



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 16 houses

AT Land at 43 Ardwick Green North, Ardwick, Manchester

FOR: The Church Inn (Ardwick) Ltd

VERSION A: 02.12.22

2022/0535/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We consider a residential scheme appropriate and are happy to support the proposals.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: the scheme design is of a high quality; there will be an appropriate number of houses on the site; the orientation the houses will focus activity in appropriate areas whilst also facilitating passive surveillance of the public realm and courtyard; the perimeter of the development will be appropriately secure; and, secure car parking has been included in the scheme.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in sections 3.3 and 4. The principal recommendations are:

- consider using high quality surfacing, lighting, distinctive sign and bespoke fencing to maintain the quality of the scheme;
- install appropriately secure gates to secure the pedestrian and vehicle entrances;
- install appropriate controls at the entry gates to restrict access to residents and *bona fide* visitors;
- install doors, locks, windows, glazing, and an intruder alarm that meet a recognised security standard; and,
- install lighting to all external doors and to illuminate entry gates.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

Adrian Murphy MRTPI

Consultant

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Contents


1	The Site and Surroundings.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood	
	2.2 Crime rate comparison	
	2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary, theft, criminal damage, and vehicle related crimes in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities	
	2.4 Environmental features of the site and surroundings that may influence crime patterns	
3	Development Appraisal	9
	3.1 The proposed development	
	3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals	
	3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme	
4	Physical Security	11
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Window frames	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.4 Intruder alarm	
	4.5 Boundary fencing and gates	
	4.6 Lighting	
	4.7 Meter cupboards	
	4.8 Downpipes	
5	Management & Maintenance	12
6	Construction	12
7	Secured by Design (SBD)	12

Appendix

A	Contact Register	13
B	Associated Documents.....	13
C	CIS Version History	13
D	Glossary	14

1 The Site and Surroundings

The application site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. Edged in red on the plan, the site is located on the northern side of Ardwick Green North, Ardwick, half a mile south of Piccadilly Station. Ardwick Green North is an unclassified road that connects Ardwick Green South, A6, to the north-west, with Higher Ardwick, to the south-east; there are no parking restrictions on either side of the road. The northern side of Ardwick Green North includes a range of business premises and residential properties that overlook Ardwick Green Park, a linear greenspace that is, largely, enclosed with railings and includes tree-lined pathways and a small playground. The Park acts as a buffer between Ardwick Green North and, heavily-trafficked, A6. Cotter Street defines the application site's eastern boundary. The northern end of the street and land to the east are dominated by houses and apartments. There is a vacant plot at the corner of Ardwick Green North and Cotter Street. A planning application to build apartments on this site was 'finally disposed of' in 2022. The St Thomas Centre, a grade II listed, former church, now a training and conference centre, and home to, and managed by, Greater Manchester Centre for Voluntary Organisations, is situated on the western side of the site. Nivin Street, with its narrow, single vehicle width carriageway, defines the application site's northern boundary. The former St Thomas Church Parish Room is situated opposite the site; it has been extended and converted to business space. The building is heavily fortified with security shutters, barred windows and doors, and barbed wire, includes a yard secured with steel palisade fencing and is monitored by CCTV cameras. Separated from the Parish Room by Randerson Street, the former St Thomas School building lies obliquely opposite the application site; it has also been converted to business space and is similarly heavily fortified.




Looking east along Ardwick Green North with the site on the left




A view across the site from Ardwick Green North towards apartments facing Cotter Street & houses facing Billing Avenue




Looking across the cleared site from Nivin Street towards Ardwick Green North




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The southern elevation and courtyard of the grade II listed, St Thomas Centre immediately west of the application site



The northern and eastern elevations of the St Thomas Centre and perimeter wall of the site



The St Thomas Parish Room is situated opposite the application site on the north side of Nivin Street

The application site extends to approximately 0.16 hectares. It is enclosed with varying lengths of welded-wire mesh, Herras™, concrete post and panel fencing, a section of brick wall and an unkempt hedge. In the recent past the site was occupied by two public houses, The Park Inn and The Church Inn. The Church Inn stood at the corner of Ardwick Green North and Cotter Street and was demolished in late 2015-early 2016. That part of the site was then enclosed with weld-mesh fencing and planted with grass seed. A planning application to erect a 3-storey building with basement to form 20 apartments with associated car & cycle parking and landscaped amenity areas was approved in 2014 but the consent was never implemented and has now expired. The Park Inn was located at the corner of Cotter Street and Nivin Street. It ceased trading as a pub and was converted to a single dwelling following the grant of planning consent in 2009. In the past couple of years, it has also been demolished. The western half of the application site now comprises an area of hardstanding, whilst the eastern part comprises a mixture of hardcore, the site of the Park Inn, and grass, the site of the Church Inn, both of which have been colonised by succession vegetation.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

The data below relates to crimes recorded between 1st October 2021 to 30th September 2022.



All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Crimes involving the use or threat of violence	Theft (including shoplifting)	Robbery	Drug related offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
16	29	54	338	265	33	20	62	21	7


- 2.1.1 There were 857 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is very high but is about average for an edge of city centre neighbourhood within the Manchester Division.
- 2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:
- the use, or threat, of violence - 39%
 - theft - 32%
 - vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 10%
 - criminal damage – 6%.
 - burglary - 5%
- 2.1.3 Typically, crimes involving the use or threat of violence are most common in many neighbourhoods, however, the percentage of violent crimes, whilst still the most common crime, is much lower than usual. The number of thefts and vehicle-related crimes are high; theft is significantly higher.
- 2.1.4 The top 5 streets/places for recorded crime were:
1. Travis Street (the Warehouse Project) - 122 crimes
 2. Baring Street – 56 crimes
 3. Ardwick Green (North & South) – 49 crimes
 4. Hyde Road – 33 crimes
 5. Stockport Road - 32 crimes.
- 2.1.5 There were 18 offences committed on Ardwick Green North and the adjacent park, 2 on Cotter Street and 1 on Nivin Street. Crimes involving the use or threat of violence were most common followed by robbery, theft, and drug offences.
- 2.1.6 In the wider neighbourhood, incidents of theft were concentrated at licensed premises particularly at the Warehouse project on Travis Street and Mayfield Depot on Fairfield Street, both venues are north of the site. Vehicle-related offences were spread around the area analysed but there is something of a concentration around the application site. Crime prevention notices have been posted on lampposts on Ardwick Green North advising motorists that car thieves operate in the area. There was no particular concentration of residential burglary, but burglary of commercial premises was most common around Temperance Street on the eastern edge of the area analysed. Incidents of criminal damage were more common on the Brunswick estate to the west of Ardwick Green South.

Domestic burglary

There were 16 burglaries committed within the neighbourhood during the period analysed. The burglary rate is around the national average and lower than the City of Manchester average.





- 2.1.7 The risk of domestic burglary is greater during the early part of the week and on Friday. The most common times for offences to be committed are the middle of the late afternoon and through the night.



- 2.1.8 In 8 cases of burglary in this neighbourhood, offenders were likely to have entered a property via an unlocked door or window. In an unusually low number of incidents (3), the offender forced a door. There were 2 incidents where entry was gained via a window.

Vehicle Crime





- 2.1.9 The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is consistently high throughout the week (except Monday). Offences are most often carried out during the afternoon and into the evening. The presence of the O2 Apollo in the neighbourhood, attracting concert-going motorists, unfamiliar with the neighbourhood parking in vulnerable locations, is a factor in the high number of offences occurring.

2.2 Crime rate comparison



Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **25% lower** than the rate for Manchester **4% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **1% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **16% higher** than the rate for Manchester, **58% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **201% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.



2.2.3 The rate of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **30% higher** than the Manchester rate, **71% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **107% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.4 The rate of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **109% higher** than the Manchester rate, **244% higher** than the Greater Manchester rate and **318% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing burglary, theft, criminal damage, and vehicle related crimes in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors to houses should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- where this can be balanced with the design of a development and its ability to fit the context of the local area, defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e., a

small, front garden enclosed with a suitably high fence. Separation of the passing public from a property can also help to reduce the risk of criminal damage; and,

- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors.

2.3.2 Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations;
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping, and damage to fencing.

2.3.3 Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry or commit criminal damage

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development;
- windows should be fitted with locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to gardens should be restricted by installing appropriately high fencing and locking gates.

2.3.4 Vehicles were targeted when parked on driveways, in unsecured car parks or on the 'street'

To minimise the risk of vehicle-related crime:

- car parking should be located within the boundaries of the property, within an area that is both very secure and well overlooked by residents or monitored by an effective CCTV system.

2.3.5 Offenders have stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting bicycles:

- a cycle store or a wall/floor anchor should be provided; and,
- rear garden gates should be robust, tall, self-closing and self-locking.

2.3.6 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- rear garden boundaries should avoid being exposed to the public realm;
- communal pathways providing access to rear gardens should be secured with self-closing, self-locking gates; and,
- fencing should be especially robust when unavoidably exposed to the public realm.

2.3.7 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure boundary should be erected around the site;
- access should be restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate the site and record activity;
- at the end of the working day, plant and machinery should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site; and,

- plant and machinery should be fitted with a tracking device.

2.4 Environmental features of the site and surroundings that may influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect a potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood with a low rate of domestic burglary;
- the site is currently enclosed with arrange of fencing styles, which help to restrict access to offenders who might be intent on fly-tipping or other anti-social or criminal acts;
- there is little on the site to attract offenders;
- there is some, limited, supervision of the site from intermittent passing traffic and pedestrians, from neighbouring houses and business premises, and from users of Ardwick Green Park; and,
- the quality of the local environment around the site is generally good. When considering certain categories of crime, offenders tend to avoid well-maintained places; they may consider that their actions will be challenged by local residents.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- whilst the site is located in a neighbourhood with a moderate volume of domestic burglary, offenders engaged in robbery and vehicle-related crime are active in this neighbourhood;
- sites that do not benefit from regular supervision by interested parties can become focal points for anti-social behaviour, which can affect the quality of life of neighbouring residents and businesses;
- the perimeter fencing is, in places, not especially secure; and,
- during the construction phase of any development, the presence of the site compound can be an attraction for offenders, who may also target property in the vicinity of the compound.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

3.1.1 Full planning application is sought for the erection of 16 townhouses across two blocks that are separated by a central parking area and landscaping. The dwelling layouts are a contemporary take on the traditional, single-aspect, back-to-back housing.

3.1.2 Four houses will face Ardwick Green North, four will face Nivin Street and the remaining eight will face onto a central courtyard, which will be dominated by parking spaces for all of the houses - 16 spaces in total. The eastern, Cotter Street, side of the courtyard will be secured with 2000mm high railings, with vehicle gates and a pedestrian gate. The vehicle gates will be automated.

3.1.3 Houses facing Ardwick Green North and three of the four houses facing Nivin Street will have a small front garden defined with a 900mm high railing. The site's boundary with the St Thomas Centre is currently defined with a brick wall around 1500mm high. The height of this boundary will be raised to

2000mm with the addition of 500mm railings. Pedestrian gates, fitted with self-closing mechanisms and electronic locks, will be erected on the, western, St Thomas Centre side of the site to allow residents access to the courtyard from both Nivin Street and Ardwick Green North. These gates will also provide a more convenient access to the communal bin store, which will be located at the western edge of the courtyard for residents of the 'outward' facing houses.

3.1.4 Each house will have a single entrance door, living space, three bedrooms, a cycle store (within the house located just inside the front door), a terrace at second floor level. The outward facing houses will also have the benefit of the small front garden. The houses on plots 04, 05 and 13 will have an additional, private, external terrace at ground level, each accessed by a second door on the western elevation.

3.1.5 The peripheral areas of the courtyard will be landscaped.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposals

3.2.1 A residential development is an appropriate use for the site given the surrounding land uses and previous consents for residential uses.

3.2.2 The proposals will result in the redevelopment of land which, if it remains unused may attract criminal and anti-social activity, for example, fly-tipping, which may affect the quality of life of nearby residents and businesses.

3.2.3 The secure courtyard will restrict access to the courtyard facing houses and the car park to residents and *bona fide* visitors only.

3.2.4 All but three of the houses will have only one external door. Doors are generally the favoured means of breaking and entering a house, particularly those on secluded, rear elevations.

3.2.5 The security of the site's perimeter has been addressed by proposals to embellish the western boundary with 500mm railings, inclusion of 2000mm high gates and railings to secure the pathways along the western side of the building, and similar arrangements to secure the courtyard.

3.2.6 There are a significant number of houses within the development, which increases the likelihood of residents of some of the properties being present throughout the day. The presence of residents or even just visible signs of people present - cars in the courtyard, lights on, external lighting on at entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.

3.2.7 The proposed layout of the dwellings with windows and terraces overlooking the public realm and courtyard will provide, much needed, passive surveillance opportunities over the adjacent streets, the park and business premises opposite. The design of the scheme will also help to animate both Ardwick Green North, Cotter Street and Nivin Street. Activity will also be generated on Cotter Street by the comings and goings of residents of the houses facing the courtyard as well as motorists driving in and out of the courtyard car park.

3.2.8 In order to generate activity and facilitate passive surveillance over this part of the street, it may have been prudent for two or more houses to face onto Cotter Street. However, it is considered that the absence of defensible space to the Cotter Street facing houses, which often results in residents closing blinds or curtains to maintain privacy and prevent their possessions being visible to passers-by, and the activity generated by having the access into the courtyard on this boundary, is a suitable arrangement from a crime prevention perspective for this edge of the site. The presence of blank gable walls onto Cotter Street at ground level is a necessary consequence of this arrangement, however, the design team have created interest and animation to these elevations with the inclusion of intricate brickwork, windows at upper floor level and views of the street from the upper-floor terraces.

3.2.9 Defensible space is included on the street facing elevations.

3.2.10 The provision of secure courtyard parking spaces will reduce the risk of vehicles being targeted by offenders.

3.2.11 Private and communal, albeit very limited, amenity space has been included in the scheme. The inclusion of social spaces provides an opportunity for residents to meet and build relationships, which can help to develop a sense of community within the scheme and deters crime and anti-social behaviour.

3.2.12 A refuse store has been provided in a secure part of the site.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the scheme

THE SITE

Courtyard/streetscape

- 3.3.1 In order to emphasise ownership and encourage maintenance of the courtyard and entrance to it, the application of a high-quality shared spaces rather than a standard engineering solution will emphasise 'territoriality', promote 'ownership' of the space amongst residents, and encourage socialising – all of which adds to the overall supervision of the development and deters crime. We suggest the inclusion of such measures as high-quality surfacing (stone setts or coloured tarmac), distinctive signs, lighting and bespoke fencing.

Vehicle gates

- 3.3.2 The gates securing the vehicle entrance should be automated and controlled using a residents' fob. Care taken to ensure that the gates close promptly but safely as vehicles come and go.

Pedestrian gates

- 3.3.3 The gates securing the pedestrian entrances on Cotter Street, Ardwick Green North and Nivin Street should be fitted with an electronic lock (that has a holding force of around 4500 Newtons) that can be activated by a residents' fob. The gates should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.
- 3.3.4 An intercom should be installed at the Cotter Street gate to allow residents to identify and converse with visitors, including delivery staff. Residents should be able to activate the locking mechanism of the gate to allow *bona fide* visitors entry.
- 3.3.5 The Ardwick Green North and Nivin Street gates should be used by residents only and signs directing visitors to the Cotter Street gate should be considered.

HOUSES

House security

- 3.3.6 Each house should be fitted with a security-rated entrance door, with number, door viewer and opening limiter. Ground level, terrace access, doors should also be security-rated.
- 3.3.7 The ground floor windows of each house should be security-rated, fitted with key-operable locks, and have opening restrictors fitted. Glazing in all external doors and all accessible windows should include laminate glass.
- 3.3.8 Fit an intruder alarm to each house.
- 3.3.9 Install a dusk-to-dawn light at all external doors of each house and to illuminate the entry gates.

4 Physical Security

The following specification should be adopted, which meets the security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Entrance doors (primary and secondary) should all be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS 202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Primary entrance doors should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key when closed.
- ☐ Primary entrance doors should have fixed sidelights or a door viewer, as well as an opening limiter fitted, so that residents can identify visitors prior to opening the door fully.
- ☐ Letter plates should meet the Door Hardware Federation's Technical Standard 008 (TS 008), be fitted with deflector plate, and be located a minimum of 400mm away from the internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Each house should be clearly numbered.

4.2 Window frames

- ☐ Ground floor windows of the houses should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within, and surrounding, all external doors and all ground floor windows of the houses should incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356.

4.4 Intruder alarm

- ☐ It is good practice to fit an alarm to each house. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all external doors, with PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms that have windows.

4.5 Boundary fencing and gates

- ☐ The arrangements set out on the Proposed Boundary Treatment Plan and Boundary Treatment Detail are ideal in terms of securing the perimeter of the development. Together with measures to secure the gates and fitting of access controls set out in section 3.3.2-3.3.4, the perimeter of the development should be secured in accordance with these plans.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting must be provided to all external doors of all houses. Lamps should produce a 'white' light and be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.

4.7 Meter cupboards

- ☐ Unless smart meters are installed, meters should be located in ground level boxes to the front of each house.

4.8 Downpipes

- ☐ Wherever possible, downpipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the brickwork to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A plan should be drawn up to address maintenance issues associated the access controls, gates, fencing landscaped areas within the site.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in and out.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout, and construction stages of homes and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
27.10.22	Ryan Millar, CODA Studios	Request for Crime Impact Statement
27.11.22		Site visited
28.11.22	Ryan Millar, CODA Studios	Revised plans received
29.11.22	Ryan Millar, CODA Studios	Additional plans received
02.12.22	Ryan Millar, CODA Studios	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
2565-CDA-00-SL-DR-A-0500	Proposed Site Layout	19/10/22	H
2565-CDA-00-SL-DR-A-0501	Site and Location Plan	25/10/22	
2565-CDA-00-SL-DR-A-0504	Proposed Boundary Treatments Plan	03/11/22	C
2565-CDA-00-SL-DR-A-0505	Proposed Access and Waste Management Plan	04/11/22	D
2565-CDA-01-XX-DR-A-0600	Proposed Floor Plans	19/10/22	E
2565-CDA-01-XX-DR-A-0601	HT01 & HT02 Typical Layout Plans	24/10/22	
2565-CDA-01-XX-DR-A-0700	Proposed Elevations – Sheet 01	19/10/22	G
2565-CDA-01-XX-DR-A-0701	Proposed Elevations – Sheet 02	19/10/22	G
2565-CDA-01-XX-DR-A-0702	Façade Study – East and West Elevation	26/10/22	
2565-CDA-01-XX-DR-A-0703	Façade Study – South Elevation	26/10/22	
2565-CDA-01-XX-DR-A-2600	Proposed Boundary Treatment Details	04/11/22	B
	Views 01, 02 & 04		

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made in this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		02.12.22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS202 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk