeting place for the community, retail, a medical or health use, or a day nursery.
- 3.1.5 The plant rooms (including sub-station and generator room), cycle store access, and bin store all will have external doors on the southern elevation. There will also be two means of escape doors on this same elevation - one allowing escape from the gym and the other from the central, stair core, via an escape corridor.
- 3.1.6 The first floor will include a large, residents' amenity space, a one-person studio and a nine-person cluster flat. The remainder of the residential units will be on floors 02 through to 10.
- 3.1.7 Externally, the forecourt at the front and space at the rear of the building will be landscaped with a range of hard and soft landscaping.

3.2 Features of the development that will promote safety and security

- 3.2.1 The proposals will result in the redevelopment of a building and site that unless re-used or redeveloped quickly, is very likely to be targeted by vandals and criminals, leading to an erosion of the quality of the local environment, attract further criminal activity to the area more widely, all of which is likely to impinge on the quality of life of nearby residents.
- 3.2.2 Given the proximity of the universities and student accommodation, the proposed development seems a reasonable use for the site.
- 3.2.3 The footprint of the building is relatively simple and free of recesses and makes securing the entire site quite straightforward.
- 3.2.4 The focus for entry to the site is suitably located on the northern side of the site at Booth Street West. There is only one residential entrance and one entrance to the community hub. The community hub is self-contained.
- 3.2.5 The inclusion of a lobby to the residential entrance, with electronic locks fitted to each set of doors, allows management to control entry at both doors, reducing the risk of offenders tail-gating legitimate residents and visitors.

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- 3.2.6 Surveillance of the surrounding public realm of Booth Street West and Boundary Lane will be enhanced by the scale and orientation of the building, the placement of windows on all elevations and the extensive areas of glazing on the north, south and western elevations at ground and first floor levels.
- 3.2.7 Similarly, surveillance across the site will be enhanced by the well-considered location of facilities within the building (i.e. the administration office, gym and first floor amenity space) and the location of residential and community hub entrances.
- 3.2.8 The location of the reception desk allows staff to monitor the movement of people in and out of the building.
- 3.2.9 A management presence is particularly welcome as visible staff in the development will not only discourage offender attempts to gain entry to the scheme but also gives residents a readily accessible contact to whom they may report management issues. Such provision can help to instil confidence in residents that the development is secure and that maintenance issues will be dealt with promptly.
- 3.2.10 The elevated position, relative to the public realm, of the residential accommodation will result in a greater degree of privacy and security for residents than might otherwise have been the case were residential use to commence at street level.
- 3.2.11 The inclusion of amenity/social space provides an opportunity for residents to meet and build relationships, which can help to develop a sense of community within the scheme and deters crime and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.12 The provision of a post room on the ground floor avoids the need for delivery staff to access the building beyond the reception area.
- 3.2.13 Lighting from the development will contribute to public lighting around the site. Good public, and building, lighting can significantly reduce the public's fear of crime.
- 3.2.14 Refuse bins will be located within a secure store within the development.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development and future residents

Management

- 3.3.1 Students should be issued with an information pack containing, *inter alia*:
- crime prevention/awareness - particularly keeping safe at night when returning to the accommodation;
 - deterred from car ownership whilst resident due to the lack of available parking;
 - respecting the amenity of other residents in the neighbourhood when returning to the accommodation late at night;
 - being vigilant in allowing others access to the building; and
 - using appropriate entrance doors to enter and leave the building.
- 3.3.2 Helpfully, a Management Plan has been produced, which acknowledges these points and sets out how each will be addressed.

Main entrance and reception area

- 3.3.3 The outer entrance door should be security-rated, fitted with an electronic locking system and automated, and capable of restricting access to residents or staff holding an appropriate fob or pass card.
- 3.3.4 An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the outer entrance door to staff at the reception desk to allow for vetting visitors prior to allowing entry via a remote lock release.
- 3.3.5 To minimise the risk of 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors, the inner lobby doors should also be automated and fitted with electronic locks capable of restricting access to residents or staff holding an appropriate fob or pass card, with a remote lock release activated by staff at reception.
- 3.3.6 Visitors to the building should be required to report to reception, whereupon staff should alert the student; schemes where students admit visitors remotely by way of electronic door lock release from inside their apartment or cluster is considered less secure.

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- 3.3.7 The reception desk should be staffed throughout the day and, ideally at night.
 - 3.3.8 In order to restrict residents, staff and visitors to appropriate areas of the building, management may wish to consider installing card/fob activated, electronic locks to the doors connecting the reception area to the gym access corridor, the stair core corridor and door to the generator and switch rooms. Similarly, management may wish to restrict access/activation of all lifts to residents and staff with a suitably programmed card or fob.

Community room

- 3.3.9 The entrance door should be security-rated.

Rear (southern) elevation

- 3.3.10 The means of escape door on the northern elevation of the building should be security-certified and used for escape purposes only. An alarm should sound local and staff at the reception desk alerted if either escape door is opened. Because of its secluded location and risk of it being targeted by criminals/vandals, at least the lower sections of these doors should not be glazed.
- 3.3.11 Cycle store access, generator room, and bin store doors should be security-rated, self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.12 If not security-rated, the sub-station doors and plant room doors (where there is no access into the building) should be of steel construction, set in a steel frame and fitted with two British Standard locks or Sold Secure padlocks fitted at 1/3 points on each set of doors.

Studios

- 3.3.13 The studio entrance doors should be security-rated and include an electronic lock, which forms part of the security certification.
- 3.3.14 Study bedroom doors should also include an electronic lock and a fixed outer handle so that entry is only possible with an appropriately authorised card/fob.

Cluster flats

- 3.3.15 The entrance door to a cluster should be security-rated and include an electronic lock, which forms part of the security certification.
- 3.3.16 Study bedroom doors should include an electronic lock and a fixed outer handle so that entry is only possible with an appropriately authorised card/fob.

Cycle store

- 3.3.17 The street level entrance door to the cycle store should be security-certified, and be self-closing and self-locking. An alarm should sound at reception if this door remains open.
- 3.3.18 The door securing the cycle store should be fitted with a fob-activated, electronic lock with push button to exit. It should be self-closing and self-locking. An alarm should sound at reception if this door remains open.
- 3.3.19 Cycle stands/racks should allow the cyclist to secure the wheels and frame to the stand/rack.

Refuse store

- 3.3.20 Both the street facing and the internal door connecting should be security-certified, and be self-closing and self-locking. Each door should be fitted with a fob activated, electronic lock (to enter or exit).

CCTV and lighting

- 3.3.21 Referred to in the Management Plan, a comprehensive CCTV system should be installed capable of monitoring all building elevations and external entrance doors, the cycle store, bin store internal entrance door, reception area, community room, gym amenity space on the first floor.
- 3.3.22 All external doors should be illuminated from dusk to dawn.

External spaces

- 3.3.23 The streetscape immediately adjacent to the development should be of a high quality. Such spaces tend to be respected and are more likely to be maintained by landowners, residents and public bodies.

- 3.3.24 Street furniture or bollards should be used to prevent pavement parking in front of the building and to restrict access to the parking/loading spaces at the rear to authorised vehicles only.
- 3.3.25 Avoid finishes on the rear elevation that might attract graffiti.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Doors

Main entrance

- ☐ The main entrance door should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, and include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic, access control system.
- ☐ The doors should be self-closing and self-locking.

Community hub entrance

- ☐ The entrance door should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.

External means of escape

- ☐ The means of escape doors on the southern elevation should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ There should be no external ironmongery on the escape doors.
- ☐ The doors should be self-closing and self-locking.

Cycle store

- ☐ The external cycle store door should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The cycle store doors should be fob activated to both enter and to leave.
- ☐ All cycle store access doors should also be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

Bin store

- ☐ The external doors should be certified to LPS 1175 sr 2.
- ☐ The internal door should be fitted with an electronic lock requiring a fob/card to activate the lock on entry and exit.
- ☐ In an emergency, panic hardware is acceptable on the inside of the street-facing doors.
- ☐ All doors should also be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

Generator room

- ☐ The external doors should be certified to LPS 1175 sr 2.
- ☐ The internal door should be at least FD30 rated fitted with a British Standard lock.
- ☐ All doors should also be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

Plant room and sub-station

- ☐ The external doors to the plant room and sub-station should be certified to LPS 1175 sr 2, or be of steel construction, set in a steel frame and fitted with two British Standard locks or Sold Secure padlocks fitted at 1/3 points on each set of doors.

Inner lobby doors

- ☐ To minimise the risk of intruders 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors, the inner lobby doors should include an electronic lock activated by a residents' fob. The doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

Studio and cluster flat entrance doors

- ☐ Entrance doors to the studios and cluster flats should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2 and include a door viewer. The doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- ☐ Study bedroom doors within the shared studios and cluster flats should be 44mm, solid-core doors fitted with a Secured by Design certified electronic lock and include a door viewer.

Administration office

- ☐ The door to the administration office should be fitted with a British Standard lock or Secured by Design certified, electronic lock, a door viewer, and be self-closing and lock securely on closure.
- ☐ An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the entrance to the handset at the reception desk. Staff should be able to open the outer door remotely.

Roof access

- ☐ Doors providing access to roof spaces should be restricted to key-holding management and maintenance staff. The doors should be FD30-rated and fitted with at least one British Standard lock.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Any opening windows at ground floor should be certified to PAS 24 or LPS 1175 sr2, have key-operated window locks and tamper-proof opening restrictors (limiting opening to 100mm) fitted.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within all of the ground floor entrance or means of escape doors, and ground floor windows/curtain walling, must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all external doors. Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ The main residents' entrance and the cyclist's entrance should be particularly well lit.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.5 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should be installed.
- ☐ Suitable locations for cameras are:
 - all elevations of the building, with particular focus on the all external doors and the approach to the main entrance;
 - lobby;
 - reception area;
 - the means of escape doors (internal view); and,
 - the cycle store entrance doors and the within store itself.
- ☐ Images should be, ideally, monitored, but at least recorded, with recording equipment securely located in the administration office, or at a suitable off-site CCTV monitoring/recording centre.

4.6 Cycle Store

- ☐ The street level entrance door to the cycle store should be should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ An alarm should sound at reception if the external door remains open.
- ☐ Cycle stands/racks should allow the cyclist to secure the wheels and frame to the stand/rack.

4.7 Signage

- ☐ Signs to indicate the name of the development should be erected at the entrance.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address repairs to communal areas – amenity spaces, kitchens, social spaces, lighting, signage, access controls, and CCTV system.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure the site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ☐ The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved, (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of a development and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
16.03.21	Ben Clee, Rhomco Consulting Ltd	Request for crime impact statement
29.03.21		Site visited
14.04.21	Ben Clee, Rhomco Consulting Ltd	Report issued
30.04.21	Ben Clee, Rhomco Consulting Ltd	Management Plan received
11.05.21	Ben Clee, Rhomco Consulting Ltd	Report re-issued
16.08.22	Ben Clee, Rhomco Consulting Ltd	Revised scheme

B CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		14.04.21
B	Report revised to acknowledge preparation of Management Plan	11.05.21