



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Plots 2 & 3, Angel Square, Manchester
Offices, Retail, Public Realm (44,525sqm)

FOR: NOMA (GP) Limited

VERSION A: 10th June 2022

REFERENCE: 2015/0291/CIS/03

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Angel Square

2015/0291/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The following areas have been identified as a concern and should be addressed (see section 3.3 for more details).

- The space between the two buildings should be illuminated to a high standard to reduce the potential for antisocial behaviour.
- The public realm should be designed so that there are good sightlines to deter criminals from operating and prevent the generation of antisocial behaviour.
- Access control and physical security of the buildings should be carefully considered.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Office Burglary Risk Analysis	
	2.4 Retail Burglary Risk Analysis	
	2.5 Restaurants / Cafés Burglary Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis	
	2.7 Office Theft Risk Analysis	
	2.8 Restaurants / Cafés Theft Risk Analysis	
	2.9 Theft Bike Cycle: Risk Analysis	
	2.10 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	13
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	14
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows & Shutters	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.5 Access control	
	4.6 Lighting	
	4.7 CCTV	
	4.8 Landscaping	
5	Management & Maintenance	16
6	Management & Maintenance	17
7	Construction	17
8	Useful References	17
	8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	18
B	Associated Documents.....	18
C	CIS Version History	18



1 Visual Audit

The site is on the northern edge of central Manchester, and site within the NOMA regeneration area. The area to the north is now largely residential, as former industrial buildings have been replaced by or converted into apartments.

The site is close to major public transport facilities at Shudehill Bus Station, Victoria railway station and two Metrolink tram stops.

Significant features of the neighbourhood include the “Printworks” leisure complex, which contains a number of licensed premises. The Manchester Arena is also nearby, which draws in large numbers of people and vehicles attending events.

The western side of the site faces Angel Square, an attractive amenity space popular with local office staff and smokers. The site lies between the clockwise and anticlockwise carriageways of the inner ring road and a substantial residential development has been developed on the adjacent lot to the East of the site, which has commercial units at ground floor.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2021 and 30th May 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
62	89	217	878	659	88	27	556	39	56

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high; however, the proposed site is located within Manchester City Centre. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded crimes within the local area. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are taking place throughout the local area, with a high concentration taking place to the southeast of the proposed site, where the Shudehill and Northern Quarter are situated; there are a large proportion of licenced premises and retail outlets within this area. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings with the majority of offences taking place within the late evening and early hours of the morning, often when licenced premises in the area are closing, verbal and physical assaults have mostly been carried out by unknown offenders.
- 2.1.3 Thefts in the local area have mostly been taking place in the licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises situated around Shudehill and the Arndale Centre; with offenders targeting mobile phones, wallets/ purses and cash. Offenders are using pick pocketing and distraction methods to obtain the personal belongings. Offences have also occurred around Red Bank situated to the northwest of the proposed site, theft from the person and the removal of insecure bags and phones have taken place within this area.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime has been taking place throughout the local area with vehicles parked on the local streets and in secure car parks being targeted. Thefts from motor vehicles is the highest recorded vehicle crime taking place in the area with smashed glazing being the most common entry point.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Secure windows and doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools to gain access to the building.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Avoid locating openings in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed.

- 2.2.2 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property.

Possible Solution - There should be a robust access control system in place to ensure that visitors to the buildings are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed further access into the building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

- 2.2.3 Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - All ground floor or otherwise accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Windows in secluded locations may require additional protection from criminal damage, such as shutters or grilles.

2.2.4 Shutters have been prised open to target doors / windows behind them.




Possible Solution - All shutters should be certified to a recognised burglary-resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR 2). Shutters certified to this standard can resist most attempts by offenders to gain access with the use of force. In high-risk situations, shutters rated to a higher standard of resistance should be installed, and retractable bollards can be used to protect section overhead doors and shutters.

2.2.5 Entering premises and removing personal items (mostly mobile phones and bags) belonging to customers.

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with ‘Chelsea Clips’ to reduce the opportunities to steal bags / coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

2.3 Office Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.




2.3.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night / into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries committed in Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors and windows behind them.

2.4 Retail Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.




2.4.1 Day / Time Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.4.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.5 Restaurants / Cafés Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 -2019.





2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday. The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the premises.
- Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the windows and doors located underneath.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors, accessing restricted areas and removing goods belonging to staff and the company.

2.6 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.

2.7 Office Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.7.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours / staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.8 Restaurants / Cafés Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.8.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants / cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants / cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.9 Theft Bike Cycle: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against Bike Storage facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 -2019.



- 2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at bike storage facilities in Manchester peaks on a Tuesday and Wednesday during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders have targeted bicycles stored within communal buildings and within residential car parking. Tools have been used to remove the bicycles - chains often cut.

2.10 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.10.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon and into the evening. Vehicles parked within close proximity to the city centre, and around hospital sites, are likely to be left unattended, out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for the offender.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The Proposed Development comprises the erection of two high quality commercial office buildings of 13 and 14 storeys, alongside public realm, car parking, extensive cycle parking facilities, and associated highways and access arrangements.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The building footprints at ground floor level are relatively simple and contain no areas of potential concealment.
- 3.2.2 The main pedestrian entrances to the buildings are located in prominent locations and are readily apparent on approaching from the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 Speed gates will restrict access from the reception of the building into the circulation cores, restricting access to employees and legitimate visitors.
- 3.2.4 The passageway/stepped area between the two buildings will be subject to high levels of natural surveillance from the ground floor commercial uses of the building, which will be a deterrent to antisocial behaviour such as loitering in this area.
- 3.2.5 All doors and shutters appear to be flush with the external elevations of the buildings, removing areas of potential concealment that could be subject to abuse. There are no features of the building footprint that could conceal an offender from view.
- 3.2.6 Glazed elevations to most of the public elevations will help to enliven the street scene and enhance natural surveillance of and from the building.
- 3.2.7 The ground floor/lower ground floor units will provide an active frontage to Angel Square and the streets/areas surrounding the building. The retail offering to the rear of the building will provide a frontage to this area.
- 3.2.8 The proposed offices and ground floor commercial unit will generate additional activity in the local area, which can deter criminals from operating in the area and reduce the potential for antisocial behaviour.
- 3.2.9 Cycle storage for staff is provided in a designated room within the buildings. Entry to this area must be restricted to genuine cyclists only and requires access-controlled doors. Space is identified for secure storage lockers, allowing cyclists to store personal items / clothing.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

No 2 & 3 Angel Square

- 3.3.1 The steps between the two buildings, providing access to Angel Square from Angel Gardens should be illuminated to a high standard to deter antisocial/criminal behaviour such as loitering, or drug/alcohol consumption. Any vegetation in this area should be carefully designed so that sight lines are not obscured, and pedestrians can view any potential threats.
- 3.3.2 Access to the upper ground floor terraces should be restricted when the associated commercial units are closed, to prevent these areas being misused by those anti-socially, or criminally, minded. These terraces should be illuminated to a high standard to prevent misuse when it is dark but the premises are open.
- 3.3.3 The office reception should be staffed during standard office hours (i.e.8am-6pm) to allow visitors to be vetted before being permitted access into the building. There should be a video/audio intercom on the main entrance to allow staff to vet visitors to the building when the main reception is not staffed.
- 3.3.4 Access into and around the office building should be governed with an auditable access control system.

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- 3.3.5 Access into the proposed bicycle store should operate on an access control system, with access restricted to genuine users. Cycle stands should be Sheffield style, or similar, allowing both wheels and the frame to be locked.
 - 3.3.6 The plans appear to indicate that cyclists will use the main entrance of the building to access to cycle store. If external access is provided to the cycle store they should be particularly well illuminated so that it can be used early in the morning and late in the evening when it is dark.
 - 3.3.7 Individual office suites should have a secure door set (i.e. BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR 2).
 - 3.3.8 The building should be covered by a monitored intruder alarm (see section 4.4 for more details). Individual offices and ground floor commercial unit(s) should have the infrastructure so that any tenants can easily install an intruder alarm.
 - 3.3.9 A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed to monitor all external doors and elevations, the reception area, circulation cores, all plant/back-of-house functions, and the cycle store. Individual offices and ground floor commercial unit(s) should have the infrastructure so that any tenants can easily install a CCTV system if required.
 - 3.3.10 Any blank facades should be treated with an anti-graffiti coating, to an approximate height of 2000mm, so that graffiti can easily be cleaned.

Angel Square Public Realm & Landscaping

- 3.3.11 Access to Angel Square from surrounding roads should be restricted with bollards rated to BS PAS 64, or similar rated HVM products, to prevent unauthorised vehicles from entering the space.
- 3.3.12 Landscaping should be carefully designed so that it does not encourage illegitimate use or block sightlines, to the advantage of offenders, or those antisocially minded. It is recommended that low planting does not exceed 1000mm in height (from floor level) and tree canopies do not fall lower than 2400mm, to ensure good sightlines can be maintained.
- 3.3.13 Any external seating areas should be well defined with the use of permanent, or removable/temporary, barriers, to prevent offenders from easily accessing tables and stealing personal property. It is highly recommended that any tables have a clip/hook on the underside so that bags can be stored securely and out of reach.
- 3.3.14 Bicycle parking should be provided for users of the public realm. Parking for bicycles should be located in highly visible locations where they can be easily seen by users.
- 3.3.15 Footpaths should be illuminated to deter congregation/loitering and allow pedestrians to view any potential threats. The footpaths should be wide enough to reduce the potential for pedestrians to pass each other with plenty of space.
- 3.3.16 Materials used in the public realm should be robust and difficult to damage/deface. Any timber used should ideally be treated with a fire retardant to reduce the risk of arson.
- 3.3.17 Maintenance of newly installed features (i.e. lighting, signage, gates etc.), should be incorporated into the management & maintenance procedures.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doorsets including the main entrance pass door, cycle access door, bin store doors and escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. All of these doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- ☐ The revolving entrance doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Entrance doors to individual office suites should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ Where feasible, any ground level, opening windows should be certificated to LPS1175 or BS PAS 24, fitted with opening restrictors and with key operated locks.
- ☐ Curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any security shutters or grilles must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required).

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All accessible glazing (i.e. below a height of 2000mm from external ground level) must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any louvres at ground floor level to plant areas/refuge stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed or damaged. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required (see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for SBD approved suppliers).

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored intruder alarm system should be installed. Alarms should have contacts on all external doors or shutters, and PIR in rooms with windows. The alarm should include a signal terminating at the security control room/patrol team. The alarms should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up), so that if either signalling path is tampered with by an intruder, or is faulty, the other continues to monitor for any further alarms and transmits them as 'confirmed activations' – extra confirmation that an intruder is on the premises and that the alarm isn't false.
- ☐ Individual office suites/floors should also consider having an intruder alarm should the buildings be open but some office remain closed. As a minimum individual offices or floorplates should have the infrastructure so that an alarm can be installed by future tenants.
- ☐ The ground floor commercial unit should have an intruder alarm or be capable of being fitted by one when tenanted.

4.5 Access control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The revolving entrance door and any pass doors.
 - Turnstiles/speed gates and/or lifts
 - Staff only areas
 - Plant areas and areas restricted to maintenance staff
 - External cycle access doors, cycle store, and changing rooms.
 - F&B/retail unit entrances (internal & external)
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should ideally be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff key-fobs/cards should be capable of being quickly activated or disabled when required, to ensure they are not misused. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work.

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- ☐ Lockers should be provided in the changing rooms for staff to store personal items whilst changing/showering.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, and producing 'white' light, should be installed to all external doors of each building.

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV camera system should be installed. Cameras should be capable of monitoring all building elevations - with particular emphasis on external doors (cameras should be able to observe people coming and going), and the entrance lobbies.
- ☐ Recording equipment should be located within a secure room or images may be recorded off-site at a suitable monitoring facility.
- ☐ CCTV monitoring screens should be located at the reception desk and or security office.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ Landscaping should be carefully designed so that it does not encourage illegitimate use or block sightlines, to the advantage of offenders, or those antisocially minded. It is recommended that low planting does not exceed 1000mm in height (from floor level) and tree canopies do not fall lower than 2400mm, to ensure good sightlines can be maintained.
- ☐ Any external seating areas should be well defined with the use of permanent, or removable/temporary, barriers, to prevent offenders from easily accessing tables and stealing personal property. It is highly recommended that any tables have a clip/hook on the underside so that bags can be stored securely and out of reach.
- ☐ Bicycle parking should be provided for users of the public realm. Parking for bicycles should be located in highly visible locations where they can be easily seen by users.
- ☐ Footpaths should be illuminated to deter congregation/loitering and allow pedestrians to view any potential threats. The footpaths should be wide enough to reduce the potential for pedestrians to pass each other with plenty of space.
- ☐ Materials used in the public realm should be robust and difficult to damage/deface. Any timber used should ideally be treated with a fire retardant to reduce the risk of arson.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security and maintenance regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
 - Opening and closing the offices, including staff arrival and departure.
 - Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
 - Details of staff security training.
 - Location and management of any smoking areas.
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc
 - Refuse collection arrangements.

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- 5.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
19/05/2022	Jennifer Chatfield	CIS instruction received
25/05/2022	Various	CIS meeting

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	CIS Presentation May 2022		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		