



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

LAND AT CORNER OF LAYSTALL STREET & GREAT ANCOATS STREET,
MANCHESTER
HOTEL (5,122sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

For: Ancoats Manchester Ltd.

Version A: 16/11/2022

Reference: 2022/0493/CIS/01

Land at corner of Laystall Street & Great Ancoats Street, Manchester

URN: 2022/0493/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements/additions required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable if the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Given that there will be no reception desk/formal staff presence at ground floor level directly overlooking all access to and egress from the building via the main entrance, measures must be put in place to:
 - Prevent public access to the basement levels;
 - Prevent unauthorised access/mis-use to the ground floor entrance foyer/public toilets during the day, during the evening and at night; and
 - Ensure staff/guest-only access to the mezzanine and bedroom floors.
- The escape route along the southern elevation of the building and out onto Lomax Street will need to be enclosed/gated if the adjacent site is developed, in order to prevent unauthorised access to the hidden escape doors and the narrow route itself. Consideration should be given to enclosing the route in any case, as surveillance over the route and the escape doors will be dependent on the management/maintenance of the adjacent vacant site, which is outside of the applicants control.
- The internal doors between the flexible guest bedrooms must be capable of being robustly secured when they are not in use.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies at the junction of Laystall Street and Great Ancoats Street on the eastern edge of Manchester city centre.

The site is vacant and is currently in use as a site enclosure for the works underway on the neighbouring building to the west.

To the immediate west is a serviced apartment scheme currently under refurbishment, with frontages onto Laystall Street (formed by unoccupied commercial units at ground level) and Lomax Street. The elevation abutting the site is largely blank, with some narrow recesses including upper floor windows.




The small parcel of land to the south/east of the site is also currently vacant and currently forms part of the same construction site enclosure.

To the north, on the opposite side of Laystall Street, are the rear elevations and service yard of a commercial estate known as Urban Exchange accessed off Great Ancoats Street, which includes a foodstore, gym and retail units served by surface and undercroft parking areas.

As a result of the unoccupied and rear facades of the commercial units lining the route, Laystall Street itself benefits from limited levels of activity at ground level, passive surveillance and direct overlooking.

To the south, on the opposite side of the narrow route of Lomax Street is a former commercial building now in use as a church, which has been heavily graffitied, next to a small pay & display car park – which again provides little overlooking over the site.

By contrast, Great Ancoats Street is a wide route busy with vehicular traffic and pedestrian footfall, meaning the site benefits from good levels of surveillance from the east.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2021 to 30th September 2022.



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
51	85	141	529	286	44	20	299	33	43

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the general volume of recorded crime is high, particularly the levels of violence, vehicle crime and theft, reflecting the site's location within the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Recorded less serious wounding offences have taken place throughout the area local area, particularly to the west of the site - around the Northern Quarter and Piccadilly areas of the city, where there are high concentrations of licenced premises. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded types of less serious wounding, with the majority of offences taking place over the weekend period and during the late evening/early hours of the morning.
- 2.1.3 Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime in the area, with offences also concentrated on the streets to the west and south (around Piccadilly Station, the Northern Quarter and Piccadilly). Offenders have particularly targeted vehicles parked within open car parks or on-street, smashing glazing to gain access to vehicles and remove items, as well as removing vehicle parts and vehicle registration plates.
- 2.1.4 Thefts have also taken place throughout the local area. Offenders have primarily used pick-pocketing and distraction methods to obtain personal belongings, as well as targeting insecure bags and mobile phones - particularly within bars/restaurants or on public transport.
- 2.1.5 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed hotel (with a public bar/coffee shop), the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at Manchester hotels fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offender's time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.

Manchester Hotel Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.2.2 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of burglaries at Manchester hotels, the point of entry has not been determined. It is likely that these burglaries have occurred when offenders have entered hotels posing as legitimate guests and have gained access to back-of-house areas or hotel rooms without using force – possibly when they have been left insecure by guests/cleaners or by using stolen or forged keys/cards. Doors have also been forced open, using bodily pressure and implements/tools to gain entry.


2.3 Theft (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Manchester Hotel Theft – Day Range






Manchester Hotel Theft – Time Range



- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend. It is possible that the risk increases at these times when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday and Friday, when they are typically less busy and they perceive a lower risk of being caught/challenged. The risk of theft is greatest around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Thefts of personal property (such as mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets) are the most routinely stolen items.

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area 2018 - 2019.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises peaks between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typically found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.
- 2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered licensed premises through external doors. Most commonly, doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools/implements. In a number of cases, glazing in doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Where the point of entry was legitimate/unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas.

2.1 Theft (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.1.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.1.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafés in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafes through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.


2.3 Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Day Range



M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Time Range



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.4 General Risk Factors

2.4.1 **Hotels:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Violence towards staff
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4.2 **Licensed Premises/Restaurants & Cafes:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting hotels, licensed premises and restaurants/cafes in Manchester are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Manchester Hotels:** Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property

Possible Solution - The main reception should be located to have full view of everyone entering and leaving the premises and all routes to bedrooms and staff areas. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. Access controls should be used to restrict access to vulnerable areas and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work (see Sections 4.1/4.2).

- **Manchester Hotels:** Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic key-cards/fobs or by exploiting insecure doors

Possible Solution - Auditable electric locking systems (such as Vingcard, Salto or similar) should be used, which can be easily activated/disabled electronically by reception staff (see Sections 4.1/4.2).

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- **Manchester Hotels:** Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tool/implements to gain entry

Possible Solution - All external doors and ideally individual bedroom doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Access controls should also be utilised to prevent non-guest access to bedroom areas/floors (see Sections 4.1/4.2) and CCTV covering access corridors should be monitored at the staffed reception desk to ensure there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded (see Section 4.8).

- **Manchester Licensed Premises & Restaurant/Cafes:** Doors have been forced open with tools/implements and bodily pressure

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- **Manchester Licensed Premises & Restaurant/Cafes:** Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access

Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.4), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- **Manchester Licensed Premises & Restaurant/Cafes:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas to steal items

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Sections 4.1/4.2).

- **Manchester Hotels, Licensed Premises & Restaurant/Cafes::** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 5). The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 20 storey hotel, comprising of 154 no. bedrooms.
- 3.1.2 The main entrance to the building will be located at the junction of Laystall Street and Great Jackson Street. The ground floor of the building will comprise of a reception space (which will not feature a staffed reception desk and will likely feature self-check-in screens), a glazed staff office, W/Cs and staff area (including luggage store, linen room, refuse store and sub-station). The building will also include two basement floors, including an additional W/C, a customer/staff cycle store, a staff room and plant areas. Staff will be present at first floor level, which will feature a public bar/coffee shop and reception areas, as well as a prep kitchen. There will be a mezzanine level above first floor which will include a gym (for guest use only), as well as 2 no. meeting rooms. The upper floors of the building will be formed by guest bedrooms, some of which will be flexible – with internal doors that can be linked up to house groups of guests together in a larger space.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area, at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The footprint of the building will include few recesses that could hide windows or doors and leave them potentially vulnerable to attack unseen.
- 3.2.3 The building will present an active frontages onto Laystall Street and Great Ancoats Street, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.4 The ground floor glazed staff office will allow staff to overlook the ground floor entrance lobby/reception space when it is occupied. First floor reception/bar staff will overlook the public bar/coffee shop area.
- 3.2.5 The scheme will be staffed and managed on a 24/7 basis, with a CCTV system installed throughout the building to allow staff to monitor movement of guests, visitors and identify potential intruders.
- 3.2.6 The layout of the hotel corridors provide clear views and contain no recessed areas that could conceal criminal activity.
- 3.2.7 The hotel bedrooms will be provided above street level, reducing the potential impacts of any noise, nuisance or anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.8 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 As proposed, there will be no reception desk/formal staff presence directly overlooking all access to and egress from the building via the main external entrance. This could provide opportunities for criminals to exploit to gain access to the ground floor public W/Cs, the basement public W/C/cycle store/staff facilities and the upper bedroom floors of the building without passing or being observed by staff. It is highly recommended that if this arrangement is retained, the following measures are incorporated:
- The public W/C at basement level should be removed or relocated to first floor level. This will allow the basement to be a staff and guest-only space (accessed via staff/guest key-card – see Sections 4.1/4.2 for more information), preventing members of the public from gaining access to the building and down to the basement without being noticed.

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- During the evening, the ground floor entrance lobby should be staffed with a bar/restaurant greeter, in order to formally overlook and manage all access to and egress from the building, as well as monitor access to the ground floor W/Cs. At night/out-of-hours, the main entrance to the building should be secured and operated by guest key-card or via an access control system linked to a first floor staff base, in order to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in or around the entrance lobby and the W/Cs (again, see Sections 4.1/4.2 for more information).
 - During the day, the ground floor glazed office should be occupied as much as possible, to allow direct overlooking over the ground floor entrance lobby area. It should also be covered by a CCTV system monitored by staff at the first floor desk/bar, to allow for an immediate response to any issues recorded (see Section 4.8 for more information).
 - As the first floor bar/coffee shop will be for customers that are not necessary guests of the hotel, it is essential that access to the upper floor bedroom floors (as well as the meeting room/gym mezzanine level and any back-of-house/staff-only areas on all levels) is robustly controlled to prevent unauthorised access. All stairwells and lifts serving bedroom floors should be fitted with access controls (operated by guest and staff key-cards), to ensure that only guests who have already booked in at reception and are staying at the hotel can access their own bedroom floor and no other (see Sections 4.1/4.2). It is preferable to have a stand-alone/dedicated lift to the serve the first floor bar only - making it easier to prevent non-guests from accessing bedroom floors.
- 3.3.2 The southern elevation of the building will feature 3 no. escape doors onto a narrow strip of land between the proposed building and the adjacent site, with egress onto Great Ancoats Street to the east and Lomax Street to the south. If the adjacent site remains undeveloped and is well-tended (with vegetation maintained at a low level), there are good levels of passive surveillance over the escape doors from Great Ancoats Street. If the adjacent site becomes overgrown or is itself developed, the hidden doors and the narrow escape routes could be vulnerable to attack or fostering crime and disorder issues unseen. If the adjacent site is developed, the narrow route should be enclosed and gated to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.6). As the security of the space and the escape doors will be reliant on the management/maintenance of the adjacent site, which is outside of the applicants control, consideration should be given to enclosing and gating the route in any case.
- 3.3.3 The internal doors between the proposed flexible rooms must be to the same physical security standard as the main bedroom doors off the access corridors on each floor and should only be capable of being unlocked by staff, in order to prevent unauthorised access between guest bedrooms (see Section 4.1 for more information).
- 3.3.4 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in guests, customers and staff.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to be Secured by Design (SBD) compliant.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main entrance to the hotel will be formed by a glazed sliding door, which should be tested and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS EN 1627 RC2, incorporating laminated glazing (see below) and multi-point locking (preventing sliding and lifting when secure). At night/out-of-hours, the door should be secured and operated by staff/guest key-card or by means of a video entry phone system linked to a staffed first floor reception desk (see Section 4.1 below).
- ☐ The main stair core and lifts serving the upper bedroom floors should only be accessible/operable by guest key card, ensuring that non-guests cannot access bedroom floors and guests can only gain access to their particular floor and no other. The lifts should serve the public bar at the first floor of the building and should only operate to basement and upper bedroom floors via staff/guest key-card. The doors to the stair/lift core on each upper floor bedroom level should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing/locking, with 3 hinges and an electromagnetic lock (which fails safe in the event of a fire alarm), operated by guest key-card. Similarly, the basement levels should only be accessible to guests (who required access to the cycle store) and staff, as should the gym and meeting rooms at mezzanine level.
- ☐ The doors into the escape-only core at each level should also be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing/locking, with 3 hinges and an electromagnetic lock (which fails safe in the event of a fire alarm), operated by staff key-card. The doors should be alarmed and clearly signed to deter casual use by guests. Once the escape core is accessed by a member of the public, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level.
- ☐ Individual hotel bedroom doorsets/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing and secured with 3 hinges and an electronically operated lock, controlled by Vingcard, Salto or similar. They should also be fitted with door viewers and chain limiters. Internal doors/frames allowing flexible rooms to be linked internally should also be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a multi-point locking mechanism to BS 3621/PAS 3621 that can only be released by staff (when interconnecting flexible rooms are booked). An additional privacy lock may be required for the use/operation of guests when interconnecting doors are in use.
- ☐ The doors into back-of-house/staff-only areas at ground and basement floors should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing/locking, with 3 hinges and an electronically operated lock operated by staff key-card only. All other internal doors/frames to staff offices/rooms, the prep kitchen, the linen room, the refuse store and plant rooms/areas should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff key-card. Careful consideration should be given to the design of any cash office, which should have solid masonry walls, no false/suspended ceilings, a security-certified doorset (to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2) and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover, certified to LPS 1183. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. The doors to the ground floor luggage store and the basement cycle store should also be security-certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 and operated by staff key-card (and guest key-card when required, in the case of the cycle store).
- ☐ The internal entrance door/frame to the mezzanine level gym should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock operated by guest key-card. The doors to the meeting rooms at mezzanine level should also be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock to allow them to be secured when unoccupied. Access to the meeting facilities should be managed directly by staff.

