



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

The erection of a new Lidl food store (Class E) with associated car parking and landscaping. (1,876sqm)

AT 550 Mauldeth Road West, Chorlton, Manchester

FOR: Lidl Great Britain Limited

VERSION A: 13.08.22

2002/1427/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

We welcome the investment in this part of Manchester and support the construction of a food store on the site. The development of a supermarket will inevitably attract criminals lead to an increase in crime - shoplifting, theft, burglary, and criminal damage, for example, but with appropriate design interventions the risk and effects of crime can be minimised.

Several recommendations to improve security within the scheme are included in section 3.3 of the report. The principal recommendations are summarised as follows:

- install appropriate fencing and gates to define the edge of the development, secure the service yard and secure the spaces on the eastern side of the building
- ensure the external walls of the store are appropriately robust
- install security-rated doors, windows, shutters, and glazing
- fit an intruder alarm and comprehensive CCTV system
- consider employing a security guard to deter offenders entering the store
- install access controls to the doors connecting the shop floor to the warehouse and back-of house
- include motorcycle parking provision within the car park.

Greater Manchester Police support the application and, should the Manchester Planning be minded to approve the application, recommend the inclusion conditions requiring the development to a) be built in accordance with the security recommendations and physical security specification set out in sections 3.3 and 4 of this report, and/or b) to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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1 The Site and Surroundings

The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located at the corner of Mauldeth Road West and Nell Lane, a well-trafficked, light controlled junction with pedestrian facilities. Mauldeth Road West, a dual carriageway, adjoins the south-eastern boundary of the site and connects Chorlton with Withington; the Manchester-to-Manchester Airport Metrolink service runs along tracks laid in the central reservation before turning in a northerly direction, just northeast of the site, towards St Werburgh's station. Nell Lane, a single carriageway road, adjoins the south-western boundary of the site. It is less busy the Mauldeth Road West and connects Chorlton with West Didsbury. An un-named road traverses the north-western boundary and provides access to Hough End Hall, a grade II listed building, which, I understand, is used for religious education and cultural purposes. The un-named road also provides a secondary means of access to Chorlton High School, which is situated to the north of the site, the principal entrance being further to the west, off Nell Lane. Mauldeth House, a vacant 7-storey, office building, of a similar style to that which occupies the development site, and its car park are situated immediately north-west of the un-named road. Consent for the conversion of the building to 72 apartments was granted in 2017 under the prior notification regulations but there is no evidence of any work starting so the consent is presumed to have lapsed. Opposite the site, on the south side of Mauldeth Road West, there are a number of commercial premises as well as residential properties - houses and apartments, whilst a community building is situated opposite the site's Nell Lane boundary, within the boundary of Chorlton Park.

Looking north across Nell Lane towards the site with Mauldeth House, a vacant office building on the left



The un-named, site access road and its junction with Nell Lane



A view across the site from Mauldeth Road West



The north-eastern edge of the site and adjacent high school



Hough End Hall adjoins the site's north-western boundary



A view along Mauldeth Road West with the site on the left of the image



The development site itself measures around 1.7 acre and comprises Lowry House, a 4-storey, former office building, with associated car park and other hard-surfaced areas. From 2018 until September of 2021, Chorlton High School South occupied Lowry House. The building occupies the north-western corner of the site, whilst the principal area set aside for parking is located in the southern part of the site and is accessed off the un-named road to the west. There is a car parking space at the extreme northern part of the site; it too is accessed from the un-named road. The north-eastern now comprises mostly rough grassland. The pupil entrance to the school is located on the Mauldeth Road West facing elevation; a pathway connects the entrance door to a pedestrian entry gate. Most of the site is enclosed with a modern, 2000-3000mm high, welded-wire mesh fence and gates, the exception being part of the north-western elevation of Lowry House, which directly abuts the un-named road. There is some peripheral landscaping, particularly along the Mauldeth Road and Nell Lane boundaries. An application to demolish Lowry House under the provisions of the Prior Notification regulations was made in June this year. In late July, the Local Planning Authority notified the applicant that prior approval to undertake the demolition is not required.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site

The data below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site recorded between 1st May 2021 to 30th April 2022.

General crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
12	<5	77	286	29	21	<5	23	<5	11

2.1.1 There were 474 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is a little above the average for a typical neighbourhood within Manchester, however, the area analysed does include a particular property that has experienced an extraordinarily high volume of crime.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded (5% or more of the total) were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 60%
- criminal damage - 16%
- theft - 8%
- vehicle crime, i.e., damage to, theft of & theft from a vehicle - 6%

2.1.3 The streets/places where 20 or more crimes were recorded were:

- Castleford Walk - 105 crimes
- Nell Lane - 54 crimes
- Mauldeth Road West - 32 crimes
- Chorlton Park - 29



2.1.4 Crime hotspots in the neighbourhood include an unusually high level of crime at residential property on Castleford Walk, as well as local high schools, Chorlton Park and nearby Metrolink stations.

Crime at retail premises

2.1.5 There are few retail premises in the area analysed none of which experienced crime in the period analysed.

Vehicle crime

2.1.6 The risk of vehicle crime is moderate. In terms of the day and time, the greatest risk appears to be over the weekend and on Monday, and during the early hours of the morning.





2.2 Crime at retail premises across the Manchester Division

The data below relates to burglary offences carried out at retail premises in Manchester.

There were 6,173 offences carried out at retail premises across the City of Manchester. These included:


- 3637 incidents of theft and shoplifting
- 1747 incidents where violence was used or threatened
- 397 burglaries
- 210 incidents of criminal damage
- 182 robberies

Burglary





2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week.

2.2.2 **Time Range:** Burglary is most common in the late evening and at night after premises have closed for business and members of staff have left.



2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** In around half of the incidents of burglary at retail premises, offenders forced open the front or rear doors. Forcing shutters open was also a common method of gaining entry. Offenders also gained entry by smashing glazing in doors and windows or forced their way through the walls or roof of a building. On a number of occasions, the offender entered by legitimate means, suggesting entry was not forced.

Theft (excluding shoplifting)



2.2.4 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft is consistently high throughout the week and is most common during the afternoon. Offenders have mostly targeted customer's personal belongings (mobile phones, bags, and purses) as well as items belonging to the business.

2.3 Modus operandi used in burglary and theft at retail premises in Manchester and measures to reduce risk

2.3.1 Ram-raiding walls, gates and shutters and penetrating walls and the roof

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing walls, roofs shutters and gates:

- security-certified fencing/gates (to LPS 1175) and should be used to secure service areas - sliding gates tend to be more secure than hinged gates;
- steel frame buildings, faced with a proprietary cladding system, should include a 2000mm high brick or blockwork base or a suitably robust inner layer of attack resistant material, e.g., expanded metal panels;
- roofs should be high enough that they are not easily accessible, comprise of a security-rated roofing system or include a sandwich of materials which makes them difficult to penetrate;
- secluded public passageways to the sides and rear of building should be avoided wherever possible; and,
- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lights.

2.3.2 Shutters have been forced upwards by offenders

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;
- where size limits the availability of certified shutters, intruder alarms, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings; and,
- anti-ram bollards or barriers should be deployed to help secure the most vulnerable shutters.

2.3.3 Doors have been forced open with tools and locks have been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 sr2 standard; and,
- external doors should be placed where they can be readily observed by staff or monitored by CCTV and fitted with alarm contacts.

2.3.4 Entering a building via unsecured doors and windows.

To minimise the risk of offenders committing rime by entering via unsecured windows or doors

- other than customer entrance doors, external doors should be self-closing and lock upon closure; and,
- windows should have opening restrictors and key operated locks fitted:

2.3.5 Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows:

- windows should be avoided on secluded elevations;
- window and glazed doors should be fitted with laminate glass, which, because of its structural properties, is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and open locks or climb through; and,
- security shutters or grilles, certified to the LPS 1175 sr2 standard, should be fitted to vulnerable windows.

2.3.6 Shoplifting and theft of employee property

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing personal property from retail premises:

- deploy a security guard at the entrance to the store

- install a one-way system to control movement through and in and out of the store;
- create a secure 'back of house' to the store, with fob or keypad-controlled doors;
- overt signage should be used to warn against entry to staff-only areas, referring visitors to appropriately located, visible reception areas; and,
- include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g., lockers or lockable drawers.

2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood with a very low number of crimes that directly affect affecting retail premises;
- the site was in use as a school until the middle of 2021. The presence of staff and pupils at the school, and the security measures employed, including CCTV, lighting, robust doors, and roller shutter, have helped to ensure the building remains secure and deterred offenders;
- staff and visitors to community centre in Chorlton Park and Hough End Hall, and pupils and staff of Chorlton High School, generate activity and passive surveillance of the site which may deter some criminal activity;
- similarly, though limited, there is visible activity and passive surveillance of residents of the houses on the south side of Mauldeth Road West, facing the site, the presence of which may deter some criminals from carrying out crime at the site; and,
- the welded wire mesh fence has proved to be a secure boundary to much of the site
- the northern boundary of the site adjoins the secure grounds of Chorlton high School.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is very visible from Nell Lane and Mauldeth Road West. Offenders are likely to observe the site as it develops and be aware of, and potentially exploit, any criminal opportunities;
- the accessibility of the north-western elevation of Lowry House leaves it vulnerable to criminal activity;
- the neighbouring presence of the openly accessible site of Mauldeth House, which is vulnerable to breaking and entering, and criminal damage, for example, may attract offenders to the locality who may then also approach Lowry House and commit offences;
- the presence of the unsecured, progressively secluded, un-named access road allows the public to approach the site and surrounding buildings providing an opportunity to commit crimes, such as burglary, robbery, car crime and criminal damage, with a limited prospect of being witnessed by passing Police, staff, or the general public, which may make the site attractive to criminals; and,
- there are indicators of neglect and deterioration on and in the immediate vicinity of the site, which is often an indicator that committing certain types of crime are largely risk free, e.g., illegal

dumping, graffiti. Developments where there are clear signs of physical deterioration and neglect often attracts offenders, who may have a perception that because of the poor quality of the environment their actions will go unchallenged.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

3.1.1 Following demolition of Lowry House, this application seeks approval for the following elements:

- erection of a part-single, part-two-storey supermarket (Use Class E);
- upgrading of the un-named road including construction of a widened junction at Nell Lane;
- creation of pedestrian route into the site from Mauldeth Road West
- laying out car and cycle parking; and,
- peripheral landscaping.

3.1.2 The proposed building will have a largely, rectangular footprint but with cut out at the north-east corner. Positioned on the eastern part of the site, and occupying around 30% of the site, the building will have a gross floorspace of 1,876m².

3.1.3 The customer entrance and exit doors will be at the south-western corner of the building. The southern façade will be set back from the pavement on Mauldeth Road West by around 2metres.

3.1.4 Servicing will take place at the north-eastern corner of the site where a turning circle, HGV, reverse-delivery bay and 5 staff parking bays will be located. The plans are not clear, but it assumed HGV's will unload onto a raised dock with service shutter and a personnel door, on the rear elevation.

3.1.5 Included on the ground floor of the store, there will be an entrance lobby, large sales floor with till points at the western end of the store, a modest warehouse space, chiller, utility room, bakery and associated freezer, and a w.c. The first-floor accommodation is limited to a 140m² space at the south-eastern corner of the building. It includes staff canteen, cloak room, meeting room, IT room and cash room.

3.1.6 Other than the customer entrance and exit doors, and the service bay access door and shutter, there will be means of escape doors on the northern elevation, allowing staff and customers to leave the shopfloor in an emergency, and on the southern elevation, allowing staff to leave the warehouse. The only external door will to the utility room, which is self-contained a with no means of accessing the store itself.

3.1.7 Externally, there will be 83-space, customer car park, laid out between the front of the store and Nell Lane. The car park includes, appropriately located, electric vehicle charging bays, disabled bays and parent and child spaces. Parking for 9 bicycles will be provided adjacent to the front of the store.

3.1.8 The unmade road will be modified to accommodate delivery, customer and staff vehicles. Customer access into the car park is at the western end of this road.

3.1.9 There will be unhindered, direct access for pedestrians and cyclist from Mauldeth Road West to the store entrance.

3.1.10 Peripheral landscaping will be introduced to the Nell Lane and Mauldeth Road West boundaries of the car park.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

3.2.1 The proposals result in the redevelopment of a site and building which, if not put to appropriate use, may otherwise attract crime and anti-social behaviour.

3.2.2 The food store will have a relatively simple, broadly rectangular, footprint, which will facilitate natural and electronic surveillance of the external areas.

3.2.3 The likely design and height of the proposed store is such that the risk of offenders accessing the roof and exploiting any weaknesses in the construction to gain entry is minimal.

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- 3.2.4 The customer entrance and exit doors will be very visible to customers arriving on foot or by car at the south-western corner.
 - 3.2.5 A glazed entrance and glazed western elevation of the store facilitates supervision of the car and cycle parking by staff and customers. All parts of the car park are visible from the store entrance, and to traffic and pedestrians within the site.
 - 3.2.6 With separate customer entrance and exit doors, and a layout requiring customers to pass through a till point) enhances the security of the store, deterring shoplifters and those intent of committing robbery.
 - 3.2.7 Back of house areas can easily be made secure with the installation of appropriate controls on doors connecting both the warehouse and the staff facilities to the shop floor.
 - 3.2.8 The cash office is located on the first floor, some distance from the store entrance.
 - 3.2.9 The development will generate activity and passive surveillance over the wider area including the adjacent office building, Hough End Hall, and High School, to the benefit of all.
 - 3.2.10 Bicycle parking is provided on the site, located close to the customer entrance and exit to the store, it will be in a place where there will be regular activity and casual supervision by customers coming and going.
 - 3.2.11 The service yard is appropriately sited.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

Secure the vehicle entrance to the site

- 3.3.1 The vehicle entrance and exit lanes should each be fitted with a swing-arm gate, which, when closed, will prevent vehicles entering the site after close of business. Car parks at retail outlets sometimes attract vehicles, and drivers, intent on anti-social behaviour late at night.

Defining the edge of the car park

- 3.3.2 The norther, southern and western edges of the car park should be defined with a suitably high (around 1000mm), railings, in order to deter the formation of desire lines through the car park between vehicles. Informal pathways can result in an increase of damage (accidental or malicious) to cars as pedestrians pass between them. Restricting access onto the site to just two or three points reduces the opportunity for offenders to target cars and easily make their escape.

Security of the service bay

- 3.3.3 Because the service area is in a secluded part of the site, and it includes a service shutter and pedestrian door, places an offender may target in attempts at breaking and entering, or targeting staff leaving the premises in advance of a robbery, I recommend that the service area should be enclosed with 2500mm high, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates. This additional layer of security will also reduce the risk of the loading area attracting anti-social behaviour, criminal damage, or of an arson attack on for example, a refuse store.
- 3.3.4 Armco™ barriers should be installed around the periphery of the service area to protect perimeter fencing and the building.
- 3.3.5 Low intensity, dusk-to-dawn lighting and CCTV should be used to illuminate, monitor and record activity in this area.

Access along the eastern elevation

- 3.3.6 The space between the store and the boundary fencing to the high school at rear of the building should be secured with 2500-3000mm railings or mesh fencing, with gates fitted with panic hardware if required.

Motorcycle parking

- 3.3.7 Motorcycle parking places should be identified, with ground anchors or hoops located within a highly visible part of the car park.

Pedestrian safety

- 3.3.8 Given the layout of the car park, and likely mix of pedestrians - often pushing shopping trolleys, and vehicles, measures should be installed that will calm traffic speeds and direct pedestrians to safe routes across the car park. Poor behaviour by both motorists and pedestrians within a busy car park can

sometimes lead to conflict. Designing the car park so that traffic speeds are moderated– using rumble strips or raised thresholds - and safe, convenient routes are included to cater for pedestrians – using distinctly different surfacing to denote pedestrian routes - will reduce the risk of disputes arising.

The building

- 3.3.9 The lower 2000mm of the external wall finished in cladding should include a brick or blockwork to minimise the risk of intruders entering by force.
- 3.3.10 All external doors, glazing and the service shutter should carry a security certification.
- 3.3.11 In order to prevent breaking and entering, and criminal damage, security-rated shutters or grilles should be fitted to windows to staff rooms, and to the customer entrance and exit doors.
- 3.3.12 The management office/cash room door should be security-rated and be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- 3.3.13 An access control system should be installed which controls entry to the warehouse and from the shop floor up the staff welfare area. A fob activated system is preferred.
- 3.3.14 If there is a window in the management office that allows a 'one-way' view across the till areas, laminate and toughened glass should be fitted.
- 3.3.15 To facilitate passive surveillance into and out of the building the glazed elements of the western elevation should be kept largely free of advertising materials.

Cash handling

- 3.3.16 A safe which meets the LPS 1163 standard should be installed in the cash room.
- 3.3.17 Chute deposit safes should be considered for use at each till point.
- 3.3.18 A dedicated parking bay should be marked out very close to the store entrance for the use of cash-in-transit vehicles only.

CCTV and alarms

- 3.3.19 A CCTV system should be installed at the store, with cameras capable of monitoring activity within the store, the store entrance and exit doors, the warehouse and back of house, the service area, all elevations of the building, the car park and cycle parking. Monitoring equipment should be located within the management office whilst recording equipment should be located within a very secure place within the store, or images should be recorded off-site by a suitable management company.
- 3.3.20 The building should be fitted with an intruder alarm that includes sensors on all doors as well as PIR detectors on the shop floor. A panic alarm should also be considered, with panic buttons fitted at till points and in the manager's office.

Security guard

- 3.3.21 Consider employing a security guard, one that is, visible on the shop floor during shopping hours.

Refuse storage

- 3.3.22 A secure refuse store should be provided within the secure service yard.

Signage

- 3.3.23 Signs should be erected to inform the public of the name of the development; direct customers to the store entrance; deter customers from entering restricted areas, inform customers of the use of CCTV on the site; and, clearly state the regulations for use of the car park (and sanctions for misuse).

Landscaping

- 3.3.24 High quality, well-maintained landscaping within the site will help improve the appearance of the development, define the edges of the site, prevent parking in inappropriate places and protect boundary fencing from irregular vehicle movements. Tree and shrub planting should respect the need to maintain lines of sight across the development by staff and customers as well as by CCTV cameras and lighting.
- 3.3.25 Bollards preventing access onto the store entrance forecourt from the car park and from Mauldeth Road West should be suitably set in concrete foundations and robust enough to withstand accidental damage by careless motorists as well as hostile attacks by criminals.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Building fabric

- ☐ There should be a brick or blockwork wall (or material of similar strength e.g., welded-steel mesh) behind any low-level cladding to the store (to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level), to ensure that the building itself is adequately secure.
- ☐ The cash room, in which the safe will be located, should have solid walls and a secure, rather than a false, ceiling.

4.2 Doors

- ☐ Sliding entrance and exit doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (RC2+) or a similar security standard.
- ☐ Hinged entrance, service doors, and all escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. All of these doors should be self-closing and be capable of locking automatically upon closure.
- ☐ The door connecting the shop floor to the management office and the door to the cash room should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202 or LPS 1175 SR2. Both doors should be self-closing and be capable of locking automatically upon closure.
- ☐ The doors connecting the shop floor to the warehouse area, and the warehouse to the first-floor accommodation, should be fitted with an electronic lock operated by a proximity-reader or swipe card. The doors should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closure.

4.3 Security shutters

- ☐ Roller shutters securing loading dock, and shutters installed to enhance security to entrance and means of escape doors or windows should meet LPS 1175 SR2 standard.

4.4 Window frames

- ☐ Any opening windows should be certificated to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175, include locks operated with a key, and have restrictors that limit opening to 100mm.

4.5 Glazing

- ☐ All glazing, including any glass in a store management office that allows views of the shop floor, should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g., 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened.
- ☐ External glazing should be kept largely free of any advertising materials.

4.6 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored intruder alarm system should be installed. The alarm should be linked to contacts on all external doors, windows and shutters, and PIR detectors should monitor all internal floor areas, with a signal terminating at a recognised Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. The alarm should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up).
- ☐ A panic alarm should be installed. Panic buttons should be fitted under the till points and in the management office so that staff can alert other staff members that assistance is required.

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should be installed. Externally, the system should be capable of monitoring all facades of the building, the service yard and bay, the car, motorcycle and bicycle parking, the vehicle and pedestrian entrances. Internally, the system should be capable of monitoring the entrance and exit

doors, all other external doors, till points, circulation aisles, the warehouse, and back-of-house unloading area.

4.8 Boundaries

- ☐ The vehicle entrance and exit to the car park should be secured with vehicle barriers outside of business opening hours.
- ☐ The perimeter of the car park should be defined with a 1000mm high railing.
- ☐ The service yard should be enclosed with a 2500mm high, welded wire mesh fence and matching vehicle gates.
- ☐ A 2500-3000mm high fence should restrict access from Mauldeth Road West along the eastern side of the building.
- ☐ Exposed hinges and large, sliding bolt apertures/locking points on the gates securing the service bay should be avoided. Alternatively locking points should be fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds.

4.9 Car park

- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- ☐ Traffic calming measures should be incorporated to limit the speed of vehicles within the site.

4.10 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn, low-intensity lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and shutters, and to all elevations of the building.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over fencing or gates.

4.11 Landscaping

- ☐ The front of the store and entrance, exit doors should be protected by anti-ram bollards.
- ☐ Traffic calming should be introduced to reduce vehicle speeds at appropriate places along the service road.
- ☐ In order to promote natural and electronic surveillance of the site, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.

4.12 Other

- ☐ Shopping trolleys should be secured at night/when the store is closed to prevent theft/abuse.

5 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out. The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme' and Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved (see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

6 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and

products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
17.05.22	Joshua Ambrus, Rapleys LLP.	Request for Crime Impact Statement
25.06.22		Site visited
28.06.22	Joshua Ambrus, Rapleys LLP.	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
XX-XX-DR-A-91002	Proposed Site Plan – Option 2		P04

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		27.06.22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF: TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock, and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding, or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel, and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/Polyvinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors, and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections, and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk