



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Shipyards. Albert Shed, Water Street.

Food Hall with seating area and stage (2,435sqm)

For: Manchester Quays Two Limited

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: 11/11/22

designforsecurity

Ref: 2022/0448/CIS/01

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# Shipyard

2022/0448/CIS/01

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Development Supported – Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure lockers for staff
- Cycle storage
- Secure internal doors
- Interface with neighbouring sites
- Access control for Back of House areas
- Refuse and storage enclosures to be secured.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

**Please note:** Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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# 1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.


The site is located adjacent to the former Granada studios site facing onto Water St and New Quay Street. The site forms part of the wider St. John's redevelopment masterplan. The area is located approx. 750m from the M/cr Town Hall.

The proposed development site currently faces onto the River Irwell, the service yard of the Marriot Hotel, Water St and New Quay St.


A nearby canal inlet/dock connects to the River Irwell. The adjacent area around the dock will be redeveloped recognising its heritage. The area and dock had fallen into disrepair and was popular with rough sleeping, drinking and drug taking. A riverside walkway runs

A new pedestrian and cycle bridge has been constructed over the River Irwell next to the Ordsall Chord railway infrastructure. The footbridge connects Manchester and Salford and provides greater connectivity for the Middlewood Locks masterplan.


A large number of apartment schemes are/have been developed within the local district within Spinningfields, Middlewood Locks and the St. John's masterplans. Alongside their leisure use offerings these districts will provide popular destinations for Manchester's emerging residents and workers. Currently under construction further along Water St is the Factory building. A new purpose-built Arts, events and cultural building which is set to be a big destination for the city.



7 – View from within the site towards neighbouring hotel.




6 – Existing site and adjacent New Quay St road bridge.



5 – View towards site across River Irwell.




1 – View towards site from Water St.



2 – Service access on Water St.



3 Recess door from site on Water St. subject to ASB



4 – Proposed site from New Quay St. Southeast.

## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> February 2018 to 31<sup>st</sup> January 2019.

### 2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| 26                | 70                    | 112             | 667                   | 642   | 52      | 25               | 272                      | 38                     | 27            |

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Manchester, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime being the highest reported crimes. The location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration when looking at the crime statistics as the site is located within the city centre where there is a high concentration of retail outlets, licenced premises, and restaurants, leading to an increase of crime and disorder in the area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly to the north and east of the proposed site, around Deansgate which has a high volume of bars and retail facilities located along it, particularly around the junction of Quay Street, Peters Street and Deansgate where the Great Northern is located. Offences have mostly occurred over the weekend period (Friday – Sunday) during the late evening and early hours of the morning when most premises in the area are closing. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the local area, with offences often taking place between known associates, with alcohol often being a factor.
- 2.1.3 Thefts have taken place throughout the area, with hotspots occurring to the south of the proposed site, around Deansgate and Bridge Street. Both areas have a high volume of foot fall due to public transport links, retail outlets and bars / restaurants. Offenders have mostly used pick pocketing techniques and distraction methods in order to obtain personal belongings, mostly mobile phones, bags, and purses / wallets. Offenders have also targeted insecure items (mostly mobile phones) left on or under tables in bars and restaurants.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area has mostly taken place in private car parks and vehicles using on street parking facilities. Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime with offenders using implements and objects in order to smash glazing and access the interior of the vehicle. Offenders have also targeted vehicle registration plates, using tools to remove them.

### 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors (mostly to the rear or side of the property) using bodily pressure and implements to gain access to the premises.

*Possible Solution* – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified door-sets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, security personnel or passers-by. Consideration should also be given to security-certified shutters (see Section 4) to protect particularly vulnerable doors

- 2.2.2 Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

*Possible Solution* - Secure storerooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular community access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

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- 2.2.3 Forcing open of shutters by levering rolling shutters open, breaking locks off of shutters or using vehicles to ram shutters and damage them, allowing access.

*Possible Solution* - To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible.
- where the size limits the availability of certified shutters, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings.
- use of high perimeter fencing, lighting and CCTV can deter offenders from entering a site and prevent access to vulnerable areas, and CCTV can increase the chances of offenders being seen by security personnel or evidence gathered which might lead to a prosecution.

- 2.2.4 **Café/Restaurant Premises:** Theft of personal property from tabletops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

*Possible Solution* - Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

- 2.2.5 **Café/Restaurant Premises:** Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

*Possible solution* – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

## 2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

## 2.4 Risk Factors – Event Venue

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of personal property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private spaces
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period
- Criminal damage
- Theft of/from vehicles

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
## 2.5 Risk Factors – Food Hall

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Cash robbery
- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property
- Controlled access
- Employee theft
- Theft of personal property
- Loitering groups/Anti-social behaviour

## 2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area 2018 - 2019.





**2.1.1 Day / Time Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday. The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typical found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.

**2.1.2 Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure doors and windows – mostly fire doors located to the side and rear of the property are targeted – using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors/ tailgating staff into restricted areas, taking property belonging to employees and the business.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements to access the doors and windows located below.
- Broken glazing to windows and doors – located mostly to the front of the property, with glass in doors highly targeted- using bricks or implements located around the scene.

## 2.2 Theft (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis


*The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.*



- 2.2.1 **Day/ Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

## 2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary Restaurants / Cafés: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.




2.3.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafés in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday. The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the premises.
- Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the windows and doors located underneath.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors, accessing restricted areas and removing goods belonging to staff and the company.

## 2.4 Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.4.1 **Day/ Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

## 2.5 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.*



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Saturday during the evening. Offenders often target vehicles, particularly around city/ town centres, during the evening, as they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the vehicle owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

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## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal seeks the redevelopment of an existing building fronting the River Irwell providing a purpose built structure housing a food & beverage hall offering a variety of food & drink outlets.
- 3.1.2 The proposal incorporates a central dining courtyard with mezzanine area above, WC's, associated loading area, refuse facilities and ancillary areas. An additional external dining terrace will overlook the River Irwell.
- 3.1.3 The concept is similar to ones which are already successfully operating within Altrincham Market, Mackie Mayor on Trinity Way and New Century Hall, Manchester.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring a new and vibrant use to the area.
- 3.2.2 The building will present an active frontage onto Water Street and New Quay Street, enlivening the street scenes .
- 3.2.3 The development site has been vacant for some time which has provided the opportunity for criminal and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.4 The proposed building will provide good levels of activity in the form of entrances, food hall use, events venue and reception space, and in-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance towards sections of the adjacent public realm.
- 3.2.5 The proposed entrances to the buildings will be clearly defined and can incorporate measures to control access to / egress from the premises when they are operational.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development would bring additional vitality to the site. It should generate legitimate activity which can help to improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.7 In addition to the proposal, the redevelopment provides an opportunity to rationalise arrangements for storage of refuse and other servicing elements. Bins should be stored in a designated area within the secure boundary of the site. Loose materials should be removed, and there should be no free-standing items stored in easily accessible areas.
- 3.2.8 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at various times of the day and night.
- 3.2.9 The proposed development will help to provide activity in the area and animate the adjacent public open space thus increasing the informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.10 The position of the entrance areas allows staff to monitor people entering and leaving the building.
- 3.2.11 The large expanse of windows allows staff to monitor customer behaviour in the outdoor seating area.
- 3.2.12 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

### 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

- 3.3.1 Riverside walkway: The proposed design should address the existing pedestrian walkway and ensure that no features facilitate or aid climbing from the walkway into or up & into the proposal.
- 3.3.2 The main external entrances to the food hall and the bar area must be staffed with security personnel at busy periods/during events to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts. Engagement at the premises should be provided by an SIA ACS approved security company.

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- 3.3.3 Cycle parking. Any provision intended for staff should be within a secured enclosure, preferably within the buildings - and covered by the site CCTV system.
  - 3.3.4 Staff should be provided with a secure area to store personal belongings (i.e. lockers) within a secure area of the school building which is restricted to staff, such as the staff room.
  - 3.3.5 All elevations of the new building should be monitored by CCTV with a complementary lighting system to illuminate it throughout the hours of darkness.
  - 3.3.6 The entrances to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff.
  - 3.3.7 The most frequently occurring crime in restaurants, and licensed premises, is the theft of personal property (i.e. handbags, purses, mobile phones) placed on tables/chairs, or the floor, for this reason it is highly recommended that tables and chairs are designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.
  - 3.3.8 Casual access to the rear of the bars/service counters should be restricted (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled) to prevent unauthorised access.
  - 3.3.9 Licensed premises are often the scene of violent disorder. A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed so that any incidents will be recorded. The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrances in to the premises, all bar/service areas, toilet lobbies and customer circulation/seating areas.
  - 3.3.10 Restaurants and bars in the area have frequently been targeted by burglars. It is highly recommended that the premises should be covered with a monitored alarm (with response).
  - 3.3.11 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. There should also be a secure cash office – which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Consideration should also be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind the bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in the till during busy periods.
  - 3.3.12 Internal access doors/frames to all other storage/staff rooms etc. should also be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with key operated locks (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times) to secure them when unoccupied.
  - 3.3.13 There should be a secure cash office (see Section 4.2), with a time delay safe securely fixed to the floor with a floor anchor. With that said, non-cash payment methods are preferred and should be encouraged. The food stalls/kiosks and bar should either be cleared at the end of an evening or should be capable of being secured out-of-hours (with no cash left within them). The bar containers within the ground floor area and the roof extension terrace should also be capable of being secured when not in use (see Section 4.5 for more information).
  - 3.3.14 It is essential that the physical security measures listed below are incorporated where appropriate into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and customers.

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## 4 Physical Security

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.*

### 4.1 Any External Alterations

*It is strongly recommended that any external alterations to be carried out as part of the proposed scope of works, or in the future, should incorporate the following physical security measures:*

- ☐ Any new external doorsets (including single-leaf, double-leaf, sliding or bi-folding) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any new windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ Any new shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Where shutters are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building where possible, where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage. Consideration could also be given to anti-vandal screens to replace any existing window grilles, which would protect any vulnerable areas of glazing at all times of the day and night (e.g. <http://www.securityshutters.co.uk/Anti-Vandal-Screens.php>).
- ☐ Any new glazing should incorporate an inner pane with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The outer pane should be a minimum of 6mm toughened or have no less than a 0.8mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 6.8mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P2A under EN 356 (see Section 7.1 for more information). The glass should be well held in suitable gaskets in 35mm rebates or be in at least 30mm rebates if held in well bedded clamped gaskets or, preferably, bonded with silicon or polysulphide sealant.
- ☐ Any existing ladders/features that may aid climbing and unauthorised access to the roof of the building should be removed or secured to deter unauthorised access.

### 4.2 Internal Security & Access Controls

- ☐ The internal doors/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a robust multi-point locking system to allow them to be secured when either space is not in use.
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. Internal access doors/frames leading to the back-of-house staff areas serving the food hall (including the kitchen, wash up/prep room, the cellar and the staff room) should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and fitted with either auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards). Doors to any offices, storage areas or plant areas serving the food hall or bar area should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and key operated locks to secure them when unoccupied/when access is not required
- ☐ There should be a secure cash office, which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a time delay safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The cash office should contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Chute deposit safes (certified to LPS 1183) should be located behind each of the large bar/servery areas, or an alternative management practice should be utilised which would reduce the amount of cash held in the tills during busy periods. Non-cash methods of payment should be encouraged.
- ☐ The new external entrance doors to the food hall should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 (with any glazing laminated - see Section 4.1 above). Any internal doors off the food hall should also be to the same standard, to allow them to be secured when required.

- ☐ Internal walls between BOH and Public areas should either be formed by robust masonry, laminated glazed screens or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the walls themselves are not vulnerable to attack/penetration.
- ☐ Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Any electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any access control cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times. The use of numeric keypad locks are not advised, as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed.

### 4.3 Alarm

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the building (or each individual unit/use if they can be independently secured), linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to the on-site security team or an Alarm Receiving Centre).
- ☐ The alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind bars/serveries, at main entrance/ticket desks on entry and in the cash office.

### 4.4 Boundaries

- ☐ Rear storage areas where commodities are kept should be secured behind a 2400mm high railings or high-security, rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers). Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that the condition of the fencing along the perimeter of the site is regularly inspected for signs of damage/attack and is repaired immediately if any incidents are experienced.

### 4.5 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting should be provided to all access routes, parking areas and external seating areas within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and shutters.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or climbing aids onto roof areas or up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be controlled from behind bars or in a security/management room, away from public access. Zoned dimmers should be used to increase the control of areas from the bar/management office. An override should be provided, within easy reach of security staff, so that if an incident occurs the lighting level can be raised. This will also help at the end of an event so that staff can see to clear up, and patrons have no doubt that it is closing time and they should make their way out of the premises. The lighting override can also be linked to music controls so that, in the event of an incident, music can be turned off immediately as well as lighting increased.

### 4.6 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

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- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
  - ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
  - ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
  - ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *Acceptable Standard* that will allow for *Identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

*Acceptable Standard* - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

*Identification* – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *Overview* and *Recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all entrances to the site and the building, all external elevations, all vehicle/cycle parking areas, all internal circulation areas, all sales counters/till positions and all internal and external seating areas.*
- ☐ The proposed CCTV system should be capable of being monitored by the 24/7 on-site security team, so there can be an immediate response to any incidents being recorded. It is also highly recommended that there is a linked public address facility, to inform any offenders who attempt to gain access out-of-hours that have been detected on site, that they are being monitored/recorded and that the police have been called.

## 4.7 Other

- ☐ Any external cycle parking areas should be located where they can be well-overlooked from routinely occupied rooms within the building or from external seating areas. They should also be covered by a monitored CCTV system (see Section 4.8). Any cycle store should include 'Sheffield' type stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>. Any gates to secure cycle stores should be self-closing/locking, with locks operated by fobs or keys issued to staff or authorised members of a cycle parking scheme.
- ☐ Any external bin/recycling stores should be secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

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## 5 Internal Layout Guidance

*The internal layout of licensed premises, cafes & restaurants and bar spaces should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.*

5.1.1 Licensed premises, cafes & restaurants and bar spaces can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in such premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent such premises means that such a venue would lack ‘community territoriality’ (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

5.1.2 The incidence and severity of disorder issues in large licensed/event venues and their environs are often linked to physical features of these locations, such as:

- High concentration of people;
- Crowd congestion;
- Services that do not cater for demand, i.e. insufficient serving staff;
- Physical hazards arising from type and placement of furniture/ancillary structures; and
- Insufficient and unclean toilets.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- 5.1.3 The main entrance(s) to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- 5.1.4 Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 5.1.5 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- 5.1.6 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers’ reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable doors or hatches that cannot be easily scaled). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- 5.1.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.2) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

- 5.1.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 5.1.9 Adequate signage should be deployed to direct people throughout the venue, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.
- 5.1.10 Public toilets can give rise to crime and disorder issues and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
  - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
  - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
  - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
  - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
  - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

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## 6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately. Comprehensive risk assessments should be carried out in advance of all events/uses, in order to identify and address potential security issues.
- 6.1.2 During any specific events, the control of people entering the venue will be essential to maintaining order, both inside and outside the premises. Strict monitoring of numbers entering the venue must be undertaken, as overcrowding inside will facilitate criminal activity. Management of people awaiting entry will also be important, in order to prevent frustrations building up that could create disorder. Signage to any appropriate location will assist in directing people to appropriate queuing locations, but sufficient security staff will be needed to supervise the entry process and an outside security presence will be required at busy times.
- 6.1.3 Security staff should also ensure the swift and safe dispersal of visitors away from the venue after an event. Trained security staff should be positioned at the exits and entrances to site as visitors leave. Suitable notices should be displayed on all exits from the site advising visitors to keep noise to a minimum when leaving the venue.
- 6.1.4 All door/security staff engaged at the premises should be provided by an SIA ACS approved security company. Security staff should regularly patrol the entire site to ensure a visible presence to visitors and potential offenders.
- 6.1.5 The setting up, dismantling and operational processes involved in events can provide many opportunities for criminal activity, as an offender can act anonymously within the relatively transient community of temporary workers/delivery personnel, and gain access to otherwise secure areas. It is therefore essential that effective identification and verification procedures are put in place for the whole period of events.
- 6.1.6 The applicant should engage in dialogue with the local neighbourhood policing team in Manchester and should give advance notice of events, so that an appropriate policing consideration and arrangement(s) can be made.
- 6.1.7 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the venue must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
  - Cash management within the premises - including a chute deposit safe behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
  - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
  - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
  - Details of staff security training;
  - Location and management of any smoking areas;
  - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. fencing, access controls, alarm systems, CCTV cameras etc;
  - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti and litter (regular litter patrols should be carried out inside and outside the premises, to prevent discarded bottles, glasses, cans etc. from being used to cause criminal damage or used as weapons); and
  - Refuse collection arrangements (which should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods).

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- 6.1.8 The opening hours of the venue should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses.
  - 6.1.9 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, music/DJ equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
    - Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas).

## 7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

## 8 Useful References

### 8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact register

| Date     | Contact With      | Summary of Contact       |
|----------|-------------------|--------------------------|
| 07/09/22 | 3DReid Architects | CIS instruction recieved |
| 27/09/22 | 3DReid Architects | Instruction confirmed    |
| 26/09/22 | DfS               | Site visit               |
| 04/11/22 | Applicant         | CIS payment recieved     |
| 11/11/22 | DfS               | CIS complete             |
| 11/11/22 | DfS               | CIS issued               |
|          |                   |                          |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No. | Drawing Title                | Date   | Rev |
|-------------|------------------------------|--------|-----|
| 200097      | Pre-Application Consultation | Aug 22 | B   |
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PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made | Date |
|---------|----------------|------|
| A       |                |      |
|         |                |      |

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.*

#### BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.*

#### ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

*The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:*

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

*This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.*

#### STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

#### STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

#### EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

*A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a*

*6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.*

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

*Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).*

#### CPTED

*Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*

#### CRS

*Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)*

#### INPT

*Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.*

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

*A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.*

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

*A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.*

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

*The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.*

### Useful Websites

#### Design for Security

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### Secured by Design

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### RIBA Product Selector

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### LPCB – Red Book Live

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### Crime Reduction (Home Office)

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

[www.designagainstcrime.org](http://www.designagainstcrime.org)

#### Building for Life

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

#### CLG (Communities and Local Government)

[www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)