



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

ANCHORS AWAY PLAY, SIMONSWAY, JUNCTION 4 M56, WYTHENSHAW
RETAIL (589sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR: Seva Patidar Ltd
VERSION A: 26/04/2022
REFERENCE: 2022/0149/CIS/01

Anchors Away Play, Simonsway, Junction 4 M56, Wythenshawe

URN: 2022/0149/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements/additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The street frontages of the units should be protected by anti-ram bollards or similar hard landscaping features to ensure they are not vulnerable to unauthorised vehicular access. The design of any raised planters/hard landscaping features should deter climbing, damage and loitering/gathering.
- The car park serving the development should be capable of being secured to prevent unauthorised vehicles getting close to the building and prevent mis-use of the car park out-of-hours – either with the existing weld-mesh fencing/gates, low-level railings or robust knee-rails and defensive planting beds, along with a vehicle arm barrier or retractable bollards at the site entrance.
- Prevention of unauthorised access to the roof of the single-storey building.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is bounded by Simonsway to the north, Greenbrow Road to the west and Deptford Avenue to the east, in the Wythenshawe area of south Manchester.

The northern portion of the site is occupied by a single-storey building currently in use as a play centre, with grass to the west and unkempt hard standing to the north. The southern portion of the site is occupied by a car park accessed off Greenbrow Road. The whole site is enclosed with high welded-wire mesh fencing/vehicular gates, some panels of which have been damaged/bent.

Simonsway, to the north of the site, is a busy vehicular route just off Junction 4 of the M56 motorway (to the east). On the northern side of Simonsway from the site are the grounds of St. Peter's Primary & High Schools (fronting towards Firbank Rad), with dense vegetation/mature trees along the street frontage – meaning the site benefits from little/no direct overlooking from this direction.


The Newhall Green Baptist Church and Oak Tree Centre on the opposite side of Greenbrow Road from the site also provides little direct overlooking over the site.

The residential properties on the opposite side of Deptford Avenue to the south provide direct overlooking over the site (particularly the car park serving the play centre).

To the immediate east of the site is Shore Green – a housing association scheme for people with dementia, fronting onto Kennett Road.

The existing building has been heavily fortified with external shutters and grilles – indicating it may have suffered from crime and disorder issues in the past. Although they can be effective, such overt retro-fitted security measures can be visually intrusive and can inadvertently raise the fear of crime.

The wider surrounding area is primarily residential in nature, with areas of open space to the east and west and school grounds to the north.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2021 to 28th February 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary


Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
22	<5	54	236	22	7	6	13	5	<5


- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively high, particularly when it is considered that the local area includes transport infrastructure, large school grounds and areas of open space – which lower the density of development within the locale. The most prevalent types of recorded crime have been less serious wounding and criminal damage.
- 2.1.2 Recorded less serious wounding crimes have taken place throughout the local area, particularly around/off the residential streets to the west and the south-east. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded crimes taking place, with the majority of offences involving domestic and neighbour disputes, as well as altercations between known associates. Offences have mostly taken place within dwellings or on residential streets.
- 2.1.3 In terms of criminal damage offences, offenders have particularly targeted the windows of vehicles and dwellings – using implements to smash them. Offenders have also damaged doors within dwellings and have damaged vehicle paint/body work.
- 2.1.4 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed retail development, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.

2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late and night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.



2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

2.3 Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or off/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Manchester retail premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Sections 4.1/4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.7 & 4.8) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by. Advice on glazed panels can be found below.

- Windows have also been prised open and glazing within them (and doors) has been smashed by offenders

Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours (see Section 4.2).

- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 4.1).

- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 4.3).

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to refurbish/extend and change the use of the existing building to form a convenience store and 2 no. smaller retail units (totalling 589sqm.), with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 Each of the 3 no. units will have entrances fronting towards Greenbrow Road, with the convenience store occupying the northern portion of the building and the 2 no. smaller retail units occupying the southern portion. Retail unit and convenience store deliveries will be via two roller shutter doors to the southern elevation of the building, with a plant enclosure to the north-east and a refuse compound to the south-east of the building. The units will be served by the existing car park to the south (off Greenbrow Road), comprising of 33 no. vehicle spaces, with cycle parking for 6 no. cycles proposed to the frontage of Retail Unit 1. Planters are proposed to the north and south of the building.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and, possibly, into the evening.
- 3.2.2 The building will have a relatively simple footprint that will provide few potential places of concealment and facilitate efficient surveillance of external areas.
- 3.2.3 The proposed customer parking area will be visible from Greenbrow Road and Deptford Avenue, increasing natural surveillance opportunities. The parking spaces will also be laid out in straight rows, with relatively few obstacles to views across them, further aiding surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.4 The main entrances to the proposed retail units will be located in prominent positions, where they can be easily seen from the street.
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The glazed street frontages of the convenience store and retail units (to both Simonsway and Greenbrow Road) should be protected by anti-ram bollards or similar hard landscaping features (should as raised planters) to ensure they are not vulnerable to unauthorised vehicular access or damage. The design of any raised planters/hard landscaping features, both along the street frontages of the units and within the car park, should be carefully considered to deter mistreatment (such as climbing) and damage. Their design should also discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them, which could encourage groups to loiter/gather around the retail units and potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to nearby residents and customers of the units.
- 3.3.2 The car park serving the development should be capable of being secured to prevent unauthorised vehicles getting close to the building and prevent mis-use of the car park out-of-hours. Either the existing weld-mesh fencing and gates should be retained (and repaired where necessary) or they should be replaced with low-level railings or robust knee-rails and defensive planting beds, along with a vehicle arm barrier or retractable bollards at the site entrance (see Section 4.6 for more information). All pedestrian access to and from the site/car park should also be off Greenbrow Road, where pedestrians will be funnelled away from the residential properties/parked vehicles along Deptford Avenue and pedestrian movement around/between parked vehicles within the site will be deterred (where damage can easily occur – both accidentally and maliciously).

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- 3.3.3 Given the single-storey nature of the existing building and that retail burglaries through roofs have been experienced across Manchester (see Section 2.2), consideration must be given to the prevention of access onto/through the roof of the proposed retail units. The eaves of the building should be as high as possible, in order to discourage unauthorised access to the roof. Ideally, the design of the eaves should also discourage climbing e.g. with rounded/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. and there should be no other features of the building (such as projecting window cills or window reveals, brickwork/cladding features, projecting shutter boxes or exposed rainwater downpipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as immediately adjacent low walls/handrails, plant/bin enclosures, raised planters, lighting columns/street furniture, canopies below the eaves of the building etc.) that may provide climbing aids onto the roof. The construction the roof area itself should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 4.3). It is obviously preferable for the design of the building to deter access without the need for the installation of overt, retro-fitted anti-climb measures if problems are experienced once the scheme is complete.
- 3.3.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme as a whole. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors (both single and double leaf) to the convenience store and retail units must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ If the main entrance to the convenience store is to be formed by sliding doors, they should be tested and certified to BS EN 1627 RC2+, with multi-point locking (preventing sliding and lifting) and laminated glazing (see below). They should also be protected by a shutter (certified to LPS 1775 SR1/2) out-of-hours.
- ☐ The delivery shutter doors serving the convenience store and retail units 1 & 2 should be compliant with and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The rear doors of retail units 1 & 2, into the shared service/delivery space, should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2 in order to prevent unauthorised internal access.
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas to the convenience store or retail units should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to back-of-house storage rooms, staff rooms, offices, plant/service areas etc. should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (operated by proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys. Key-coded locks are not advised as they can be easily observed/shared and are rarely changed. Any cash offices should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset (see above). Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ Any electric locking systems to be used throughout the units should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

4.2 Window & Shutters

- ☐ All windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed and non-opening.
- ☐ Any shutters to be installed should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any external shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack or being used as a climbing aid to reach the roof of the building.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ The glazed street frontages of the convenience store and retail units should be protected by anti-ram bollards or hard landscaping features (as described within Section 3.3). Any louvered elevations should be of robust construction i.e. the louvres themselves should not be easily removable, easily damaged/bended and should be aligned to deter climbing. Security-certified louvered doorsets are available if required (see www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search?view=category&category=Doors).

- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any areas of external cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack. Internal walls between units, as well as to shared delivery spaces, should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.
- ☐ The eaves of the building should be as high as possible, in order to discourage unauthorised access to the roof. The design of the eaves should also discourage climbing (e.g. with rounded/overhanging eaves or high balustrades) and there should be no other features of the building or nearby hard/soft landscaping features that may provide climbing aids onto the roof. The construction of any 'accessible' areas of roof should also be carefully considered to prevent criminal intrusion. Certificated lightweight roof systems are available to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, expanded-metal or welded-mesh should be incorporated between the skins of double-skinned roof coverings or within the roof space.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to an anti-graffiti coating to any large expanses of blank walls (e.g. such as 'easy-on' protective coating, please see www.urbanhygiene.com for more information) that prevent it from adhering to the surface. If the surface is defaced, it can then be easily and quickly removed.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Monitored alarm systems should be installed to cover the convenience store and the retail units, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. The alarms themselves should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up).

4.5 Any ATM

- ☐ If an ATM is required to the convenience store, it should preferably be located internally within the premises - well-overlooked from the staff counter. If an external, through-the-wall ATM must be provided, it should be located to maximize surveillance over it and its users. It should also be located away from the entrance of the unit, where members of the public would be funnelled into close proximity of the ATM and its users – providing opportunities to criminals. The following general measures should also be incorporated:
 - Lighting should be provided to the area around any ATM to an adequate and uniform level (as defined within BS 5489), so as not to allow any areas of pooling/shadowing.
 - Defensible space ground markings (e.g. 1sqm. painted area or change in surface texture) should be employed at the front of any ATM to indicate that only one user at a time may enter the space.
 - Any ATMs should be covered by CCTV that should view the area and the users of the ATM, but not the ATM keypad itself.
 - Any ATM should be protected by anti-ram bollards or similar to deter against ram-raid type attacks.
 - Replenishment of any ATM should be carried out from a secure area inside the host building or while members of the public are excluded from the premises. A dedicated parking area should be provided for the cash-in-transit vehicle within the immediately vicinity of any ATM.

4.6 Boundaries & Car Park

- ☐ The external plant area to the north-east of the building and the refuse compound to the south-east should be enclosed and secured with walls, fire-retardant acoustic/screen fencing or rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing and pedestrian gates, to a height of 2100-2400mm. Care must be taken to ensure the enclosures do not form a climbing aid onto the roof the building. Where pedestrian gates may be required for emergency egress purposes, the release mechanism on the internal side of the gate should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fenceline/gate. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and all boundaries/gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as adjacent planters, lighting columns, trees or street furniture etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to gates should be



avoided or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.

- ☐ The car park serving the retail units should be capable of being secured to prevent unauthorised vehicles getting close to the building and prevent mis-use of the car park out-of-hours. Either the existing weld-mesh fencing and gates should be retained (and repaired where necessary) or they should be replaced with low-level railings or robust knee-rails and defensive planting beds, along with a vehicle arm barrier or retractable bollards at the site entrance. All pedestrian access to/from the site should also be off Greenbrow Road, where pedestrians will be funnelled away from the residential properties/parked vehicles along Deptford Avenue and pedestrian movement around/between parked vehicles within the site will be deterred (where damage can easily occur – both accidentally and maliciously).
- ☐ The car park serving the development should be defined and enclosed with the existing weld-mesh fencing and gates (repaired where necessary), low-level railings (e.g. 1200mm high) or robust knee-rails along with low-level/dense defensive planting beds, with a vehicle arm barrier or retractable bollards at the vehicular entrance to allow it to be secured out-of-hours.
- ☐ The surface of the car park should be even tarmac. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime. Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or onto the roof of the building. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an **acceptable standard** that will allow for **identification** of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are **overview** and **recognition**, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the main entrances to convenience store and the retail units](#), [all internal circulation areas including all pay points/cash offices and all external areas \(including the car park, service/delivery areas and all façades of the building\)](#).

4.9 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 600mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots. These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.10 Other

- ☐ It is preferable to have cycle lockers for customers to use. If not, there should be 'Sheffield' style racks (or similar) provided in a highly visible location. Cyclists should be encouraged to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar and, therefore, a design of cycle stand that enables this method of locking is recommended (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ The external refuse store should be a secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosure (see Section 4.6 above). A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development and servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

5 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of the convenience store and retails unit should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-user requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

- 5.1.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.
- 5.1.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrances to the units.
- 5.1.3 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.
- 5.1.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 5.1.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the retail units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of the premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash storage/management within the units;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices;
 - Management of stock deliveries and waste collection;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. lighting, alarm systems, CCTV cameras etc; and
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc.
- 6.1.2 The opening hours of the premises should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses.
- 6.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout each of the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
22 nd March 2022	CW Architects	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
23 rd March 2022	CW Architects	Confirmation of instruction/fee
13 th April 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
19791-CWA-XX-A-0100	Site Location Plan	22/03/22	P01
19791-CWA-XX-A-0101	Proposed Site Plan	22/03/22	P02
19791-CWA-XX-A-0102	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	22/03/22	P02
19791-CWA-XX-A-0103	Proposed Elevations	22/03/22	P01
19791-CWA-XX-A-0201	Existing Site Plan	22/03/22	P02
19791-CWA-XX-A-0202	Existing Ground Floor Plan	22/03/22	P01
19791-CWA-XX-A-0203	Existing Elevations	22/03/22	P01

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk