



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

LLOYDS HOUSE, JACKSON'S ROW, MANCHESTER
CHANGE OF USE OF BASEMENT PARKING/STORAGE TO
DRINKING ESTABLISHMENT (385sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR: Cocktail Takeover Ltd.

VERSION A: 10/11/2022

REFERENCE: 2022/0474/CIS/01

Lloyds House, Jackson's Row, Manchester

URN: 2022/0474/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.2 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The security of the proposal will be heavily reliant on the secure enclosure of the ground floor recessed entrance area out-of-hours, as well as the management of this space and customer access/egress during operational hours.
- Prevention of unauthorised internal access through to adjacent car park/upper floors of the building and vice versa.

If these issues are addressed as described within the report, we are happy to endorse this development subject to the appropriate security measures contained with Section 3 of this report being incorporated into the proposed scope of works.

The overall security of the development will be heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the premises, rather than just the physical measures recommended in the report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site comprises of part of the basement and a gated ground floor entrance to Lloyds House – a part 4/5 storey Grade II listed building with frontages onto Lloyd Street to the north and Jackson's Row to the south.



Albert Square lies just to the north-east and Deansgate lies just to the west.

The entrance to the site is located on Jackson's Row and is a former loading bay secured with full height metal gates, with an existing stair down to basement level. When left open and accessible, such sheltered, partially hidden spaces can often foster loitering/gathering, nuisance/anti-social behaviour issues and mis-use – particularly in the city centre.

The existing western portion of the basement is currently in use as car parking and storage. The existing shuttered car park entrance lies just to the east of the site entrance and will be retained to serve the remaining basement parking areas.

Jackson's Row is a relatively narrow route that's benefits from limited levels of activity at street level, passive surveillance and direct overlooking. The buildings surrounding the site typically include club/bar/restaurant uses at ground level, with offices above. Although there are some premises that front onto it, the majority of neighbouring buildings front onto Lloyd Street to the north.

The site on the opposite side of the street is currently being redeveloped to provide a large mixed-use scheme, which is likely to increase activity and surveillance opportunities along the route.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2021 to 30th September 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary


Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
17	155	226	1508	1371	147	43	372	52	112

- 2.1.1 The volume of crime in the local area is very high – with the most prevalent types of crime being violence, theft, vehicle crime, criminal damage, non-domestic burglary and robbery. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed licensed premises, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.

2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area 2018 - 2019.



- 2.1.1 **Day Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday.
- 2.1.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typically found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.
- 2.1.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered licensed premises through external doors. Most commonly, doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools/implements. In a number of cases, glazing in doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Where the point of entry was legitimate/unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas.

2.2 Theft (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.3 General Risk Factors

- 2.3.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Burglary
 - Robbery to business
 - Criminal damage to property
 - Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
 - Miscellaneous theft to customers
 - Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
 - Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
 - Violence towards staff
 - Safety of staff personal belongings

-
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.4.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting licensed premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been forced open with tools/implements and bodily pressure
Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 3.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.
- Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access
Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 3.2), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.
- Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas to steal items
Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 3.3).
- Theft of personal property, particularly from table tops, from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables
Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 3.7). The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

3 Scheme Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to change the use of part of the existing basement from car parking and storage to a drinking establishment – a seated, table service cocktail bar similar to the existing Speak in Code bar on the ground floor of Lloyds House.
- 3.1.2 Customers will access the premises off Jackson's Row. The full-height gates off Jackson's Row will be retained and refurbished, along with the staircase and railing surround. The stairs will lead down to an entrance, with a welcome foyer and small waiting area. The rest of the premises will feature a bar with high-level bar seating, non-fixed high-level/low-level seating and booth seating, as well as a cellar/store/office, back-of-house area behind the bar and customer W/Cs. The proposed opening hours of the premises are:
- 17:00 to 03:00 Sundays to Thursdays.
 - 17:00 to 03:00 Fridays and Saturdays.
- 3.1.3 The existing vehicular ramp from ground level to basement level will be retained to maintain access for the remaining car parking. New partition walls will be erected to enclose and separate the premises from the car park.

3.2 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.2.1 The sheltered recessed entrance area at ground level (off Jackson's Row) could be vulnerable to fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance/anti-social behaviour issues and mis-use when it is accessible during operational hours (particularly late at night). The basement entrance to the premises will be hidden from view from the street and could be vulnerable to attack unseen if left accessible out-of-hours. The security of the proposal is therefore heavily reliant on the secure enclosure of the ground floor area out-of-hours, as well as the management of the space during operational hours. The following measures must be incorporated:
- The existing gates must be refurbished and any damaged or weakened/corroded elements repaired or replaced where necessary. Out-of-hours, they should be secured with a multi-point locking mechanism (locking the gate leafs together, as well as to the floor) or secured with closed-shackle padlocks to Sold Secure Gold Standard.
 - The basement entrance to the premises, accessed via the refurbished stairs, should be formed by a single-leaf doorset compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, with any glazing including at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356.
 - During operational hours, formal surveillance over the recessed ground floor area, as well as the access stairs, will be essential ensure the safe access and egress of customers and avoid potential conflicts or issues from arising. Staff within the welcome foyer should be capable of monitoring CCTV coverage of the recessed area and access stair (see Section 3.6), to ensure they can respond to any issues recorded. During busy periods, it may be necessary to have a staff presence at ground floor level to manage customer access and egress via the stair and to manage any customer queue.
 - The recessed area and stair should also be lit to an adequate and uniform level (see Section 3.5), with no areas of pooling or shadowing, in order to aid surveillance and support the CCTV system installed.
- 3.2.2 It should not be possible for patrons of the premises to gain unauthorised internal access to the adjacent basement parking areas or upper floors of the building (or vice versa). Any doors between the premises and such areas should be security-certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 (with any escape ironmongery permitted under the security certification of the product, if they are required for means of escape purposes). They should also be alarmed and signed as such to deter casual use. New internal walls between the premises and the adjacent parking basement should ideally be of robust masonry

construction, or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the walls of the premises themselves are not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

3.3 Internal Security

- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. Ideally, there should also be a secure cash office – which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Consideration should also be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind bar/servery areas, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in the till during busy periods.
- ☐ Internal access doors/frames to all other staff areas and storage rooms should also be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and fitted with either auditable access controls or secured with key operated locks to secure them when not in use/access is not required. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.
- ☐ Any electric locking system to be used throughout the premises should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any access control cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Keys or passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times. The use of numeric keypad locks are not advised, as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed.

3.4 Alarm

- ☐ An alarm should be installed to cover the premises, linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (e.g. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre or security control room, who will alert the key holder).
- ☐ It is also recommended that the alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind the bar or in any cash office (which should also contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal).

3.5 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to the main entrance gates, the recessed ground floor entrance area, the access stair and the basement entrance to the premises. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and should compliment the CCTV system installed.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be controlled from behind the bar or in an office, away from public access. Zoned dimmers should be used to increase the control of areas and an override should be provided, within easy reach of staff, so that if an incident occurs the lighting level can be raised if required.

3.6 CCTV

- 3.6.1 Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
 - ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
 - ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
 - ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *the ground floor recessed entrance area, the access stair and the basement entrance to the premises, the bar/servery and all till positions, all customer circulation/seating areas, any cash office and any external smoking area.*
- ☐ The proposed CCTV system should be capable of being monitored by the on-site staff, so there can be an immediate response to any incidents being recorded.

3.7 Internal Layout Guidance

3.7.1 Bars can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- *Opportunities* - Large numbers of people congregating in premises, generating opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- *Lack of attention* - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- *Cohesion* – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- *Customer turnover* – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- *Valuable goods* – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses/wallets, keys etc.
- *Stealth* - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

3.7.2 The internal security and layout of the premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, in order to minimise the issues highlighted above:

- ☐ The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- ☐ Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- ☐ The internal layout of premises should generally be as uncluttered as possible, with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable doors or hatches that cannot be easily scaled). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.

- ☐ Consideration should be given to customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- ☐ Toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

4 Management & Maintenance

- 4.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Any cash management within the premises;
 - Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.

There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

- 4.1.2 Monitoring of numbers entering the premises must be undertaken, as overcrowding can facilitate criminal activity. The management of people awaiting entry will be important, in order to prevent frustrations building up that could create disorder. Sufficient security staff will be needed to supervise the entry process and an outside security presence may be required at busy times. All door/security staff engaged at the premises should be SIA licensed.
- 4.1.3 The opening hours of the premises should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Service of drinks should end approximately 30 minutes before the premises closes, in order to aid effective dispersal of customers.
- 4.1.4 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 4.1.5 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.
- 4.1.6 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

5 Construction

- 5.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 5.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

6 Useful References

6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 6.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20 th September 2022	Caroline Tamworth Planning	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
22 nd September 2022	Caroline Tamworth Planning	Quote issued
27 th September 2022	Caroline Tamworth Planning	Confirmation of instruction/fee
6 th October 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
31 st October to 1 st November 2022	Caroline Tamworth Planning	Email correspondence re: timescales

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
085-PL-0.00	Existing and Proposed Site and Location Plans	Sept 2022	-
085-EX-1.00	Existing Ground Floor Plan	Sept 2022	-
085-EX-1.01	Existing Basement Floor Plan	Sept 2022	-
085-EX-2.00	Existing Elevation	Sept 2022	-
085-EX-3.00	Existing Sections	Sept 2022	-
085-PL-1.00	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	Sept 2022	-
085-PL-1.01	Proposed Basement Floor Plan	Sept 2022	-
085-PL-2.00	Proposed Elevations	Sept 2022	-
085-PL-3.00	Proposed Sections	Sept 2022	-
CT1102	Planning, Design and Access Statement	Sept 2022	-
0012	Heritage Statement	Sept 2022	B

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk