



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land at Collingham Street

Storage/Distribution

For: **Low Cost Storage Ltd**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **30/01/23**

design**for**security

Ref: **2023/0013/CIS/01**

Land at Collingham Street

2023/0013/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported – Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- External lighting
- Site wide CCTV
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti
- Management & maintenance regime

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition for Secured by Design is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors	
	2.4 Industrial Units Burglary Risk Analysis	
	2.5 Industrial Units Theft Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	9
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	11
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Shutters	
	4.3 Windows	
	4.4 Glazing	
	4.5 Alarms	
	4.6 Access Control	
	4.7 Wall Construction	
	4.8 Roof construction	
	4.9 Boundaries	
	4.10 Lighting	
	4.11 CCTV	
	4.12 Other	
5	Construction	14
6	Useful References	14
	6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	15
B	Associated Documents.....	15
C	CIS Version History	15
D	Glossary	16

1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site lies on the northern edge of Manchester city centre. The local area is dominated principally by industrial & commercial; having developed with small-scale textile factories, warehousing and wholesale businesses.

The site is currently being used as a self-storage container yard. To the rear on Honey St, the neighbouring site contains further self-storage container units.


Due to the proximity to city centre and Manchester Arena, there is considerable demand for car parking space in the area. As a result parking in isolated locations within this area is reflected in the high crime rates for Vehicle crime, less serious wounding and robbery.

There are what appear to be several vacant plots and buildings in the area; these are frequently neglected and can become a target for ASB and criminal activity. In turn this creates the impression that the environment is not cared for, and that abuse is tolerated.


Along Collingham St & adjacent to the site are a number of HGV wagons which appear to have been parked for a considerable length of time.

A variety of measures have been used to protect premises from unauthorised access via the introduction of metal bars and security shutters to ground floor windows and doors and barbed wire.

Collingham St is poorly managed and litter is contained along the street. The general impression is unmanaged & enhances feelings of insecurity.



7 – Example of litter along Collingham St.



6 – View east along Collingham St.




5 – Adjacent businesses on Collingham St.



1 – View towards the site from Collingham St.



2 – View east along Collingham St.



3 – Existing boundary treatment to the site.



4 – Entrance to travellers site at the end of Collingham St.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2022 to 31st December 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
12	31	45	191	66	9	6	63	30	<5

- 2.1.1 In the last 12 months, the general volume of crime in the local area has been relatively high, with the most prevalent types of crime being less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft. The majority of offences have occurred to the south of the proposed site, around Lord Street and Stock Street East, as well as along Cheetham Hill Road, which is the main arterial route in the area.
- 2.1.2 Recorded crimes of less serious wounding have taken place throughout the local area, with particular hotspots around/off the main arterial routes of Cheetham Hill Road (A665) to the west and Derby Street and Eden Leadership Academy to the north. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded types of less serious wounding offences in the area, with the majority of assaults occurring within domestic settings and the majority of public order offences taking place between pupils and teachers at the local school. Offences have also occurred between unknown associates, often around public transport stops.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime offences in the local area have been concentrated in approximately the same locations, at Red Bank and surrounding streets where there are a number of apartment buildings, on street parking facilities and large car parks, all within walking distance of the City Centre. Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded offence taking place.
- 2.1.4 Thefts in the local area have mostly occurred around/off Cheetham Hill Road and around Red Bank, where offenders have targeted insecure mobile phones, mostly left insecure on public transport. Offenders have also removed items from businesses, as well as targeting industrial sites, removing items from service yards (particularly metal). Offences of stolen wheel clamps belonging to Manchester City Council is also high in the area.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry.**

Possible Solution - All external doors and accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Entrance doors should be positioned where they can be easily seen from neighbouring properties and passers-by. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- 2.2.2 **Breaking glazing in windows and doors (mostly ground floor windows) using implements.**

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear windows are only accessible to residents. Secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible, as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

- 2.2.3 **Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.**

Possible Solution - A robust access control system is required to prevent unauthorised entry to communal areas. Communal entrance doors and all individual apartments should be provided with a

security-certified entrance door set (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Apartment entrance doors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. Any ground floor doors opening onto private or communal garden space must fall within a secure boundary line.

2.2.4 Entering apartment building by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and entering communal areas (mostly corridors and bike storage areas).

Possible Solution - Internally, a secure lobby arrangement should be introduced at the entrance(s) to the block in order to reduce potential tailgating opportunities. This would require additional, access-controlled doors to prevent unauthorised entry to the stairs and residential corridors. Apartments should not be directly accessed off the lobby. Installation of a monitored CCTV can also assist in identification of intruders.




2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of fuel, company stock, tools and IT equipment
- Theft of employee personal belongings
- Criminal damage the buildings and vehicles
- Arson
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Bicycle and motorcycle theft
- Theft of plant and machinery and criminal damage during the construction period.

2.4 Industrial Units Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at industrial units in the Manchester area peaks on a Monday and Sunday during the evening and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial properties in the evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

- 2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements (mostly metal bars and vehicles) in order to gain access to doors and windows located beneath.
 - Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
 - Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
 - Posing as a legitimate customer/ visitor and accessing restricted areas.
 - Forcing open perimeter fencing and gates using tools and vehicles.
 - Climbing onto the roof of the building and using tools in order to remove tiles and enter the property.
 - Removing bricks from the wall using tools in order to gain access.

2.5 Industrial Units Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft from industrial units in the Manchester area peaks on a Saturday during the morning and into the afternoon (9am – 4pm). There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, bags, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from service yards.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the locale peaks on Monday and Wednesday. During the day, the risk peaks during the late afternoon/early evening. During the day, owners are more likely to be away from their vehicles for long periods of time (e.g. while at work, while visiting city centre shops/attractions/events etc.) and offenders can target them without fear of being disturbed. Vehicles parked within open communal areas or on the street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure garages/parking facilities.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal seeks to develop land currently used as a commercial business for container storage. The proposed development will provide 10 Class B8 units with office and storage space with mezzanine space over. The scheme has been arranged so the main entrance frontages face surrounding streets.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.
- 3.2.2 The proposal provides a new use and the redevelopment of the site. Greater opportunities for additional natural surveillance within and around the sites will support a safer community.
- 3.2.3 Access to the sides and rear of the units should be controlled using fence lines aligned with the front or side elevations of the buildings, to create an obvious division between the communal frontage of the site and the more secluded areas behind the buildings, where an intruder could operate without fear of detection. It is recommended the installation of lockable side gates should be implemented to create an obvious divide between site and units across the scheme.
- 3.2.4 Given the development sites location and the current level of illegal 'fly-tipping' around the vicinity it is important that all boundaries are covered under a site wide CCTV system. A management plan should be developed and submitted, incorporating regular removal and cleaning the pavements of litter and graffiti. Removal of litter on a weekly basis will challenge the 'Broken window' theory whereby it becomes the norm & acceptable that litter & graffiti is allowed to happen. Removal of these issue help create a sense of pride and community within the area in-turn helping to create an atmosphere of order and lawfulness, thereby preventing more serious crimes from happening.
- 3.2.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and visitors.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Review of boundaries. New boundary fencing should be 2.4m high minimum (see section 4.9). This should include the division between the site and the neighbouring premises.
- 3.3.2 Access to the sides and rear of the units should be controlled using fence lines aligned with the front or side elevations of the buildings, to create an obvious division between the communal frontage of the site and the more secluded areas behind the buildings, where an intruder could operate without fear of detection. It is recommended the installation of low level knee railings / hoops should be implemented to create an obvious divide between site and units across the scheme.
- 3.3.3 Protection of buildings and fence lines from vehicular movements. Perimeter fencing and buildings should be protected from accidental vehicle damage by installation of wheel stops in parking bays or installation of crash barriers, bollards or kerbing. Areas for vehicle movement within the site should be well-defined and distinguished from parking areas and pedestrian routes – parking bays must be demarcated to clearly indicate where parking is permitted / not permitted.
- 3.3.4 Entrance positions. The entrances to the units should be readily apparent on approaching them. Footpath routes should lead directly to the entrances, and landscaped areas around the building should be well-defined to avoid creating ambiguity of purpose.

-
- 3.3.5 Given the prolific high levels of graffiti within and around the site, it is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed protected and supports the removal of graffiti.
- 3.3.6 Given the development sites location and the current level of illegal 'fly-tipping' around the vicinity it is important that all boundaries are covered under a site wide CCTV system. A management plan should be developed and submitted, incorporating regular removal and cleaning the pavements of litter and graffiti. Removal of litter on a weekly basis will challenge the 'Broken window' theory whereby it becomes the norm & acceptable that litter & graffiti is allowed to happen. Removal of these issue help create a sense of pride and community within the area in-turn helping to create an atmosphere of order and lawfulness, thereby preventing more serious crimes from happening.
- 3.3.7 **Further Recommendations**
- CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements into and out of the site as well as each building. An audible warning system should be employed to alert to intruders that they have been detected and a response has been generated. To facilitate the CCTV system, dusk until dawn lighting should be provided for the site, particularly around the access doors/gates and loading bays. Signage should be located at the site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be recorded.
 - Staff lockers should be provided, and in a location where there is a high level of activity and surveillance, so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
 - Internally, the buildings should be capable of zoning so that entry to parts of the premises can be effectively controlled. Movements in and out of the buildings should be confined to specific areas and access controls used to ensure only authorised staff can enter controlled areas.
- 3.3.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors (single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any shutters or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ The doors/frames to internal offices / rooms etc. should be robust / solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied. Staff should be able to store their belongings in a secure area while at work.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

4.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

4.3 Windows

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as **P4A** under **EN 356**. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all buildings on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
 - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
 - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)

4.7 Wall Construction

- ☐ Wall construction should be of a robust nature enough to withstand physical attack through the material.
- ☐ Where a lightweight wall construction is being considered a reinforced lining such as welded steel mesh will need to be incorporated. Alternatively, there should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.8 Roof construction

- ☐ Lightweight roofing systems must be certified to a minimum of:
 - LPS 1175: issue 5 or above, SR1
 - STS 202: Issue 1 or above, BR1

4.9 Boundaries

- ☐ The whole of the site should be secured with rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing (with no mid-rails that would aid climbing) and gates, minimum height of 2.4m. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures / locking points to gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding / protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The fencing/gates should also be located away from any other climbing aids, such as lighting columns, trees, junction boxes etc.
- ☐ The site boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ Where exposed, the perimeter fencing should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary. The condition of fencing along the perimeter of the site should be regularly inspected for damage/attack.



4.10 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

4.11 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.](#)

4.12 Other

- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Directions and signage. Visitors to the site should be clearly directed to appropriate entrances and exits. Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people to and through the buildings, but also to deter unauthorised access to restricted areas. Lack of orientation can provide legitimacy to an intruder.
- ☐ Staff lockers should be provided, and in a location where there is a high level of activity and surveillance, so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
- ☐ Extraction systems. The premises should be designed with efficient ventilation / extraction systems capable of reducing temperatures and providing sufficient ventilation without the need for staff or customers to open service doors (to the side or rear of the premises) that could undermine the integrity of other security arrangements.
- ☐ Places that may be vulnerable to graffiti such as expanses of wall and doors should be formed of graffiti-resistant materials or have a protective coating applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal (e.g. 'easy on' – see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- ☐ The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5 Construction

- 5.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 5.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

6 Useful References

6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 6.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
10/01/23	Client	Application submitted
13/01/23	Client	Client confirmed CIS report
27/01/23	DfS	Invoice issued
08/02/23	DfS	Site visit
10/08/23	DfS	CIS complete

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1	Location Plan	Mar 22	A
2	Existing Site Plan	Mar 22	A
3	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	Mar 22	C
5	Proposed Elevations	Mar 22	B
	Design and Access Statement		A
	Proposed Boundary Treatment		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk