



Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Crime Impact Statement

Manchester Science Park, Lloyd Street North
Offices (6644sqm) and Car Parking (4739sqm)

For Deloitte LLP

Version B: 11th June 2014

www.designforsecurity.org
info@designforsecurity.org
0161 856 5912



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Not Protectively Marked

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Manchester Science Park, Lloyd Street North

Offices (6644sqm)

2007/1255/CIS/01

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Executive Summary


- ☐ **Significant material changes are advised**
- ☒ **Proposal is satisfactory in principle but changes are advised**
- ☐ **Proposal is generally acceptable subject to the advice in this report**

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. Particular consideration should be given to the following matters, which are discussed in more detail within this report (see Section 5.2):

- The proposal for the The Hub Building is fully supported on the basis of the advice within this report.
- Support for temporary car park can **only** be given on the basis of adequate security measures, most essentially a secure boundary treatment listed in section 5.2.

If these concerns / issues can be addresses as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

We would encourage further dialogue with the applicant throughout the design and construction process to ensure the resulting development is secure. Please get in touch with Design for Security if you have any queries regarding the contents of this document, or the security standards referred to therein.



Julia Hall RIBA

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The diagram below highlights relevant local features that could have an impact upon the security of the scheme and/or indicate the presence of crime and antisocial behaviour in the surrounding area.



- 1 View looking south from Burlington Street along Pencroft Way. The proposed development site is located to the left hand side of this
- 2 View looking west from Pencroft Way.
- 3 View looking east from Pencroft Way across the proposed development site towards Lloyd Street North.
- 4 View looking east from the proposed development site towards Lloyd Street North. Manchester University can be seen across Lloyd Street North in the distance.
- 5 View looking east from the existing entrance to Manchester Science Park across Lloyd Street North towards Manchester University. This is an existing and well used pedestrian route.
- 6 View looking south along Lloyd Street North towards Moss Side.
- 7 View looking north from Rippon Street into the north-west corner of the proposed car park site.
- 8 View looking south from inside the existing disused council premises (proposed surface car parking) towards the existing entrance gates located on Denmark Road.
- 9 View looking south-east from within the existing disused council premises (proposed surface car parking) at the existing boundary walls.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2013 and 2014.

2.1 Crime Count

Figure 1: Recorded Crime in Km² Centred on Site

Burglary Dwelling	Burglary Other	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Misc. Thefts	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Theft of Pedal Cycle
45	99	163	579	740	75	<20	136	<20	133

- 2.1.1 The volume of crime in this area is high, due to its location within the city centre. The volumes of violent crimes, theft, robbery and vehicle crime are exceptionally high and the rate of burglary at commercial premises is much greater than is experienced across Manchester as a whole.

2.2 Misc Theft (Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to miscellaneous thefts within/against office premises, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.

Figure 2: Misc Theft – Day Range





Figure 3: Misc Theft – Time Range



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of misc. theft in office premises is greatest between Monday and Friday, with fewer incidents occurring at the weekend. Office buildings are likely to be busiest during the week, when most people work, and the opportunity to commit theft is greatest.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of misc. theft rises between 1pm and 2pm. This is when many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas vulnerable.

2.3 Burglary Other (Office Use Only): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to burglary other offences within/against office premises, recorded in the Manchester city centre area.

Figure 4: Burglary Other – Day Range




Figure 5: Burglary Other – Time Range





Figure 6: Burglary Other – Point of Entry



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** Burglaries at offices occur slightly more frequently on Tuesdays than on any other day of the week. It is unlikely that there is a specific reason as to why burglary against office buildings is committed more on these days.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary against office premises is greatest in the evening, between 7pm and 9pm and around midnight. Offenders are likely to target office buildings when they are shut for the day and the chance of being caught is lower.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in the local area have been committed through doors, particularly front doors. Burglary against office buildings in this area does not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. There have also been many cases when glazed panels in doors have been smashed to gain entry. A number of burglaries have occurred during the day, when offices are open, with offenders posing as legitimate visitors and trespassing to steal property. Fire doors have also been frequently forced open by offenders to gain entry.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 9: Vehicle Crime – Day Range





Figure 10: Vehicle Crime – Time Range



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week the risk of vehicle crime peaks on Monday and Thursday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is concentrated in the afternoon. It is in the afternoon when the volume of vehicles in the local area is highest, due to workers, students and shoppers all parking in the area, creating opportunities for offenders.

2.5 Wounding: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to instances of wounding committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 11: Wounding – Day Range





Figure 12: Wounding – Time Range



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** Violent crime peaks at the weekend. Between Friday and Sunday, a greater number of people attend city centre licensed premises, often drinking for longer periods and consuming more alcohol – leading to conflicts.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** The risk of violent crime increases in the late evening and into the early hours of the morning, peaking between 1am and 2am. At these times, those attending licenses premises are more likely to be intoxicated and violent disorder is more likely to breakout in licensed premises, on streets, at taxi ranks/bus stops/train stations and at takeaways.

2.6 Criminal Damage and Robbery: Breakdown

The data below relates to criminal damage and robbery offences committed within a Km² centred on the site.

Figure 13: Criminal Damage Targets





Figure 14: Robbery Targets



- 2.6.1 **Criminal Damage Targets:** In the local area vehicles have been targeted more frequently than property. The majority of incidents are damage to glazing.
- 2.6.2 **Robbery Targets:** Robbery against the person is much more prevalent than against businesses in this area. The risk of personal robbery increases when lone victims take quieter, more secluded routes through the area in the evening/at night.

2.7 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.7.1 Fire doors have been forced open to gain entry

Possible solution – Doors for emergency egress use should be certified to recognised security standards. Doors should not be set in deep recesses where abuse or a concerted attack can occur unnoticed.

- 2.7.2 Theft of personal property left on desks

Possible solution – There should be a robust access control system in place to ensure that callers to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into the building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

- 2.7.3 Doors to the front and rear of premises have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

Possible solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can deter criminals from attempting this, by deterring access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passersby.

3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

4 Design Considerations

The design and layout of your development will be appraised both in this document and through face-to-face meetings if and when required. Design for Security does recommend however that designers and developers refer to:

4.1 Safer Places (2004) ODPM, London

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are detailed within Chapter 2 of this ODPM publication. Annex 3 also contains many useful references. You can download 'Safer Places' at www.designforsecurity.org

4.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

5 Design & Layout Appraisal

5.1 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

- 5.1.1 The proposed development creates clear indication and division of areas that are public, communal or private. Electronically operated entry gates for vehicles, and doors for pedestrians are essential in order to control access to the internal communal spaces.
- 5.1.2 The development will benefit from a 24 hour security presence, allowing staff to monitor people entering and leaving the building. Visitors should be required to report to the concierge.
- 5.1.3 The principal entrances to the building are all located in prominent positions and are readily apparent from the public realm.
- 5.1.4 The internal layout of corridors is uncluttered with few obstacles to surveillance. Individual office unit doors are not located in recessed areas and are clearly visible from within the corridors.
- 5.1.5 The layout and facades of the proposed building are uncluttered with few obstacles to surveillance. The building footprint contains relatively few recesses at ground level where an offender could be sheltered or concealed.
- 5.1.6 Offices have windows overlooking the adjacent public realm which will provide some natural surveillance to and from the development.

5.2 Changes and Amendments Needed

The Hub Building

- 5.2.1 There is currently no formal reception point indicated within the current layout plans in order to identify or direct visitors to the building.

It is advisable to incorporate a reception desk between the two main entrances of the building. This reception should be staffed at all times when the building is in use. The desk itself should be high and wide, allowing staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering and exiting the building. Multiple

building entrances/exits can provide opportunities to criminals, who can gain access and egress to/from the building without being noticed or challenged. Entrance points should be well-overlooked/controlled by staff, this increases surveillance over everyone entering and exiting the building and deters criminal activity. All visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the building. Reception staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day. The external entrance doors should be capable of being secured and controlled remotely by reception staff if required (e.g. if the building is open late), to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobby.

- 5.2.2 The building currently proposes no formal air lock arrangement to the atrium space of the building and the lift/stair core, it is therefore essential to include access controls to individual suites to prevent unauthorised access. It should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office floor/suite to access another. All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Access to plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only).
- 5.2.3 Each office space/suite should be covered by a monitored alarm.
- 5.2.4 It is essential to ensure the maintenance of the proposed landscaping for the development in order to maintain the sight lines across the site. Low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- 5.2.5 It is essential that sight lines between the proposed development and the footpaths/ramps are maintained. Any retaining features such as walls should be designed to discourage use as informal sitting areas. Any balustrade alongside steps or ramps should use a visibly permeable railing. Hard landscape treatments should not include features that would encourage loitering or skateboarding.
- 5.2.6 External lighting should be installed above all external doors. Additionally, it is recommended that all publically accessible elevations of the building elevations should be illuminated (at ground floor level) to deter loitering/congregation.
- 5.2.7 Appropriate external lighting should be provided in order to provide good security for the proposal and its surroundings and to ensure the effective use of CCTV across the site.
- 5.2.8 External café seating should be removed and stored inside the building out of business hours.
- 5.2.9 There should be a secure room, with a time delay safe, so that staff can count the takings from the café out of public gaze and store cash overnight.
- 5.2.10 There is currently no indication of provision for the storage of refuse. There should be a secure bin store provided to the site to prevent unauthorised access and movement of bins.
- 5.2.11 It is essential to ensure that the new facility does not block existing CCTV coverage across the existing site.
- 5.2.12 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

Temporary Surface Car Parking

- 5.2.13 The proposed location of the temporary car parking to be provided in lieu of the displaced parking from Manchester Science Park, is remote from the buildings the spaces are intended to serve. Therefore the location is afforded little natural surveillance by overlooking.
- 5.2.14 It is essential that the proposed surface car park is a secure boundary treatment and should be 2100mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in this case.
- 5.2.15 Automatic vehicle and pedestrian entry gates should be in keeping with the adjacent boundary treatments.

- 5.2.16 Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10 (rural areas) or 20 (urban areas) with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- 5.2.17 Electronic car park exit gates must not be on an induction loop (open automatically). All gates to car parks should be fob-in and fob-out.
- 5.2.18 Pedestrian gates in to car parks must also be fob in and fob out only.
- 5.2.19 It is essential that the proposed temporary car park and pedestrian link path are covered by a suitable CCTV system. See Section 7.3.
- 5.2.20 It is essential the proposed pedestrian link path lighting must be provided in accordance with BS 5489.

6 Physical Security

The following standards and features will be required for this development to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

6.1 Doors

- 6.1.1 External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- 6.1.2 Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- 6.1.3 Revolving doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- 6.1.4 External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- 6.1.5 Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- 6.1.6 All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts (only if an alarm is to be provided; see section 11.4)

6.2 Windows and Shutters

- 6.2.1 Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- 6.2.2 Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- 6.2.3 Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

6.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

6.4 Alarms

- 6.4.1 If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors.
- 6.4.2 If an alarm is installed, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- 6.4.3 If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be an infrastructure in place to allow for the easy installation of an alarm system (conduits and power points).
- 6.4.4 It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

6.5 Access Control

6.5.1 Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Entrance / Exit doors
- Entrance doors to individual office suites
- Café / refreshment space
- Plant rooms
- Store rooms
- Roof access

6.6 Boundaries

6.6.1 Secure boundary treatments should generally be 2100mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.

6.6.2 There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling in to secure areas.

6.6.3 The site boundary treatment should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.

6.6.4 Sub-divisional boundaries within the site may be as low as 1800mm.

6.6.5 The openly accessible areas of the site should be demarcated by a low boundary and/or indicated by a change in surface treatment to communicate a sense of ownership of the space.

6.6.6 Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

6.6.7 Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
- A key operable deadlock

Double gates should have lockable (or externally inaccessible) drop bolts to each leaf.

6.7 Fit-Out

Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their buildings once complete, and therefore the end-users requirements. Typical components which are subject to fit-out are:

- Internal access control
- Internal doors in to premises
- Alarm systems

These features can be critical to a secure environment, and we would urge the client to provide would-be tenants with the contact details for Design for Security, who will provide free advice on internal security matters so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

7 External Features

7.1 Landscaping

7.1.1 In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

- 7.1.2 Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- 7.1.3 Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- 7.1.4 There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

7.2 Lighting

- 7.2.1 External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- 7.2.2 Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- 7.2.3 Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- 7.2.4 Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

7.3 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- 7.3.1 CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- 7.3.2 Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- 7.3.3 With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- 7.3.4 Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an **acceptable standard** that will allow for **identification** of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '**Overview**' and '**Recognition**', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **Main entrances, lifts, stairwells, sales counters and lobbies.**

7.4 Car Parks

- 7.4.1 Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10 (rural areas) or 20 (urban areas) with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- 7.4.2 Lighting to basement and/or under croft parking areas should display an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%.

- 7.4.3 Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- 7.4.4 Where feasible, a one-way system should be implemented to reduce the likelihood of collisions and conflict.
- 7.4.5 Electronic car park exit gates should not be on an induction loop (open automatically). All gates to car parks should be fob-in and fob-out.
- 7.4.6 Pedestrian gates in to car parks should also be fob in and fob out only.

7.5 Communal Areas

- 7.5.1 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7.6 Other

- 7.6.1 There must be no features of the building envelope which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.
- 7.6.2 Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- 7.6.3 Any cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf
- 7.6.4 Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

8 Management & Maintenance

The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

9 Construction

Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
19.03.2014	L. Feekins	CIS application received
08.05.2014	J. Hall	Site visit
16.05.2014	J. Hall	CIS report issued
11.06.2014	J. Hall	CIS Revision B report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

DWG No.	DWG Title	Date	Rev
(0-) AP003	Phase 1_The Hub – Proposed Site Plan		
(0-) AP100	General Arrangement – Ground Floor Plan		
(0-) AP101	General Arrangement – First Floor Plan		
(0-) AE102	East Elevation		
(0-) AS100	General Arrangement – Section A-A		
(0-) AE100	South Elevation		
(21) AD104	Opening Windows N&S Elevations		
(21) AD101	Elevations / Typical Bay East Elevation / Plan Elevation Section		
(21) AD100	Elevations / Typical Bay / Plan Elevation Section		
(9-) L011	Ripon Street – Temporary Car Park		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status	Revisions Made
A	☐ ☐ ☒	
B	☐ ☒ ☐	Temporary car park added

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 3621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Key Egress.

The minimum standard for locks on external or entrance doors to be acceptable to the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the police service. The effectiveness of the lock also depends on the quality of the door, frame and other hardware which is not tested by this standard and which may fail before the lock.

BS 8621, 2007

Thief resistant locks. Keyless Egress.

Same as above, but egress is possible without a key (by use of thumb turn or latch lever).

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2007

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- Resistance of glazing
- Performance of hardware
- Resistance to static loading
- Resistance to dynamic loading
- Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRA

Crime Reduction Advisor. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

NPT

Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk