



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Stadium Extension, Hotel, Offices, Retail, Public Realm and a Fan Zone

AT Etihad Campus, Manchester

FOR: Manchester City Football Club Ltd

VERSION D: 17.04.23

2006/0905/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity



Development supported

Greater Manchester Police Design for Security are delighted to support the continuing investment in East Manchester and in the Etihad Campus. The scheme has been very well-designed from a crime prevention perspective and will further add to the activity and interest to this part of the city. Our support is conditional upon the security measures outlined in sections 3.3 and 4 of this report being included, wherever feasible, in the scheme.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will recommend that, should the Manchester Planning be minded to approve the application, a condition be included to require the development be built in accordance with the specification set out in sections 3.3 and 4 of this Statement.

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

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1 The Site and Surroundings

The application site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. Edged in red on the plan, the site forms part of the Etihad Stadium, the home of Manchester City Football Club, which is located at the junction of Ashton New Road and Alan Turing Way in east Manchester; The stadium is the principal element of the 'Etihad Campus', which itself forms part of the Sportcity neighbourhood of east Manchester. The particular area to which the planning application relates is located at the northern and north-eastern corner of the stadium. The National Squash Centre is situated immediately west of the application site and further to the west is the Manchester Regional Arena, an outdoor athletics venue. There is a large area of temporary car parking east of the stadium, which is accessed from Alan Turing Way. The Manchester to Ashton-under-Lyne Metrolink line, which includes the Etihad Campus station, traverses the application site's northern boundary. The Ashton Canal lies immediately north of the Metrolink line. Bridging over the canal and Metrolink line, Joe Mercer Way connects the stadium to a large car park to the north. On the western side of Joe Mercer Way is the Manchester Tennis and Football Centre, whilst to the east a 23,500 capacity, music-first, indoor arena, Co-op Live, is under construction with first events planned for December 2023.



Having been extended in 2015 with the addition of a third tier to the south stand, the Etihad Stadium has a capacity of around 55,000. The southern end of the stadium accommodates the 'away' supporters, whilst the northern end has a concentration of fan facilities and direct access to the 'Etihad Campus' Metrolink station. The application site comprises several elements: a) the north stand of the stadium; the part of the stadium forecourt and circulation route adjacent to the north stand; b) a canopied, performance area in the centre of the forecourt; c) the two-storey City Store, which sits centrally between the north stand and Joe Mercer Way; d) City Square, the food and beverage outlets, and covered seating areas, of the fan zone areas either side of the City Store; and, e) a large expanse of car parking east of the fan zone and the access to it from Alan Turing Way to the east.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2022 to 31st January 2023.

All crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Crimes involving the use or threat of violence	Theft (including shoplifting)	Robbery	Drug related offences	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
10	5	77	315	59	9	25	7	6	<5

2.1.1 There were 520 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This volume of crime is well above the average for a neighbourhood within Manchester but not significantly greater than many other inner-city neighbourhoods.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 61%
- criminal damage – 15%
- theft - 11%
- drug related crimes
- vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 3%
- burglary - 3%.

2.1.3 The streets and places where crime was most likely to occur were:

- Ashton New Road - 194 offences (including 163 offences at the Etihad Stadium)
- Gibbon Street – 44 offences
- Stuart Street – 22 offences
- The Waterfront – 19 offences
- Willdale Close – 18 offences

2.1.4 Hotspots include the Etihad Stadium, Eastlands Asda store, the Waterfront Apartments and the McDonalds restaurant on Gibbon Street.

2.1.5 Less serious wounding, mostly consist of assaults, harassment and public order offences, with offences taking place at the stadium and residential streets. Offences have involved road rage incidents, verbal and physical assaults during events, as well as verbal and psychical assaults occurring in dwellings.



2.1.6 Theft has mostly involved unattended items being removed from tables and chairs in local restaurants and in and around the various stadia in the area; it also includes parcels being removed from communal areas in nearby apartment buildings and shoplifting from retail outlets east of the site.

2.1.7 Criminal damage offences have mostly occurred against vehicles and dwellings. Offenders have used implements in order to smash glazing in windows, as well as damage body work of vehicles and damage personal belongings within the home.

Crime at the Etihad Stadium

2.1.8 There were 163 offences recorded at the stadium, of which violent and public disorder crimes accounted for 64% of the total, with theft 12%, drug offences 11%, and criminal damage 10%. All other offences, including robbery, burglary and vehicle crime amounted to less than 3% collectively.

Vehicle Crime



- 2.1.9 Whilst the risk of vehicle crime is very low, incidents are more frequent on a Monday and Saturday, especially during the evening.




2.2 Crime at hotels, offices, retail premises and sports venues in Manchester

The data below relates crimes recorded in the year prior to the pandemic.

Hotels

Burglary

- 2.2.1 There were around 100 burglaries at hotels in Manchester. The risk fluctuates throughout the week, with the greatest risk on Tuesday. Offences occur throughout the day but particularly at night.





- 2.2.2 Offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to restricted areas was the most common method (46 incidents) of gaining entry to commit burglary. Doors were forced on 27 occasions and

windows just 4 times. Forced entry by removing shutter was recorded on 3 occasions and forced entry through a wall was recorded just once.



Theft

- 2.2.3 There were around 150 incidents of theft recorded at hotels. The risk is consistent through the week with a higher proportion of offences occurring in the evening.




Offices

Burglary





- 2.2.4 The risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is high throughout the week. The risk rises sharply in the early evening, often as staff are leaving at the end of the working day, and concierge and reception staff have left or are carrying out other duties.



- 2.2.5 The greatest number of burglaries has involved gaining entry gained by forcing entry doors or fire doors. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry and a number of burglaries have occurred during the day, when offices are open. In these cases, offenders may have

posed as legitimate visitors and trespassed before stealing property or may have been employees stealing from colleagues.



Theft




- 2.2.6 The risk of theft is greatest during the working week and falls sharply over the weekend, when many premises are closed for business. Risk is concentrated during standard working hours, peaking around midday. During this time, office workers tend to take their lunch break and move around or out of their building, leaving property unattended.

Retail Premises

Burglary





- 2.2.7 The risk of burglary is consistently high throughout the week. Risk increases in the early hours of the morning when premises are closed.



- 2.2.8 Forcing shutters open is the most common method of entry into premises, often followed by forcing the door or smashing the glass in a door or window protected by the shutter. Around 40 burglaries have been committed with offenders posing as legitimate customers before targeting property stored in staff-only areas.



Theft




- 2.2.9 The risk is consistently high throughout the week. The risk is greatest in the mid-afternoon. Small, personal items such as mobile phones, purses and bags are most commonly targeted.

Sports Venues

Burglary





There were just 18 burglaries at sports venues. Incidents occurred primarily at the weekend and during the night, the late afternoon or early evening.



- 2.2.10 Forcing shutters, entering via an unsecured door or gaining access posing as legitimate visitors are the most common methods of entry into premises.

Theft



- 2.2.11 Theft tends to happen on a Tuesday and Saturday, with a greater risk in the mid-afternoon and early evening. Times that largely correspond with football matchdays and kick off times. Small, personal items such as mobile phones, purses and bags as well as goods belonging to the venue are most commonly targeted. Offenders have also targeted lead and cooper piping.

2.3 Typical modus operandi used in committing crime at stadia, retail outlets, offices & hotels, & measures to reduce vulnerabilities

Stadium

2.3.1 Violence and abusive language in and around the stadium

To minimise the risk of violence and abusive language:

- Segregating home and away support.
- Reinforcing rules through the use of signage within and outside of the stadium, announcements, Police and stewards present, and highly visible, within the stadium.

2.3.2 Vehicle crime on match days, particularly in the evening

To minimise the risk of vehicle crime:

- Prepare and execute a plan for less reliance on spectators arriving by car through increased provision of public transport and safe walking routes to and from the city centre. Accredited secure parking, Police patrols of streets where there have been car crime issues. Signage and education advising supporters to avoid unauthorised car parks operators parking in unsafe side streets

Office and retail

2.3.3 Shutters were forced open

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- shutters, whether solid or perforated, should be certified to LPS 1175 sr1 or sr2; and,
- high fencing should be used to secure vulnerable, secluded elevations of the building where shuttered openings may be located.

2.3.4 Doors have been forced open and glazed panels within them have been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing the doors or smashing glazed panels:

- entrance and service doors should be certified to PAS 24 or LPS 1175;
- glazed doors, and windows on side and rear elevations should be avoided;
- glazing to any other doors and to the shop display windows should include laminate rather than toughened glazing;
- the customer entrance doors should be very visible;
- external service areas should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates;

- secluded public passageways to the sides and rear should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate secluded access to service yards, as well as attract anti-social behaviour; and,
- all external doors should be illuminated by dusk-to-dawn lights.

2.3.5 **Offenders posing as legitimate customers in order to steal goods or gain access to staff-only areas and steal property**

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing from premises:

- use overt CCTV to allow staff to monitor customer behaviour and include signs to warn customers that CCTV is in operation;
- create a secure 'back of house' to the unit, with fob or key-pad controlled doors; and,
- locate customer entrance doors and 'back of house' doors in areas where staff can easily monitor movements in and out (back of house doors are best located adjacent to or behind service counters).

2.3.6 **Bicycle theft**

To minimise the risk of bicycle theft:

- provide convenient, cycle parking, that is visible to people, particularly staff, circulating around the campus and is monitored by CCTV.

Hotel

2.3.7 **Offenders posing as hotel staff or guests, accessing staff only/restricted areas to steal property**

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining access to staff only areas and the hotel generally:

- access control systems should be used to secure sensitive areas of the hotel, e.g., the staff rest rooms, bar/cellar, kitchens, offices and storerooms;
- staff should be required to wear an appropriate form of clearly visible ID and/or a company uniform;
- all doors separating public areas from staff only areas should be monitored by CCTV; and,
- personal lockers should be provided for staff to secure their belongings within a secure staff room and a small safe provided to each guest bedroom.

2.3.8 **Doors in hotels have been targeted when left insecure**

To minimise the risk of 'walk -in' burglaries:

- Internal and external doors into staff only areas within the hotel should include robust access controls and doors should be self-closing and self-locking when and where appropriate;
- hotel bedrooms should include self-closing doors which, upon closure, and activate the locking mechanism fully;
- all external doors should all be monitored by CCTV; and,
- an alarm should sound to alert hotel/security staff that service doors or escape doors are open.

2.3.9 **Theft from hotel guest rooms**

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing personal property from guest rooms:

- the reception desk should be located in such a place that staff can easily monitor movements in and out of the hotel, and of the lift/stairway to guest rooms;
- install a safe in all guest rooms;
- access control systems should be installed to appropriate doors and lifts to prevent unauthorised entry into the building, particularly at night, or gaining access beyond the reception foyer;
- guest room doors should be particularly robust, with a recognised security standard locking mechanism; and overt signage should be used to guide guests along appropriate routes through the hotel.

2.4 Environmental features that can influence crime patterns

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder on and around the site are as follows:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood where significant developments are planned or under construction, the result of which will be greater levels of activity and footfall on the streets around the site with an increase in passive surveillance from residents and staff of the planned developments. The public realm will improve and street lighting, and light spilling from buildings that are likely to be occupied well into the night area, will make the neighbourhood feel safer for pedestrians;
- the area has been hugely uplifted by developments over the past 20 years. Neighbourhoods where the environment is of a high quality tend to be respected by the public and better maintained by public bodies;
- there are an increasingly diverse range of land uses in the neighbourhood broadening the appeal of this part of the city and attracting custom throughout the day and into the evening, seven days week;
- the Etihad Campus is pro-actively managed with modern CCTV system and a 24/7 security presence, and highly visible stewarding on event days;
- the stadium lies within boundary that can be secured outside of business hours;
- There is a continuing, clear sense of identity in this part of the city, making it an attractive place to visit and invest.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located within an area where there is a high volume of recorded crime. Criminals are already attracted to this area and may exploit other criminal opportunities;
- high profile, crowded venues may attract criminals wishing to make political statements;
- large crowds allow criminals to act anonymously, carrying out acts of theft, criminal damage, abusive language and assaults; and,
- the absence of regular very activity or passive surveillance in parts of the stadium site, and reliance on CCTV, leave parts of the site and individuals vulnerable to criminal and anti-social activity.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development involves the following:

- Extension of the Etihad Stadium to increase the capacity to 61,958 with the addition of 7,910 seats. The additional seating will be accommodated by creating a new upper tier at the northern end of the ground. There will be significant changes to the existing North Stand, which include t introducing a new spectator entrance and a separate, corporate entrance, both at ground level.

As well as spectator seating, there will be corporate entertainment facilities and a hospitality lounge on the highest levels of the extension

- Erection of a tricorn, hotel building with circa 400 guest rooms on land north-east of the north stand. The hotel will include a link to the stadium and includes suites/guest rooms with a pitch view. As well as guest rooms the hotel will have food and beverage facilities for guests and non-guests
- Erection of an eight-storey commercial building which will be located on a similar site to the existing club store. The building will include a new club store at ground and first floor, a museum at level 02 with a direct link to the stadium for stadium tours, a football 'experience', entertainment venue at level 03, and office space on all of the remaining floors. The offices will have an entirely separate entrance to the other facilities available in this building.
- Creation of a revamped, City Square, with the food and beverage outlets within the ground floor of both the hotel and retail/office building, and with a canopy over the whole of the square.

3.2 Elements of the development likely to promote public safety and deter crime and disorder

- 3.2.1 The plans indicate that the development will be of a very high quality. Such developments tend to be well-maintained from the outset and ensure longevity.
- 3.2.2 The mix of uses will help diversify land use at the Stadium and in the neighbourhood.
- 3.2.3 Over the years, the Football Club have built up a wealth of experience, deploying management practices that have been successful in minimising crime and preventing disorder in and around the stadium. There are already well-established security protocols, which will be adapted to ensure the extended stadium and related development remain largely crime free. Effective liaison arrangements are in place with the Greater Manchester Police to prepare for and manage events at the stadium.
- 3.2.4 There will be staff presence in all areas when operational, which will provide authoritative supervision of the internal and external spaces. Visible staff in the development will not only discourage offender attempts to gain entry but also gives staff, guests and visitors a readily accessible contact to whom they may report management issues. Such provision can help to instil confidence in residents, guests and staff that the development is secure and that maintenance issues will be dealt with promptly.
- 3.2.5 The wider site will continue to be secure.
- 3.2.6 The hotel, retail and leisure provision, and offices will generate activity and footfall throughout the day as well as contribute to passive surveillance of the public realm through the working day.
- 3.2.7 The location of the principal entrance doors to all buildings will be prominent and logical.
- 3.2.8 An access control strategy has been developed for each building, one which restricts access to appropriate staff, visitors and guests to appropriate spaces.
- 3.2.9 There is a commitment to enhancing the semi-public realm around the site and preventing access by vehicles into appropriate areas.
- 3.2.10 Secure and managed car parking spaces will be available to spectators, visitors and hotel guests. There is also excellent access to public transport and car parks for staff and office workers.
- 3.2.11 The existing CCTV system will be adapted to reflect the development proposed.

3.3 Recommendations to enhance the security of the development and its surroundings

Stadium

- 3.3.1 All external doors should be security-rated.
- 3.3.2 Laminated glass should be used throughout the building.
- 3.3.3 CCTV should monitor all areas of the concourse, seating and approaches to the north stand.
- 3.3.4 Laminated glazing should be used wherever glazing is installed.
- 3.3.5 Electronic locking and associated access controls should operate on internal doors to restricted areas.

-
- 3.3.6 Staff should wear a uniform and name badge and/or lanyard with identification card.
 - 3.3.7 On match/event days, access to corporate facilities and the players lounge should be controlled by staff present at the relevant doors.

Hotel

- 3.3.8 All external doors should be security-rated.
- 3.3.9 Laminate glass should be used throughout the building.
- 3.3.10 Doors connecting the reception area to the guest room corridors should be fitted with a Secured by Design approved electronic lock. Doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.11 Guest rooms doors should be fitted with a Secured by Design approved electronic lock. Doors should be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.12 Guest rooms should be provided with a safe.
- 3.3.13 A secure room should be available to guests to store baggage before and after checking.
- 3.3.14 Storage lockers should be provided in the hotel staff room.
- 3.3.15 Management offices should contain a suitably anchored cash deposit safe that is certified to LPS 1183.
- 3.3.16 Staff should wear a uniform and name badge and/or lanyard with identification card.
- 3.3.17 The access route to the hotel from Gibbon Street/Alan Turing Way must be of a suitably high quality, in terms of lighting, protection from encroachment by vehicles, and hard and soft landscaping. Consider installing access controls to pedestrian and vehicle gates at the site entrance or deploying security staff at the point.

Offices

- 3.3.18 All external doors should be security rated.
- 3.3.19 All external facing, hinged doors should include door closers, which fully engage the locking mechanisms upon closure.
- 3.3.20 Laminate glass should be used throughout the building.
- 3.3.21 The reception desk should be staffed at least during standard office hours, preferably longer to deter criminal and anti-social activity, and to actively monitor security cameras.
- 3.3.22 All visitors should report to reception for vetting by staff before gaining access to the rest of the building.
- 3.3.23 Staff should wear a lanyard with identification card. Similarly, all visitors and contractors should be required to sign in and out and wear a lanyard with access authorisation card.
- 3.3.24 Audio-visual links should be included at the main office entrance doors providing visitors and staff a means of communicating with the reception/management office outside of standard office hours when the main entrance doors should only be operable by holders of appropriate door release cards/fobs. Similarly, doors to individual office suites should include electronic locks with audio-visual controls so that reception staff within each office can further verify visitors prior to allowing entry. A door viewer, or small glazed panel, is also recommended on these doors.
- 3.3.25 A turnstile entry system is recommended, which will prevent unauthorised visitors from easily by-passing reception/security. In the absence of turnstiles, secondary doors should be installed to control access into the lifts and stairs.
- 3.3.26 Cycle parking should be placed in highly visible locations areas that are readily supervised by people circulating around the campus and are monitored by CCTV.
- 3.3.27 Lockers should be provided to enable staff to store valuables within their office and also within the ground floor changing rooms.
- 3.3.28 An intruder alarm should be installed to the building and to each office suite.
- 3.3.29 A CCTV system should be installed to monitor the entrances, escape and service doors, ground and upper floor lobbies, and the cycle store.

Retail/food and beverage

- 3.3.30 All units should be fitted with security-certified external doors/shutters, including service doors.

- 3.3.31 The shopfront should include laminate glazing.
- 3.3.32 Provision should be made for the inclusion of an intruder alarm and CCTV within each unit.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

Stadium

- ☐ External doors to the stadium should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Back of house doors should be FD30 rated and fitted with a Secured by Design approved, electronic, fob-operated, lock.

Hotel

- ☐ The entrance, service, plant and escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The entrance doors to back of house, lift lobby and guest bedrooms should be FD30 rated and fitted with a Secured by Design approved, electronic, fob-operated, lock.
- ☐ Guest bedroom and the management office doors should be fitted with a door viewer.

Offices

- ☐ The entrance, service, plant and escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The entrance doors to office suites should be FD30 rated and ideally, fitted with a Secured by Design approved, electronic, fob-operated, lock or at least one BS 8621 lock.
- ☐ Office suite entrance doors should be fitted with a glazed panel or door viewer.

Retail/museum/football experience

- ☐ External doors to the stadium should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Back of house doors should be FD30 rated and fitted with a Secured by Design approved, electronic, fob-operated, lock.

4.2 Glazing & building fabric

- ☐ All external glazing to all buildings must incorporate an internal pane of glass that meets the requirements of BS EN 356:2000, Class P1A or higher, e.g., 6.8mm laminate. The remaining external pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Curtain walling panels should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.3 Access control

- ☐ In order to restrict access to back of house areas, guest rooms, offices, and corporate facilities, an access controls strategy should be prepared.

4.4 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting must be provided to all of the external entrance doors of all buildings, pedestrian and pathways around the development.
- ☐ Lights should be operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ The hotel customer entrance should be particularly well lit and 'welcoming' to staff, guests, and visitors.

4.5 Car parking

- ☐ Parking space allocated to retail, office and hotel staff, and hotel guests, should be convenient and brightly illuminated from dusk to dawn. Ideally, access to these spaces should be controlled by vehicle barriers or other suitable means.
- ☐ The barrier should be fob or card activated. There must be an intercom at the barriers to allow hotel guests to contact hotel or car park management staff to request access and egress.

4.6 CCTV

- ☐ Cameras should be capable of monitoring:
 - ☐ all entrance, service, plant room and escape doors of all buildings
 - ☐ lobbies of all buildings
 - ☐ retail floors
 - ☐ spectator seating and concourses
 - ☐ City Square bars and seating
 - ☐ car and cycle parking
- ☐ The CCTV system, monitoring and recording equipment should be stored in a suitable management office, with screens available to the reception/concierge staff to monitor activity in and around their building.

4.7 Alarm

- ☐ An intruder alarm should be fitted to the retail/entertainment/office building and all of the office suites. Alarm contacts should be fitted to all external doors with PIR detectors on all accessible rooms with windows.
- ☐ It is strongly recommended that alarm systems are monitored.

4.8 Cycle stores

- ☐ Cycle stands/racks should be provided in a suitably visible and readily monitored location.
- ☐ Cycle stands should be anchored within a concrete base.

4.9 Landscaping

- ☐ A detailed public realm landscape plan should include: street and footpath surfacing; boundary details; lighting; measures to prevent vehicles accessing the forecourt of the stadium and the hotel; parking; visitor cycle parking; and, tree and shrub planting.
- ☐ Security-rated bollards, PAS 68 or similar, should be installed in places of high pedestrian flows, where there may be conflict between pedestrian vehicles.
- ☐ Tree and shrub planting should not unduly interfere with casual supervision of building entrances or pathways.

4.10 Signage

- ☐ Signs should indicate the appropriate entrance doors for guests, staff, delivery staff and visitors.

5 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure the site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular movements in and out.
- ☐ The contractor should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.

- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved, (see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx>).

6 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of commercial buildings, and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of Contact
08.11.20	Matthew Lam, Deloitte	Request for crime impact statement
12.12.22		Site visited
31.03.23	Matthew Lam, Deloitte	Report issued
05.04.23	Rachel Brown, Deloitte	Comments received following review of report
14.04.23	Matthew Lam, Deloitte	Report re-issued
14.04.23	Matthew Lam, Deloitte	Red edge amendment and proposed capacity confirmed
14.04.23	Matthew Lam, Deloitte	Report re-issued
17.04.23	Matthew Lam, Deloitte	Further text changes received following review of report
17.04.23	Matthew Lam, Deloitte	Report re-issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following plans:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Extensive package of drawings and presentation	23.11.22	

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		31.03.23
B	Text amended to reflect comments received from Deloitte	14.04.23
C	Changes to red edge plan and confirmation of additional seating and capacity	14.04.23
D	Minor changes to text to reflect comments received from Deloitte	17.04.23