



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

ARCHES 1-4 & 6-11, CORPORATION STREET, MANCHESTER
CHANGE OF USE OF ARCHES TO FORM USE CLASS E UNITS

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: The Arch Company

VERSION A: 17/01/2023

REFERENCE: 2022/0577/CIS/01

Arches 1-4 & 6-11, Corporation Street, Manchester

URN: 2022/0577/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.2 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Removal of vulnerable sheltered recess to frontage of Arch 10, which could foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues. If the frontage of the unit cannot be brought forward, the recess should at least be secured with a shutter out-of-hours and should be well-lit and covered by CCTV monitored by staff during operational hours.

If these issues are addressed as described within the report, we are happy to endorse this development subject to the appropriate security measures contained with Section 3 of this report being incorporated into the proposed scope of works.

The overall security of the development will be heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the premises, rather than just the physical measures recommended in the report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies in the north side of Corporation Street and Dantzig Street, on the northern edge of Manchester city centre. It is formed by 10 no. railway arches that are currently vacant.





The existing arches are secured with timber or steel doors, shutters or timber/herras fencing panels, as well as infills secured with metal/timber panels and steel mesh. Many of them are in a poor condition, with deteriorating brickwork due to damage from water, salt and vehicle impact. Many have also been heavily graffitied.

Similar arches across the city centre foster crime and disorder issues. Vacant/derelict buildings and sites can often attract nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal activity, as an offenders presence is less likely to attract attention and such sites can feel like they are not under supervision. If signs of disorder (such as graffiti, smashed glazing, fly-tipping etc.) are not addressed immediately, they can often attract further abuse and trigger a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality - giving the impression that such sites are not owned or cared for by anybody and that crime and disorder is tolerated.

Arch 5, sitting between vacant Arches 4 & 6, is currently occupied by a cycle café and maintenance, servicing and repair specialists. To the east of Arch 11, there are a number of similar vacant arches, beyond which is a small parking and storage area enclosed with high Palisade fencing/gates.

On the opposite side of Corporation Street and Dantzig Street from the site are commercial buildings, a hostel and a recently constructed high-rise residential scheme - many of which do not have active frontages at street level.

The rear of the arches directly abut the River Irk running underneath the arched viaduct. On the opposite side of the river is a surface pay and display car park accessed off Red Bank. Some of the arches have glazed rear facades directly abutting the river, which have been vandalised/smashed.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2021 to 31st October 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary


Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
53	66	133	640	237	39	17	328	36	23

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the general volume of recorded crime is high, particularly the levels of less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft, reflecting the site's location within the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have taken place throughout the local area, with particularly high concentrations to the north-west (around/off Cheetham Hill Road), to the south-east (around/off Rochdale Road and to the south-west (around Manchester Victoria). These crimes have mostly consisted of assaults and public order offences, taking place within dwellings or business premises (usually physically or verbally assaults with victims known to the offender) and on streets (usually carried out by unknown offenders in the late evening/early hours of the morning).
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime in the local area is high, with theft from a motor vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle being the most commonly occurring types of vehicle crime. Vehicles parked in open car parks and on-street have most frequently been targeted, with offenders often smashing glazing to cause damage, as well as gain access to vehicles and steal items. Offenders have also removed vehicle registration plates or vehicle parts and have damaged vehicle paintwork/bodywork.
- 2.1.4 Thefts in the local area have been concentrated to the north-west and south-east of the site and have mostly involved offenders using pick-pocketing and distraction methods to steal personal items from members of the public.
- 2.1.5 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed commercial units, the more detailed analysis below will focus on use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.

- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.



- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

2.3 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.




- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to

offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Thefts of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.
- 2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.5 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.


2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.



- 2.1.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafes in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.1.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.1.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafes through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.


2.2 Theft (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.

M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Day Range




M/cr Restaurant/Cafe Theft – Time Range



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Industrial): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Manchester industrial premises peaks on Thursday and is lowest on Friday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks late at night/during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas are typically quiet, units are closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at Manchester industrial premises have been committed through doors, which offenders have forced open doors using tools/implements or have smashed locks to gain entry. Windows have also been targeted (predominantly by smashing the glazing) as have shutters, which offenders have damaged or forced shutters upwards to gain access to doors and windows behind. Offenders have regularly used a variety of tools to gain unauthorised access – suggesting incidents are more likely to have been planned rather than being opportunistic. In a number of cases, the point of entry was unknown. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before gaining access to 'staff only'/unauthorised areas and stealing property unnoticed.

2.4 Theft (Manchester Industrial): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial premises, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.





2.4.1 **Day Range:** The risk of theft at Manchester industrial premises peaks on Friday.

2.4.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft is greatest around midday and during the late evening. There are more opportunities for offenders to access buildings and private areas anonymously during the working day, before targeting the personal property of staff, as well as tools, plant and externally stored materials. External materials/equipment can often be vulnerable at night, particularly when compounds are not securely enclosed.


2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

GM Leisure Facilities Burglary – Point of Entry




2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.


2.6 Theft (GM Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.

GM Leisure Facilities Theft – Day Range



GM Leisure Facilities Theft – Time Range



2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday, but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.7 General Risk Factors

2.7.1 **Retail:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7.2 **Offices:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7.3 **Restaurants & Cafes:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7.4 **Industrial:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery of businesses
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Employee theft
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7.5 **Leisure:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Controlled access (staff/user only)
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Employee theft
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.8 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.8.1 Having looked at the crime data for the proposed uses, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting Manchester retail premises, offices, restaurant/café premises, industrial premises and Greater Manchester leisure facilities are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Manchester Retail, Offices, Restaurant/Cafes, Industrial & GM Leisure Facilities:** Doors have been forced open with tools/implements and bodily pressure

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 3.3), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Section 3.4) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- **Manchester Offices, Restaurant/Cafes & GM Leisure Facilities:** Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access

Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 3.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- **Manchester Restaurant/Cafes & GM Leisure Facilities:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas to steal items
Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Sections 3.4).
- **Manchester Retail & Restaurant/Cafes:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables
Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 4.1). The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.
- **Manchester Retail & Industrial:** A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them
Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 3.3) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.
- **Manchester Retail & GM Leisure Facilities:** Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders
Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 3.3) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 3.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours. It may also be necessary for more windows to be fitted with bars, grilles or perforated metal/polycarbonate panels, in order to provide some additional protection.
- **Manchester Retail:** Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.
Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.
- **Manchester Offices & Industrial:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property
Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access (see Section 3.4). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.
- **Manchester Industrial:** Theft of externally stored materials, tools and plant equipment
Possible Solution - The integrity of any boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Inappropriately parked vehicles/trailers and other externally stored items can obscure the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage, creating potential areas of intense shadowing and blind spots. It is recommended that this is considered in any external arrangements, and 'no store/park' areas are specifically identified, to avoid inadvertently blocking surveillance. Storage/parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing.

3 Scheme Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to change the use of Arches 1-4 & 6-11 to drinking establishments with expanded food provision and open Class E use (including retail, office, light industrial and restaurant/café uses), including external and internal refurbishment works, and a erect a new substation.
- 3.1.2 The proposed works will include:
- New cavity walls, masonry and glazed infills, doors and roller shutters to the Arch frontages;
 - New cavity walls and masonry infills to the rear of the Arches;
 - Clearing the internal spaces of the arches, including new floors, lighting and utilities/services; and
 - Unit signage.
- 3.1.3 Fire regulations mean that the longer Arches (7 to 11) will require a dedicated internal escape corridor leading to a secondary means of escape at the front of each of them.
- 3.1.4 A new substation is proposed to the east of the Arches, off Dantzic Street, adjacent to the existing fenced/gated parking and storage area. The existing fenceline will be amended to allow for 24 hour access to the new substation, with an off-road parking space for servicing and maintenance.

3.2 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.2.1 As proposed, the frontage of the unit within Arch 10 will be recessed to allow for the secondary means of escape door adjacent to the unit frontage/main entrance. This will leave a sheltered, partially hidden, recessed external space that could foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues – particularly when the unit is closed. The main entrance and escape doors will also be partially obscured from view from the street, leaving them vulnerable to attack unseen. If at all possible, the main entrance and escape doors should be brought forward to be flush with the outer wall of the archway (or to reduce the recess as much as possible), in order to remove the vulnerable recess and maximise surveillance opportunities over the doors themselves. If the frontage of the unit cannot be brought forward, at the very least the recessed area should be secured with a shutter when the unit is closed, to prevent unauthorised access out-of-hours. During operational hours, the recessed area should be well-lit, capable of being directly overlooked from within the unit as much as possible and covered by CCTV monitored by staff (see Section 3.4).

3.3 External Alterations

It is strongly recommended that if any external alterations to be carried out, either as part of the proposed scope of works or in the future, the following physical security specifications are adhered to:

- ☐ Any new external doorsets (including single-leaf or double-leaf) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any new windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards)
- ☐ Any opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any new glazing should incorporate an inner pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining outer pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

- ☐ Any new shutters to be installed should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, external shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and would be less visually intrusive.
- ☐ Any louvered panels should be of robust construction i.e. the louvres themselves should not be easily removable, easily damaged/bended and should be aligned to deter climbing. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required (see www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search?view=category&category=Doors).
- ☐ Consideration should be given to an anti-graffiti coating to any large expanses of blank walls (e.g. such as 'easy-on' protective coating, please see www.urbanhygiene.com for more information) that prevent it from adhering to the surface. If the surface is defaced, it can then be easily and quickly removed.

3.4 Internal Security/Tenant Fit Out

3.4.1 Access Controls

- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas to any drinking establishments with expanded food provision or retail units should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to storage rooms, staff rooms or offices should be solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys. Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ Any office or light industrial premises should have a staffed reception desk adjacent to the main entrance and all visitors should report to the reception for vetting by staff before gaining access. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required (e.g. into the evening/at night) to prevent unauthorised access. Any internal doors/frames to individual rooms or offices should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and key-lockable so that they can be secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ The entrance to any gym/leisure facility should be controlled by reception staff, by turnstiles (that cannot be easily by-passed) or by a portal/airlock system (allowing one person to gain access at a time, eliminating the potential for tailgating), operated by membership card. Swipe card or proximity readers are a more secure method of entry, rather than key code entry (which can be observed by others). Membership cards should be capable of being easily/quickly activated or disabled by staff. If key code entry must be used, key codes should be unique to each member, code entry should not be capable of being observed by others and there must be robust controls in place to ensure that key codes are only used by authorised members. To mitigate the risk of theft, lockers should be provided for the use of gym users, ideally with clear views of them from the main workout areas to increase the chances of any offenders attempting to force open lockers being seen. The lockers themselves must be robust/secure and all visitors must be encouraged to use them and not leave belongings unattended. Staff should undertake regular inspections of all areas of the facility, including any changing facilities and the locker areas. Internal access doors/frames to any back-of-house areas or equipment stores should be operated by staff key-card/fob only.
- ☐ Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Any electric locking system to be used throughout each of the units should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any access control cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that misuse is prevented. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times. The use of numeric keypad locks are not advised, as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed.

3.4.2 Alarms

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover each of the proposed units, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

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- ☐ In the case of any drinking establishments with expanded food provision or retail units, the alarm systems should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind bars/serveries, behind till positions and within cash offices.

3.4.3 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and shutters.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Internal lighting to drinking establishments should be controlled from behind bars or in a security/management room, away from public access. Zoned dimmers should be used to increase the control of areas from the bar/management office. An override should be provided, within easy reach of security staff, so that if an incident occurs the lighting level can be raised. This will also help at the end of an evening/event so that staff can see to clear up, and patrons have no doubt that it is closing time and they should make their way out of the premises. The lighting override can also be linked to music controls so that, in the event of an incident, music can be turned off immediately as well as lighting increased.

3.4.4 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all unit frontages/entrances, the main entrance lobby to each unit, all sales counters/till positions and all customer circulation/seating areas.*

4 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of any drinking establishments with expanded food provision or retail units should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

4.1 Restaurants/Cafes


4.1.1 Restaurants/cafes can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in restaurant/café premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent restaurant/café premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- 4.1.2 The main entrances to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- 4.1.3 Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 4.1.4 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- 4.1.5 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- 4.1.6 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 4.1.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 3.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

- 4.1.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 4.1.9 Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

4.2 Retail Units

- 4.2.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.
- 4.2.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrance to the unit.
- 4.2.3 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.
- 4.2.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 4.2.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 3.4) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the commercial units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the units. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 5.1.2 The opening hours of any drinking establishments with expanded food provision or retail units should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- 5.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and each of the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to resident or staff-only areas.
- 5.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details). Useful References

6.2 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 6.2.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
28 th November 2023	Rapleys LLP	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
29 th November to 5 th December 2022	Rapleys LLP	Confirmation of instruction/fee & email correspondence re: requirement for CIS
3 rd to 10 th January 2023	Rapleys LLP	Email correspondence re: invoice, payment & timescales
17 th January 2023	Rapleys LLP	Email sent re: report completion & payment
10 th January to 9 th February 2023	The Arch Company	Email correspondence re: supplier & invoice details
17 th February to 1 st March 2023	The Arch Company & Rapleys LLP	Email correspondence re: invoice & payment
1 st March 2023	GMP Finance Dept	Invoice still outstanding
??	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
19-259-014-SGP-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-LOC001-P03P	Corporation Street Location	21/09/22	P03
19-259-014-SGP-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-PLA001-P02	Corporation Street Planning Red Line	21/09/22	P02
19-259-014-SGP-XX-XX-DR-A-ELE001-P04P	Existing and Proposed External Elevations - Arches 1-6	26/08/22	P04
19-259-014-SGP-XX-XX-DR-A-ELE002-P04P	Existing and Proposed External Elevations - Arches 7-11	26/08/22	P04
19-259-014-SGP-XX-XX-DR-A-GAE001-P02P	Corporation Street Existing Plans	14/09/22	P02
19-259-014-SGP-XX-XX-DR-A-GAP001-P03P	Corporation Street Proposed Plans	14/09/22	P03
19-259-014-SGP-XX-XX-DR-A-SEC001-P01P	Manchester Corporation Street Sections – Arches 1-6	26/08/22	P01
19-259-014-SGP-XX-XX-DR-A-SEC002-P01P	Manchester Corporation Street Sections – Arches 7	26/08/22	P01
19-259-014-SGP-XX-XX-DR-A-SEC003-P01P	Manchester Corporation Street Sections – Arches 8	26/08/22	P01
19-259-014-SGP-XX-XX-DR-A-SEC004-P01P	Manchester Corporation Street Sections – Arches 9	26/08/22	P01
19-259-014-SGP-XX-XX-DR-A-SEC005-P01P	Manchester Corporation Street Sections – Arches 10	26/08/22	P01
19-259-014-SGP-XX-XX-DR-A-SEC006-P01P	Manchester Corporation Street Sections – Arches 11	26/08/22	P01
AL/22-01715	Planning Statement Covering Letter	01/11/22	-
-	Design and Access Statement	21/10/22	3

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk