



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

BIGNOR STREET PARK, BIGNOR STREET, CHEETHAM HILL, MANCHESTER
PRIMARY SCHOOL (2,073sqm) & CRICKET NETS FOR COMMUNITY USE

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Conlon Construction Ltd

VERSION A: 06/02/2023

REFERENCE: 2022/0630/CIS/01

Bignor Street Park, Bignor Street, Cheetham Manchester

URN: 2022/0630/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

No design changes required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The whole school site should be securely enclosed out-of-hours, with secondary fencelines/gates to secure external student/play areas and parking areas to the sides and rear of the building during operational hours. Given the high crime levels in the area, the existing damaged/fortified fencelines within the locale and the fact that the surrounding dwellings offer limited levels of direct overlooking over the site, consideration should be given to a particularly robust specification of fencing to prevent damage and scaling.
- Control of access into and around the site/building during operational hours.
- Prevention of unauthorised access to the roof of any single-storey elements.
- Community cricket nets should be independently enclosed/secured and effectively managed/maintained to prevent unauthorised access and damage.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (M/cr Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis	
	2.3 Theft (M/cr Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis	
	2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
	2.5 General Risk Factors	
	2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	9
	3.1 Proposed Development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Point for Further Consideration	
4	Physical Security	11
	4.1 External Doors	
	4.2 Windows & Shutters	
	4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric	
	4.4 Alarm	
	4.5 Access Controls & Internal Security	
	4.6 Boundaries	
	4.7 Car Park	
	4.8 Lighting	
	4.9 CCTV	
	4.10 Landscaping	
5	Management & Maintenance	15
6	Construction	15
7	Useful References	15
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact Register.....	16
B	Associated Documents.....	16
C	CIS Version History	16
D	Glossary	17

1 Visual Audit

The site is bounded by Heywood Street to the east, Brentfield Avenue to the north and Tamerton Drive to the west and south, in the Cheetham Hill area of north Manchester.


It is currently formed by a public park (Bignor Street Park), which comprises of a hard surface basketball court to the north, open grassland to the south and some mature trees to the perimeter. The park is currently enclosed with weld-mesh fencing, which has been vandalised in places and panels have been removed to create alternative access points. There is evidence of unauthorised vehicular access within the site.

To the north of the site is Brentfield Avenue, which is closed to vehicular traffic along the northern boundary of the site, beyond which is an area of open space (known as Bello Street Dog Park) that is overlooked by the residential properties along Bellott Street and Heywood Street.

To the west of the site is a community centre fronting onto Brentfield Avenue and a day nursery fronting onto Tamerton Drive. The nursery site is enclosed with high-security weld-mesh fencing/gates and crash barriers – indicating that it may have experienced crime and disorder issues in the past.

To the south-west and south of the site is a church and Radburn style residential estates featuring pedestrian routes separated from vehicular movement (often to the rear of dwellings), communal areas of landscaping and communal parking areas remote from the dwellings they serve. This type of layout can result in a lack of definition between public and private space, creating areas which can attract nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal damage. The networks of the pedestrian access routes through such estates often make them extremely permeable and also provide easy access/escape routes for criminals to utilise – particularly those which benefit from little/no natural surveillance and are likely to be infrequently used.

The residential properties on the opposite side of Heywood Street back onto the route itself (with high walls/fencing enclosing their rear boundaries) – meaning the site benefits from limited levels of direct overlooking.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2022 to 31st January 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary




Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
27	14	82	440	50	13	12	26	31	7

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area high, with the most prevalent types of crime being less serious wounding and, to a lesser extent criminal damage, vehicle crime (see Section 2.4) and theft.
- 2.1.2 Recorded less serious wounding crimes have taken place throughout the local area, with particular concentrations around/off the main arterial routes of Cheetham Hill Road to the east and Elizabeth Street to the south. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place, with offences often involving incidents between known associates and domestic incidents.
- 2.1.3 As this CIS relates to a proposed school, the more detailed analysis below will focus on use-specific burglary and theft, as well as local vehicle crime.

2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (M/cr Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Manchester educational premises peaks on Sunday, when many are likely to be closed.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary fluctuates throughout the day, peaking late at night and during the early hours of the morning. The opportunities for burglary often rise in the afternoon (at breaks and at the end of the school day), when large numbers of students are entering/leaving buildings, staff presence is likely to be lower and parents/carers enter school sites – providing anonymity to offenders. Offenders often target educational buildings at night when they are closed, it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they perceive a lower risk of being detected.
- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** At Manchester educational facilities, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders:
- Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.
 - Windows have also been targeted, with offenders prised them open, removing the beading/glazing or smashing the glazing to gain unauthorised access.
 - Where the point of entry is unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have gained access to insecure rooms/areas unnoticed, before targeting school equipment.
 - Shutters have been prised open with bodily pressure/implements to gain access to doors/windows behind them.

2.3 Theft (M/cr Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend than during the working week. The risk of crime is likely to be low at the weekend, when the majority of schools/colleges are closed or are used for limited periods by organisations/groups.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The majority of thefts are concentrated during the school day, with offences frequently taking place during breaks, when pupils and teachers leave personal property in unlocked rooms, where they are accessible and vulnerable to theft. Mobile phones, bags and laptops are the most routinely stolen items.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime peaks on Friday. During the day, the risk peaks during the afternoon. Vehicles are often more at risk when parked on street or in open communal parking areas (rather than when parked in-curtilage of in secure parking facilities) – where they are accessible to offenders and can be remote from their owners.
- 2.4.2 Offenders have smashed glazing to steal items from within vehicles, as well as the vehicles themselves. They have also stolen vehicle registration plates and car parts, as well as caused damage to vehicle bodywork.

2.5 General Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings and non-public areas
- Anti-social behaviour/loitering groups (particularly out-of-hours)
- Internal theft
- Theft of staff/pupil belongings
- Cycle theft
- Bullying
- Staff, pupil and parent safety
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.6.1 Having looked at the use-specific crime data, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Manchester educational premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:
- **M/cr Educational Facilities:** Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff
- Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter*

boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.8 and 4.9) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, users or passers-by.

- **M/cr Educational Facilities:** Windows have also been targeted, with offenders prised them open, removing the beading/glazing or smashing the glazing to gain unauthorised access

Possible Solution - All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- **M/cr Educational Facilities:** Offenders have gained access to insecure rooms/areas unnoticed, before targeting school equipment

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. All visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school. Reception staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day. Effective access controls within the buildings should assist in restricting entry to vulnerable areas.

- **M/cr Educational Facilities:** Shutters have been forced upwards to gain unauthorised access or to access doors/windows behind them

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- **M/cr Educational Facilities:** Theft of insecure property belonging to students and staff

Possible Solution - All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. Staff-only areas/rooms should not be accessible to students. Students should also be encouraged to keep items of value with them or store them securely in lockers.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a new part single-storey/part two-storey primary school for 420 pupils (aged 4 to 11) with associated parking, facilities and landscaping, as well as cricket nets for use of the wider community.
- 3.1.2 The whole of the school site will be enclosed within a 2400mm high perimeter fenceline, with lower secondary fencelines between parking areas and external play areas. The northern portion of the site will incorporate a 35 no. space car park, accessed through an automatic sliding gate off Haywood Street (opposite Bignor Street). The car park will also include a bin store and staff cycle store. The proposed school building will occupy the north-eastern portion of the site, fronting towards Heywood Street. There will be a main entrance/visitor entrance gate operated by intercom linked to reception, as well as a separate pupil entrance gate off Haywood Street leading to KS1 and KS2 play and parent waiting areas. The building itself will consist of:
- 2 no. reception classes;
 - 4 no. infant classes;
 - 8 no. junior classes;
 - A library;
 - A Multi Media Resource (MMR) room;
 - Groups support spaces;
 - Multipurpose hall and studio;
 - Admin offices; and
 - Associated plant, storage & W/C facilities.
- 3.1.3 The school site will also include hard surface reception, KS1 and KS2 play areas surrounding the building, a trim trail/habitat area and MUGA to the west of the building and a mini football pitch to the south of the site.
- 3.1.4 2 no. battling enclosures (including 2 no. cricket wickets and nets) will be located to the south-east corner of the site, outside of the school perimeter fencing, but within it's own enclosure. They will be available for hire by the local community for the following hours:
- 17:00 to 20:00 Monday to Thursday, 15:00 to 20:00 Friday, 10:00 to 18:00 Saturday and 10:00 to 13:00 Sunday during term time; and
 - 10:00 to 15:00 Monday to Sunday and public holidays outside of term time.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The location of the proposed building will benefit from passive surveillance from Haywood Street and Brentfield Avenue.
- 3.2.2 The proposed school will be located within a secure perimeter fenceline, preventing unauthorised access to external play areas/staff parking areas during the school day and the whole site at night/when the school is closed.
- 3.2.3 The footprint/design of the building has been kept simple, with no deep recesses within the building line, where partially hidden windows/doors could be vulnerable to attack unseen.
- 3.2.4 The proposed staff car park will be securely gated, with spaces laid out in rows and few obstacles to views across it - protecting the parked vehicles and aiding surveillance opportunities.

-
- 3.2.5 The location of the main entrance to the site and the building provides a clear and direct route for visitors and for parents/guardians dropping off/collecting their children. There will be a staffed office adjacent to the proposed entrance lobby, providing surveillance over everyone entering/leaving the building.
 - 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Point for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The whole perimeter of the site should be enclosed secure fencing and gates to a minimum height of 2400mm, in order to prevent unauthorised access to the parking areas, the building and the landscape/play areas at night or when the school is closed. Given the high crime levels in the area, the existing damaged/fortified fencelines within the locale and the fact that the surrounding dwellings offer limited levels of direct overlooking over the site, consideration should be given to a particularly robust specification of fencing to prevent damage and scaling (see Section 4.6 for more information). The proposed secondary fencelines within the site allow public access to the main entrance of the school during the day, but prevent unauthorised access to staff parking areas and external pupil/play areas - ensuring that the main entrance reception cannot be bypassed. Care should be taken to ensure any changes in ground levels do not inadvertently leave gaps underneath fencing panels or aid scaling. Care should also be taken to ensure that any existing adjacent trees do not form a climbing aid over the boundaries - low branches should be pruned or removed where possible to prevent scaling. Boundary treatment should ideally be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- 3.3.2 It is appreciated that the sheer number of pupils arriving/leaving at peak times will mean that it may be impractical for them all to use the main entrance gate/door of the building. A limited number of student/parent gates and entrances should be opened and supervised at peak times in the morning and in the afternoon only, after/before which the external student/play areas surrounding the building should be secured and all visitors, parents/carers, pupils and staff should use the main entrance. The reception/general office adjacent to the main entrance should be staffed at all times when the building is in use, with a high/wide desk allowing staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering and exiting the building. All visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school. The entrance lobby should work as an 'air lock' during the day, with internal doors controlled by reception staff (see Sections 4.1/4.5). Consideration should be given to how parent/carer access will be managed for dropping off/collecting nursery children throughout the day, without compromising the security of the rest of the school site.
- 3.3.3 Accessible roofs of school buildings have often been exploited by criminals across Greater Manchester to gain unauthorised access, particularly where there are single-storey elements, where eaves are lower or where buildings are publicly accessible out-of-hours – making access easier. Given the proposed building will be 1½ to 2 storeys high, it should be tall enough to make unauthorised access to the roof difficult. However, care should be taken to ensure that there are no features of the building or nearby hard/soft landscaping features that may provide climbing aids up to high level windows or onto the roof (see Section 4.3 for more information).
- 3.3.4 The proposed cricket nets should be managed by members of school staff or a third party leisure management company, in order ensure that they are only used by members of the public that have pre-booked and are secured when not in use to prevent unauthorised access and damage. There should also be the ability to securely store equipment and any belongings of patrons, entirely separate from the school site. The robust management and maintenance of such a facility is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 External Doors

- ☐ All external doors (both single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The main entrance to the school should be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock system permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated remotely by reception staff. The internal doors off the entrance lobby should also be capable of being remotely secured/released by reception staff, to ensure all visitors to the building are vetted before being allowed further access into the school (see Section 4.5 below).

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All ground floor and any potentially accessible first floor windows/rooftlights (e.g. above single-storey elements, shelters/canopies, handrails etc.) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ All ground floor/potentially accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ If any shutters are to be installed, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, shutter-boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and less visually intrusive.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor/potentially accessible glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ As much as possible, there should be no features of the building (such as louvered features that could be used as a ladder, projecting window cills or brickwork features, canopies below the level of the single storey eaves, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids onto the roof. Any louvres to the building should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach roof areas. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available if required to plant areas (search for certified products at <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search>).
- ☐ It is highly recommended that any external canopied/sheltered areas around the building are secured with shutters out-of-hours in order to prevent them from attracting loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues out-of-hours. This will also provide a secure space to store any external play equipment when the school is closed.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the proposed building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors to all accessible windows with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Access Controls & Internal Security

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff key-cards/fobs and not numeric key pads (which can be easily observed/shared and are rarely changed). The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The sliding vehicular gate to the car park, with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), and any gates/entrances off the car park for staff use (operated by staff key-fob and by an intercom lined to the staff office);
 - The main pedestrian access gate, the main external entrance doorset and the internal doorset off the entrance lobby (controlled remotely by office staff);
 - The external entrance to the reception classes (controlled remotely by reception staff);
 - Any other external doors for the use of staff-only;
 - Any internal doors needed to provide internal zoning and restrict access to parts of the building not in use (e.g. during evenings/weekends); and
 - Any doors to obvious risk areas (e.g. IT suites, kitchens etc.).
- ☐ All internal doors/frames to classrooms, offices, meeting rooms, staff rooms, stores and plant rooms should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock, so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ Electric locking systems should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Key-cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The whole school site (as well as the community cricket nets) should be enclosed with railings or rigid-panel, 358 gauge welded-wire mesh fencing and pedestrian/vehicular gates to a minimum height of 2400mm, which has small apertures to deter scaling and cutting (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers). The proposed cricket nets to the south-east of the site should be similarly enclosed within their own fenceline, entirely separate for the school site.
- ☐ Secondary fencelines and gates (1800-2400mm high) should be incorporated within the site to prevent unauthorised pedestrian access to external student/play areas and staff parking areas during operational hours. External refuse/recycling, plant and storage areas within the site should be similarly enclosed/gated.
- ☐ The staff car park should be secured with a 2400mm high sliding vehicular gate, operated using a staff key fob/proximity reader system with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out') so that criminals cannot gain access, attack the vehicles and escape. There should also be an audio or visual intercom system linked to the main entrance office, to allow staff to remotely allow access if/when required (e.g. for deliveries, refuse collections etc.).

- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.



- ☐ The site boundary treatments should ideally be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.7 Car Park

- ☐ The car park should be secured with an automatic vehicular sliding gate as described above, which should not be on an induction loop i.e. should not open automatically (see Sections 4.5/4.6).
- ☐ The proposed car park should be lit to an adequate and uniform level (in accordance with BS 5489 – see below), with no areas of pooling or shadowing.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- ☐ Cycle parking areas should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied rooms and should include 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: [Downloads – Design For Security](#).
- ☐ Any bin/recycling stores should be secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to the car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.9 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

-
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
 - ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
 - ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
 - ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *the main entrance gate/door and the entrance lobby, all external facades of the building and all vehicle/cycle parking areas.*

4.10 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations, such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (such as access controls, lighting, signage, CCTV etc.)
 - A weekly physical check of all perimeter fencing to check for evidence of breaches
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.3 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20 th December 2022	Conlon Construction	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
21 st December 2022	Conlon Construction	Quote issued
3 rd January 2023	Conlon Construction	Confirmation of instruction/fee. Receipt of additional info, more to follow
11 th January 2023	Conlon Construction	Receipt of draft D&A Statement
17 th January 2023	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
22-037-BSA-XX-XX-D-A-0001	Site Location Plan	08/12/22	-
FS0766-BSA-XX-XX-D-A-1003	Proposed Site Plan - Boundary Treatments	19/12/22	A
FS0766-BSA-XX-XX-D-A-1004	Proposed Site Plan - Roof	19/12/22	A
FS0766-BSA-XX-XX-D-A-1005	Proposed Site Sections	19/12/22	A
FS0766-BSA-XX-XX-D-A-1010	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	19/12/22	A
FS0766-BSA-XX-XX-D-A-1011	Proposed First Floor Plan	12/02/23	A
FS0766-BSA-XX-XX-D-A-1015	Proposed Elevations	19/12/22	B
FS0766-BSA-XX-XX-D-A-1017	Proposed Sections	19/12/22	A
-	Draft Design & Access Statement (SUPERSEDED)	Jan 2023	-
22-037	Design & Access Statement	Jan 2023	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk