



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Conversion of existing building to student accommodation and erection of purpose-built student accommodation building, comprising 261-bedroom units, with ancillary amenity space, and associated landscape works and infrastructure

AT 466-472 Moss Lane East, Rusholme, Manchester

FOR: CS Moss Lane East Limited

VERSION A: 13.08.22

2012/0607/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

Because this neighbourhood has one of the highest burglary rates in Greater Manchester, we recommend that a very high standard of security is designed into development, so that the risk of the property and residents being targeted by offenders is minimised.

Having discussed the development with the design team and reviewed the plans, I am satisfied that all potential risks have been considered and that team have prepared a scheme that has been extremely well designed from a crime prevention perspective. We are delighted to support it.

Positive aspects of the scheme include:

- the facility will be managed by a company with experience in managing of student accommodation in Manchester;
- a grade II listed building will be retained and enhance;
- management staff will be present throughout the day, including at a reception desk overlooking the principal entrance;
- student representatives will be resident in the accommodation;
- the density of development will generate significant activity within and on the approaches to it;
- the orientation of buildings and uses within promote activity and surveillance in the most appropriate areas;
- the principal entrances doors are appropriately focussed on Moss Lane East;
- access controls will be installed to restrict access to the development and to particular spaces and accommodation within;
- existing boundaries will be retained and enhanced; and,
- very secure cycle parking is provided with a separate entrance door on the Heald Place elevation.

There are few interventions necessary to improve the scheme from a crime prevention perspective but we recommend:

- install security rated doors, windows and glazing to the new building;
- install an audio-visual unit at the main entrance to allow visitors to contact staff;
- add window locks and opening restrictors to the ground floor windows of the listed building;
- limit access to the roof terrace at night;
- consider installing bollard on Moss Lane East to prevent pavement parking and a service bay to assist on moving in and out days; and,
- ensure the maintenance path is secured with appropriately high and secure gates.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application and seek the inclusion of a condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation which, based on the plans reviewed and recommendations within the report, it should comfortably achieve.



Adrian Murphy MRTPI

Consultant

e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

Contents

1	The Site and Surroundings.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood	
	2.2 Crime rate comparison	
	2.3 Modus operandi used by offenders in committing burglary and theft in this neighbourhood & measures to reduce vulnerability	
	2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns	
3	Development Appraisal	9
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Features of the development that will promote safety and security	
	3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development	
4	Physical Security	12
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows frames and glazing	
	4.3 Entrance gates, courtyard gates and boundary details	
	4.4 Lighting	
	4.5 CCTV	
	4.6 Signage	
5	Management & Maintenance	13
6	Construction	13
7	Secured by Design (SBD)	13

Appendix


A	Contact Register	14
B	Associated Documents.....	14
C	CIS Version History	14
D	Glossary	15

1 The Site and Surroundings

The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site edged in red on the plan is located on the south side of Moss Lane East close to Rusholme district centre, a vibrant commercial centre with a mix of retail and restaurant/take-away premises. Moss Lane East is a well-trafficked route that connects the district centre and Wilmslow Road, B5166 through Moss Side to Princess Road, B5117. In the vicinity of the site, Moss Lane East is congested with parked cars as are many of the side street close to the district centre, a reflection of the popularity of the centre and the fact that the streets west of the centre are largely terraced residential streets, or as in the case with Moss Lane East made up of apartments, student halls and houses in multiple occupation, where residents rely on on-street parking. Whitworth Park, a large municipal recreation ground is situated opposite the development site on the north side of Moss Lane Road East. Parkfield Street a short residential cul-de-sac lies immediately west of the site. Further west there is a terrace of residential properties, several of which have been subdivided into multi-tenanted dwellings. Heald Place is immediate east of the site. It is a residential street with a short terrace of commercial premises adjacent to the site's south-eastern corner. A hand car wash businesses operates from a largely open site at the corner of Heald Place and Moss Lane East, further east is a large, purpose built student accommodation development, Ropemaker Court. At the rear of the site there is a hall and associated prefabricated building which I understand was used as a place of worship.




Looking west along Moss Lane east towards the site on the left with modern, student accommodation and a hand carwash in the fore- and mid-ground



The Moss Lane East facades of numbers 470-472 on the left and grade II listed, numbers 466-468 on the right



The rear elevations of all properties, and payable car park and cycle store in the foreground




Crown copyright and database rights 2022 Ordnance Survey 100019888



The Heald Place elevation of number 472 and the entrance to the car park at the rear



A community hall immediately to the rear of the site



The pathway & entrance doors to 466 & 468 Moss Lane East

The development site is largely rectangular in shape and comprises four properties. Firstly, numbers 466 and 468 Moss Lane East consists of a pair of town houses, each a four-storey building, including a basement, with three upper floors with 2 self-contained, 1-bed flats on each floor of each property, 16 flats in total. The pair are grade II listed and are approximately 170 years old. Each is constructed in brick with a white rendered front elevation and a slated roof. Dating from the turn of the 19th century and not listed, numbers 470 and 472 Moss Lane East are similarly a four-storey, residential building that has been converted to 12 flats. At the rear of the properties is a pay and park, public car park, access into which is gained from Heald Place. There is also a small, grassed, amenity area, a steel, storage container, brick cycle store for residents of the flats. The hall at the rear of the site appears to have a means of escape door that opens out onto the car park. The Moss Lane East boundary of both buildings is defined with railings and a low, stone wall in the case of numbers 470 and 472. The Parkfield Street boundary is defined with a brick wall around 1800mm high, Wall and railings, including 1800mm gates that mark the entrance to the car park define the Heald Place boundary. A well-manicured lawn separates the two buildings from Moss Lane East boundary.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

Crime committed within a 500m radius of the site, recorded between 1st July 2021 & 30th June 2022. Data is accurate to +/- 8%, due to updates with our I.T systems

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Crimes involving the use or threat of violence	Theft (including shoplifting)	Robbery	Drug related offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
92	30	111	833	336	72	47	102	16	62

2.1.1 There were 1701 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. With the exception of neighbourhoods within the city centre, this volume of crime is three or four times higher than the average rate across the Manchester Division. The neighbourhood includes Rusholme district centre, and contains a mixture of residential property, commercial uses - including late-night, licensed premises, Manchester Royal Infirmary, private rented and social housing, and student accommodation, all of which significantly affect the number, type, and distribution of crimes.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:

- crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence - 49%
- theft - 23%
- criminal damage - 7%.
- Vehicle crime - 7%
- domestic and commercial burglaries - 7%.

2.1.3 Robbery was much more common in the neighbourhood than in most neighbourhoods outside of the city centre. Whitworth Park opposite the site has historically been something of a robbery hotspot, as has Oxford Road. Burglary is also much higher than many other neighbourhoods within the conurbation.



2.1.4 The streets experiencing the greatest volume of crime (20 offences or more) were:

- Wilmslow Road – 407 offences
- Hathersage Road - 193 offences
- Oxford Road - 95 offences
- Great Western Street – 87 offences
- Moss Lane East – 65 offences


2.1.5 The crimes that occurred on Moss Lane East broadly reflected the overall pattern of crime. There were 26 offences recorded on Heald Place and 6 on Parkfield Street. Crimes involving the use or threat, or violence dominated but there were also several burglaries.

Domestic burglary committed within a 500m radius of the site

2.1.6 There were 92 reports of burglary within the neighbourhood during the period analysed.





- 2.1.7 The risk is greatest in the early part of the week peaking on Wednesday. Offences occur all across the day but are more common during the night and in the late afternoon and early evening



- 2.1.8 Where the means of entry was known, doors were most frequently targeted, with offenders kicking the door open. Windows were also forced, or the glazing smashed, prior to the offender gaining entry. In over one third of all burglaries recorded entry was not forced, rather the offender entered through an unsecured door or window or was invited into a property.



Vehicle crime committed within a 500m radius of the site



- 2.1.9 The risk of vehicle crime remains fairly high throughout the week. The most common times for cars to be targeted is in evening.



2.2 Crime rate comparison

Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales England & Wales data relates to the period January – December 2021.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **64% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **111% higher** than Greater Manchester and **117% higher** than England & Wales.

- 2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings is **9% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **49% higher** than Greater Manchester and **184% higher** than England & Wales.



- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **2% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **34% higher** than Greater Manchester and **63% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **13% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **87% higher** than Greater Manchester and **127% higher** than England & Wales.

2.3 Modus operandi used by offenders in committing burglary and theft in this neighbourhood & measures to reduce vulnerability

2.3.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools to drill locks

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping, or damage to fencing.

2.3.2 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- communal entrance doors to apartments should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing.
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e., a small front garden enclosed with a 1000mm high fence. A degree of separation between public and private space can act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are then less willing to cross from public to clearly defined private space. Such boundary definition can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to property; and
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors. Light suggests a dwelling is occupied and highlights the actions of intruders.

2.3.3 Windows have been prised open by offenders

To minimise the risk of prising windows open:

- all ground floor windows should include key operated locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to the rear of the dwellings should be controlled by the erection of robust boundaries and locking gates. Pedestrian routes alongside the rear boundaries should be avoided. As a means to break and enter dwellings, offenders are more likely to target windows on secluded side or rear elevations.

2.3.4 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development; and,
- access to rear gardens should be restricted with the installation of high fencing and locking gates.

2.3.5 Bikes were stolen from cycle stores at halls of residence, apartments, when secured to railings or street furniture, and at a leisure facility

To minimise the risk of bicycle theft:

- provide convenient, secure cycle parking in a secure store within the building, or in a store which has self-closing, self-locking doors, or gates, and is only accessible to residents in possession of a programmable access control fob.

2.3.6 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- rear garden boundaries should avoid being exposed to the public realm;
- communal pathways providing access to rear gardens should be secured with self-closing, self-locking gates; and,
- fencing should be especially robust when unavoidably exposed to the public realm.

2.3.7 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate the site and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site currently and in the future are as follows:

- residents in the apartments on the site have a vested interest in supervising activity in the grounds of the site and of the passing public to maintain order and deter criminal and anti-social activity;
- staff working at the car wash provide day-long supervision of the eastern side of the site;

- there is a regular flow of motorists, and pedestrians and cyclist past the site, particularly using Whitworth Park to access the University or city centre. Collectively they casually they perform a guardianship role as they pass the site, which will help to deter offenders;
- all of the buildings on the site are occupied and in a very good state of repair. The current owner/landlord clearly is attentive to the upkeep of the buildings and the grounds;
- basement light-wells on all four properties on the site are protected with ornate railings;
- the Parkfield Street and rear boundary are reasonably secure; and,
- there is a very pleasant outlook north from the site across the well-maintained front gardens towards the park. High quality environments can have a positive affect on mood and the propensity to commit crime.

2.4.3 There are also some features of the locality that might facilitate crime and disorder, and the fear of crime and reduction in residential amenity, these include:

- the overall volume and nature of crime, particularly violent crime, burglary, theft, and robbery in the vicinity of the site are a concern;
- the site is easily accessed from Moss Lane East or Heald Place, indeed the public car park at the rear openly invites people into the site, some of whom may have criminal intentions;
- the site is prominently located on a well-trafficked route - pedestrians and vehicle traffic is likely to include offenders who will quickly become aware of any opportunities to exploit opportunities presented by the redevelopment or target individuals coming and going from the site;
- neighbourhoods with a concentration of student accommodation can, due to the pattern of behaviour of students, for example, socialising and returning to their accommodation late at night when neighbouring residents are sleeping, lead to a reduction of the amenity of more settled residents;
- the quality of the environment to the east and south of the site, for example, graffiti on walls and fences, refuse bins on the pavement, litter, barred windows, is not ideal; and,
- there is pressure for tariff-free on-street parking in this neighbourhood. A development lacking in on-site, secure parking (and displacement of vehicles that currently park on the site) may lead to greater pressure on scarce parking spaces in the surrounding streets and beyond, and an increase vehicle-related crime in the neighbourhood.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development scheme will involve:

- retention and refurbishment of the listed building - 466 and 468 Moss Lane East;
- demolition of numbers 470 and 472 Moss Lane East;
- construction of an L-shaped student accommodation facility, linked to the listed building;
- creation of internal and external amenity spaces;
- management centre within Oakley Villa; and,
- cycle parking.

3.1.2 The accommodation within the listed building will be rearranged to accommodate a series of studios on the basement, first and second floors. The ground floor will be converted to meeting rooms, and collaboration and study spaces. The exterior will remain largely unaltered, the exception being on the eastern elevation where the proposed new-building block will be lightly attached at ground floor level only.

3.1.3 The L-shaped building will provide accommodation over up to 9 floors, plus a basement floor. There will be a set back at the sixth-floor level. There will also be an amenity space on one of the roofs, accessed from level 8.

-
- 3.1.4 The basement floor will be used for cycle parking, refuse storage, and plant.
 - 3.1.5 Management services space - including a reception desk manned from 08.00 until 18.00, a post room and office - will be located adjacent to the communal entrance to the development on the ground floor. Also on the ground floor, there will be communal workspace, w.c's, a lounge, a gym, a laundry, and a cinema room (all for resident use only). With the exception of a sub-station accessed externally from Heald Place, the remainder of the ground floor will be given over to residential accommodation in the form of cluster flats and a studio. All of the upper floors will similarly accommodate cluster flats and studios. Clusters will typically have 6-8 study rooms per flat and a communal kitchen lounge
 - 3.1.6 The two buildings will be capable of accommodating 261 residents. There will be access controls, operated by staff and resident held fobs, to access the building, the relevant floor of the building, each studio or cluster, and the supporting facilities, for example, the cycle store and gym.
 - 3.1.7 The principal communal entrance will be in the new building and will face Moss Lane East. The cycle store entrance door will be on the Heald Place elevation. The two existing entrance doors on the Moss Lane East elevation of the listed building will be retained, but the principal entrance will be the route by which all residents will enter and leave the development on foot.
 - 3.1.8 The front gardens to the site will be retained as will the boundary railings and the boundary wall to Parkfield Street.
 - 3.1.9 At the centre of the development there will be an amenity courtyard for residents' use, and accessed from the new building via one of two doors on the ground floor.
 - 3.1.10 There will be a maintenance path at the rear of the site which will only be accessed from either Heald Place or Parkfield Street; a secure gate will be installed at each entrance.
 - 3.1.11 There is no car parking on the development.

3.2 Features of the development that will promote safety and security

- 3.2.1 Given the proximity of the universities and other student accommodation, the proposed development seems an appropriate use for the site.
- 3.2.2 The repurposing, refurbishment and extension to the listed building will secure the future of a locally important heritage asset.
- 3.2.3 The focus for entry to the site is suitably located on the Moss Lane East elevation, the most heavily trafficked and 'active' street.
- 3.2.4 The existing perimeter walls and railings will be largely retained or replaced with similar forms of enclosure, clearly defining the edge of the development, and helping to distinguish public space from semi-private space.
- 3.2.5 Along with the boundary treatments, there will be a degree of separation between the perimeter of the development and Moss Lane East, providing an area of defensible space between passing public and the buildings.
- 3.2.6 Surveillance of the surrounding public realm of Moss Lane East, Parkfield Street and Heald Place will be enhanced by the scale and orientation of the buildings and well-considered location of facilities and windows.
- 3.2.7 Similarly, surveillance within the site will be enhanced the placement of windows overlooking the courtyard and the maintenance path.
- 3.2.8 Windows that are exposed to the public realm will have the protection of ornate grilles, preventing offenders attempting to gain entry via windows or steal items through open windows.
- 3.2.9 Lighting from the development will contribute to public lighting around the site. Good public, and building, lighting can significantly reduce the public's fear of crime.
- 3.2.10 The development will be managed by a company with experience of managing similar accommodation in several locations across Manchester. A management and security presence are particularly welcome as visible staff in the development will not only discourage offender attempts to gain entry to the scheme but also gives residents a readily accessible contact to whom they may report management issues. Such provision can help to instil confidence in residents that the development is secure and that maintenance issues will be dealt with promptly.

-
- 3.2.11 The elevated position, relative to the public realm, of most of the residential accommodation will result in a greater degree of privacy and security for residents than might otherwise have been the case were residential use to commence at street level or without some degree of separation between the building and the surrounding streets and pathways.
 - 3.2.12 The inclusion of social spaces provides an opportunity for residents to meet and build relationships, which can help to develop a sense of community within the scheme and deters crime and anti-social behaviour.
 - 3.2.13 A secure post and parcel facility has been included in the design of the development
 - 3.2.14 Cycle parking is provided in very secure location within the basement with cyclists having to pass through several controlled doors and lift in order to enter the store.
 - 3.2.15 Refuse bins will be located within a secure store within the development.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

- 3.3.1 Ideally, each entrance to the site on Moss Lane East should be defined with a gate that matches the adjacent railings. The gates should be self-closing.
- 3.3.2 With the exception of residents on bicycles, residents, staff, and visitors should enter the development the communal entrance door on the Moss Lane elevation.
- 3.3.3 The gates that will secure the maintenance pathway should each be 2100mm high and secured with a Sold Secure™ Gold padlock or similar. Gates should be fabricated in steel with a steel frame and designed so that scaling the gate is difficult.
- 3.3.4 Wherever possible, the existing boundary walls, railings and planting should be retained.
- 3.3.5 Access into and the courtyard and back into the building should be controlled.
- 3.3.6 Bollards or similar should be installed on Moss Lane East to prevent pavement parking.
- 3.3.7 Plans for residents moving in and out should be prepared to avoid congestion on Moss Lane East and adjacent residential streets. Ideally loading bays should be formed in the highway if space allows.
- 3.3.8 Where feasible, entrance and escape doors should be security-rated, with entry restricted to residents or staff holding an appropriate fob or pass card. Where existing external doors are retained, the security of the door should be enhanced with Secured by Design/British Standard rated locks. External doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.9 Study bedroom doors should include an electronic lock and a fixed outer handle, so that entry is only possible with an appropriately programmed fob. These doors should also be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.10 An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the main entrance door to staff at the reception desk to allow staff to vet visitors prior to allowing entry via a remote lock release as appropriate.
- 3.3.11 Window locks and opening restrictors should be fitted to the ground floor windows of the listed building.
- 3.3.12 Laminate glass should be use for all ground level windows and external doors of the new building.
- 3.3.13 Each external, entrance door, cluster flat and studio entrance doors, and the cycle store external door
- 3.3.14 should be security-rated. All of these doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- 3.3.15 An alarm should sound locally and at the reception desk/management office if the cycle store door remains open.
- 3.3.16 A modest CCTV system should monitor the main entrance door, cycle store entrance doors, the reception area, maintenance path and courtyard.
- 3.3.17 Use of level 8 terrace should be time limited to 22.00-23.00.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ The communal entrance doors (main entrance and cycle store) should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, and include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. These doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- ☐ Where existing external doors are retained and re-used, they should be fitted with at least one BS/PAS/Secured by Design accredited locks.
- ☐ An audio-visual unit should relay images (one way) and audio (two ways) from the communal entrance door to staff at the reception desk. Staff should be able to open the door remotely from the desk or remotely via the management company.
- ☐ The door to the management office should be solid-core, FD30-rated, and fitted with an electronic lock. The lock should be activated with a staff fob. This door should be self-closing and lock upon closure.
- ☐ Entrance doors to the individual studios and cluster flats should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2 and include a door viewer.
- ☐ Study bedroom doors should be solid-core, FD30-rated, and fitted with an electronic lock. The lock should be activated with a fob.
- ☐ The courtyard access doors should be certified to LPS 1175 sr 2.
- ☐ Internal, access-controlled doors should be solid-core, FD30-rated, and fitted with an electronic lock. Doors should also be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

4.2 Windows frames and glazing

- ☐ All ground floor windows on the listed building should be fitted with a key-operated lock as well as restrictors that limit opening to 100mm. If the glazing in any of the ground floor windows is replaced, laminate glass that achieves the EN 356 P1A rating should be installed.
- ☐ Any opening window frames not protected with ornate grilles at ground floor level of the new building should meet the PAS 24 standard.
- ☐ Laminate glass that achieves at least a BS EN356 P1A rating should be installed in all ground floor windows and all external doors of the new building
- ☐ Basement windows in the listed building should continue be protected with ironwork railings.

4.3 Entrance gates, courtyard gates and boundary details

- ☐ Wherever possible, the existing boundary walls, railings and hedges should be retained.
- ☐ Fencing and gates securing the south-western corner of the site and between Oakley Villa and the L-shaped building should be 2100mm high.
- ☐ Railings and gates securing the access to the courtyard from Oakley Villa pathway should be 1800mm high. The gate should be fitted with a fob-operated, electronic lock, e.g., a maglock, with a holding force of 4500N. The gate should be self-closing and lock upon closure.

4.4 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all external doors. Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ The cycle store and refuse store lights should be activated by movement sensors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light.

4.5 CCTV

☐ A CCTV system should be capable of monitoring the following:

- all entrance doors;
- the reception area;
- the cycle store and entrance door;
- the courtyard; and,
- the maintenance path.

4.5.1 Monitors should be placed at reception desk and the management office to allow staff to review images.

4.5.2 Images should be recorded with recording equipment securely located in the management office or transmitted to a suitable off-site, CCTV monitoring/recording centre.

4.6 Signage

☐ Signage to indicate the name and address of the development, contact details of the management company, and informing residents staff and visitors that CCTV is in operation, should be erected at the main entrance door and the cycle store entrance.

5 Management & Maintenance

☐ A security plan should be prepared. It should set out the details of the staffing of the development; the site-wide CCTV and any alarm systems; procedures for programming, issuing, and cancelling door entry fobs/cards; procedures for moving in and out of the development; procedures for managing visitors to the development; and, address maintenance and repairs to:

- perimeter walls, gates, and fencing
- access control systems
- communal areas
- lighting
- signage
- the CCTV and any alarm systems.

6 Construction

☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure the site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.

☐ The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.

☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved, (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of a development and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
21.07.22	Daniel Cohen, CS Moss Lane East Limited	Request for crime impact statement
11.08.22		Site visited
13.08.22	Daniel Cohen, CS Moss Lane East Limited	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and documents:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
CS-1094_005	GA – Proposed Site Plan	10/06/22	
CS-1094_099	GA – Basement Floor Plan	11/03/21	1
CS-1094_100	GA – Ground Floor Plan	28/10/21	1
CS-1094_101	GA – 1st Floor Plan	28/10/21	1
CS-1094_102	GA – 2nd Floor Plan	28/10/21	1
CS-1094_103	GA – 3rd-6th Floor Plan	28/10/21	
CS-1094_107	GA – 7th Floor Plan	28/10/21	
CS-1094_108	GA – 8th Floor Plan	28/10/21	
CS-1094_109	GA – 9th Floor Plan	01/12/21	
CS-1094_200	SE – Section AA	01/12/21	
CS-1094_201	SE – Section BB	20/04/21	
CS-1094_202	SE – Section CC	01/12/21	
CS-1094_300	EL – North Elevation	28/10/21	
CS-1094_301	EL – East Elevation	28/10/21	
CS-1094_302	EL – South Elevation	28/10/21	
CS-1094_303	EL – West Elevation	28/10/21	
CS-1094_310	EL – Northeast Contextual	10/06/21	
CS-1094_311	EL – Southwest Contextual	10/06/21	
CS-1094_901	SC – Area Schedule Summary	04/11/21	
CS-1094_902	SC – Ensuite Room Schedule	01/12/21	1
CS-1094_902	SC – Studio Schedule	01/12/21	1

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made in this report.-.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		13.08.22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF: TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock, and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding, or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel, and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/Polyvinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors, and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections, and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk