



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 50 apartments
AT Manchester Road, Chorlton, Manchester

FOR: Rowlinson Construction Ltd

VERSION A: 30.03.23

2022/0616/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

We welcome the redevelopment of the site and consider a residential scheme appropriate.

From a crime prevention perspective, the positive features of the development include: it is well designed; a suitable amount of defensible space has been included around the development; with appropriate walls, fencing and gates, there will be a clear distinction between public, semi-private and private space; entrance doors, windows and balconies facilitate supervision across the development and of the public realm; shared, indoor and outdoor amenity space has been included in the scheme; and, secure, car and cycle/scooter parking have been included.

Advice is included in the report, which we consider will enhance security of the development and this set out in section 3.3. The recommendations are summarised as follows:

- Secured by Design accredited doors and window frames and laminate glass should be used in construction;
- Devise an access control strategy that restricts access to the development to residents and their *bona fide* visitors;
- install appropriately high fencing to secure all boundaries of the development;
- install motorised vehicle gates activated by a residents' fob to access the car park;
- invest in high quality surfacing to the car park access, pathways and car park;
- include measures to prevent anti-social parking on the edges of the car park;
- install appropriate lighting to the development, particularly to external doors, the car park, cycle/scooter and bin stores, and pathways;
- consider installing a modest CCTV system;
- arrangements for mail delivery should not compromise the security of the mail or the apartments; and,
- ensure the cycle/scooter store is very secure.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

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Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The application site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The site, edged in red, is located on the eastern side of Manchester Road, on the southern edge of Chorlton district centre. Manchester Road, B5217, the principal, north-south route through the neighbourhood, is well-trafficked and lined with mature trees. It connects Chorlton district centre south of the application site to Old Trafford to the north. There are parking restrictions on Manchester Road in the immediate vicinity of the site restricting parking between business hours from Monday to Saturday and no parking at all either side of the pelican crossing that is located next to the south-western corner of the site. Pedestrian guardrails along the edge of the footpath in front of the former leisure centre, direct pedestrians towards the pelican crossing. Immediately north of the site, the pipework of the Thirlmere Aqueduct emerges from below ground to cross over the Manchester-to-Manchester Airport Metrolink line situated within a cutting alongside the site's eastern boundary, before being heading underground again on the eastern side of the tracks. The aqueduct is secured behind tall steel-palisade fencing and locked gates. Occupying sizeable premises, the Unicorn grocery store is situated to the south of the site. A timber enclosure, presumably used for storage of goods or waste associated with the store separates the store from the application site. The western side of Manchester Road includes terraces of two-three store buildings, the ground floors of which are in commercial use, whilst the upper floors of most premises appear to be in residential use. The commercial uses include bars, restaurants, retail premises and hot food take-aways. Immediately west of Manchester Road, there are several residential streets comprising terraced housing, often congested with parked cars due to the general lack of off-street parking.


Looking south along Manchester Road with the site on the right and commercial premises opposite



The vacant, former Chorlton Leisure Centre stands vacant on the central and southern part of the application site




The northern part of the site comprises hardstanding enclosed with high fencing



The elevated, ashlar and brickwork, main entrance to the Leisure Centre facing Manchester Road



A grocery store occupies the site immediately south of the site



Secured with steel-palisade railings and gates, the Thirlmere Aqueduct traverses the northern edge of the site



The application site is trapezoid in shape and measures approximately 0.27 hectares. The vacant, former Chorlton Leisure Centre occupies most of the southern and central parts of the site. It is a largely brick-built, part single, part two-storey (with basement), flat roof building dating from the 1930's. The principal entrances (male and female doors) to the building are located centrally on the Manchester Road façade. There are several other minor doors at ground and basement level also on the Manchester Road facing elevation. At the rear, eastern side, of the site, there is a large, steel container, whilst a steel, retaining structure defines the boundary with the Metrolink line. Between the leisure centre and the Metrolink line, there is also a narrow strip of land, which is overgrown with shrubs. Formerly used for car parking, the northern part is made up of hardstanding, which is beginning to be colonised by simple plants. This eastern and western side of this part of the site is enclosed with panels of steel-palisade and welded-wire, mesh fencing. The northern boundary is defined by a dark, engineering brick, wall constructed to protect the Thirlmere Aqueduct. The southern boundary of the site is secured by a part of Unicorn grocers building and a timber fence that has been embellished with razor wire to deter intruders. Perforated steel panels have been installed to restrict entry to the building whilst anti-climb measures have been added to the roofline at the rear of the building. The leisure centre, particularly the rear elevation, has been daubed with graffiti.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below relates to crimes recorded between 1st December 2021 to 30th November 2022.

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Crimes involving the use or threat of violence	Theft (including shoplifting)	Robbery	Drug related offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
21	14	42	321	227	15	19	24	11	14

2.1.1 There were 716 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is well above the average for a neighbourhood within Manchester but not significantly greater than neighbourhoods which lie within a district centre with a significant retail and food and beverage offer.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 45%
- theft - 32%
- vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 6%
- criminal damage – 6%
- burglary - 5%.

2.1.3 Typically, crimes involving the use or threat of violence are usually the most common in any given neighbourhood. The percentage of violent crimes in this part of Whalley Range is similar to other inner-city neighbourhoods. In many residential areas, recorded incidents of burglary, vehicle crime, criminal damage and theft tend to occur at a similar volume. In this instance, vehicle-related crime, theft and criminal damage are a little more common than incidents of burglary.



2.1.4 The top 5 streets/places for recorded crime were:

1. Wilbraham Road - 157 crimes
2. Manchester Road - 110 crimes
3. Chorlton Place – 92 crimes
4. Upper Chorlton Road – 24 crimes
5. Albany Road – 21 crimes.


2.1.5 Looking at crimes recorded on Manchester Road, crimes involving the use or threat of violence made up half of all of the total with theft at 20%, burglary at 12% and criminal damage 9%. Business premises were targeted in two thirds of the burglaries. A petrol filling station was the principal focal point for crime on Manchester Road. Elsewhere the supermarket on Wilbraham Road and the retail premises with Chorlton Square were the main hotspots for crime, in both cases theft and shoplifting were most common.

Domestic burglary

2.1.6 There were 21 burglaries committed within the neighbourhood during the period analysed. The burglary rate is a much lower than the City of Manchester average for neighbourhoods of the same size and also lower than rates across the conurbation and the country. Properties on Manchester Road, Manley Road and Buckingham Road were most commonly targeted. Houses were targeted twice as often as flats.





- 2.1.7 The risk of domestic burglary is greater at the end of the week. Offences were committed through the night or in the late afternoon and early evening.



- 2.1.8 In 9 of the 21 cases of burglary in this neighbourhood, offenders have targeted the front and rear doors of homes as a means to gain entry - using force to a door open or a hand tool to damage the lock. There were 4 incidents where entry was gained via a window. There were a further 6 burglaries where offenders were likely to have entered a property via an unlocked door or window, and 2 incidents where the offender targeted a garden shed.

Vehicle crime





- 2.1.9 The risk of vehicle crime is very low but the risk rises on Monday, Saturday and Sunday, and through the night.



2.2 Crime rate comparison

Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester, and England & Wales

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **50% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **36% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **35% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of wounding per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **41% lower** than the rate for Manchester, **20% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate but **53% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.



- 2.2.3 The rate of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **49% lower** than the Manchester rate, **33% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **19% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings in the neighbourhood around the site is **47% lower** than the Manchester rate, **12% lower** than the Greater Manchester rate and **7% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing crime at residential property in Manchester, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

2.3.1 Communal entrance doors and apartment doors were targeted when left unsecured by residents.

To minimise the risk of offenders tailgating through communal doors or entering apartments through unsecured doors:

- communal entry doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure;
- install a secondary set of secure doors (airlock/secure lobby), also self-closing and self-locking;

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- lifts should be operated by an access control system;
 - install CCTV cameras in the entrance lobby;
 - employ a concierge; and,
 - apartment doors should be self-closing with a thumb turn lock on the inner side that meets fire regulations.

2.3.2 Doors and windows have been forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors and windows:

- all external doors and apartment entry doors, and all accessible windows, should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors and windows are very difficult to force open;
- external entrance and means of escape doors should be readily visible from the street or surroundings - offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- restrict access to secluded elevations with appropriately high and robust fencing;
- all external doors should be illuminated with dusk-to-dawn lighting. Light suggests property is occupied and may deter offenders from targeting it. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed; and,
- CCTV should be considered to record activity within and around exterior of the building.

2.3.3 Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry or commit criminal damage

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground or accessible floors of the development; and,
- any accessible windows should be fitted with locks and opening restrictors.

2.3.4 Offenders have stolen bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting bicycles:

- a cycle store should be provided within a secure part of the site;
- CCTV should monitor activity in and around cycle stores; and,
- PIR lighting should be installed to illuminate the cycle store.

2.3.5 Vehicles were targeted when parked in unsecured car parks or on the 'street'

To minimise the risk of vehicle-related crime:

- car parking should be located within the boundaries of the development, within an area that is secure and overlooked by residents or monitored by an effective CCTV system. Consideration may be given to installing automatic vehicle gates and fencing around the car parks.

2.3.6 Offenders have damaged boundary fencing

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting fencing:

- fence panels should be especially robust when exposed to the public realm.

2.3.7 Theft of plant and machinery, and criminal damage during the construction period.

To minimise the risk of offenders targeting the construction site:

- a secure hoarding should be erected around the site with access restricted to contractors and authorised visitors;
- security staff should patrol the site or visit during non-working hours;
- lighting and CCTV should be installed to illuminate the site and record activity; and,
- plant and machinery should be fitted with tracking devices, and, at the end of the working day, it should be arranged to prevent forced access onto the site and to minimise the risk of theft.

2.4 Environmental features of the site and surroundings that may influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- there is a regular flow of traffic and pedestrians along Manchester Road throughout the day and into the evening. Offenders are less likely to carry out certain types of crime, e.g., burglary and criminal damage, when there is a good prospect of their acts being witnessed by passers-by;
- the pelican crossing adjacent to the north-eastern corner of the site helps to generate activity adding to the overall surveillance of the site;
- the presence of commercial establishments in the vicinity of the site also generates activity and adds to the overall site surveillance;
- the site and Manchester Road are overlooked by the residents of the flats above the shops opposite, and they may intervene if they see or hear anything unusual;
- the site has been secured with the addition of high, welded-wire mesh fencing, that allows views into the site from Manchester Road, and of perforated-steel sheets that restrict access into the building;
- being defined by the Metrolink lines and the Thirlmere Aqueduct, the eastern and southern boundaries of the site are very secure;
- access along part of the site's northern boundary is restricted by the presence of the adjacent Unicorn grocery store; and,
- there are numerous, mature, street trees along Manchester Road. Research suggests that the presence of street trees is thought to calm traffic speeds, encourage walking, which increases street surveillance and can deter criminal activity, and reduce mental fatigue, which is sometimes a precursor to violent crime.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- there is a high level of crime in the neighbourhood throughout the day and night, indicating that offenders are active in the area. Nearby retail premises act as focal points for crime, drawing criminals into the area who may then target people or property nearby;
- the site is very visible from Manchester Road, a well-trafficked route. Offenders are likely to notice the development as it emerges from early in the construction phase, and be aware of, and potentially exploit, any criminal opportunities;
- whilst effort is required to overcome the site's boundary fencing, clearly offenders have entered the site and scrawled graffiti on all aspects of the building at ground and first floor level. The physical deterioration of the buildings and the site can sometimes encourage further crimes to be committed as offenders are drawn to the site and who also may then target nearby properties or people; and,
- the sight of graffiti, decaying boundary walls, and boarded-up doors and windows on the site can invoke feelings of insecurity in passers-by.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development involves:

- demolition of the former leisure centre
- clearance of the vegetation at the rear of the site and the boundary fencing to Manchester Road site
- erection of an open, V-shaped, residential building
- construction of a vehicle access onto Manchester Road
- setting out a residents' car park and residents' amenity spaces
- retention of the mature trees on Manchester Road in front of the development

3.1.2 Set out as two, rectangular, blocks, connected at the upper levels by walkways that allow access to the apartment entrance doors from a central core, the proposed building will be five-storeys high and faced in brick. It will contain fifty apartments - a mix of 32no. one-bedroom and 18no. two-bedroom dwellings. Located centrally on the site, with a 2-3metre setback from both the eastern and western boundaries, and occupying around 50% of the site area, the longer of the two blocks will address Manchester Road. The smaller block will be located parallel to the eastern, Metrolink, boundary. Serving both blocks, the residents' communal entrance door and lobby will located in the longer block facing Manchester Road. Residents and visitors will pass through the lobby into a central courtyard from which the ground floor apartments can be accessed; access to the walkways serving the upper floors is gained via the stand-alone, lift and stair core, located within the courtyard.

3.1.3 In addition to the communal entrance door and lobby, the ground floor of the Manchester Road facing block will include three apartments, a community room, a combined bike/residents' mobility scooter store, refuse store, and a plant room. Access to the community room and the bike/scooter store can be gained from within the entrance lobby. The bin store, for the use of residents of both blocks, two sets of doors, one set opening onto Manchester Road and the other pair facing the courtyard. The entrance doors to all ground floor apartments of both blocks will face the courtyard. The upper floors of the block will each have six apartments per floor.

3.1.4 On the ground floor of the residential block on the eastern edge of the site, there will be a residents' lounge, accessed solely from the courtyard, and four apartments. The upper floors will each accommodate five apartments.

3.1.5 The plans indicate that all upper floor apartments of both blocks will have the benefit of a balcony, with balconies located on all outward facing aspects of the development.

3.1.6 Externally, there will be a 20-space car park laid out at the southern end of the site, with access from Manchester Road. The access will be secured with tall fencing and vehicle gate. A small area of amenity space will be introduced at the northern end of the site. The space between the blocks and the eastern and western boundaries will be landscaped. Existing street trees will be retained, and additional tree s planted around the periphery of the site where feasible.

3.2 Features of the proposals that promote security

3.2.1 The proposals will result in the redevelopment of a site which contributes little to the vitality of the district centre and is prone to minor acts of criminal and anti-social behaviour.

3.2.2 A residential development seems to be an appropriate use for the site.

3.2.3 The proposals will result in the redevelopment of a site which, if it continues to remain vacant, may attract added abuse and lead to a deterioration of the fabric of the building, posing a health and safety risk as well as a risk of continuing to attract criminals to the site. Such circumstances will further affect the quality of life of local residents, adversely impact of the appearance of the local environment and security of neighbouring land and premises.

3.2.4 The development is well-designed and already has a strong identity and sense of place, such places tend to have experience less crime or anti-social issues than poorly designed developments.

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- 3.2.5 The proposed development will contribute to the increase in the resident population in the heart of Chorlton, which will ultimately result in a more vibrant neighbourhood, provide a boost to local shops and services, and generate activity throughout the day and into the evening
- 3.2.6 Mosscafe St Vincents have an excellent record in the provision, and maintenance, of good quality, residential schemes.
- 3.2.7 An appropriate number of apartments are proposed in the development, which should make it easier for residents to become familiar with their neighbours and distinguish between residents and non-residents as they come and go, positively influencing community safety in and around the development. There will be a sufficient number of apartments to provide a good prospect of at least some residents being present throughout the day, and particularly at night and at the weekend.
- 3.2.8 I understand that the development will be targeted at people over the age of 55. It is more likely that older residents will develop a sense of neighbourliness, with anti-social behaviours moderated and neighbours likely to interact, assume 'ownership' and actively supervise the shared spaces within the development. The provision of shared facilities for residents, i.e., the lounge, community room and outdoor amenity space will encourage interaction and help build relationships and a sense of community, which can help to maintain social and environmental standards, as well as deter offenders. If the wider community are invited to use the facility, the inclusion of a community room can broaden the sense of neighbourliness to others living in the area.
- 3.2.9 The building is set back from the Manchester Road boundary. The inclusion of defensible space between passers-by and property reduces the risk of some petty crimes, such as criminal damage and theft, and anti-social behaviours, such as noise disturbance, banging on windows, privacy issues at ground level, that routinely affect developments in built-up areas that lack such a buffer.
- 3.2.10 The proposed, communal entrance to the main building is suitably located, easily located by legitimate visitors and delivery staff. A secure lobby can be created with the installation of access controls to the external and internal doors to reduce the risk of offenders tailgating residents or *bona fide* visitors and delivery staff. The vehicle access is also suitably located on Manchester Road.
- 3.2.11 The orientation of the longer of the two blocks, with windows, including balconies, of routinely occupied rooms overlooking the approaches to the building and public realm, will facilitate natural surveillance. Additionally, the inclusion of outdoor amenity space will encourage residents outdoors and further enhance passive surveillance across parts of the site and Manchester Road.
- 3.2.12 The proposed landscaping and retention and management of trees will help to improve the environmental quality of the neighbourhood. Well-maintained verdant environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.13 The provision of convenient, off-street-parking reduces the risk of the vehicles of residents being targeted by offenders. The number of spaces seems adequate for a development of this size and located in an area with good access to shops, services and public transport.
- 3.2.14 A cycle/scooter store and a refuse store are included.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

Deterring unwanted visitors to the site

- 3.3.1 To distinguish between public and private space, and to help preserve residents' privacy as well as reducing the risk of crime and anti-social behaviour affecting the development, the edges of the site should be defined with appropriate fencing, gates signage, and surface treatment of the vehicle access. We recommend the following:
- the Manchester Road boundary should be defined with 1500mm high, railings with a pointed, e.g., fleur de lys, finish to deter intruders, the railings should return to the communal entrance door to restrict access along the front of the building;
 - the Metrolink boundary should be secured with 2000mm high railings or welded-wire mesh fencing;
 - the boundary wall at the northern end of the site should be retained;
 - the southern boundary should be defined with a 2500mm high, timber, screen fence;

- the vehicle access to the car park should be secured with 2000mm high, motorised, vehicle gate with complementary railings to secure the opening
- to distinguish the private nature of the site, the access to the car park (or at least the initial part of it, adjacent to the entrance) should be surfaced with a coloured or textured surface that distinguishes it from the public highway; and,
- signs indicating the name of the development should be erected at the vehicle and pedestrian entrances.

Controlling access into the development

- 3.3.2 The communal entrance door must be security-rated, self-closing and lock upon closure. The door should be secured with an electrically operated, multi-point lock (included in its certification), activated with a residents' fob. An audio-visual unit with a link to each apartment accessed via this door should be fitted, so that when visitors call, residents can vet them prior to releasing the lock from within their apartment, allowing access into the lobby to *bona fide* visitors only.
- 3.3.3 The inner lobby door should be fitted with an electronic lock that is activated with a residents' fob.
- 3.3.4 The lift should be activated by residents' fob.
- 3.3.5 The door into the stair core at ground level should be fitted with an electronic lock that is activated by residents' fob.
- 3.3.6 The door securing the residents' lounge and the doors to the community room should also be security-rated and fitted with electronic locks that form part of their security certification

Apartment security

- 3.3.7 Each apartment should be fitted with a security-rated entrance door with door viewer and opening limiter.
- 3.3.8 Any garden access doors of the ground floor apartments must also be security-rated.
- 3.3.9 The window frames of ground floor apartments, and those accessible from the elevated walkways, should be security-rated and fitted with key-operable locks and opening restrictors.
- 3.3.10 Glazing in all external doors, including apartment entrance doors, and all accessible windows should include laminate glass.
- 3.3.11 The developer should consider installing an intruder alarm to each apartment.

Mail delivery

- 3.3.12 So that delivery staff do not need to enter the courtyard, individual, robust, and lockable, postal boxes for each apartment should be mounted on the wall within the lobby.

High-quality external space

- 3.3.13 Rather than basic tarmac, the application of high-quality treatments, e.g., coloured tarmac or stone setts is recommended for the courtyard and parking bays and pathways within the site. The edges of the access and footpaths should be defined with bollards or 900mm high railings to prevent over-running by vehicles and anti-social parking.
- 3.3.14 The parking bays should be clearly defined - with stone setts, ideally.
- 3.3.15 Good quality, dusk-to-dawn, lighting should illuminate all external doors, the car park, pathways and the vehicle access gate.
- 3.3.16 PIR activated lighting should illuminate cycle/scooter and bin stores.
- 3.3.17 To encourage use of the amenity space by residents, it should be designed to a very high standard.
- 3.3.18 Signs should be mounted within the car park informing motorists of the sanctions for unauthorised parking.

Cycle/scooter store

- 3.3.19 The door to the cycle/scooter store should be security-rated and fitted with an electronic lock with a holding force of around 4500 Newton. The lock should be operated by a residents' fob/card, and the door should be self-closing and locks securely upon closure.

3.3.20 Securely anchored, Sheffield stands should be installed within the cycle store.

Refuse store

3.3.21 The street facing doors to the refuse store should be security-certified and be self-closing and self-locking. Panic hardware is acceptable on the inner side of these doors, if required.

3.3.22 The internal doors should be fitted with an electronic lock with a fob required to access or leave the store via these doors.

Plant/meter rooms

3.3.23 The plant/meter rooms should be fitted with FD-30 rated doors, fitted with a BS3621, key-operated, mechanical lock.

CCTV

3.3.24 A proportionate CCTV system should be installed that is capable of monitoring activity in and around the development, particularly the communal entrance door, entrance lobby and mailboxes, doors to the residents' lounge and community room, the cycle/scooter, car park and the vehicle gates.

4 Physical Security Measures

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ The communal entrance doors should be:
 - compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2;
 - include a multi-point electronic lock, (which is an integral part of the certification), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system; and,
 - self-closing and lock automatically on closure.
- ☐ An audio-visual, unit should be located at the communal entrance door to allow visitors to communicate with residents.
- ☐ Residents should have a handset in their apartment to speak to (and view) visitors.
- ☐ Residents should be able to operate the communal entry door locking mechanism remotely from within their apartment to allow *bona fide* visitors entry into the lobby.
- ☐ The inner lobby door should be FD30-rated and fitted with a fob-activated, electronic lock.
- ☐ The following doors should also be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2:
 - apartment entrance doors
 - ground floor garden access doors.
 - community room entrance doors
 - residents' lounge entrance door
 - cycle/scooter store entrance door
 - refuse store, street-facing doors.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors should include a door viewer.
- ☐ A chain, or similar opening limiter, should be fitted to apartment entrance doors.
- ☐ Each apartment should be clearly numbered.

4.2 Window frames

- ☐ Window frames of ground floor apartments and those accessible from the elevated walkways, and of the residents' lounge and community room, must be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24, be fitted with key-operated locks, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limiting opening to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing within all external doors, and all ground floor and walkway level windows, must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356.

4.4 Downpipes

- ☐ Wherever possible, downpipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the brickwork to prevent climbing to upper floor balconies or windows.

4.5 Intruder alarm

- ☐ We advise fitting an intruder alarm to each apartment, particularly those on ground floors. The alarm should be linked to contacts on all external doors with PIR detectors covering all lower and upper ground floor rooms that have windows.

4.6 Cycle/scooter store

- ☐ The access into the cycle/scooter store should be secured with a PAS24 or LPS 1175 rated door and fitted with a fob-operated, electronic lock that has a 4500 Newton holding force, and is self-closing and locks upon closure.
- ☐ The cycle store should be fitted with Sheffield stands to allow cyclist to secure the frame and wheels.

4.7 Boundaries and gates

- ☐ The Manchester Road boundary should be defined with 1500mm high, railings.
- ☐ The Metrolink boundary should be secured with 2000mm high railings or welded-wire mesh fencing.
- ☐ The boundary wall at the northern end of the site should be retained.
- ☐ The southern boundary should be defined with a 2500mm high, timber, screen fence.
- The vehicle access to the car park should be secured with 2000mm high, motorised, vehicle gate with complementary railings to secure the opening. Access in and out should be controlled by a card or fob presented to a reader at the side of the gate.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External, dusk-to-dawn, LED, 'white' lighting must be provided to all external doors of the apartments, the communal entrance door, residents' lounge, community room, entry gates, the car park, cycle/scooter and refuse stores, and all pathways. Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor. PIR security lighting is not recommended other than in the cycle store and the refuse store.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ A modest CCTV system should be installed. Cameras should be placed where they are able to monitor:
- the communal entrance door
 - the entrance lobby and mailboxes
 - doors to the residents' lounge and community room
 - the cycle/scooter store
 - the vehicle gates
 - the car park.
- ☐ Images should be recorded, and a playback/review system included in the system. CCTV equipment may be located in the secure room on or off site.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address maintenance of the access controls, lift, entry gates, the car park, and the grounds of the development.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access into and out of the site.
- ☐ The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of housing and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
08.12.22	Paul Slater, Rowlinson Construction Ltd	Request for Crime Impact Statement
31.01.23		Site visited
30.03.23	Paul Slater, Rowlinson Construction Ltd	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
CHOBA-BUT-XX-XX-DR-A-04116	Access Option 4B	07/12/22	D
CHOBA-BUT-XX-XX-DR-A-05002	Elevations Option 4B	07/12/22	
CHOBA-BUT-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-06001	Sections Option 4B	07/12/22	
	Development brief	Jan '21	

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made in this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		30.03.23

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- Resistance of glazing
- Performance of hardware
- Resistance to static loading
- Resistance to dynamic loading
- Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk