



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

SITE BOUNDED BY KING STREET WEST, ST. MARYS PARSONAGE,
GARDEN LANE & SMITHY LANE, MANCHESTER

OFFICES & GROUND FLOOR COMMERCIAL UNIT (10,000sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Property Alliance Group

VERSION A: 27/07/2022

REFERENCE: 2022/0017/CIS/02

Site bounded by King Street West, St. Marys Parsonage, Garden Lane & Smithy Lane, Manchester

URN: 2022/0017/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements/additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

■ ...

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is bounded by King Street West to the south, St. Mary's Parsonage to the west, Garden Lane to the north and Smithy Lane to the east, in Manchester City Centre.

It is occupied by a cluster of Grade II listed buildings (collectively known as Reedham House), including former carriage manufacturer and warehouse buildings to the north (enclosing an external courtyard) constructed in the mid-1800s to the north, and more modern buildings constructed/remodelled in 1926 and 1956 to the south.

The ground floor of the buildings are currently occupied by a restaurant, a health clinic and a beauticians fronting onto King Street West and a wall systems supplier fronting onto St. Mary's Parsonage. The upper floors of the building are occupied by offices.

To the north of the site, on the opposite side of Garden Lane, is a similar heritage building occupied by a Solicitors, which is connected to the site by a high-level glass bridge.

To the east is a multi-storey car park, beyond which is the former Kendals department store, which have planning consent for conversion and new build ground floor retail and upper floor offices.


On the opposite side of St. Mary' Parsonage from the site is a pedestrian-only public realm route leading to a footbridge over the River Irwell (Trinity Bridge) flanked by Alberton House to the east and Albert Bridge House to the west. Alberton House is also due to be redeveloped..

To the south (on the opposite side of King Street West), the building overlooks Motor Square – a small area of hard landscaped public realm bounded by King Street West, St. Mary's Parsonage, Bridge Street and commercial premises to the east.

Garden Lane and Smithy Lane are very narrow routes that benefit from limited levels of activity, surveillance and overlooking. They are flanked by partially blank facades to the adjacent buildings and the MSCP, which have been daubed with large amounts of graffiti. Any low/high level window openings along the routes have been heavily fortified with bars/grilles or shutters – indicating the presence or crime and disorder issues.

There are many similar 'back' streets within the city centre, which have limited levels of pedestrian footfall and vehicular movement, particularly at night, and this can leave buildings potentially vulnerable to unauthorised access or damage unseen, as well as to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues, and can leave pedestrians using them somewhat remote/isolated.

Given the primarily commercial uses in the immediate local of the site, the area is likely to benefit from lower levels of footfall, passive surveillance and direct overlooking late at night than it does during the day (particularly during the working week).



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st June 2021 to 31st May 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
20	93	188	1305	1183	116	43	250	40	93

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is very high, particularly the levels of violence and theft, reflecting the site's location within the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of such crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly to the east and south of the proposed site, around/off Deansgate/Bridge Street/Peter Street, where there is a concentration of licensed premises. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises, often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts.
- 2.1.3 Thefts have taken place throughout the area, with hotspots occurring to the south of the proposed site, around/off Deansgate and Quay Street/Peter Street. These areas have a high volume of footfall due a concentration of public transport links, licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises. Offenders have primarily used pick-pocketing techniques and distraction methods to obtain personal belongings, mostly mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (particularly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.
- 2.1.4 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed office scheme (with ancillary uses), the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

Manchester Office Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.


2.3 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.

Manchester Office Theft – Day Range




Manchester Office Theft – Time Range



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



2.4.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.

2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

2.5 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.


2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area 2018 - 2019.



- 2.1.1 **Day Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises peaks between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday.
- 2.1.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typically found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.

M/cr Licensed Premises Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.1.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered licensed premises through external doors. Most commonly, doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools/implements. In a number of cases, glazing in doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Where the point of entry was legitimate/unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas.


2.2 Theft (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

M/cr Licensed Premises Theft – Day Range




M/cr Licensed Premises Theft – Time Range



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafés in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafés through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.

2.4 Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.5 General Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- 2.5.1 **Offices:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

- 2.5.2 **Retail:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles

- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5.3 **Licensed Premises/Restaurants & Cafes:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting Manchester office/retail premises and Greater Manchester leisure facilities are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Manchester Offices, Retail, Licensed Premises & Restaurants/Cafes:** Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure to gain entry

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting (see Section 4.6) and CCTV (see Section 4.9) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- **Manchester Offices:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to the office building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Sections 4.1/4.2). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

- **Manchester Offices, Licensed Premises & Restaurants/Cafes:** Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain access

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.4), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- **Manchester Retail:** A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (to LPS 1175 SR 1/2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- **Manchester Retail:** Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders

Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.3) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.4), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours.

- **Manchester Retail, Licensed Premises & Restaurants/Cafes:** A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Sections 4.1/4.2).

- **Manchester Retail:** Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

- **Manchester Licensed Premises, Restaurant/Cafes & Retail:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 5). The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to retain the existing heritage carriageworks buildings to the north of the site and demolish the remaining buildings to make way for a part single storey, part 13 storey new build element wrapping around the retained listed structures. The existing historic courtyard will be enclosed as a glazed atrium space.
- 3.1.2 The building will front towards King Street West, with the main front entrance off the street and a secondary entrance to the rear of the building off Garden Lane – allowing staff/cycle access to the lift serving the basement cycle store/changing facilities. The ground floor of the building will feature a large entrance foyer/atrium with concierge desk, a single-storey retail/food & beverage unit fronting onto St. Mary' Parsonage (with a potential internal link to the office entrance lobby), a gym for the use of office tenants, a large bin store and plant areas, a dedicated lift to serve the basement cycle store/changing facilities, lifts/stair cores to serve the listed office floorplates to the rear of the building and separate lift/stair cores to serve the new build element of the scheme. The upper floors of the building will feature open plan office floorplates and W/Cs (the existing and new build elements will be treated as separate structures due to the fire engineering strategy). Level 10 will feature a wrap-around inset terrace for use of the tenant and the roof of the new build will feature plant and an internal amenity space and terrace for the use of all tenants.
- 3.1.3 The public realm areas/routes surrounding the building will be improved as part of the proposal and will likely include bollards, natural stone paving, bespoke lighting columns, cycle parking areas, feature trees, rain gardens and seating.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The replacement of an existing cluster of commercial/office buildings with a new office led scheme, in an area of the city occupied primarily by similar premises, is unlikely to have any detrimental effect on the existing community.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will provide additional activity, natural surveillance and overlooking to the area, at all times of the day and into the evening/night
- 3.2.3 The building will present active frontages along King Street West and St Mary's Parsonage, as well as increased activity/surveillance along the widened routes of Garden Lane and Smithy Lane - enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.4 The glazed façades of the building offer both surveillance opportunities and a greater level of artificial light onto the street/public realm.
- 3.2.5 The building will include no deep/narrow recesses at ground level that would hide windows/doors, leaving them potentially vulnerable to attack.
- 3.2.6 The office reception desk will clearly visible from the exterior of the building and all staff/visitors coming through the main entrance should pass by it to access the upper floors of the building. Each floor plate will be capable of being individually secured, ensuring tenants cannot gain unauthorised access onto other floors/areas within the building.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The proposed ground floor retail/food and beverage space unit will be publicly accessible and could be open late into the evening. If this space is to be part of the office entrance lobby, this could provide opportunities for offenders to gain unauthorised access to the upper office floors of the building (or the basement) without being noticed/challenged. It is preferable for the proposed retail/food & beverage unit along St. Mary's Parsonage to be entirely separate from the office entrance lobby (or at least capable of being separated from it out-of-hours with doors/shutters), to allow it to operate independently and prevent unauthorised access to the upper floor offices or the basement. If the unit is to be part of the office lobby, the control and management of access will be paramount to the security of the scheme (see below).
- 3.3.2 The reception desk within the entrance lobby should be staffed at all times when the building is operational, allowing staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering/leaving the building as well as over the surrounding public realm. The reception desk itself should be relocated to allow staff to directly overlook both the front and rear entrances of the building, as well as the lift/stair access cores serving the building. All visitors to the offices should report to the reception desk for vetting by staff before gaining access to the upper office floors of the building. Ideally, access to the lift/stair cores should be via access-controlled turnstiles/speed gates, particularly if the retail/food and beverage unit is linked internally to the office entrance lobby. It should not be possible for members of the public to by-pass the ground floor reception desk to gain access to the upper floors of the building or the basement. A high, wide reception desk increases the distance between reception staff and any potential aggressive visitors and aids surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby. The main entrance doors off King Street West and the rear entrance doors of Garden Lane should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required (e.g. into the evening) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in or around the entrance lobby. If the building is to be open at any time without a concierge staffing the lobby area, the main circular sliding/revolving doors should be secured and an adjacent single-leaf entrance door should be utilised, controlled by staff swipe-card/fob or by means of a video access control system linked to each individual office suite (allowing staff to vet visitors before allowing them access). The rear entrance doors off Garden Lane should also be secured and operated by staff swipe-card/fob only. Given the building will be occupied by multiple tenants, it should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office suite to access another. All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and any rooms within flexible working spaces or office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Access to all back-of-house plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only), as should the ground floor gym and the basement staff locker/changing areas and cycle store (as well as the dedicated lift down to them).
- 3.3.3 At present, the narrow routes of Garden Lane and Smithy Lane to the side and rear of the site benefit from lower levels of activity, footfall, passive surveillance and direct overlooking than King Street West and St. Mary's Parsonage. They are also flanked by partially blank facades or door/high level window openings heavily fortified with bars/grilles, which are daubed with large amounts of graffiti – leaving legitimate pedestrians somewhat remote/isolated, intimidated and potentially vulnerable. The proposed scheme will result in a greater level of activity along the adjacent facades (although it is unavoidable that back-of-house functions and service doors will reduce activity along the routes to some degree) and the approved Kendals redevelopment opposite will remove the multi-storey car park, widen the routes themselves and also add active frontages along them. It is highly recommended that the routes are well-lit and well-maintained/managed, in order to encourage legitimate use and discourage mistreatment (see Sections 4.6/4.8). Formal surveillance over the routes will help with this, be it directly from the staffed reception desk (where possible) or remotely via CCTV monitored from the reception desk (see Section 4.9). Any landscape features (hard or soft) along it should not impede natural surveillance of/from the building, along the routes or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or CCTV systems. It is highly recommended that seating is not provided along the routes, which may encourage loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues arising – Garden Lane and Smithy Lane should be defined as movement routes, rather than spaces to gather. Any ramps, steps or any other hard landscaping features (such as raised planters etc.) should be designed to withstand mis-treatment (e.g. from vandalism, skateboarding etc.) and deter anyone from comfortably leaning/sitting/lying on them. There should be bollards or hard/soft landscape features preventing unauthorised vehicular

access off King Street West/St Mary's Parsonage/Dunlop Street. Any cycle parking areas located throughout the public realm area must be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied areas within the adjacent buildings. Secure cycle lockers are preferred, but if not, 'Sheffield' stands should be provided that allow both wheels and the crossbar to be locked to them, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle parking guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>.

- 3.3.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and customers.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2+. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required to plant rooms or refuse stores (see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for SBD approved suppliers).
- ☐ The revolving or sliding doorset to the main entrance of the building should be tested and certified BS PAS 24 or BS EN 1627 RC2. Outside of normal working hours or if the building is to be open at any time without a concierge staffing the lobby area, the revolving/sliding doors should be secured and a single-leaf entrance door (which should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2+) should be controlled by staff key-card and by means of a video access control system linked to a security office or to each individual office suite, allowing staff to vet visitors before allowing them access. See Section 4.2 for more information.
- ☐ Outside of normal working hours or if the building is to be open at any time without a concierge staffing the lobby area, the rear entrance doors off Garden Lane should also be secured and operated by staff swipe-card/fob only (for access to/from the basement cycle store).
- ☐ Given that the office building is to be occupied by multiple tenants, all individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing, solid-core doors (minimum 44mm thick) with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions. Any individual rooms within office suites should be capable of being secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ Any internal doors into any shared emergency egress stair cores should also be solid-core doors (with no ironmongery on the stairwell side of the doorset) and alarmed, with signage to deter mis-use. Once any dedicated emergency escape core is accessed, the only means of egress should be externally at ground floor level.
- ☐ The basement staff changing facilities (as well as the cycle store) should be secured with security-certified doorsets to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, operated by staff key-card only. All other internal doors/frames to the tenant gym, back-of-house plant areas, storage rooms or refuse stores should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff key-card. Similarly, the doorsets to the rooftop amenity space should be capable of being secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ If the ground floor retail/food & beverage unit is to be part of the office entrance lobby and it is to be open late at night, it should be capable of being separated from the office lobby (with security-certified doorsets or LPS 1175 SR1 shutters) outside of normal working hours or if the reception desk is not staffed by a concierge. All back-of-house/staff areas within the unit should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms etc. should be solid-core and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times). Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.

4.2 Access Controls

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads (where codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed). The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The main entrance revolving/sliding doors and any adjacent single-leaf out-of-hours access door (off King Street West) and the rear entrance doors (off Garden Lane) – capable of being operated remotely by reception staff or by staff key-card outside of normal working hours/when required (e.g. outside of normal working hours).
 - It is highly recommended that there are turnstiles/security barriers/speed gates controlling access to the lift/stair cores from the ground floor entrance lobby (particularly if the retail/food and beverage unit is linked internally to the office entrance lobby) – operated remotely by reception staff (for visitor access) or by staff key-card.
 - The dedicated lift down to the basement staff locker/changing areas and cycle store – operable by staff key-card.
 - Internal doors to the tenant gym, cycle stores, changing facilities and all other back-of-house rooms, plant areas, stores and refuse areas – operated by staff key-card.
 - Internal doors to each individually let office suites/floors – operated by staff key-card or remotely by individual office suite reception staff.
 - Any cash office or back-of-house area serving the ground floor retail/food & beverage unit – operated by staff key-card.
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allowing the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work or they are authorised to use and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows, where possible, should be certificated BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any ground floor or first floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than just to perimeter columns.

4.4 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground and first floor glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. All upper floor glazing should incorporate an internal pane rated as at least P1A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the proposed building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack. Any louvres at ground floor level to plant areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid.
- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills/brickwork features, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids to scale the building facades or gain unauthorised access to upper floor windows.

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- ☐ The eaves of the single-storey retail/food & beverage unit should be as high as possible, in order to discourage unauthorised access to the roof. The design of the eaves should also discourage climbing (e.g. with rounded/overhanging eaves) and there should be no other features of the building or nearby hard/soft landscaping features that may provide climbing aids onto the roof. The construction of any 'accessible' areas of roof should also be carefully considered to prevent criminal intrusion. Certificated lightweight roof systems are available to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, expanded-metal or welded-mesh should be incorporated between the skins of double-skinned roof coverings or within the roof space. Any rooflights or upper floor windows potentially accessible from the roof should be to the same physical security specification as those at ground level (see Sections 4.3/4.4 above).

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building (as well as the ground floor retail/food & beverage unit and any individually let office floors/suites), linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre or security office).

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all surrounding public realm/pedestrian routes, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ External lighting must also be provided to all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or to upper floor windows/terraces. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Any External Seating Area

- ☐ Any external seating area to the potential food & beverage unit should be clearly defined as separate from the pedestrian footway by screens, barriers or planters. The overall width of any external seating area (including all tables/chairs and screens/barriers/planters) should be no wider than 50% of the total width of any adjacent pedestrian routes. Tables directly adjacent to the pinch points, such as around lighting columns or signage posts, should be avoided.
- ☐ Tables and chairs, as well as any removable canopies, heaters or screens/barriers should be stored within the premises or within areas secured with shutters/grilles out-of-hours, in order to prevent damage or mis-use and prevent the space from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour when the premises are closed. Any awnings should also be retracted out-of-hours.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see Section 5) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.
- ☐ The layout of any external tables/chairs should be configured so that, as much as possible, they are not located directly adjacent to barriers where it would be easy reach over and steal any items of value. All external seating areas should be capable of being clearly overlooked from internal staff positions.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that any advertising A-boards signs do not inadvertently provide additional features that may narrow the footway and funnel pedestrians into close proximity of the proposed external seating area.
- ☐ The success of any external seating area is largely dependent on the effective management of the space, particularly at peak times. Staff should closely monitor customer use/behaviour and should regularly clear away used crockery/cutlery to prevent theft or mis-use.

4.8 Public Realm/Landscaping

- ☐ The pedestrianised routes to the east side and rear of the building (i.e. Garden lane and Smithy Lane), should be secured with bollards (or similar hard/soft landscaping features - such as mature trees or raised planters) to prevent unauthorised vehicular access.
- ☐ The routes should have no barriers to surveillance along or over them and should be well-lit to an adequate and uniform level (i.e. adoptable standards), with no areas of pooling or shadowing (see Section 4.6 above).
- ☐ The routes should also be overlooked from the main reception desk where possible or via a CCTV system monitored at the reception desk where this is not possible, allowing there to be an immediate response to any incidents recorded (see Section 4.9).
- ☐ The design of any proposed hard landscaping features or street furniture, such as ramps, steps or raised planters, should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment and damage (e.g. from vandalism, skateboarding etc.) and deter anyone from comfortably leaning/sitting/lying or climbing on them. There should be no benches or seating provided along the routes. Loose surface materials should be avoided where possible, as small fragments can be used as missiles to cause damage.
- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, building frontages and along pedestrian routes, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ The robust management of the public realm is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance' can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. If signs of disorder (such as criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse.

4.9 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are [overview](#) and [recognition](#), which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

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- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [all building facades and external entrances](#), the main office entrance lobby (including any turnstiles/speed gates), the retail/food & beverage unit (including the main entrance, customer circulation/seating areas and all pay points), the secure cycle store, all lift lobbies/stairwells on each level and the public realm/pedestrian routes of Garden Lane/Smithy Lane.

It is highly recommended that CCTV coverage over any vulnerable areas is monitored at the reception desk, to ensure there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded.

4.10 Other

- ☐ The secure cycle store should include either secure lockers or stands that allow staff to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>
- ☐ Lockers should ideally be provided within the office changing rooms. The lockers themselves must be robust/secure and all users must be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended/insecure.
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Internal Layout Guidance for Ground Floor Retail/Food & Beverage Unit

The internal layout of any the ground floor retail/food & beverage unit should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1 Retail

- 5.1.1 Clear views should remain across the ground floor space and from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.
- 5.1.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of pay points to ensure that staff have full surveillance over all areas.
- 5.1.3 Any aisles or product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the building.
- 5.1.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods. Non-cash methods of payment are preferred.
- 5.1.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. If the retail unit is to be part of the office entrance lobby, it should be capable of being secured with internal security-certified doors/shutters if the retail unit closes and the office building remains open (see Section 4.1 for more information).

5.2 Food & Beverage

- 5.2.1 Such premises can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:
 - **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating generates opportunities for crime. Patrons are likely to be stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
 - **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
 - **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
 - **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show – small, valuable, concealable goods are particularly vulnerable, such as laptops/tablets, mobile phones, purses/wallets, keys or swipe cards etc.
 - **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- 5.2.2 Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 5.2.3 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- 5.2.4 Consideration should be given to high/wide service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- 5.2.5 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods. Non-cash methods of payment are preferred.

- 5.2.6 It is highly recommended that any customer tables (both internal and to any external seating areas) are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 5.2.7 All back-of-house/staff-only areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. If the food & beverage unit is to be part of the office entrance lobby, it should be capable of being secured with internal security-certified doors/shutters if the food & beverage unit closes and the office building remains open (see Section 4.1 for more information).

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the building must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the development. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing the office building, as well as the retail/food & beverage unit, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Management of deliveries;
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 6.1.2 All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.3 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- 6.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
16 th June 2022	Euan Kellie	Receipt of CIS instruction form
16 th June 2022	Euan Kellie	Quote issued & request for plans/info
16 th June 2022	Euan Kellie	Confirmation of instruction/fee – plans to follow
21 st June 2022	Euan Kellie	Receipt of plans
22 nd June to 4 th	Euan Kellie	Email correspondence re: meeting
14 th July 2022	Euan Kellie & JMA	Meeting to discuss proposals
14 th July 2022	GMP Finance Dept & Euan Kellie	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Document Title	Date	Rev
-	Reedham House – GMP (containing info/plans re: existing buildings, materiality, proposed site plan/floorplans/elevations and draft public realm proposals)	21.06.2022	Issue No. 1

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk