



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Proposed 6,731m² extension of the Phase1 creative arts building for
both Manchester College & UCEN

AT The Manchester College, 60 Great Ducie Street, Manchester

FOR: The Manchester College

VERSION A: 21.03.23

2023/0014/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

The proposed scheme is well designed from a crime prevention perspective and Design for Security are happy to support the development. Our support is conditional upon the security measures outlined in sections 3.3 and 4 of this report being included, wherever feasible, in the scheme.

The principal security issues to be addressed are outlined as follows:

- Install security-rated, external doors, window frames and laminate glazing
- Install measures to control access into and through the extended building
- Extend the CCTV and intruder alarm systems and building's external lighting
- Ensure the service yard and cycle store are secure.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will recommend that, should the Manchester Planning be minded to approve the application, a condition be included to require the development be built in accordance with the specification set out in sections 3.3 and 4 of this Statement.

Adrian Murphy *MRTPI*

Consultant

e: adrian.murphy@designforsecurity.org

Contents

1	The Site and Surroundings.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood	
	2.2 Crime at education premises in Manchester	
	2.3 Modus operandi used in committing crime at education premises in Manchester & measures to reduce vulnerabilities	
	2.4 Environmental features that might influence crime patterns	
3	Development Appraisal	9
	3.1 The proposed development	
	3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal	
	3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development	
4	Physical Security	11
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Access controls and visitor management	
	4.3 Windows	
	4.4 Glazing	
	4.5 Intruder alarm	
	4.6 CCTV	
	4.7 Lighting	
	4.8 Fencing and gates	
5	Secured by Design	12


Appendix

A	Contact Register	12
B	Associated Documents.....	12
C	CIS Version History	12
D	Glossary	13

1 The Site and Surroundings

The photographs and plan below show the application site and its surroundings. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located on the eastern side of Great Ducie Street, A56, on the northern edge of Manchester City Centre. Great Ducie Street is a heavily trafficked, arterial route that connects the city centre with, *inter alia*, the inner-city suburbs of Broughton and Cheetham as well as Bury and the M60 motorway further north. On the western side of Great Ducie Street, opposite the application site, there are two large commercial premises, one occupied by a wholesaler and the other by a leisure facility. There is a service road, which provides access from Great Ducie Street to Manchester College/UCEN's car park and service yard, on the north side of the site. The land between this service road and nearby Travelodge hotel is vacant and enclosed with a temporary, wire-mesh fencing system. It was most recently used as a public car park having previously formed part of the occupied Boddington's Strangeways Brewery. In June 2022, planning consent was gained for a large, residential (461 dwellings) and commercial development on this land. Several plots of land east of the application site, some of which are at significantly different levels to the site, are also largely used for car parking. Collectively, these plots had the benefit of planning consent for a residential (556 dwellings) and commercial development, but this is thought to have now expired. The Manchester College/UCEN is situated immediately south of the site. This five-storey building occupies part of the former Boddington's Brewery site and was opened in September 2022. There are two principal entrances to the building, one at the corner of Great Ducie Street and New Bridge Street at the south-western corner of the building, and the other at the south-eastern corner on New Bridge Street.


Looking east along New Bridge Street with the AO Arena on the right and The Manchester College on the left



The western (Great Ducie Street) and northern elevations of Manchester College



The northern elevation of Manchester College and service area enclosed with tall, steel-mesh fencing and gates



The northern elevation of Manchester College and a grassed amenity area immediately adjacent enclosed with steel railings



The northern elevation of Manchester College and associated parking secured with a vehicle, arm-barrier



Looking north from the site across undeveloped land towards the Travelodge hotel that faces Great Ducie Street



The application site comprises the external areas on the north side of the College that were constructed as part of the Phase I build. The site includes several, distinct spaces, which from west to east, includes: a) a small, unfenced, car park, access to which is restricted by the presence of an automated, vehicle, arm-barrier; b) a grassed amenity space, extractor and secure, steel-framed and timber clad, cycle parking shelter all of which are enclosed with 2,100mm high, steel railings and gates; d) a service yard, and a refuse store of a similar design to the cycle store, are enclosed with 2,000mm high fencing and gates; and, e) a parking bay for the College mini-bus, also enclosed with 2,000mm high welded-wire, mesh fencing and similarly designed gates. The northern elevation includes windows at ground level overlooking the car park as well as several service, fire and means of escape doors and shutters. There are windows along the entire elevation at the upper floor levels. In addition, this elevation, and all others, are monitored by building-mounted, CCTV cameras.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2022 to 31st January 2023.

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Crimes involving the use or threat of violence	Theft (including shoplifting)	Robbery	Drug related offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
46	44	114	625	157	35	34	315	35	13

2.1.1 There have been 2,045 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the application site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is very high but is about average for an edge of city centre neighbourhood within the Manchester Division.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded, i.e., those that amounted to 5% or more of the total, were:

- crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence - 39%
- vehicle-related crimes – 18%
- theft - 15%
- miscellaneous crime (principally offences committed in or around HMP Manchester) – 10%
- drug-related – 7%
- criminal damage to property - 6%.

2.1.3 The streets and places where crime was most likely to occur were:

- HMP Manchester - 307 offences
- AO Arena - 120 offences
- Victoria Station – 115 offences
- Greengate – 85 offences
- Cheetham Hill Road – 84 offences
- Travelodge, Great Ducie Street – 60 offences

2.1.4 Vehicle-related crime is very common around the site, particularly at Great Ducie Street, Dutton Street and Park Street.



Crime at The Manchester College

2.1.5 There were just three offences recorded as having taken place at The Manchester College.


2.2 Crime at education premises in Manchester

Burglary

The data relates to crime committed at schools and colleges with the City of Manchester between 1st June 2018 to 31st May 2019





2.2.1 The risk of burglary is greatest on a Sunday and premises are targeted sporadically throughout the day.



2.2.2 Forcing doors and windows open is the most common method of breaking and entering into education buildings. Security shutters were also forced open as a means for offenders to gain entry. On fewer occasions, the glass within doors and windows was smashed prior to entry. Unsecured doors and shutters have also allowed offenders entry without the use of force. In cases where the point of entry is unknown, offenders have often posed as legitimate students/visitors and entered restricted areas via insecure doors.

Theft



2.2.3 The risk of theft is greatest on a Tuesday, peaking in the mid-afternoon. The risk drops significantly at the weekend when the majority of education buildings are closed. Mobile phones, bags and wallets/purses are the most commonly stolen items.

2.3 Modus operandi used in committing crime at education premises in Manchester & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- prevent entry to the site by erecting suitably high perimeter fencing and gates;
- external doors should be certified to the PAS 24 or LPS 1175 security standard - such doors are very difficult to force open;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn light. Light suggests a presence of people and may deter offenders from targeting the building. Lighting will also support the CCTV system and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being detected; and,
- CCTV should be installed to record activity within and around exterior of the building, particularly around the entrance doors.

2.3.2 Theft of equipment, and of student and staff property

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing property from the premises:

- access control systems should be employed within the building to prevent unauthorised personnel from entering staff and storage rooms, where sensitive information, ICT or other expensive, portable equipment, or staff belongings may be stored;
- overt signage can also assist in deterring casual entry; and,
- include space for staff and students to store personal/valuable items securely e.g., small lockers or lockable drawers.

2.3.3 Offenders prised open windows or smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain access

In order to reduce the risk of damage to doors and windows, and breaking and entering:

- windows should be security certified and include tamper proof opening restrictors;
- glazing in doors and windows should include both laminate and toughened panes;
- lighting should illuminate all elevations of the building; and,
- landscaping should be managed in order to promote surveillance (natural and electronic) across the site.

2.3.4 Bikes were stolen by offenders using tools to break locks

In order to reduce the risk of bicycle theft:

- install a secure shelter for staff and pupils to park their bikes;
- locate the shelter in a secure area within the school grounds, one that benefits from regular supervision by staff and pupils; and,
- install a CCTV camera to monitor movements in and out of the shelter.

2.3.5 Offenders smashed glazing of buildings in acts of criminal damage

In order to reduce the risk of criminal damage to glazing;

- glazing in doors and windows should include both laminate and toughened panes;
- install shutters or grilles to the most vulnerable openings; and,
- avoid glazed openings on the most secluded areas of the site, especially those that are visible from secluded pathways.

2.3.6 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;

- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.4 Environmental features that might influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns of criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder on the site are as follows:

- the high level of investment, planned and in progress, in the neighbourhood is likely to result in more pro-active management and maintenance of the private and public spaces. The public realm will be improved and street lighting, and light spilling from buildings that are likely to be occupied well into the night, should make the neighbourhood feel safer for passing pedestrians;
- the site is visible from Great Ducie Street where there is the prospect of passers-by witnessing the actions of offenders, which can act as a deterrent to criminal or anti-social activities;
- the presence of public parking, The Manchester College and Travelodge hotel generates activity at and near the site. The presence of people (staff, students and customers) in and around the site may be inclined to intervene should they witness unusual or criminal activity;
- the proposed residential developments on adjacent sites to the north and east will generate activity and surveillance over the site during construction and when completed and occupied. The emergence of residential development in the neighbourhood will increase the period of street activity beyond the working day and into evenings;
- CCTV installed at the College are likely to assist in the capture of any unlawful activity at the site;
- the existing high fencing that encloses almost all of the site provides a very secure boundary and restricts free movement in and out; and,
- redevelopment of the poorly secured, car parks in the neighbourhood will greatly reduce the opportunities for car thieves to operate; the volume of vehicle-related and other crimes are likely to decrease markedly as offenders divert their activities to other poorly secured car parks elsewhere in the city centre

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood where crime is commonplace;
- there are several crime attractors and crime generators in the neighbourhood, including HMP Manchester, Victoria Station, AO Arena, the Booth Centre (for homeless people) on Pimlett Street. Criminals already familiar with or active in this area may exploit any new opportunities as the site is redeveloped or target residents and visitors as they come and go from the development;

- the future success of the proposed development is very dependent on the Old Brewery Gardens scheme progressing otherwise the western side of the development will be vulnerable to crime and disorder;
- although the college generates activity during the day and evening, it is closed at the weekend and the volume of people in the immediate vicinity of the site will drop off significantly;
- the site is very visible from Great Ducie Street. Offenders are likely to observe the site as it develops and be aware of, and potentially exploit, any criminal opportunities;
- the permeability of the neighbourhood, particularly the streets into the Strangeways and Cambridge industrial area, present would-be offenders with easy and convenient routes to and from the site; and,
- there are indicators of neglect and deterioration in the vicinity of the site, particularly to the north and east, for example, premises in a poor state of repair, over-fortification of premises, overgrown landscaping, graffiti and litter, which are often indicators that crime is, or has been, a significant issue in an area. Neglected streets and spaces often attract offenders, who may have a perception that because of the poor quality of the environment their actions will go unnoticed or unchallenged.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves the erection of a rectangular, part two-, part five-storey extension to the northern side of the existing building, adding 6,731m² floorspace to the College. It will occupy the site of the existing car park, cycle store and amenity space; the service yard at the north-eastern corner of the College site will be retained but rearranged.
- 3.1.2 The western elevation of the proposed extension will form a continuous building line to Great Ducie Street. The existing entrances to the College at the corner of Great Ducie Street and New Bridge Street and on New Bridge Street will continue to be the primary entrances to the extended building, with a link-corridors at ground and first floor levels into the extension.
- 3.1.3 On the ground floor of the extension there will be an incubator hub and a click studio, both of which will have public entrance doors on the Great Ducie Street elevation. In addition, accessed from the internal corridors there will be classrooms, a PC suite, IT hub, café, staffroom, meeting rooms, a social space, w. c's and circulation space, including stairs and lifts to the upper floors. The replacement cycle store, bin store and plant rooms will be located the eastern end of the ground floor. The cycle store and bin store will each have an external door only. The only other external doors will be into plant room and three means of escape doors – two on the rear (eastern) elevation and one on the side (northern) elevation.
- 3.1.4 The upper floors all have a reduced floorplate compared with the ground floor and on the first to third floors, classrooms dominate the use of the space, whilst on the fifth floor there will be a mix of classrooms, PC suites, wet labs and staff and meeting rooms. The roof will have plant screened with louvres.
- 3.1.5 The extension will have a similar appearance to the existing College building.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will continue the transformation of this part of the city centre and contribute to the increasing footfall along Great Ducie Street.
- 3.2.2 The development will increase the activity and general surveillance of the public realm around the site.
- 3.2.3 The building is a regular shape, which can be readily monitored by CCTV system.
- 3.2.4 The Business Hub and Click Studio are suitably located on the ground with entrance doors allowing direct access from Great Ducie Street. Access controls can be used to restrict access through these units into the main building as necessary.
- 3.2.5 Both of the existing, main entrances to the are overseen by reception staff and access is further controlled with turnstiles.
- 3.2.6 Staff and students are required to wear a Manchester College designated lanyard and fob/access/ID card.

-
- 3.2.7 Glazed elements at all of the building will subtly promote surveillance, or at least the sense of it, of the public realm. This will be particularly so at night when the lighting within the building highlights activity within the building whilst helping to brighten the levels of illumination of Great Ducie Street and the service road.
 - 3.2.8 The revamped service area will continue to be appropriately enclosed.
 - 3.2.9 The cycle store will be secure and can only be accessed via a single external door.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

Door, window & glazing specification

- 3.3.1 All external doors and any ground level, opening windows should be certified to a Secured by Design recognised security standard (PAS 24 or LPS 1175).
- 3.3.2 Laminate glass should be used in all external glazed doors, curtain walling and all windows.

Access controls

- 3.3.3 Access controls should be installed on the doors connecting the Business Hub and Click Studio to the internal sill out space.
- 3.3.4 Access controls should be installed on the staff-only rooms/facilities.
- 3.3.5 Access to the roof top plant should be restricted to relevant staff.

Cycle store

- 3.3.6 The door to the cycle store should be certified to a Secured by Design recognised security standard (PAS 24 or LPS 1175). Alternatively, a steel-rail gate may be used. In both cases a fob-activated, electronic lock with a holding force of 4500N should be fitted.
- 3.3.7 Access into the cycle store should be controlled using card or fob.
- 3.3.8 The door/gate should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- 3.3.9 Should a steel-rail gate be installed, the push-button release to exit the store should be shrouded and positioned beyond the reach of any would-be intruder.
- 3.3.10 'Sheffield' style stands that allow the cyclist to secure both wheels and the frame to the stand should be installed.
- 3.3.11 CCTV should monitor the entrance door and the store itself.

Lighting, CCTV & intruder alarm

- 3.3.12 All elevations of the extended building and all external doors, entrance gates and the cycle store should be monitored by CCTV, with a complementary, low intensity, lighting system to illuminate the building and approaches to it throughout the hours of darkness.
- 3.3.13 The intruder alarm should be adapted to ensure the extension is monitored.

Service yard

- 3.3.14 The service yard should continue to be enclosed with the 2000m high, weld-mesh fence and gates.
- 3.3.15 An intercom should be installed at the gates to allow visitors/drivers not issued with an access fob to communicate with staff prior to gaining entry.

Signage

- 3.3.16 Signage should indicate the external entrances to the Business Hub and the Click Studio.

4 Physical Security

The following specification sets out the requirements for the extension to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors (Business Hub, Click Studio, escape, bin store, cycle store, plant) should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ All internal doors to classrooms, PC suites, IT Hub, offices, and the storerooms should have a solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever, mortise, deadlock (to BS 3621/8621/EN 12209), so that the rooms can be secured when vacant.

4.2 Access controls and visitor management

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob systems. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Staff rooms
 - Doors connecting the Business Hub and Click Studio to the spill out space
 - Storerooms where high value/sensitive materials may be stored.
 - Service yard
 - Cycle store

4.3 Windows

- ☐ If there any ground floor, opening windows they should be certified to either PAS 24 or LPS 1175 sr2, and should include opening limiters, restricting opening to 100mm. Where compliance with the security standard is not feasible, they should still have opening restrictors fitted.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ All external glazing (curtain walling, windows, roof lights and door glazing) should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g., 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Intruder alarm

- ☐ The intruder alarm system should be extended to ensure all of the extension is monitored, with contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors in all rooms with windows on the ground floor. The alarm signal should terminate at a security control room. The security control room should be able to deploy a patrol team to investigate any security issues.

4.6 CCTV

- ☐ The CCTV system should be extended so that all external doors, the cycle store and all elevations are monitored.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Low intensity, dusk-to-dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to illuminate all building elevations, external doors, and the service yard gate.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.

4.8 Fencing and gates

- ☐ The service yard should continue to be enclosed with high fencing and gates.

5 Secured by Design



Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of school buildings and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
11.01.23	Gary Quinn, Bond Bryan Architects	Request for Crime Impact Statement
05.02.23		Site visited
21.03.23	Gary Quinn, Bond Bryan Architects	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
CCPH2-BBA-ZZ-00-DR-A-1002	Existing Site Plan		
CCPH2-BBA-ZZ-00-DR-A-2001	Ground Floor Campus GA Plan		
CCPH2-BBA-ZZ-01-DR-A-2001	First Floor Campus		
CCPH2-BBA-ZZ-02-DR-A-2001	Second Floor Campus		
CCPH2-BBA-ZZ-03-DR-A-2001	Third Floor Campus		
CCPH2-BBA-ZZ-04-DR-A-2001	Fourth Floor Campus		
CCPH2-BBA-ZZ-RF-DR-A-2001	Roof Campus		
CCPH2-BBA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-3001	GA Elevation East		
CCPH2-BBA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-3002	GA Elevation West		
CCPH2-BBA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-3003	GA Elevation South		
CCPH2-BBA-ZZ-XX-DR-A-3004	GA Elevation North		
CCPH2-BBA-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-1003	Proposed Site Plan		

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made in this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		21.03.23

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels

of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk