



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Brigham Street

20 No. Houses and 4 No. Apartments

FOR: One Manchester

VERSION A: 17th October 2022

REFERENCE: 2022/0453/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Brigham Street

2022/0453/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Points for Further Consideration

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, the points raised in section 3.3 should be addressed including the following:

- The main entrances for apartments 13 & 15 are slightly concealed from view and this should be addressed.
- The development should not compromise the existing alleyway gating scheme adjacent (rear of Meech Street).
- It is recommended that the houses and apartment building should be built to Secured by Design standards.

If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented, we would be generally supportive of the planning application.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Openshaw area of Manchester.

The site is roughly rectangular, and the boundaries are defined by a public footpath (continuation of Kirktown Walk) and open space to the North, to the East the site is bound by Brigham Street, to the South the site is bound by the rear boundaries of dwellings on Meech Street, and to the West the site is bound by the rears of dwellings on Connie Street.

The site is presently undeveloped and is seeded over, with the site boundary being defined with a low timber knee rail.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2021 and 31st August 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
21	12	35	227	37	13	8	7	6	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is 12% below the average rate of crime for the Manchester district, with less serious woundings, criminal damage and theft being the highest recorded offences. The majority of offences have taken place to the south of the proposed site where a residential area is located, as well as to the east of the proposed site where a retail park is located.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences taking place to the east of the proposed site, around Parkhouse Street, Elysian Street and Victoria Street. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place, with offences often involving incidents between known associates and domestic incidents.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage offences have taken place throughout the residential estates located to the north of the proposed site, particularly around Greenside Street and to the south around South Street. Offenders have targeted glazing in windows and doors of dwellings and vehicles. Offenders have also used bodily pressure in order to damage the body work of vehicles, causing a dent/scratch.
- 2.1.4 Theft offences have taken place throughout the residential streets, particularly those located to the east of Openshaw Park. Offenders have targeted building sites, climbing over fencing and gaining access, removing materials from within. Offenders have also made off with wheel clamps belonging to Manchester City Council. Residential bins have also been targeted, whereby offenders have removed the bins from gardens or residential streets.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the front of the property) using implements and tools in order to gain entry.

Possible Solution - Front and rear doors should be certified to burglary resistant standards (i.e. BS PAS 24). Front doors should be positioned where they can be viewed from the public highway/footway and rear doors should be positioned within a secure rear garden. External doors should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting.

- 2.2.2 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution – All ground floor glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356 so that it cannot be easily smashed or shattered.

- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Front doors should have split spindles or a fixed external handle so then cannot be opened from outside without a key. Rear doors should be positioned in secure rear gardens where offenders can't easily gain access.

- 2.2.4 Entering an apartment building by means of insecure doors and tailgating legitimate residents, accessing communal areas (mostly corridors - targeting insecure front doors).

Possible Solution - Communal entrance doors must be certified to a burglary resistant standard and operate on a robust access control system to prevent offenders or those antisocially minded from tailgating genuine residents, or visitors, into residential areas of the building where they can then target apartment entrance door.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **4% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **34% higher** than Greater Manchester and **38% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **24% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **68% higher** than Greater Manchester and **221% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **10% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **18% higher** than Greater Manchester and **43% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **65% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **43% lower** than Greater Manchester and **30% lower** than England & Wales.


2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Friday during the evening (5pm- 8pm) and early hours of the morning (3:30am – 6am). Offenders often target properties during the evening and early hours of the morning when it is often dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as “unknown” it is likely that offenders have exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Wednesday, Thursday and Saturday during the morning and into the afternoon (9:30am – 3pm). Offenders often target vehicles during the day as they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time whilst the owner attends work, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of 20 no. houses and 4 no. apartments.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 All dwellings will have driveway parking. Vehicles parked in garages and on driveways are less likely to be targeted by offenders than when parked on the road or in communal parking courts.
- 3.2.2 Driveways are generally positioned where they can be overlooked from within the dwelling. The layout of the development allows residents can easily view other resident's parked vehicles allowing for mutual surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.3 Front doors are generally positioned in prominent locations where they can be overlooked from the street allowing residents to view any potential threats on approaching their property. Houses on Brigham Road will overlook the existing properties, allowing for mutual surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.4 Bins will be positioned in secure rear gardens where they cannot be subject to misuse.
- 3.2.5 The site is currently vacant which can attract antisocial and criminal behaviour, the redevelopment of the site will encourage positive use of the site and nearby public realm areas by increasing residential activity in the area. The site entrance is currently littered with alcohol drink containers which shows some misuse of the site is taking place.
- 3.2.6 The ground floor apartments do not have any patio/French doors which can be vulnerable if left insecure.
- 3.2.7 All apartments have external front doors and no shared communal areas.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The main entrances to the apartments 13 & 15 are set back from the building and this could potentially conceal an offender from view. It is highly recommended that the entrances are flush with the building

elevation so that they can be easily seen from the access road. If they cannot be moved, they should be illuminated to a high standard to deter offenders/misuse.

- 3.3.2 Parking spaces to the side of properties cannot always be easily seen from the public highway and this can leave parked vehicles vulnerable. These spaces should be illuminated with high quality lighting operating on a dusk-til-dawn sensor.
- 3.3.3 The proposed development should not compromise the security of the existing alleygating scheme to the rear of houses on Meech Street. To prevent new boundaries from assisting an offender to climb into this alleyway any new boundaries adjacent this area should be to the same height, or include a transition panel to the same height where the boundaries meet.
- 3.3.4 The front garden boundaries for the proposed houses and apartments should be defined with a low boundary (i.e. metal railings to an approximate height of 1000mm) or shrubbery.
- 3.3.5 The proposed access roads should be illuminated to adoptable standard, to reduce the potential for crime and fear of crime. The access road should have a change of surface colour, or texture, at the entrance from the public highway as a symbolic barrier and signalling that the area beyond is private.
- 3.3.6 Landscaping should be carefully considered so that sightlines are not obscured and no areas that are concealed from view are created.
- 3.3.7 The proposed dwellings and apartments should be built to Secured by Design standards.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ External apartment entrance doors should be capable of being opened externally without a key. These doors should have a fixed external handle or a split-spindle.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, or LPS 2081 SRA
- ☐ Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.

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- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
 - ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors into garages) and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure
- ☐ Rear boundaries adjacent publicly accessible open space should have a strip of defensible planting to protect rear boundaries.
- ☐ Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- ☐ Gates into the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
 - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
 - A key operable deadlock

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

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- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ The proposed access road should be illuminated to adoptable standards.
- ☐ Parking spaces positioned to the side of dwellings should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting.

4.9 Car Parking Areas

- ☐ Apartment car parking areas should be illuminated to a high standard.
- ☐ Car parking spaces should be clearly marked, and signage should indicate that these are for residents use only.

4.10 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.
- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- ☐ Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
13/09/2022	Mark Trayhorn	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
20-051_SK01	Location Plan	02/03/22	B
20-051_SK16	Proposed Site Plan	26/05/22	C
20-051_SK20	House Type A	26/04/22	A
20-051_SK21	House Type B	26/04/22	A
20-051_SK22	House Type C	26/04/22	A
20-051_SK23	House Type D1&D2	26/04/22	A
20-051_SK30	Proposed Elevational Study	20/05/22	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		