4.2 Access Controls

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff swipe card/fob or by guest key-card, and not numeric key pads (which can be easily observed/shared and are rarely changed). The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The main entrance to the hotel – operated remotely by first floor reception staff and via guest/staff key-card at night.
 - The lifts serving the mezzanine floor, upper bedroom floors and basement floors - operated via guest/staff key-card.
 - The doors to the main stair/lift core on each upper bedroom floor and basement floors – operated by guest/staff key-card.
 - The doors into the escape-only stair core at each level – operated by staff key-card only.
 - All doors to any back-of-house/staff-only areas or rooms – operated by staff key-card only.
 - The doors to the gym and cycle store - operated via guest/staff key-card.
- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff and guest key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than just to perimeter columns. All windows should be non-opening.

4.4 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground and first floor glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. All upper floor glazing should incorporate an internal pane rated as at least P1A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the proposed building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack. Any louvres at ground floor level to plant areas etc. should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required (see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for SBD approved suppliers).
- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills/brickwork features, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows.

4.5 Alarm

- ☐ All external doors and internal escape doors should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to an intruder alarm system, so that any mis-use or out-of-hours alarm activations can be relayed to the hotel staff, allowing them to investigate or call the authorities as appropriate.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The escape route along the southern elevation of the building and out onto Lomax Street will need to be enclosed/gated at its outermost point if the adjacent site is developed, in order to prevent unauthorised access to the hidden escape doors and the narrow route itself. Consideration should be given to enclosing the route in any case, as surveillance over the route and the escape doors will be dependent on the management/maintenance of the adjacent vacant site, which is outside of the applicants control.
- ☐ The route should be enclosed with 2100mm high railings and gates to prevent unauthorised access. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, street furniture etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. Any escape ironmongery required on the internal side of emergency egress gates should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fence/gate. The gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.



4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors, building facades and any escape routes and should complement any CCTV system installed (see below).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or to upper floor windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are [overview](#) and [recognition](#), which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

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- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [all external facades/doors, the main entrance lobby, the first floor bar/reception and seating areas, lift/stair lobbies on each floor and all bedroom corridors.](#)
 - ☐ The CCTV system should be monitored behind the reception desk/bar by hotel staff (particularly over the ground floor entrance foyer), to ensure there can be an immediate response to any incidents recorded.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Each guest bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- ☐ The basement cycle store should be for the use of hotel staff and pre-arranged guests only and should include either secure lockers or stands that allow staff to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>
- ☐ Lockers should be provided for the use of guests using the gym. The lockers themselves must be robust/secure and all users must be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended/insecure. Staff should undertake regular inspections of the facility.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping or features of the building that could inadvertently create sheltered/hiding places, ledges, seating or loitering spots. These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Guidance on Internal Layout of Bar/Coffee Shop


The internal layout of the bar restaurant should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1.1 Licensed premises and cafes/restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating bars/restaurants generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent bars/restaurants means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

5.1.2 In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- The main entrance to the building/premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff, who should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.



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- Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
 - Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
 - All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
 - Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
 - Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the hotel and public bar must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the development. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 6.1.2 The opening hours of the bar/coffee shop should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict. An operating/maintenance plan for the premises should also be prepared, which focuses on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 6.1.3 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools, portable gym equipment etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.4 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- 6.1.5 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas and guest-only floors.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
30 th September 2022	Deloitte	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
30 th September 2022	Deloitte	Email correspondence re: details to calculate fee
3 rd October 2022	Deloitte	Quotation issued & request for additional info
6 th October 2022	Deloitte	Confirmation of instruction/fee
10 th to 20 th October 2022	Deloitte	Receipt of plans & email correspondence re: meeting
27 th October 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
1 st November 2022	Deloitte	Teams meeting to discuss scheme
10 th November 2022	Deloitte	Email correspondence re: timescales

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
-	Site Location (SUPERSEDED)	18.07.22	-
-	Site Photos (SUPERSEDED)	18.07.22	-
-	Typical Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	23.09.22	-
-	Typical Upper Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	23.09.22	-
-	Ground Floor Site/Servicing Plan (SUPERSEDED)	23.09.22	-
-	Ground Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	23.09.22	-
-	First Floor Plan (SUPERSEDED)	23.09.22	-
-	Working Model Images (SUPERSEDED)	23.09.22	-
-	Working Model Images (SUPERSEDED)	23.09.22	-
10403-SHP-A-G200-PL-00-001	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	07.10.22	P05
10403-SHP-A-G200-PL-01-001	Proposed Level 01 Plan	07.10.22	P04
10403-SHP-A-G200-PL-B1-001	Proposed Basement 01 Plan	07.10.22	P04
10403-SHP-A-G200-PL-B2-001	Proposed Basement 02 Plan	07.10.22	P02
10403-SHP-A-G200-PL-M1-001	Proposed Mezzanine Level Plan	07.10.22	P03
10403-SHP-A-G200-PL-RF-001	Proposed Roof Plan	07.10.22	P04
10403-SHP-A-G200-PL-TY-001	Proposed Typical Lower Level Plan	07.10.22	P04
10403-SHP-A-G200-PL-TY-002	Proposed Typical Upper Level Plan	07.10.22	P04
10403-SHP-A-G200-SE-AA-001	Section AA	07.10.22	P02
10403-SHP-A-G200-SE-BB-001	Section BB	07.10.22	P02
10403-SHP-A-G200-EL-EE-001	Proposed East Elevation	07.10.22	P03
10403-SHP-A-G200-EL-EN-001	Proposed North Elevation	07.10.22	P03
10403-SHP-A-G200-EL-EE-001	Proposed South Elevation	07.10.22	P03
10403-SHP-A-G200-EL-EE-001	Proposed West Elevation	07.10.22	P03
10403-A-RP-PA-Web01	Consultation Webinar Presentation	26.10.22	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status	Revisions Made
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk