



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Albert Bridge House

Apartments, Offices, Retail and Public Realm

For: **Oval Real Estate Ltd**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **24/11/22**

design**for**security

Ref: **2018/0310/CIS/01**

Albert Bridge House

2018/0310/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
 - vehicle entrance/egress access
 - Secure cycle store provision
 - Ground floor external material protection against graffiti
- If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application subject to the design team suitably addressing the recommendations contained in the report (Sections 3.3, 4 & 5), and will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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1 Visual Audit


The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site lies within the Parsonage Gardens Conservation Area of central Manchester and contains Kendals department store and Fraser Building (NCP multi-story car park and retail building) to the rear.


The activity of the immediate area contains a mix of retail, residential and commercial uses. The area is also associated with a high concentration of bars, restaurants and leisure uses which support a busy night-time economy. A small area of public space (Motor Square) is located to the southeast of the site and Parsonage Gardens to the north. Adjacent to the River Irwell is a small riverside walkway with benches. This public space contains evidence of rough sleeping, drinking and drug paraphernalia. Licensed premises in the area can generate alcohol-related disorder issues.

The Site is bounded by the River Irwell to the north-west, Bridge Street to the south, St. Mary's Parsonage to the east and the Trinity Bridge landing to the north-east.


The Site is currently occupied by Albert Bridge House, two car parks and Albert Bridge Gardens. The current building includes four parts, an 18-storey building, flanked by a six and three-storey building and single storey building fronting the River Irwell. Albert Bridge House was most recently occupied by HMRC, however the site was vacated in October 2022.



7 – On-site Graffiti and ASB along riverside park.



6 – View towards Trinity Bridge.



5 – Public riverside park, recently cleared.




1 – View of site.



2 – View southeast towards Motor Square.



3 – Minor level changes & non-spaces.



4 – Car parking & overgrown landscape.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2021 to 31st October 2022.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
23	133	167	1513	532	100	41	288	41	53

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Manchester, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime being the highest reported crimes. The location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration when looking at the crime statistics as the site is located within the city centre where there is a high concentration of retail outlets, licenced premises, and restaurants, leading to an increase of crime and disorder in the area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly to the east and southeast of the proposed site, around Deansgate which has a high volume of bars and retail facilities located along it, particularly around the junction of Quay Street, Peters Street and Deansgate where the Great Northern is located. Offences have mostly occurred over the weekend period (Friday – Sunday) during the late evening and early hours of the morning when most premises in the area are closing. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the local area, with offences often taking place between known associates, with alcohol often being a factor.
- 2.1.3 Thefts have taken place throughout the area, with hotspots occurring to the south of the proposed site, around Deansgate where the bars and restaurants are located. The area has a high volume of foot fall due to public transport links, retail outlets and bars / restaurants. Offenders have mostly used pick pocketing techniques and distraction methods to obtain personal belongings, mostly mobile phones, bags, and purses / wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (mostly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area has mostly taken place in private car parks and vehicles using on street parking facilities. Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime with offenders using implements and objects in order to smash glazing and access the interior of the vehicle. Offenders have also targeted vehicle registration plates, using tools to remove them.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **General:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 4.4).

- 2.2.2 **General:** Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;
- where the size limits the availability of certified shutters, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings.

- 2.2.3 **General:** Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly front doors and fire exit doors) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the premises.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.4 **General:** Broken glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, grilles or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

2.2.5 *General:* Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

2.2.6 *General:* Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.2.7 *General:* Forcing open shutters using implements and tools in order to gain access to the doors and windows located beneath.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

2.2.8 *General:* Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Ensure that rubbish and loose material is removed from the areas around the site. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

2.2.9 *Commercial/Retail:* Posing as a legitimate customer and entering restricted areas by means of insecure doors and tailgating employees.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

2.2.10 *Café/Restaurant:* Theft of personal property from tabletops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

2.2.11 *Office:* Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure storerooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building or fit-out. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Portable equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular visitor access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

2.2.12 *Residential:* Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment blocks before allowing them access (see Sections 4.1/4.2). The main communal entrance

to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

- 2.2.13 **Residential:** Doors have been targeted (a common M.O. when apartments are burgled) and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies that would be publicly accessible from street level.

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings / private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

2.5 Risk Factors – Cafes / Restaurants

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property

-
- Alcohol-fuelled violence / conflict if licensed
 - Miscellaneous theft to customers
 - Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
 - Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
 - Violence towards staff
 - Safety of staff personal belongings
 - Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period





2.6 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.7 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.




- 2.7.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **94% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **92% lower** than Greater Manchester and **92% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.7.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **4% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **31% higher** than Greater Manchester and **150% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.7.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwelling is **49% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **34% lower** than Greater Manchester and **19% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.7.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **71% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **182% higher** than Greater Manchester and **242% higher** than England & Wales.


2.8 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary dwelling – Day Range



Burglary dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary in local area peaks on a Wednesday during the afternoon, when residents are likely to be away at work, and early hours of the morning (12am – 4am). Offenders often target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.8.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as "unknown" it is likely that offenders have targeted insecure entry.
- Offenders have gained access to apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents, gaining access to communal areas.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.

2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Saturday during the morning and into the evening, peaking between 7pm – 10pm. Offenders often target vehicles throughout the day, around the city centre, as they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

2.10 Burglary Risk Analysis – Offices

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.12.2 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night / into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.12.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries committed in Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors, or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors and windows behind them.

2.13 Theft Offices: Risk Analysis




The data below relates to thefts within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours / staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.14 Burglary Risk Analysis – Restaurants/Cafés

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.14.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday, and Sunday. The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

2.14.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the premises.
- Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the windows and doors located underneath.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors, accessing restricted areas, and removing goods belonging to staff and the company.

2.15 Theft Restaurants / Cafés: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants / cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants / cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets, and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.16 Retail Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.16.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.16.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.17 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.17.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The Proposed Development comprises the full demolition and redevelopment of Albert Bridge House and adjacent car park to deliver a new Grade A office building, a residential building with basement, flexible commercial space, including food and beverage, and significant public realm.
- 3.1.2 This includes:
- 367 residential units in a 45 storey (plus plant) building.
 - 50,850 sqm (GEA) (excluding basement) office floorspace in a 19 storey building with accessible external amenity space.
 - 2,569 sqm (GEA) flexible commercial space across the two buildings.
 - Basement space to serve each building.
 - 4,130 sq m of accessible public space.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will seek to create a connected community through enhancing existing routes and links across the public realm and to new developments; in doing so this will allow economic growth for the area through the proposed developments and forge new links. The new development will encourage emerging new businesses and communities to develop within and around the proposed site thus supporting the future development and growth of the site and surrounding area.
- 3.2.2 The proposed site will see the redevelopment of the area which, in places has been a generator of anti-social behaviour and criminal activity. Particularly the existing car parking and riverside walkway.
- 3.2.3 The redevelopment of the site will provide interesting and diverse uses offering an employment opportunity and another interesting piece of architecture within the city centre.
- 3.2.4 The building provides ground floor activity in the form of residential entrances, office and reception space, commercial/retail use and in-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent public realm.
- 3.2.5 The footprint of the building facing onto the public realm is relatively simple and free from deeply recessed or concealed areas.
- 3.2.6 The proposed building clearly defines the different uses of the building(s), and all entrances can be easily located and navigated.
- 3.2.7 The main public realm circulation routes appear obvious, leading people directly to where they need to go. The proposals are intended to integrate with surrounding circulation routes.
- 3.2.8 The foyer/reception zone provides the opportunity for good levels of security at a central control point for the commercial/office space.
- 3.2.9 The scheme will be staffed and managed on a 24/7 basis, with a CCTV system installed throughout the building to allow staff to monitor movement of guests, visitors and identify potential intruders.
- 3.2.10 The internal layout of the building(s) appears capable of being divided into identifiable zones, allowing separation of accessible and restricted areas. The access-control strategy adopted for the development should be capable of confining movement into and through the building, thus allowing staff and visitors to only enter parts of the site to which they have legitimate reason to be present. Access permissions should be fully auditable and regularly reviewed.
- 3.2.11 The car parking has been well laid out, avoiding potential hiding spaces for intruders. This report recommends careful consideration to review and reduce the number of existing open pedestrian access routes into the car park at street level.
- 3.2.12 The proposals should provide good levels of ground floor activity; in-turn the building uses will offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent community space and public realm.
- 3.2.13 Post. Reception and distribution of post within the building has been considered. Incoming post and deliveries should be processed at one single point, in an area that can be easily isolated.

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- 3.2.14 The redevelopment of the area will provide an interesting and diverse uses; offering opportunity for new communities alongside existing ones; also providing interesting and safer public realm with a chance to create an exciting destination.
- 3.2.15 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.1 Public Realm influences over crime patterns

- 3.1.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:
- How easy will it be to enter the area?
 - How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
 - What are the chances of being seen?
 - If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
 - Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?
- 3.1.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:
- being located on well-trafficked streets and overlooked by routinely occupied buildings. The site is subject to surveillance by local businesses and residents as well as passers-by on foot and in cars. The casual observations by residents and passers-by may deter some offenders.
 - the site is well connected to the core of the city centre. Pedestrian routes are generally busy during the daytime, particularly that they pass along Bridge Street to Deansgate and Salford Central Train station, and include commercial spaces with largely 'active' frontages and regular pedestrian flows, especially during the working day.
- 3.1.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder and the fear of crime, these include:
- A development in this location, is very likely to attract the interest of criminals should they become aware of it whilst going about their everyday activities. Opportunists, criminal damage to buildings, theft and bicycle crime are all likely to affect a development on this site.
 - vacant buildings and plots of vacant land in the vicinity of the site sometimes attract those intent on criminal damage (e.g. smashing glazing and graffiti), burglary and theft (particularly metals).
 - A site wide management strategy should work in tandem with existing and new bar/restaurant and leisure uses. Any door staff should be present to monitor queues and keep them flowing when appropriate, as patrons enter and leave the premises.
- 3.1.4 The design and layout of the public realm surrounding the blocks should be carefully considered. It should not include any hard/soft landscaping features that may impede surveillance opportunities or foster nuisance, anti-social behaviour or misuse. The following issues should be addressed with the public realm/landscaping strategy (also see Section 4.7):
- The proposed public realm features and any changes in ground levels, with step/ramp features to accommodate them. Such features can sometimes impede surveillance opportunities and provide features that can be mis-used. These features, as well as benches and any other hard landscaping features, should be designed to deter and withstand any such treatment and to maximise surveillance opportunities of/from them.
 - Public realm furniture items should be robust to sustain constant daily use and form part of the management and maintenance regime. Damaged features which are not tended to over a period of time can lead to further decline and respect for the area.

- In particular, the potential to foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues at night. The central public realm area will benefit from levels of footfall, activity and will rely on passive surveillance from the commercial and residential properties overlooking this area. The area must be well-lit and designed to maximise surveillance opportunities and eliminate hiding places. Any windows or doors adjacent to these areas may also need additional protection.
- 3.1.5 Any cycle parking areas located throughout the public realm area should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied areas.
- 3.1.6 The long-term redevelopment of the area should seek to address and remove the concealment and shelter provided by structures and improve visual links between spaces, green spaces, bridges, buildings and adjacent streets / premises.
- 3.1.7 The development of this public realm space would encourage further significant pedestrian footfall in the area, with people spending longer in the area, rather than it simply being passed through as part of a journey from A to B. The aspirations of the plans also seek to extend the use of this space beyond event times.
- 3.1.8 Engagement at the very early RIBA stages has previously proven to afford those involved in the development the opportunity to 'build-in' protective measures, which often results in more aesthetically pleasing, cost-effective measures in the long-run.

3.2 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.2.1 As the proposed public spaces and plots are developed consideration needs to be given towards external lighting. The proposals are to incorporate a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination evenly around the space without areas of shadowing or pooling and work coherently with the wider security requirements of the site such as CCTV.
- 3.2.2 Consideration for safe bicycle storage should be embedded within the landscape design. Short-stay cycle parking stands should be located where they can be readily observed. The location of cycle stores within proposed buildings should consider the position, inherent physical security and safety of cyclists using the facility.
- 3.2.3 Cycle store to residential tower: Access to the first-floor cycle store should only be operated via a fob access control system on entry & egress. Entry into this space should be strictly limited via the access-controlled system on application to the building management company ensuring only genuine cyclists can gain access. It is understood the proposal offers 100% cycle parking for the tower, and the extensive public realm design promotes greater activity however this doesn't guarantee an active location at the GF cycle store area. The location is riverside facing and suffers from limited natural surveillance. In addition to this, the two external lifts create potential hiding spaces; in turn this can increase feelings of isolation & insecurity. Should the area become an issue, residents might insist their safety is at risk and prefer to take their bikes through the main reception? If there is a strong desire to maintain the external lifts and not allow bikes through reception then this area needs to be addressed. Creating a safer environment in this location is achievable through small design adjustments to increasing the visual openness and reduce feelings of insecurity:
- Opening up the external staircase treads & balustrade, increases the visual links.
 - Consider railings to the car park ramp, again increasing the visual links.
 - Scenic lifts and shaft would support a safer environment (I understand there's a potential commercial uplift).
 - CCTV coverage of the area should be incorporated. It can be a deterrent but only captures a crime/incident taking place and may not deter hardened opportunist criminals.
 - Good lighting levels are required to support residents' feelings of insecurity during hours of darkness.
 - Regular management security checks of the area through walk arounds across the day and evening.
- 3.2.4 General maintenance of the area, i.e., no rough sleeping, removing litter and graffiti, maintenance of damaged/broken items, lighting, building fabric and public realm furniture... all help support the residents wellbeing & knowledge that their building and environment is cared for, a simple win.

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- 3.2.5 Cycle store to commercial tower: Entrance to the basement cycle store is via a staircase accessed from the retail unit. Opportunists could take advantage of a busy environment or confidently and easily access the basement area. To prevent this easy access, it is recommended a lobby door arrangement with access control should be incorporated at GF level (adjacent to the top of the staircase) from the retail unit. Application to the building management company should be made by building employees ensuring only genuine cyclists can gain access to these amenities.
- 3.2.6 Cycle stores General: The entrance point to both cycle stores are located towards the rear of each block and are inhibited by good levels of natural surveillance from within the proposal and surrounding environment. It is therefore important that effective and preventative security measures are incorporated at each location. Good levels of lighting and CCTV. Thought should be given to the layout of the public realm around this area which will encourage active footfall. Regular on-site management checks around the building are encouraged and should form part of the 'Management & maintenance' Plan in order to discourage people from loitering around the residential cycle entrance/egress area. In turn this helps to promote a safe environment of an area with limited natural surveillance.
- 3.2.7 The layout appears generally free of obstacles to vision allowing people to see and be seen within the area and maintains sight lines across the site. Planting and street furniture has been aligned to avoid creating potential hiding places and avoids blocking sight lines. However, the choice of trees and other plant species should allow some visible permeability through the canopies and foliage so that people cannot be concealed within the public spaces.
- 3.2.8 Street furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.
- 3.2.9 Access beyond the reception lobby should be controlled so that intruders cannot easily reach restricted parts of the buildings. Access to the stair core and lifts from the entrance lobby should require passage through access-controlled turnstiles or doors. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in / around the entrance lobbies.
- 3.2.10 All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Access to plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only). Where the upper floor office areas are subdivided into smaller individual units, each suite of offices should be capable of separation with their own individual access controls.
- 3.2.11 Glazing to proposed elevations along or in close proximity to crowded pedestrian spaces/routes should incorporate laminated glass (see section 4.3 for further detail).
- 3.2.12 The residential stairs and lift cores in the blocks will require access control allowing only building staff and residents' access beyond the reception space to upper floors, in order to create a secure lobby area.
- 3.2.13 Due to the complex nature of the scheme in relation to the mix of uses within the development, the architecture and signage should clearly direct visitors to the appropriate apartment entrance or communal entrance door.
- 3.2.14 The entrance gates must be:
- be fitted with an electronic lock with a holding force of around 4500N;
 - be self-closing and locking upon closure.
- 3.2.15 The communal entrance doors to the residential buildings must be:
- certified to a suitable security standard.
 - be fitted with an electronic lock that forms part of the door certification.
 - be self-closing and locking upon closure.
- 3.2.16 Means of escape doors must be security-rated and be self-closing and locking upon closure.
- 3.2.17 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme as a whole. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or

surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob allowing secure entry and exit.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within the vicinity of crowded places should incorporate laminated glazing. Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate 6mm outer pane and at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass. It is recommended that glazing to elevations adjoining public areas or evacuation routes should also be laminated.
- ☐ All new glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) should incorporate at least one pane of a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- All external doors where regular staff access is required.
- Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
- Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
- Cycle store

4.6 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

4.7 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 Other

☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.

☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.

☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

5.1 Doors

☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.

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- ☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
 - ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
 - ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.
 - ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

5.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

5.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

5.4 Glazing

- ☐ All glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.5 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

5.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
 - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
 - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)

5.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

5.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
17/05/2022	Deloitte & SEW Arch.	Project presentation
28/09/2022	Deloitte	CIS instruction received
09/11/2022	Deloitte	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
16/11/2022	GMP	Invoice Issued
10/11/2022	Deloitte	Additional drawings issued
30/11/2022	GMP	CIS completed
30/11/2022	GMP	CIS issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	WIP Designs	May 22	
	0412-SEW-ZZ-00-DR-A-PL1000	Nov 22	
	0412-SEW-ZZ-01-DR-A-PL1001	Nov 22	
	0412-SEW-ZZ-02-DR-A-PL1002	Nov 22	
	0412-SEW-ZZ-12-DR-A-PL1012	Nov 22	
	0412-SEW-ZZ-RF-DR-A-PL1020	Nov 22	
	0412-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-PL0000	Nov 22	
	0412-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-PL0001	Nov 22	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk