



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Laindon Road, Manchester

41 No. Apartments & 31 No. Houses

FOR: Britannia Victoria Ltd

VERSION B: 25th October 2022

REFERENCE: 2022/0422/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The development is broadly acceptable, in terms of designing out crime; however, the points raised in section 3.3 should be addressed including the following:

- Apartment communal entrance doors should be certified to a burglary resistant standard and operate on an access control system.
- It is recommended that the houses and apartment building should be built to Secured by Design standards.

If the recommendations contained within section 3.3 are implemented, we would be generally supportive of the planning application.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors	
	2.4 Crime Rate Comparison	
	2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	8
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	9
	4.1 Doors (Apartments)	
	4.2 Doors (Houses)	
	4.3 Windows	
	4.4 Glazing	
	4.5 Alarms	
	4.6 Boundaries	
	4.7 Landscaping	
	4.8 Lighting	
	4.9 Car Parking Areas	
	4.10 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	11
6	Construction	11
7	Useful References	11
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	11
B	Associated Documents.....	12
C	CIS Version History	12


1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located is positioned between the Rusholme and Longsight areas of Manchester.

The site is roughly rectangular, and it is positioned on the junction of Daisy Bank Road to the North, and Laindon Road to the West. To the East the site boundary is defined by the rear/side boundaries of existing residential properties, and to the South the site is bound by Marillac House.

The site has been previously developed as a probation office, with two buildings remaining on site with associated surface car park and landscaped areas. The public facing site boundaries on Laindon Road, and Daisy Bank Road are well defined with blockwork walls.

The local area is predominantly residential and the density of housing in the area is high, with a large number of terraced houses and older large houses/villas that have been converted into apartments or HMOs.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2021 to 31st July 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
59	6	97	487	115	35	13	55	18	14

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is 14% below the average rate of crime for the Manchester district, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime most commonly reported. The majority of crime has taken place to the east and south of the proposed site, around Cloverdale Crescent and Bennett Street where residential estates are located. Offences occurring to the west are concentrated around the industrial estate just off Hyde Road.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences occurring to the south of the proposed site, around Laidon Road and Dickenson Road, as well as to the north and east around Stockport Road and Plymouth Grove. Assaults, harassment, and public order offences have been the highest recorded offences taking place with domestic incidents and incidents between known associates being the most commonly reported.
- 2.1.3 Theft offences have mostly taken place around the Stockport Road and Dickenson Road. Offences have often involved the theft of mobile phones, which have either been stored in coat pockets or left insecure in businesses/ dwellings and removed by the offender. Offences have also involved theft of bins, as well as wheel clamps belonging to Manchester City Council.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime has taken place throughout the area, with criminal damage to vehicles, theft from and theft of vehicles taking place. Offenders have smashed glazing, caused damage, and removed items from vehicles. Offenders have also targeted registration plates and vehicle parts, using tools to remove them. Offences of criminal damage have often involved bodily force being used to damage the body work of the vehicle, as well as the use of sharp implements in order to scratch paint work and damage tyres.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the front of the property) using implements and tools in order to gain entry.
- Possible Solution - Front and rear doors should be certified to burglary resistant standards (i.e. BS PAS 24). Front doors should be positioned where they can be viewed from the public highway/footway and rear doors should be positioned within a secure rear garden. External doors should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting.*
- 2.2.2 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Possible Solution – All ground floor glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356 so that it cannot be easily smashed or shattered.*
- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Possible Solution - Front doors should have split spindles or a fixed external handle so then cannot be opened from outside without a key. Rear doors should be positioned in secure rear gardens where offenders can't easily gain access.*
- 2.2.4 Entering an apartment building by means of insecure doors and tailgating legitimate residents, accessing communal areas (mostly corridors - targeting insecure front doors).
- Possible Solution - Communal entrance doors must be certified to a burglary resistant standard and operate on a robust access control system to prevent offenders or those antisocially minded from tailgating genuine residents, or visitors, into residential areas of the building where they can then target apartment entrance door.*





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison




The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **7% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **37% higher** than Greater Manchester and **41% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **26% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **1% higher** than Greater Manchester and **92% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **10% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **19% higher** than Greater Manchester and **44% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **29% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **17% higher** than Greater Manchester and **42% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Thursday and Saturday during the evening (5pm – 7pm and 9pm – 11:59pm). Offenders often target properties during the evening when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.
- 2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
 - Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
 - Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

- Posing as a legitimate visitor and gaining access to communal areas within apartment buildings/ shared accommodation.
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements, gain access to the garden shed.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Monday and Tuesday during the early hours of the morning (12am – 3am) and into the late morning (9am – 11:59am). Offenders often target vehicles during the early hours of the morning as vehicles are often left unattended for long periods of time, often out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of 41 no. apartments and 31 no. houses

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The apartment building is located on the prominent junction of Laidon Road and Daisy Bank Road, allowing for passive surveillance opportunities from those passing by.
- 3.2.2 The apartment car parking area will be well overlooked by apartments on the rear of the apartment building, and the adjacent houses.
- 3.2.3 The allotments will be overlooked by residents, reducing the potential for misuse.
- 3.2.4 The apartment entrance can be viewed from Laidon Road, allowing residents or visitors to view any threats before approaching.
- 3.2.5 The majority of houses overlook each other, or the existing buildings on the surrounding rounds which will allow for mutual surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.6 The apartment car park will be enclosed with a sliding gate. Pedestrian access into this space will be restricted with gates.
- 3.2.7 Rear parking spaces for the dwellings will be well overlooked.
- 3.2.8 The cycle store will be located in the secure apartment car park.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

-
- 3.3.1 Exposed gable ends can generate antisocial behaviour to the detriment of residents (i.e. ball games or loitering) any exposed gable ends should be protected with shrubbery or a low boundary to prevent misuse.
 - 3.3.2 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
 - 3.3.3 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
 - 3.3.4 The apartment car parking areas and any pedestrian routes in the site should be illuminated in accordance with BS 5489.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ External apartment entrance doors should not be capable of being opened externally without a key. These doors should have a fixed external handle or a split-spindle.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, or LPS 2081 SRA
- ☐ Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm. Windows can be fully openable from the inside to allow ventilation of the dwellings in accordance with Approved Document O but the window restrictor must reengage when the window is closed.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors into garages) and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The proposed boundary treatments are acceptable (dwg: A662_P_100 REV:J)

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ The proposed access road should be illuminated to adoptable standards.
- ☐ Parking spaces positioned to the side of dwellings should be illuminated with dusk-til-dawn lighting.

4.9 Car Parking Areas

- ☐ The rear car park of the apartment should be secured with automated gates. Gates should be 2100mm high to prevent them from being easily climbed. They should not have centrally located horizontal bars

to aid climbing, the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, and the gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.

- ☐ Apartment car parking areas should be illuminated to a high standard.
- ☐ Car parking spaces should be clearly marked, and signage should indicate that these are for residents use only.

4.10 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.
- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible, and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
22/08/2022	Lauren Neary	CIS instruction confirmed
25/10/2022	Lauren Neary	Revised site plan

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A662_P_001	Location Plan	July 22	
A662_P_002	Block Plan	July 22	
A662_P_100	Site Plan	July 22	J
A662_P_201	Apartment Type 1A/2A Plan	July 22	
A662_P_202	House Type 3A Plan	June 22	
A662_P_203	House Type 4A Plan	June 22	
A662_P_204	House Type 6A Plan	June 22	
A662_P_251	Block 1 Plans	June 22	
A662_P_252	Block 1 Plans	June 22	
A662_P_253	Block 2 and 3 Plans	June 22	
A662_P_254	Block 2 and 3 Plans	June 22	
A662_P_255	Block 7 Plans	June 22	
A662_P_300	Street Elevations	June 22	
A662_P_301	Apartment Type 1A/2A Elevations	June 22	
A662_P_302	House Type 3A Elevations	June 22	
A662_P_303	House Type 4A Elevations	June 22	
A662_P_304	House Type 6A Elevations	June 22	
A662_P_351	Block 1 Elevations	June 22	
A662_P_352	Block 2 and 3 Sections	June 22	
A662_P_353	Block 7 Sections	June 22	
A662_P_402	House Type 3A Sections	June 22	
A662_P_403	House Type 4A Sections	June 22	
A662_P_404	House Type 6A Sections	June 22	
A662_P_451	Block 1 Sections	June 22	
A662_P_452	Block 2 and 3 Elevations	June 22	
A662_P_453	Block 7 Elevations	June 22	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Revised site plan	25/10/22

