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FAITHFUL + GOULD

FORMER WHITEMOSS DAY CARE

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

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FAITHFUL + GOULD

FORMER WHITEMOSS DAY CARE, MANCHESTER

CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

DECEMBER 2022

PREPARED BY:

Alex Lomax Planner



APPROVED BY:

Alison Mitchell Technical Director



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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose of a Crime Impact Assessment

1.1.1 Crime Prevention is a material consideration in the planning process. The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) (2021)¹ refers to crime in the context of healthy communities and well-designed places.

1.1.2 Chapter 8, 'Promoting healthy and safe communities', states that "planning policies and decisions should aim to achieve healthy, inclusive and safe places which: are safe and accessible, so that crime and disorder, and the fear of crime, do not undermine the quality of life or community cohesion – for example, through the use of attractive, well-designed, clear and legible pedestrian and cycle routes, and high quality public space, which encourage the active and continual use of public areas" (paragraph 92).

1.1.3 Chapter 8 also states that, "planning policies and decisions should promote public safety and take into account wider security and defence requirements by:

- a) anticipating and addressing possible malicious threats and natural hazards, especially in locations where large numbers of people are expected to congregate. Policies for relevant areas (such as town centre and regeneration frameworks), and the layout and design of developments, should be informed by the most up-to-date information available from the police and other agencies about the nature of potential threats and their implications. This includes appropriate and proportionate steps that can be taken to reduce vulnerability, increase resilience and ensure public safety and security; and
- b) recognising and supporting development required for operational defence and security purposes and ensuring that operational sites are not affected adversely by the impact of other development proposed in the area" (paragraph 97).

1.1.4 Chapter 12, 'Achieving well-designed places', reiterates that "planning policies and decisions should ensure that developments: create places that are safe, inclusive and accessible and which promote health and well-being, with a high standard of amenity for existing and future users; and where crime and disorder, and the fear of crime, do not undermine the quality of life or community cohesion and resilience." (Paragraph 130).

¹ National Planning Policy Framework, Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 2021

- 1.1.5 The accompanying National Planning Practice Guidance (NPPG)² (Note 7.5) reiterates the government's intention that designing out crime and designing in community safety should be central to the planning and delivery of new development.
- 1.1.6 Manchester City Council's (MCC) 'Manchester's Local Development Framework: Core Strategy Development Plan Document' (adopted July 2012)³ should also be taken into consideration, alongside other relevant local level publications including MCC's 'Anti-Social Behaviour Policy and Procedures'⁴ (July 2017) and 'Greater Manchester's Plan to Tackle Hate Crime'⁵ (2020-2023). Manchester Community Safety Partnership⁶ (MCSP) which brings together housing providers, the NHS, community and voluntary organisations, police, offender services and the local council to help combat crime and disorder in Manchester, is also of relevance having published a number of strategy documents⁷ (Community Safety Strategy, Domestic Abuse Strategy, Hate Crime Strategy, Youth Justice Plan and Women's Night-time Safety Charter).
- 1.1.7 Information on how a development's design can significantly lower fear of crime and increase crime prevention is detailed in MCC's Core Strategy. The intention is that developers will take these overarching considerations into account and help achieve the Council's Strategic Objectives through the implementation of safe parking arrangements, layout, secure buildings and informal surveillance, along with other best practice security designs detailed in the document.
- 1.1.8 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Section 17, states that police and local authorities have a duty to exercise their functions with regards to the effect on levels of crime and disorder. Crime and disorder issues must be considered by local planning authorities when making planning decisions.
- 1.1.9 A Crime Impact Statement (CIS) clearly demonstrates that the Applicant has considered what impact their proposal may have on the surrounding area. Faithful + Gould has commissioned this assessment in support of a planning application for a proposed residential development at Former Whitemoss Day Care, Manchester.

² Planning practice guidance, GOV.UK, [Planning practice guidance - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/planning-practice-guidance)

³ Manchester's Local Development Framework, Core Strategy Development Plan Document, Manchester City Council, Adopted 12th July 2012.

⁴ Anti-Social Behavior Policy and Procedures, Manchester City Council, July 2017.

⁵ Greater Manchester's Plan to Tackle Hate Crime 2020-2023, Greater Manchester.

⁶ Manchester Community Safety Partnership, About the Partnership, [About the partnership | Manchester Community Safety Partnership | Manchester City Council](#)

⁷ Manchester Community Safety Partnership, Strategies, [Strategies | Manchester Community Safety Partnership | Manchester City Council](#)

1.1.10 The proposal is for the development of the site for residential use, including 20 No. residential units, with associated infrastructure and landscaping. The proposed layout is shown on the Proposed Site Plan, drawing ref: PL.007A.

1.1.11 This CIS is produced by Wardell Armstrong; a multi-disciplinary consultancy which is independent of the design process. The team are Chartered Planners (MRTPI) with a number of years' experience preparing Crime Impact Statements for various developments in accordance with SBD guidance and have a clear understanding of factors affecting security in relation to construction and the built environment. A number of the WA team are certificated for attendance at an appropriate Police Crime Prevention Academy training course.

1.1.12 This report should be read alongside the full planning application to be submitted to Manchester City Council. The CIS includes information to:

- Consider crime issues in the vicinity of the proposed development site through analysis of available crime data as a basis for assessing potential risk;
- Assess the development proposal in terms of its likely effect on crime and disorder;
- Show how security considerations can influence the detailed design of the proposed development; and
- Explain the design solutions that will reduce the proposed development's vulnerability to crime, including:
 - Design, layout and spatial relationships;
 - Management and maintenance; and
 - Physical security measures.

1.1.13 This CIS has been composed in order to:

- Aid the applicant to adapt the proposed development to avoid/reduce the adverse effects of crime and disorder;
- Allow Manchester City Council to assess the information contained within this CIS in relation to the overall impact of the proposed development on the local and surrounding area; and
- Help to allay any public concerns about the proposed development which are often brought about by a lack of information.

1.1.14 This CIS has been written to analyse crime issues in order to account for these at the earliest opportunity i.e. prior to detailed design. As such, this ensures that the planning application reflects any potential issues identified.

2 THE SITE AND PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT

2.1 General Description of the Site and Surrounding Area

- 2.1.1 The proposed development site is located on land off Benmore Road, at Former Whitemoss Day Care, Manchester. The site is bounded to the north and east by residential properties off Whitemoss Road and Pembridge Road, respectively. The majority of the southern and western borders of the site are bordered by Benmore Road, with the exception of a few residential properties to the northwest off Clement Stott Close. The site lies approximately 470m southeast of Blackley village centre, with a National Grid Reference of SD 86438 03439.
- 2.1.2 Low density residential land use lies to the north, west and south, and within the wider area surrounding the site; to the east a block of flats off Pembridge Road backs onto the proposed development. Woodland and open green space predominate beyond the residential properties. Bailey's Wood, approximately 455m southwest of the development site and Boggart Hole Clough, a large woodland and urban country park lying approximately 635m southeast of the site, make up a large percentage of this woodland and open green space.
- 2.1.3 The proposed development site is located on a vacant grassed area. Access to the site is off Benmore Road to the south and west through gated steel fencing.

2.2 Site Visit

- 2.2.1 Wardell Armstrong has undertaken a site and surrounding area walkover to supplement this Crime Impact Statement.
- 2.2.2 The nature of a site can change considerably once it is developed. In this case, the 0.5 hectare (ha) site will be transformed by 20 residential units, made up of 10 two bed and 10 three bed properties.
- 2.2.3 The main benefit of a site walkover is to give an indication of potential crime risks during the site development/construction and operation stages given the characteristics of the surrounding areas and to highlight any mitigation measures that would be required as part of the proposed development.
- 2.2.4 As such, a walkover of the site and surrounding areas was undertaken on Tuesday 29th November 2022.



Photograph 1: Steel gate, southeast of the site, providing vehicular access to the development.



Photograph 2: Steel gate, southwest of the site, providing pedestrian access to the development.



Photograph 3: Steel gate, west of the site, providing pedestrian access to the site. development.



Photograph 4: View west across the site towards low-level steel fencing and adjacent properties overlooking the site.

2.2.5 Photograph 1 shows the steel gate off Benmore Road, southeast of the site, which provides vehicular access to the development. A large, grey concrete slab is present behind the gate to prevent unauthorised access to the site. To the southwestern and western corners of the site, a further two smaller steel gates provide pedestrian access to the development off Benmore Road (Photographs 2 & 3). The site is enclosed to the

west and south by low-level steel fencing, which allows for good natural observation from the adjacent properties bordering the development site (Photograph 4).



Photograph 5: Street lighting present on Benmore Road and view east of the site.



Photograph 6: Street lighting present on Benmore Road and view west of the site.



Photograph 7: Overgrown vegetation and view north across the site.



Photograph 8: Overgrown vegetation and view west across the site.

2.2.6 Street lighting is present on either side of the footpath outside the proposed development site (Photographs 5 & 6). Although, the vicinity of the site appeared to be well-maintained, the site itself was overgrown with vegetation which acts to limit the natural surveillance of the site from surrounding properties (Photographs 7 & 8). At the time of the visit, the proposed development site contained tall grasses which limited the walkability around the site. Given that this area is going to be cleared and

redeveloped, this doesn't present a significant problem, but rather presents an opportunity to improve the safety and appearance of the area.



Photograph 9: General litter and view east across the site.



Photograph 10: Discarded chest of drawers and view east across the site.



Photograph 11: View of discarded wooden panelling along western pavement bordering the development site.



Photograph 12: Discarded aerosol cans found within the hedgerows to the west of the site.

2.2.7 Plastic bottles, shopping bags and coffee cups were amongst the general litter found on the site (Photograph 9), alongside evidence of fly tipping demonstrated through the presence of large litter items including a chest of drawers at the southwestern corner of the site (Photograph 10). On the pavements bordering the site, general litter

(paper, cans, plastic bottles) was also found alongside further large items of litter, including what appeared to be wooden panelling, (Photograph 11), on the western pavement bordering the development site. Also to the west, aerosol and beer cans were found in the hedgerows overgrown onto the low-lying black metal fencing surrounding the site to the west and south, (Photograph 12), indicating signs of anti-social behaviour.

- 2.2.8 Within the wider area, limited items of litter were found along the pavement and there were no further signs of anti-social behaviour.
- 2.2.9 The side of an existing dwelling off Clement Stott Close backed onto the proposed development site, leaving the proposed side façade potentially vulnerable and exposed (Photographs 13 & 14). This is not a cause for concern given that adjacent dwellings to the north and east are bordered by high-level metal fencing and are outside of the development boundary.



Photograph 13: View north towards the exposed side façade of the adjacent property off Clement Stott Close.



Photograph 14: View south towards terraced properties off Clement Stott Close, where the side façade is left exposed against the north of the development site.

3 CRIME DATA ANALYSIS

3.1 Crime Issues in the Vicinity of the Site

3.1.1 Typically, this section would report the crime incidents from September 2021 to October 2022 recorded by the police⁸. The data would consider incidents within a 1-mile radius of the proposed development at Former Whitemoss Day Care, Manchester and analyse the frequency of their occurrence.

3.1.2 At the time of writing, the police.uk website had not been updated with September 2021 to October 2022 data, nor was any data available from the earliest selectable date of October 2019. As a result, we propose to check the website frequently and update the report as and when data becomes available. Additionally, the police.uk website does not state the Greater Manchester Police (GMP) priorities for the area surrounding this site. WA submitted a freedom of information request to gain crime data for the time period detailed above on 07/12/22, at the time of writing a response has not yet been received regarding this.

3.2 Modus Operandi (operating method)

3.2.1 In criminology, this is the distinct pattern or manner of working that comes to be associated with a particular criminal. Criminologists have observed that, whatever the speciality - for example, burglary, auto theft and so on - the professional criminal is very likely to adhere to one particular way of operating. If, for example, a burglar begins his career by entering houses from the roof, he will, in all probability, continue this method for as long as he is able to work. Some burglars become so attached to their *modus operandi* that they burgle the same places or people again and again.

3.2.2 Although crime data has been unattainable, it may still be worthwhile listing some of the most prominent crime types. With reference to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), the following provides details about these types of crime.

⁸ Crime Incidents data from the police website: Greater Manchester Police crime statistics for 2018-2019 accessed from <http://police.uk> in October 2020.

3.2.3 ***Violence and Sexual Offences***⁹

- 3.2.4 Violent crime covers a wide spectrum of offences, from minor assaults such as pushing and shoving that result in no physical harm through to serious incidents of wounding and homicide.
- 3.2.5 Any sexual contact without consent is sexual assault and is a crime. Sexual offences include rape, sexual assault and unlawful sexual activity against adults and children, sexual grooming and indecent exposure.
- 3.2.6 Police recorded crime encompasses a full range of violent crimes and sexual offences, although is restricted to those crimes that have been reported to and recorded by them.

Anti-Social Behaviour

- 3.2.7 Anti-social behaviour is behaviour that lacks consideration for others and may cause damage to society, whether intentionally or through negligence.
- 3.2.8 Anti-social behaviour is labelled as such when it is deemed contrary to prevailing norms for social conduct. This encompasses a large spectrum of actions and a wide variety of other activities such as those detailed below:

- Abusive, verbal behaviour;
- Arson;
- Assault;
- Begging;
- Behaviour which is abusive to other individuals;
- Cars/vehicles being driven around with noisy car stereos;
- Bullies and Bullying;
- Children and Young People who are bullied in public places;
- Criminal Behaviour;
- Criminal Damage;
- Damage to property;
- Distressing behaviour;
- Domestic violence;
- Drug and alcohol misuse/abuse;

⁹ Information sourced from
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/compendium/focusonviolentcrimeandsexualoffences/yearendingmarch2016/overviewofviolentcrimeandsexualoffences>

- Handling stolen property;
- Harassment / Harassing passers-by or local residents;
- Homophobic Behaviour;
- Illegal use of fireworks;
- Intimidating gangs of people (including young people);
- Joy riders;
- Kerb crawling and prostitution;
- Neighbour Intimidation;
- Noise Pollution;
- Nuisance Animals;
- Other Damage;
- Overgrown, unkempt gardens;
- Parking illegally and abandoned vehicles;
- Racist behaviour / Racial harassment;
- Rubbish and dumping of litter;
- Running a business from home;
- Stalking;
- Threatening behaviour;
- Threats made in person or via the telephone;
- Throwing any kind of 'missile';
- Underage or illegal sales;
- Use of inappropriate places for sport/activities;
- Vandalism, graffiti; and
- Youths and young people loitering.

3.2.9 The term Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) is used to describe a wide range of inconsiderate and nuisance behaviour. While this type of behaviour may not in itself be a criminal offence, it can affect the quality of life of individuals and communities. It is therefore important to address / seek to prevent anti-social behaviour from occurring within development proposals.

Reducing the Incidences of Anti-Social Behaviour

3.2.10 It is thought that the creation of a community helps to deal with persistent ASB as residents become proactive in securing the development through informal

surveillance. This in turn discourages ASB through the creation of a sense of place, belonging and ownership.

3.2.11 Furthermore, the management and maintenance of the site, along with the provision of appropriate lighting and boundary treatments, will help to discourage ASB from taking place.

Burglary

3.2.12 According to the ONS¹⁰, “Broadly speaking, a person commits a burglary if they enter any building or part of a building as a trespasser and, having done so, steal or attempt to steal anything”.

3.2.13 An in-depth study amongst a group of convicted British burglars, on behalf of Halifax Home Insurance and conducted by leading criminologist Professor Martin Gill, has helped to illustrate why Britain has become Europe's burglary capital.

3.2.14 The report, entitled The Modus Operandi of a Thief (conducted amongst 13 convicted British burglars by Professor Martin Gill and his team at University of Leicester spin-out company Perpetuity Research and Consultancy International Ltd, 2006/7, sponsored by Halifax General Insurance) is the culmination of a number of one-to-one interviews with British burglars and a tour of three notorious burglary hotspots in Nottingham, Bedford and the West Midlands.

3.2.15 Burglars point out where and how Britons are leaving their homes wide open to burglars:

- Burglar alarms are often left inactivated or ignored. This information was confirmed in a separate poll by Halifax (Omnibus research amongst 1668 British adults sponsored by Halifax General Insurance, 2007) where 34% of householders with an alarm fitted to their home said they rarely activated it. A further 33% also said that they assume sounding burglar alarms in their neighbourhood to be false.
- Doors and windows are often left unsecured or even wide open, allowing potential burglars to let themselves in. This was backed up by 64% of householders who confessed to occasionally leaving doors unlocked whilst

¹⁰ Information sourced from
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/articles/overviewofburglaryandotherhouseholdtheft/englandandwales>

away from the home, and a further 37% whilst inside the home - even though statistics show that 22% of burglaries are carried out with the thief aware that the home was occupied. One offender stated that they often gained entry to homes by putting their hands in a letterbox and pulling the keys out.

- Some thieves have learnt how to dismantle alarms, remove patio doors and force open sash windows.
- Even the security lighting can be used to help thieves see inside an unlit home. Others will pose as a bogus caller to gain entry, wear disguises to avoid CCTV camera detection and even poison meat to silence noisy animals.

3.2.16 In general, burglars prefer empty properties, often looking for visual clues such as an empty drive.

3.2.17 Evidence of occupancy is generally a bad sign, so any lights, televisions and radios left on are usually off-putting for burglars.

3.2.18 Burglars are often attracted by the sight of valuables, including car keys. They spot these by simply looking through windows and doors. Householders need to be careful about the type of goods that are on display. Blinds can help to obscure vision.

3.2.19 Empty packaging left outside in view of passers-by (e.g. plasma TV boxes) suggests that there is something expensive in the property worth stealing.

Assessing the Risk

3.2.20 An activated alarm linked to a formal response will deter some thieves.

3.2.21 Window and door locks make access more difficult, especially for the opportunist.

3.2.22 In high crime areas, some burglars advised fitting bars and grilles to vulnerable windows to stop anyone climbing through.

3.2.23 Security lights that are positioned high out of reach where they cannot be easily repositioned are seen as a nuisance by some burglars.

3.2.24 Trees and hedges are used as cover for burglars since it decreases the chances they could be seen by a passer-by. Fences, high walls and gates surrounding the property make escape more difficult.

3.2.25 Many burglars said that they don't like dogs because they bark and draw attention and can also bite. A simple sign warning of dogs was enough to deter some.

Getting In

- 3.2.26 The majority of offenders preferred opportunist burglaries because it “made their lives easier”. In the majority of cases, these opportunities were said to present themselves in the form of an open window or an unlocked door - most burglars opting for the back door first.
- 3.2.27 For an opportunist burglary, some criminals will burgle garages and sheds first in order to access tools to help them gain entry to the house.
- 3.2.28 If an opportunity did not present itself, then the second most common type of burglary in the study was breaking and entering or forced entry. A variety of techniques were used for this such as using a crowbar, spade or shovel, wrapping a brick in a jumper and smashing a window or simply kicking a door down.
- 3.2.29 The most common tool used to aid entry was a screwdriver, often used as a lever to remove windows, doors and hinges. Other tools included crowbars and bolt cutters.
- 3.2.30 Some offenders even dismantle alarms and patio doors, which clearly involves a high level of skill and dexterity.
- 3.2.31 Burglars are not above impersonating someone else to access a property. One burglar would gain the confidence of the owner by posing as a car washer to gain entrance to a home. Once inside, they would distract the homeowner to enable them to steal items of value.

Avoiding Security

- 3.2.32 Burglar alarms are often not set at night, and often even during the day when the house was left unoccupied. Even when an alarm is set burglars feel they have some time before the police will arrive - noting that the public were often accustomed to alarms going off and so don't take a lot of notice.
- 3.2.33 Even when security products and initiatives are more sophisticated, so too are the methods and techniques employed by offenders. In some cases, security measures work to a burglar's advantage, a case in point is security lights. In the opinion of burglars these can significantly improve their vision when accessing a property, providing a handy light to work by. Others reposition motion sensors to prevent them from illuminating when they pass.
- 3.2.34 The effectiveness of CCTV is often mitigated by wearing disguises - typically hats, largely baseball caps.

3.2.35 In addition to wearing protective gloves to ensure no DNA/prints were left at the scene, carrier bags are sometimes worn over shoes to ensure no footprints are left behind.

Accessing and Escaping from a Property

3.2.36 Generally, burglars like to access property from the rear as it offers a safe environment. Having adequate fences and locked gates can make this a less inviting opportunity.

3.2.37 Alleyways are seen as a useful resource in both accessing properties from the back and providing a quick escape. Increasingly, these alleyways are fitted with wrought iron gates.

3.2.38 Those that were closed and locked did serve as a deterrent to some burglars.

Vehicle Crime

3.2.39 Most vehicle crimes are associated with the theft of property from inside the vehicle. In this respect, in order to reduce the chances of becoming a victim, it is possible to minimise the availability of property worth stealing, i.e. by doing something to make it less attractive to the thief, more difficult to take or by reducing the opportunity to commit the theft.

Reducing the theft of property from vehicles

- Remove personal items such as handbags, leather jackets, wallets, laptops and shopping from the vehicle. These should never be left on view. If necessary, some of this can be locked in the boot;
- A portable Satellite Navigation system (Sat-Nav) should be carried on the person or left in a locked boot, together with its cradle or mat when leaving the car. Any suction cup marks on the windscreen should be wiped away as their presence will indicate to the thief that you may have a device, such as a Sat-Nav, hidden in the glove compartment. This may not be the case, but this won't stop the thief from smashing a side window to take a look;
- Always close the windows and sunroof, lock the doors and set the immobiliser and alarm before leaving the vehicle, even for a minute, such as de-icing the vehicle outside the property;
- If the vehicle does not have an alarm, then have one fitted;
- Lock the doors and boot before driving away to reduce the chances of snatch

theft and robbery when stopped, even within a residential area;

- Take extra care if you are driving a convertible vehicle with the roof down. Consider raising the windows when stationary or in slow traffic and keep the doors and boot locked; and
- When parking at home, use a garage if you have one, or park on a well-lit driveway or hardstanding, rather than in the street. If street parking is the only option, park in a place that is well lit and overlooked.

Reducing the incidence of vehicle theft

When leaving the vehicle;

- Always remove the ignition keys, close the windows and lock the doors, even for a short time, such as when you are paying for the petrol at the filling station;
- Always engage the steering lock;
- When using a remote operating key always double check that you have indeed locked the car. People often accidentally press the button as they make their way in through the front door and don't realise that they've just unlocked the car again;
- Don't leave the vehicle unattended with the engine running to warm it up or defrost the windows;
- When at home put the keys in a drawer or cupboard and never leave them on view through a window or door or close to the door's letter plate;
- When going out, with or without the car, always take the car keys with you and ensure that the home is properly secured; and

4 DESIGNING OUT CRIME

4.1 An Overview for Consideration

- 4.1.1 Considering the typical modus operandi detailed in section 3.2, the main principles of designing out crime are based on the notion that most crime is opportunistic. By using design measures to increase natural surveillance and define ownership of public and private space, a sense of community can be fostered where potential criminals are made to feel unwelcome.

Natural Surveillance

- 4.1.2 Natural surveillance relies on observation - people and property visible from occupied buildings are less vulnerable than those out of sight. The fear of crime can also be reduced in places which are in continuous occupation and where people are passing or looking on. The orientation of entrances and windows to buildings can encourage surveillance and 'self-policing'. Good lighting is also an important tool in achieving this.

Public and Private

- 4.1.3 Public and private spaces should be clearly defined to deter unauthorised access into clearly 'private' areas. Public and private spaces can be separated by low walls, changes in surfacing materials or other symbolic entrance features. Door entry systems also 'create' areas of defensible space in multi-occupied buildings, as well as helping to restrict unauthorised entry.
- 4.1.4 It is also important to consider the effect of crime prevention measures on properties adjacent to a development, and the personal safety of people. A 'Fortress Approach' for new developments is discouraged as it tends to be unattractive and can result in an oppressive environment for both residents and passing pedestrians. It is important to have linkages through to other residential areas. A balance has to be struck between maintaining an attractive environment whilst achieving effective prevention of crime.

4.2 Secured by Design

- 4.2.1 Secured by Design is a police initiative to guide and encourage those engaged within the specification, design and build of new homes to adopt crime prevention measures.
- 4.2.2 For residential dwellings, the most recent guidance is Homes 2019, which provides advice that has been proven to reduce the opportunity for crime and the fear of crime, creating safer, more secure and sustainable environments.

4.2.3 The Homes 2019 guidance document is presented in three sections, as follows:

- Section 1: Development layout and design.
 - This section provides guidance on all aspects of design and layout that impact on the creation of a safe and secure environments, including road layout, footpath design, communal areas, dwelling boundaries, car parking and lighting.
- Section 2: Physical security of the home.
 - Section 2 provides the 'Police Preferred Specification' for all physical security requirements for new or refurbished homes. Section 2a reflects the requirements of the UK Buildings Regulations. Section 2b addresses bespoke new homes and existing homes, so is applicable for the proposed apartment buildings.
- Section 3: Additional features.
 - The essential security dwelling detail requirements in Section 2 are further enhanced by the requirements set out in this section. Section 3 addresses the requirements for a range of additional or optional residential features, such as enhanced glazing, bicycle storage, drying rooms, external bin stores, etc.

4.2.4 This chapter will assess the proposed development at Former Whitemoss Day Care, Manchester in the context of the above sections within the guidance document.

4.2.5 Following the assessment of the proposed development, recommendations will be provided to incorporate into the design.

4.3 **Section 1: Development Layout and Design**

4.3.1 In every development, there are a number of aspects of the design that should be considered to reduce opportunities for crime. The following section assesses the design considerations as highlighted in the Homes 2019 guidance and makes recommendations as appropriate.

Layout of roads and footpaths

4.3.2 There are no through roads within the proposed development. There is one combined vehicle and pedestrian entrance point off Benmore Road to the south of the development which will allow for two-way traffic access to and from the site.

- 4.3.3 Footpaths throughout the site will follow the proposed vehicular access route off Benmore Road to the south. No additional footpaths through the site, or connecting to the wider area, are planned. The proposed development therefore will have low permeability which may act to protect the development from elevated crime rates, but it would have lower street activity and passive surveillance due to minimal legitimate footfall.
- 4.3.4 Surface treatments will differ throughout the site, between the main vehicular routes and pedestrian paths.
- 4.3.5 The positions of such vehicular and pedestrian routes are located such that passive surveillance is enabled by residents. However, while passive surveillance and high levels of street activity are desirable and have been proven to deter criminal behaviour, they are no guarantee of lower crime, which evidence proves is achieved primarily through the control and limitation of permeability.

Recommendations

- 4.3.6 It is recommended that any street furniture, walls and planting beds along the footpaths should all be low in height, so providing residents with good visibility. Planting immediately abutting the path should be avoided as shrubs and trees may grow over the path, creating pinch points, places of concealment and unnecessary maintenance.
- 4.3.7 It is recommended that the lighting strategy for the proposed development comply with BS 5489:2013 to help illuminate facial features and reduce fear of crime. The lighting strategy should co-ordinate with the planting scheme throughout the site to ensure there will be no conflict between lighting and tree canopies.
- 4.3.8 This will respond positively to the Secured by Design requirement that lighting illuminates all elevations containing a doorset, car parking and footpaths leading to dwellings.

Communal areas and play space

- 4.3.9 There appears to be no communal open space within the vicinity of the site. The nearest open space lies approximately 95m southeast of the proposed development, consisting of a large open field with a hybrid football/basketball court at the centre of the site. The open space receives good natural surveillance from the opposing dwellings, especially given the absence of high vegetation and trees at property frontages. To the west of the field, a public footpath runs through the site, likely

connecting the communal area to Bailey's Wood and Boggart Hole Clough woodland and urban country park behind.

Recommendations

- 4.3.10 It is recommended that communal spaces should be clearly defined with features that prevent unauthorised vehicular access.
- 4.3.11 The lighting strategy of the roads and footpaths should take into account the location of any open spaces and incorporate lighting close to the open space to improve visibility.

Dwelling boundaries

- 4.3.12 Gates to the side of dwellings that provide access to rear gardens or yards will be robustly constructed and must be the same height as the fence (minimum 1.8m). Each will have a locking mechanism.
- 4.3.13 Vulnerable areas, such as exposed side and rear gardens will be bounded by fencing to a minimum height of 1.8m. Gardens bounding the road and footpath network throughout the site will be bounded by walls.

Recommendations

- 4.3.14 It is recommended that the boundary between public and private areas is clearly indicated. This can be achieved using landscaping and planting schemes or fencing and walls to signify private space.
- 4.3.15 It is desirable for dwelling frontages to be open to view to aid natural surveillance of footpaths and car parking areas, so any walls, fences and hedges should be kept low. Planting schemes in front gardens should be set back from paths and placed to avoid obstructing visibility of doors and windows. Planting that allows a clear line of sight to the pavement and road is preferable.
- 4.3.16 It is recommended that additional deterrent features to protect side and rear dwelling boundaries are considered. These could include increasing the height of fencing or planting thorny shrubs.

Layout and orientation of dwellings

- 4.3.17 Dwellings are positioned to face out onto their access roads and footpaths, resulting in many of the dwellings facing each other. This allows neighbours to easily view their surroundings, thus making any potential offender feel vulnerable to detection.

4.3.18 The proposed development incorporates a combination of affordable dwellings including 10 two bed and 10 three bed properties. Totalling 20 residences, all dwellings are semi-detached. This enables greater potential for homes to be occupied throughout the day giving increased opportunity for natural surveillance, community interaction, engagement and participation and environmental control.

Gable end walls

4.3.19 Gable end walls have been incorporated within the proposed development.

Recommendations

4.3.20 It is important to avoid the creation of windowless elevations and blank walls immediately adjacent to public spaces. This type of elevation tends to attract graffiti, inappropriate loitering and ball games. The provision of at least one window above ground floor level, where possible, will offer additional surveillance over the public area.

4.3.21 Where blank gable walls are unavoidable, it is recommended that one of the following methods should be used to protect them:

- Provision of a 1m buffer zone using a 1.2 – 1.4m railing or a 1m mature height hedge with high thorn content. The hedge should be contained within the boundary of the adjacent building to increase the likelihood it will be maintained;
- Where there is insufficient space to create defensible space between public and private space, an appropriate (non-destructive) climbing plant should be planted adjacent to the wall;
- Where there is insufficient space to create defensible space between public and private space, a finish should be applied to the wall that will allow easy removal of graffiti.

Rear access footpaths

4.3.22 The proposed development does not include rear access footpaths.

Recommendations

4.3.23 It is recommended that footpaths are gated, the gates must be lockable and placed at the entrance to the footpath as near to the front building line as possible. The gates must not be easy to climb or remove from their hinges.

- 4.3.24 Where possible, the street lighting scheme should be designed to ensure that gates are well illuminated.

Dwelling identification

- 4.3.25 Clear signage (naming and/or numbering) of properties will be implemented to assist residents, postal workers, and the attendance of emergency services.

Climbing aids

Recommendations

- 4.3.26 It is recommended that boundary walls, bin stores, street furniture, trees, low roofs, car ports, and any other potential climbing aids, should be designed to remove climbing aids to gain access into properties.

Vehicle parking

- 4.3.27 Two in-curtilage parking spaces are proposed to be provided alongside each individual dwelling through the provision of driveways.

- 4.3.28 Parking for dwellings is designed to be placed either in front of, adjacent or between units.

Recommendations

- 4.3.29 Vegetation surrounding parking bays may provide cover for thieves to interfere with vehicles. An encroaching or uncontrolled undergrowth can hinder natural surveillance, restrict access for the car user, and impact the fall of light. It is recommended that any shrubs selected should have a mature growth height no taller than 1 metre, trees should have no foliage, shoots or lower branches below 2 metres, thereby allowing a 1-metre clear field of vision.

Planting in new developments

- 4.3.30 The planting plan for the proposed development is not yet confirmed. However, the proposed site layout plan (ref: PL.007A) details any soft landscaping, trees and tree removal proposed.

Recommendations

- 4.3.31 It is recommended that the planting scheme considers certain species of plants such as spiny or thorny shrubs to help prevent graffiti and loitering, and to create or enhance perimeter security. Climbing plants can also be used to cover walls to deter graffiti.

- 4.3.32 Planting should not impede the opportunity for natural surveillance and wayfinding through the site. It should also avoid the creation of potential hiding places.
- 4.3.33 Where good visibility is needed, it is recommended that shrubs should be selected to have a mature growth height no taller than 1 metre, and trees should have no foliage or lower branches below 2 metres, thereby allowing a 1 metre clear field of vision. Building frontages should be open to view and any planned hedges should not obscure doors or windows.
- 4.3.34 The position of trees should be carefully considered so they cannot be of use as climbing aids into property, and so they do not obscure any lighting.
- 4.3.35 It is recommended that a maintenance and management programme should be put in place to ensure the landscape fulfils the aims of the original design.

Street lighting

- 4.3.36 Street lighting will be designed in accordance with Secure by Design and Manchester City Council adoptable roads standards for street lighting.

Recommendations

- 4.3.37 The lighting strategy for the proposed development should ensure the streetscape is kept free from clutter, while helping to illuminate facial features and reduce fear of crime. The strategy should comply with BS 5489-1:2013.
- 4.3.38 This responds positively to the Secured by Design requirement that lighting illuminates all elevations containing a doorset, car parking and footpaths leading to buildings. It is also recommended that the lighting scheme illuminates entrances and gateways into the development. Lighting will be adequate for public streets and will be well-integrated and in keeping with the overall scheme.
- 4.3.39 It is recommended that bollard lighting is avoided as it can be easily obscured and does not provide sufficient light at the right height, making it difficult to recognise facial features and as a result causes an increase in the fear of crime.
- 4.3.40 Trees may restrict the performance of street lighting by blocking or causing damage through collision with branches and should not be located within 5 metres of a lighting source.

4.4 **Section 2: Physical Security**

4.4.1 The recent recognition that security forms part of a sustainable and vibrant development has been demonstrated by the inclusion of a Building Regulation in England and Wales. Part Q of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations in both countries specifically states that “Reasonable provision must be made to resist unauthorised access...” There are a number of security categories that are listed within the Homes 2019 guidance and the following section assesses the proposed development against these categories. Recommendations are made as appropriate.

Dwelling entrance doorsets

4.4.2 Front door sets are specified in Guinness Standard Specification document and secure by design requirements. All external doorsets allowing direct access into the home will be pre-installed with locks as per the manufacturer specifications and will be designed to comply with the Secured by Design Approved Document Q (Security – Dwellings) Part Q and British Standard.

Recommendations

4.4.3 It is recommended that the applicant adheres to the required standards as stated in section 21 of the Homes 2019 guidance.

Windows, roof windows and roof lights

4.4.4 The proposed windows, roof windows and roof lights are not yet specified. With the exception of windows covered by Building Regulations, ground floor windows will have key operated locks.

Recommendations

4.4.5 It is recommended that the applicant will adhere to the required standards as stated in section 22 and section 47 of the Homes 2019 guidance.

4.4.6 All easily accessible windows should incorporate key lockable hardware unless designated as emergency egress routes, these routes may require non-key locking hardware. Windows that are not easily accessible will require either lockable hardware or an opening restrictor in the interests of child safety.

Conservatories and sun rooms

4.4.7 The proposed development does not include conservatories or sun rooms.

External lighting

- 4.4.8 External lighting fixed to dwelling facades will be provided. In particular, lighting will be provided to the front external door. I

Recommendations

- 4.4.9 It is recommended that the lighting strategy for the proposed development will aim to provide public lighting alongside the roads and footpaths, to help to illuminate facial features and reduce fear of crime.
- 4.4.10 This will respond positively to the Secured by Design requirement that lighting illuminates all elevations containing a doorset, car parking and footpaths leading to dwellings.

Utility meters

- 4.4.11 Utility meters are proposed to be located externally. Generally, utility metres are located outside the dwelling along the front façade. In some cases, utility metres are located to the sides of dwellings. These are positioned close to the front of the building and in front of any fencing and gates, in keeping with the Homes 2019 guidance.

Recommendations

- 4.4.12 It is recommended that care should be taken to prevent the potential for utility meters located to the side of dwellings to be used as climbing aids.

CCTV and Recording

- 4.4.13 CCTV is not proposed to be installed at the development.

Recommendations

- 4.4.14 CCTV can help deter crime and criminal behaviour, assist with the identification of offenders, promote personal safety and provide reassurance for residents and visitors. It is advised that a CCTV system is considered for communal areas within the apartment block, in particular at communal entrances/exits and internal lobby areas.

CCTV management and maintenance protocols

Recommendations

- 4.4.15 Should a CCTV system be installed, it is recommended that management and maintenance protocols follow the guidance detailed within section 30 of the Homes 2019 guidance document.

4.5 **Section 3: Additional Features**

- 4.5.1 This Section of the Homes 2019 guidance requires consideration of the security requirements for a range of additional or optional residential features that may be included as part of a proposed development. The below points consider the proposed development in relation to each of the features outlined in the Homes 2019 guidance.

Additional window requirements for the SBD Gold Award

- 4.5.2 This aspect of the Homes 2019 guidance is required for development proposals “in certain high crime locations only”. Based on the crime data highlighted in Chapter 3, it is not deemed necessary to meet the requirements of BS EN 356:2000 class 1A detailed within section 53 of the Homes 2019 guidance.

External garage doorsets

- 4.5.3 The proposed development does not include garages.

Car Parking

- 4.5.4 The proposed development does not include any residential communal parking

Secure external storage facilities and bicycle security

- 4.5.5 The proposed development does not include secure external storage facilities and bicycle security.

Integral communal bin, mobility vehicles and bicycle stores

- 4.5.6 The proposed development does not include an integral communal bin, mobility vehicles or bicycle stores.

Recommendations

- 4.5.7 If incorporated into the design, it is recommended that these facilities should be easily accessible, with no windows and should be fitted with a secure doorset that meets the specification as detailed within section 57 of the Homes 2019 guidance. This is to ensure that they are only accessible to residents and to ensure that residents cannot be accidentally locked in by another person.

Private external lighting and dwelling lighting

- 4.5.8 The lighting strategy for the proposed development is not yet confirmed.

Recommendations

- 4.5.9 In keeping with the Homes 2019 guidance, it is recommended that all elevations containing a doorset, car parking and garage areas, and footpaths leading to dwellings are lit.
- 4.5.10 Bollard lighting is not advised to be used, as it does not project sufficient light at the right height, making it difficult to recognise facial features and as a result causes an increase in the fear of crime.

Intruder alarms

- 4.5.11 Intruder alarms will not be included in dwellings as standard and will be provided at the discretion of the occupier.

Recommendations

- 4.5.12 As per the Homes 2019 guidance Section 60, where an intruder alarm system is installed then it shall meet the requirements of BS EN 50131 (wired and wire free systems). All installations shall be in accordance with the current electrical regulations. If an immediate police response is required, then installers must meet the requirements of the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) police document – *Guidelines on Police Requirements & Response to Security Systems* which can be obtained from www.securedbydesign.com.

5 CONCLUSION

- 5.1.1 The proposal is for the development of the site for 20 No. residential units with associated infrastructure and landscaping. The currently vacant largely grassed site will be transformed by residential development.
- 5.1.2 Given the incorporation of our recommendations, the proposed development will be consistent with the principles set out in the NPPF, the Manchester City Council local policy and guidance, and the Homes 2019 guidance produced by Secured by Design by promoting an inclusive and safe development, with safe and accessible environments where crime will not undermine community cohesion.
- 5.1.3 The site visit (Chapter 2) identifies the existing safety and accessibility at the site by studying the site and its surrounding area. Its evidence illustrates the potential to safely and securely develop the site, and the subsequent chapters emphasise the opportunity presented by this proposal's positive design features, which will help to create a residential development that uses attractive layout and design that prevents the impact of crime or the fear of crime.
- 5.1.4 Views to and from dwellings, and the movement network hierarchy through the development will aid surveillance. The detailed design of the residential units will also benefit from the use of robust materials with security features, including locks on windows and doors so to discourage breaking and entering and criminal damage.
- 5.1.5 The design of the proposed development responds well to the opportunity to develop the site by creating a safe and secure new development. The scheme promotes the key points of national and local policy, as well as the Secured by Design Homes 2019 guidance in the context of its location.

STOKE-ON-TRENT

Sir Henry Doulton House
Forge Lane
Etruria
Stoke-on-Trent
ST1 5BD
Tel: +44 (0)1782 276 700

BIRMINGHAM

Two Devon Way
Longbridge Technology Park
Longbridge
Birmingham
B31 2TS
Tel: +44 (0)121 580 0909

BOLTON

41-50 Futura Park
Aspinall Way
Middlebrook
Bolton
BL6 6SU
Tel: +44 (0)1204 227 227

BRISTOL

Temple Studios
Temple Gate
Redcliffe
Bristol
BS1 6QA
Tel: +44 (0)117 203 4477

BURY ST EDMUNDS

Armstrong House
Lamdin Road
Bury St Edmunds
Suffolk
IP32 6NU
Tel: +44 (0)1284 765 210

CARDIFF

Tudor House
16 Cathedral Road
Cardiff
CF11 9LJ
Tel: +44 (0)292 072 9191

CARLISLE

Marconi Road
Burgh Road Industrial Estate
Carlisle
Cumbria
CA2 7NA
Tel: +44 (0)1228 550 575

EDINBURGH

Great Michael House
14 Links Place
Edinburgh
EH6 7EZ
Tel: +44 (0)131 555 3311

GLASGOW

24 St Vincent Place
Glasgow
G1 2EU
Tel: +44 (0)141 428 4499

LEEDS

36 Park Row
Leeds
LS1 5JL
Tel: +44 (0)113 831 5533

LONDON

Third Floor
46 Chancery Lane
London
WC2A 1JE
Tel: +44 (0)207 242 3243

NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE

City Quadrant
11 Waterloo Square
Newcastle upon Tyne
NE1 4DP
Tel: +44 (0)191 232 0943

TRURO

Baldhu House
Wheal Jane Earth Science Park
Baldhu
Truro
TR3 6EH
Tel: +44 (0)187 256 0738

International office:

ALMATY

29/6 Satpaev Avenue
Hyatt Regency Hotel
Office Tower
Almaty
Kazakhstan
050040
Tel: +7(727) 334 1310