



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

EV Charging Hub

AT Reliance Street, Newton Heath, Manchester

FOR: BE.EV

VERSION A: 05.10.22

2015/0831/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

We welcome the investment in this part of Manchester and support the construction of an electric vehicle charging station on the site. The development will inevitably attract criminals and lead to an increase in crime at the site - shoplifting, theft, burglary, assaults, criminal damage and anti-social activity, for example, but with appropriate design interventions the risk and effects of crime can be minimised.

Several recommendations to improve security within the scheme are included in section 3.3 of the report. The principal recommendations are summarised as follows:

- Restrict access to the western side of the commercial unit
- Consider relocating the cycle parking/charging to a location more visible to staff and customers
- Limit customer entry to the commercial unit to a single door and install access controls to allow staff to control entry in the evening and late at night
- Consider restricting the opening hours of the commercial unit and limiting the number of charging points available for use late at night
- Carefully consider the placement of outdoor seating and consider removing seating and storing it securely at night
- Eliminate opportunities to access the roof of the commercial unit
- Ensure the external walls of the store are appropriately robust
- Install security-rated doors, roof, windows, shutters, and glazing
- Consider employing a security guard to deter offenders entering the commercial unit
- Install access controls to the door connecting the shop floor to the back-of house
- Fit an intruder alarm and comprehensive CCTV system
- Increase the height of boundary fencing and replace timber with a more robust material.

Greater Manchester Police support the application and, should the Manchester Planning be minded to approve the application, recommend the inclusion conditions requiring the development to a) be built in accordance with the security recommendations and physical security specification set out in sections 3.3 and 4 of this report, and/or b) to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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Consultant

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
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1 The Site and Surroundings

The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, edged in red on the plan, is located on land at the junction of Oldham Road, A62, and Reliance Street in Newton Heath, Manchester. Oldham Road is a very heavily trafficked route throughout the day and into the night. Reliance Street is a cul-de-sac that serves a range of industrial and retail premises. During the working day, traffic flows on Reliance Street is regular, at night there is little or no traffic. To the north of the site, on the Reliance Street Trading Estate, there are a pair of vacant retail units and associated large car park. This site is currently the subject of an, as yet, undetermined planning application to change of use of existing vacant units to a mixed storage, distribution warehouse and retail use, with ancillary offices, together with warehouse loading bay extension and ancillary works. The plans indicate that the car park at the front of the building will remain unchanged. To the west of the site there is a four-storey apartment building, 53 Ivy Graham Close, the primary access to which is at the rear, off Ivy Graham Close. There appears to be a pedestrian entrance at the south-eastern corner of the building facing Oldham Road. Apartments on the building's eastern elevation overlook the site. A hand carwash business operates on the corner of Oldham Road and Reliance Street opposite the site, whilst a MOT garage operates in the premises adjacent to it, both businesses are accessed from Reliance Street.


Looking east along Oldham Road with the boundary fencing of the site on the left



Reliance Street and the eastern boundary of the site on the left




A view across the site from Reliance Street towards the apartment building 53 Ivy Green Close



Looking across the site towards Oldham Road



Reliance Street Trading Estate - vacant retail units and associated car park to the north of the site



Car wash on the opposite corner of Oldham Road and Reliance Street



The regularly-shaped, development site measures approximately 1,377m². It is currently vacant having previously occupied by a petrol filling station and a vehicle sales business. The buildings and canopy that once stood on the site were demolished around 10 years ago; the hardstanding remains. The western part of the site includes a strip of tarmacked, land between the apartment building and the former garage. A sign indicates that fly tipping has been an issue on this land. A timber trip-rail has been erected to deter vehicle access. The site generally is slowly being colonised by self-seeding plants and grasses, leading to the break-up of the tarmac and concrete hardstanding. The former garage site is enclosed with 2000mm high, steel, railings and steel, palisade fencing. Access into the site is gained from Reliance Street via a pair of steel palisade gates located at the north-eastern corner of the site. Razor wire has been added to the top of parts of the fencing to enhance security. Several advertising boards and banners have been fixed to the boundary fencing, all of which add to the poor environmental quality of the site and surroundings.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood around the site

The data below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site recorded between 1st August 2021 to 31st August 2022.

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Crimes involving the use, or threat, of violence	Theft	Robbery	Drug offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
26	28	78	358	106	24	7	37	14	7

2.1.1 There were 702 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is well above the average for a typical neighbourhood within Manchester, however, the area analysed does include Newton Heath district centre, where there are many retail outlets, licensed premises, and hot food take-aways, all of which tend to generate criminal activity.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded (5% or more of the total) were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 51%
- theft - 16%
- criminal damage - 11%
- burglary – 8%
- vehicle crime, i.e., damage to, theft of & theft from a vehicle - 7%

2.1.3 The streets/places where 30 or more crimes were recorded were:

- Old Church Street – 142 offences
- Oldham Road – 102 offences
- Dean Lane - 32 offences



2.1.4 Crime hotspots in the neighbourhood include an unusually high level of crime at residential property on Castleford Walk, as well as local high schools, Chorlton Park and nearby Metrolink stations.

Crime at service stations

2.1.5 There were 41 offences committed at the three service stations located within the area analysed. Theft of fuel was the most common offence followed crimes involving the use of violence towards staff and between customers, and shoplifting. There were also a small number of vehicle-related crimes and acts of criminal damage.

Vehicle crime

2.1.6 The risk of vehicle crime is moderate. In terms of the day and time, the greatest risk appears to be towards the middle of the week and in the mid-late afternoon.





2.2 Crime at retail premises across the Manchester Division

The data below relates to burglary offences carried out at retail premises in Manchester.

There were 6,173 offences carried out at retail premises across the City of Manchester. These included:


- 3637 incidents of theft and shoplifting
- 1747 incidents where violence was used or threatened
- 397 burglaries
- 210 incidents of criminal damage
- 182 robberies

Burglary





2.2.1 The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week.

2.2.2 Burglary is most common in the late evening and at night after premises have closed for business and members of staff have left.



2.2.3 In around half of the incidents of burglary at retail premises, offenders forced open the front or rear doors. Forcing shutters open was also a common method of gaining entry. Offenders also gained entry by smashing glazing in doors and windows or forced their way through the walls or roof of a building. On a number of occasions, the offender entered by legitimate means, suggesting entry was not forced.

Theft (excluding shoplifting)



2.2.4 The risk of theft is consistently high throughout the week and is most common during the afternoon. Offenders have mostly targeted customer's personal belongings (mobile phones, bags, and purses) as well as items belonging to the business.

2.3 Modus operandi used in burglary and theft at retail premises in Manchester and measures to reduce risk

2.3.1 Ram-raiding walls, gates and shutters and penetrating walls and the roof

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing walls, roofs shutters and gates:

- security-certified fencing/gates (to LPS 1175) and should be used to secure service areas - sliding gates tend to be more secure than hinged gates;
- steel frame buildings, faced with a proprietary cladding system, should include a 2000mm high brick or blockwork base or a suitably robust inner layer of attack resistant material, e.g., expanded metal panels;
- roofs should be high enough that they are not easily accessible, comprise of a security-rated roofing system or include a sandwich of materials which makes them difficult to penetrate;
- secluded public passageways to the sides and rear of building should be avoided wherever possible; and,
- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lights.

2.3.2 Shutters have been forced upwards by offenders

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;
- where size limits the availability of certified shutters, intruder alarms, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings; and,
- anti-ram bollards or barriers should be deployed to help secure the most vulnerable shutters.

2.3.3 Doors have been forced open with tools and locks have been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 sr2 standard; and,
- external doors should be placed where they can be readily observed by staff or monitored by CCTV and fitted with alarm contacts.

2.3.4 Entering a building via unsecured doors and windows.

To minimise the risk of offenders committing rime by entering via unsecured windows or doors

- other than customer entrance doors, external doors should be self-closing and lock upon closure; and,
- windows should have opening restrictors and key operated locks fitted:

2.3.5 Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows:

- windows should be avoided on secluded elevations;
- window and glazed doors should be fitted with laminate glass, which, because of its structural properties, is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and open locks or climb through; and,
- security shutters or grilles, certified to the LPS 1175 sr2 standard, should be fitted to vulnerable windows.

2.3.6 Shoplifting and theft of employee property

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing personal property from retail premises:

- deploy a security guard at the entrance to the store

- install a one-way system to control movement through and in and out of the store;
- create a secure 'back of house' to the store, with fob or keypad-controlled doors;
- overt signage should be used to warn against entry to staff-only areas, referring visitors to appropriately located, visible reception areas; and,
- include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g., lockers or lockable drawers.

2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the site is vacant and has been for several years; there is little on the site that might attract offenders or those intent on causing anti-social behaviour;
- staff, customers, and residents of buildings overlooking the site generate activity and passive surveillance of the site which may deter some criminal activity;
- Oldham Road is well-trafficked through the day and into the night with passing motorists and pedestrians observing the site as they pass. Again, should they witness inappropriate activity, they may be inclined to report it, and their presence may deter offenders; and,
- the palisade and wire mesh fence has proved to be a secure boundary to the site.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood with a high number of crimes that directly affect affecting retail premises;
- criminals are particularly active in the area; service stations have been targeted regularly;
- the environmental quality of the site and surroundings is poor. There are indicators of neglect and deterioration in the immediate vicinity of the site, with vacant buildings and vacant sites, signs of over-fortification of sites and premises, which is often an indicator that crime is, or has been, a significant issue. Developments where there are signs of physical deterioration and neglect often attracts offenders, who may have a perception that, because of the poor quality of the environment and apparent tolerance of disorder, their actions are less likely to be challenged;
- the site is very visible from Oldham Road. Offenders are likely to observe the site as it develops and be aware of, and potentially exploit, any criminal opportunities; and,
- the accessibility of all boundaries of the site leaves it vulnerable to criminal activity.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development involves the clearance of fencing and vegetation from the site followed by the erection of a 24-hour, electric vehicle charging station. The charging station includes 16 vehicle charging points, cycle parking for 10 bikes to include 4 electric bike charging points, associated plant, and a commercial unit.
- 3.1.2 The vehicle charging points will be located in the centre and eastern parts of the site and arranged in a circular layout with a green-roof, canopy over. The commercial unit will be located on the western third of the site with oversight of the vehicle charging points. The bicycle charging zone will be located to the rear of the commercial unit.
- 3.1.3 The commercial unit will be a single-storey, flat, green-roofed building with a floorspace of around 160-175m². It will have an expansive shopfront and be clad in zinc panels. The plans indicate that it will include retail use including serving hot drinks. Within the unit there will be customer toilets and a refuse store. The underside of the canopy will be formed with timber batons radiating from the centre and supported by slim branching, steel columns finished in white.
- 3.1.4 Plant associated with the vehicle charging will be located between the commercial unit and the site's northern boundary.
- 3.1.5 Vehicle and pedestrian access to the development will be gained from Reliance Street, with vehicle flow around a central roundabout in order to access the charging points or exit the site. Pedestrian access will also be provided from Oldham Road with a pathway linking directly to the commercial unit. Bollards will be installed around the charging points to prevent vehicles over-running the circular pedestrian route that will connect the charging points to the commercial unit.
- 3.1.6 The Oldham Road and Reliance Street edges of the site will be defined by a timber knee-rail whilst a 1800mm high timber fence will secure the boundary with the adjacent car park.
- 3.1.7 The peripheral areas will be landscaped and include customer seating.
- 3.1.8 A comprehensive CCTV system will be installed and be capable of being monitored on site and remotely. Automatic number plate recognition, ANPR, cameras will control unauthorised parking.
- 3.1.9 The commercial unit will not hold any significant cash beyond the daily cash float for change. Cash will be collected regularly, and a time delay safe will be provided. All EV power transactions will be by card payment only at the terminals.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposals result in the redevelopment of a visually, unattractive site which, if not put to appropriate use, may otherwise attract crime and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.2 The design of the development is very good from a visual perspective and will enhance the appearance of this part of Newton Heath.
- 3.2.3 This site is prominently located at the junction of Oldham Road and Reliance Street. The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and well into the evening and night.
- 3.2.4 The commercial unit will have a simple footprint with no recesses or places of concealment and glazed elements will facilitate surveillance of external areas.
- 3.2.5 The entrances to the commercial unit will be located in a prominent position, where they can be easily seen from Oldham Road and from the forecourt.
- 3.2.6 A back of house area can easily be made secure with the installation of appropriate controls on the door.
- 3.2.7 The development will operate, largely, cash-free. A time-delay safe will be installed to store any cash taken.

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- 3.2.8 A full CCTV and appropriate lighting systems will be installed.
 - 3.2.9 The edges of the site will be defined with in order to guide customers to approach the site the appropriate entry points.

3.3 Recommendations to improve security at the site and each unit

Cycle parking and cycle charging

- 3.3.1 Consider relocating the cycle provision to a more visible location where staff and all customers are able to monitor activity.

Commercial unit

- 3.3.2 Rather than two customer entrance doors, limit access to a single entrance door facing the forecourt.
- 3.3.3 Access controls should be fitted to the customer entrance doors to allow staff to control entry through the evening and at night. An audio unit should be fitted at the entrance door to allow visitors to communicate with staff prior to gaining entry. Staff should be capable of operating the locking mechanism of the entrance door from the service counter to allow *bona fide* customers entry and when leaving.
- 3.3.4 For security reasons and considering the amenity of neighbouring residents, consider restricting the use of charging points through the night to those most closely supervised by staff in the commercial unit. Also, for similar reasons, consider limiting the hours of opening of the commercial unit.
- 3.3.5 Consider employing a security guard to deter offenders entering the facility.
- 3.3.6 Restrict access to the western side of the unit by erecting a 2000mm high railings (with secure gate for access by staff).
- 3.3.7 Walls and roofs are sometimes targeted by offenders so all external walls should be sufficiently high to deter attempts at trespass. If necessary, the walls should be raised by adding a parapet or designed in such a way, e.g., with a rounded, non-grip coping or appropriate overhang, to deter offenders.
- 3.3.8 Other than the shopfront, walls should comprise block work, or other suitably secure material(s), to a height of around 2000mm.
- 3.3.9 All external doors, roof materials, windows, glazing and shutters should carry a security certification.
- 3.3.10 Clear, laminated glass should be used within the shopfront and any windows.
- 3.3.11 Roller shutters should be set within the fabric of the building. The shutters may be fitted internally or externally.
- 3.3.12 Window advertising will interfere with passive surveillance into and out of the unit, so should be avoided.
- 3.3.13 A secure management office should be included. It should include the time-delay safe, and lockers for staff to store their belongings.
- 3.3.14 The door to the management office/safe room should carry a security rating. The door should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure. A door viewer should be installed to allow staff to vet people prior to opening door.
- 3.3.15 The time-delay safe should meet the LPS 1163 standard.
- 3.3.16 A chute deposit safe should be considered for use at the till point.
- 3.3.17 Consider employing a security guard, visible on the 'shop' floor during trading hours.
- 3.3.18 Customer toilets can often give rise to crime and anti-social issue. Consequently, fittings should be robust to avoid damage or tampering, and concealed cisterns and pipework should be used.

CCTV inside the commercial unit and around site

- 3.3.19 The CCTV system should be installed with cameras capable of monitoring activity within the unit, the entrance doors, the back of house area, the vehicle and cycle charging areas, the car and cycle parking, and all elevations of the building. Recording equipment should be located within the management office or off-site by a suitable management company. Staff should be able to view images as they work at the service counter.

External areas of the development

- 3.3.20 Reconsider the installation of permanent, external, seating. Instead, use movable seating and store it within the commercial unit at night.
- 3.3.21 To prevent 'desire lines' forming, the Oldham Road and Reliance Street boundaries should be defined with a robust, 1000mm high railing rather than a knee-rail. Pedestrian routes should be clear and avoid passing between parked cars.
- 3.3.22 The proposed 1800mm high, timber, boundary fence to the car park is unlikely to sufficiently robust and should be replaced with a powder-coated, steel railing or fencing of similarly robust material.
- 3.3.23 For additional protection, external plant should be caged.
- 3.3.24 The lighting design should complement the CCTV system.
- 3.3.25 Bollards restricting vehicle access should be set in concrete foundations and robust enough to withstand accidental damage by careless motorists as well as hostile attacks by criminals.
- 3.3.26 Signs and markings should be placed strategically throughout the development to inform the public of the name of the development, deter customers from entering restricted areas, highlight pedestrian routes and, inform customers of the use of CCTV and ANPR on the site.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors, including the refuse store door, must be compliant with and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding entrance and exit doors may be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (RC2+) or a similar security standard.
- ☐ The door to the back of house should be fitted with an electronic lock, operated by a fob or electronic keypad.
- ☐ All external doors should be fitted with alarm contacts.
- ☐ Mail delivery should be considered.

4.2 Windows and shutters

- ☐ Where feasible, any opening windows must be compliant with and certified to LPS1175 SR2 or PAS 24 and fitted with key-operated, locks, and opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.
- ☐ If shutters are used, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required).
- ☐ Rapid deployment shutters linked to panic buttons should be considered for installation at the service counter to reduce the risk of robbery.

4.3 Glazing & building fabric

- ☐ Curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g., 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g., welded-steel mesh) behind or within any cladding in order to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable.

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- ☐ Roofing systems should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.
 - ☐ Rainwater pipes should set within the building fabric to prevent climbing to the roof.

4.4 Alarm systems

- ☐ Panic alarms buttons should be located at serving/till points, manager's office, for example.
- ☐ An intruder alarm should be installed to the commercial unit, and it should be linked to contacts on all external doors. PIR detectors should cover all rooms with windows.
- ☐ The alarm systems should be monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team). Panic alarm monitoring should include the ability to remotely monitor CCTV images and initiate an appropriate response.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all areas of the site. Fittings should produce 'white' light.

4.6 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should be installed. Externally, the system should be capable of monitoring all facades of the building, the charging points, cycle parking, plant area and site entrances. Internally, the system should be capable of monitoring the entrance doors, any other external doors, till points, seating area, circulation space, and the management office door.

4.7 Boundary fencing

- ☐ With the exception of the vehicle entrance and a pedestrian access, the Oldham Road and Reliance Street boundaries should be defined with a 1000mm high railing. The boundary with the car park should be secured with an 1800-2000mm high, powder-coated, steel railings or similar.
- ☐ Access to the rear of the commercial unit should be secured with 2000mm high railings and a secure gate.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In order to promote natural and electronic surveillance of the site, planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ Active, continuous management and maintenance of the development can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the development, this plan should focus on issues such as:
 - Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries;
 - Management of stock deliveries;
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas, if any;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g., alarm system, CCTV cameras & lighting;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti and litter; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.

- ☐ Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the development, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out. The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme' and Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved (see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
18.08.22	Lorna Lovatt, Lipton Plant Architects	Request for Crime Impact Statement
16.09.22		Site visited
23.09.22	Lorna Lovatt, Lipton Plant Architects	Additional plans received
06.10.22	Lorna Lovatt, Lipton Plant Architects	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following documents.

Drawing No.	Document Title	Date	Rev
	Be.EV Reliance Street Pre-Application	September 2022	B

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations in this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		06.10.22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk