



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Plot D Great Jackson Street

Apartments, Offices (3,870sqm) and Restaurant (1,076sqm)

For: **Renaker Build Ltd**

Greater Manchester Police

Version B: **03/04/23**

design**for**security

Ref: **2023/0042/CIS/01**

Great Jackson Street

2023/0042/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- vehicle entrance/egress access
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti
- Management and maintenance policy

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application subject to the design team suitably addressing the recommendations contained in the report (Sections 3.3, 4 & 5), and will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located on the southern edge of central Manchester, approx. 1km from Albert Square; close to the conference facilities at Manchester Central and the Bridgewater Hall and good walking/cycling distance to the university districts.

The local area contains a mix of development types, comprising residential, commercial, and hotel buildings.





The site is currently used to process concrete for the neighbouring developments. The site to the west is currently under transition under the Great Jackson St Masterplan.

The perimeter is enclosed with a 2.5m high boarded boundary and steel vehicle gates which can be secured.

The A57(M) Mancunian Way is to the immediate southern edge of the site beyond the public footpath & bridge, with a slip road onto the A57(M).

The A57(M) forms the boundary between M/cr City & Hulme district. A footpath leads to a pedestrian footbridge crossing the A57(M). Unfortunately, the bridge has been a notable crime & ASB generator.

To the north and east of the site are two established residential developments; 'Deansgate Sq' & 'Crown St'. Both developments provide high quality public realm & architecture and incorporate a good maintenance strategy.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2022 to 31st January 2023.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
54	32	118	684	186	49	22	241	33	28

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is relatively high, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft being the highest recorded crimes. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are mostly taking place to the north and south of the proposed site, around Deansgate metrolink stop and Jackson Crescent. The assaults in the area are mostly taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period, which is when licenced premises have a larger attendance and are open for longer periods. The assaults are mostly carried out by unknown offenders.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime in the local area is mostly taking place around Ellesmere Street and Bridgewater Viaduct. Theft from a Motor vehicle is the highest occurring vehicle crime with smashed glazing being the most common entry point to the vehicle. The area in which vehicle crime has occurred has a large number of car parking facilities and on street parking, which increases the number of opportunities for offenders.
- 2.1.4 Thefts have occurred around the north and east of the proposed site, around Deansgate/ Castleford Metrolink stop and to the north around Liverpool Road, where pickpocketing has been most commonly used to obtain goods. Thefts have also occurred around the licenced premises in the area, with mobile phones and purses/ wallets being taken.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **General:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 4.4).

- 2.2.2 **General:** Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;
- where the size limits the availability of certified shutters, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings.

- 2.2.3 **General:** Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly front doors and fire exit doors) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the premises.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.4 **General:** Broken glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly

adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, grilles or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

2.2.5 General: Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

2.2.6 General: Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.2.7 General: Forcing open shutters using implements and tools in order to gain access to the doors and windows located beneath.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

2.2.8 General: Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Ensure that rubbish and loose material is removed from the areas around the site. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

2.2.9 Commercial/Retail: Posing as a legitimate customer and entering restricted areas by means of insecure doors and tailgating employees.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

2.2.10 Café/Restaurant: Theft of personal property from tabletops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

2.2.11 Office: Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure storerooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building or fit-out. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Portable equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular visitor access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

2.2.12 Residential: Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment blocks before allowing them access (see Sections 4.1/4.2). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

2.2.13 **Residential:** Doors have been targeted (a common M.O. when apartments are burgled) and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies that would be publicly accessible from street level.

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings / private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

2.5 Risk Factors – Cafes / Restaurants





The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence / conflict if licensed
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour

-
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
 - Violence towards staff
 - Safety of staff personal belongings
 - Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2022.




- 2.6.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **61% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **50% lower** than Greater Manchester and **49% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.6.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **54% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **37% lower** than Greater Manchester and **20% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.6.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwelling is **57% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **43% lower** than Greater Manchester and **31% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.6.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **13% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **86% higher** than Greater Manchester and **126% higher** than England & Wales.


2.7 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary dwelling – Day Range



Burglary dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Monday and Wednesday during the afternoon (2pm - 5pm) and early hours of the morning (12am – 3:30am). Offenders often target properties during the day when residents are likely to be away at work, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified. Offenders are also likely to target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.7.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Offenders posing as legitimate residents/visitors and entering restricted areas through insecure doors or tailgating residents.
- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as unknown, offenders have typically targeted insecure windows and doors.

2.8 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Saturday during the evening (6pm – 11:59pm.) Vehicles targeted have mostly been parked on streets and private car parks. During the evening it is often dark with less footfall in the area, the offender perceives that there is less of a risk of being caught/ identified.

2.9 Burglary Risk Analysis – Offices

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.11.2 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night / into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.11.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries committed in Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors, or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors and windows behind them.

2.12 Theft Offices: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours / staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.13 Burglary Risk Analysis – Restaurants/Cafés

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.13.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafés in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday, and Sunday. The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.

2.13.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the premises.
- Breaking glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the windows and doors located underneath.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors, accessing restricted areas, and removing goods belonging to staff and the company.

2.14 Theft Restaurants / Cafés: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants / cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants / cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets, and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The primarily residential scheme offering 642 apartments. In addition, residential amenities will include a range of internal and external amenity spaces, including a sky pool, yoga studio, lounge, co-working spaces and a gym.
- 3.1.2 A publicly accessible restaurant will be provided on the top floor of the tower, accessed via a dedicated ground floor lobby and bank of lifts.
- 3.1.3 214 car parking spaces and 642 cycle parking spaces for the residents are incorporated over 3 basement levels. A large ground floor level secure cycle parking store is provided, with overflow stores in the basement. Access to the Basement is from a secure vehicle and cyclist entry point, which will be provided via the internal access road off Melbourne Street and Great Jackson Street.
- 3.1.4 In addition, a separate Estate Office is proposed.
- 3.1.5 Total floor space in sq. m: office building = 3,870m² (gross). Publicly accessible restaurant = 1,076m².

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed building will see the redevelopment of a site which has formed concrete processing site supporting several of the surrounding construction sites over recent years. The proposed building will form part of the wider Great Jackson Street SRF. The redevelopment of the site will remove a building which provided little street level activity.
- 3.2.2 There are a number of large residential developments in close vicinity to the proposed development site, including the developments at Deansgate Square, River Street, and Crown Street. These developments and the proposed development will significantly increase residential activity in the area which can foster a safer environment, and reduce the potential for crime, fear of crime, and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.3 Concierge presence. The development will benefit from a staffed concierge / security presence (at both the residential, restaurant and commercial office entrances), located at a reception desk overlooking the main entrances off Great Jackson Street. This will allow staff to monitor people entering and leaving the building(s). Visitors will need to report to the concierge, and residents should not be able to admit people remotely to the building. The building management offices will also provide some surveillance of the public realm at the southwestern end of the site.
- 3.2.4 Apartments are positioned at the fourth floor and above where they are less likely to experience noise disturbance by those passing through the development late at night or in the early hours of the morning.
- 3.2.5 The building is capable of zoning which restricts access within the site and thus if an offender does manage to enter the building, their movement is restricted. All rooms containing facilities for residents should have access controls managed by the concierge staff. The scale of the proposed development requires subdivision so that occupiers only have access to the zone where they live and do not have unrestricted entry to all residential floors.
- 3.2.6 The residential and restaurant functions appear to have been kept separate from each other. Servicing for the commercial areas must not require external storage of bins or other equipment.
- 3.2.7 The main entrances to the buildings are in prominent locations where they can easily be seen by residents and visitors from the road.
- 3.2.8 The proposed building plots provide further ground floor activity in the form of commercial/residential lobby/restaurant spaces and new public realm leading to a dedicated resident entrance reception space. In-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent streets. Cycle storage is in basement of the building; accessed via a cycle ramps.
- 3.2.9 Resident amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.

-
- 3.2.10 Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken through the use of external facing materials; glazing, providing good levels of activity.
 - 3.2.11 The entrance lobbies incorporate a concierge which provides a good view of people entering each building. Entry to the stairs and lifts from the lobby should require access-controlled-operation. All visitors to the residents of the apartments will be required to enter via the concierge. Mailboxes for residents should be located within the lobby area so that regular delivery personnel do not need to be given access to the residential parts of the building.
 - 3.2.12 The residential cycle store will be enclosed within the secure area. Ensure that each entrance/exit point is provided with access control to prevent illegitimate access.
 - 3.2.13 Cycle stores for residents and workers are provided within the buildings. Entry to the stores must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosures should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels.
 - 3.2.14 The roof terrace landscaped area and public realm will be well-overlooked by the proposed buildings and should benefit from legitimate activity and passive surveillance at all times of the day and night, promoting a greater sense of safety in the public realm.
 - 3.2.15 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime
 - 3.2.16 The foyer/reception zone provides the opportunity for good levels of security at a central control point for the commercial/office space.
 - 3.2.17 The footprint of the building facing onto the public realm is relatively simple and free from deeply recessed concealed areas. Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken through the use of external facing materials; glazing, providing good levels of activity.
 - 3.2.18 The layout of upper floor corridors appears to be free of projections or recesses that would impede sight lines. Doors within communal corridors should contain a glazed element to improve informal surveillance.
 - 3.2.19 Individual apartment entrance doors are flush with the corridor walls.
 - 3.2.20 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Further consideration required

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The overall building footprint must be free of any projections or recesses that could provide concealment for a potential offender.
- 3.3.2 Post. Postal theft is a significant problem within apartment blocks. If the mailboxes are to be located within the building itself they should be situated within the entrance lobby area so that postal delivery staff do not have access to the whole of the building. Mailboxes should be easily monitored from the concierge desk and / or covered by CCTV.
- 3.3.3 The development should take into account the security of residents, guests and staff approaching and leaving the building, particularly at quiet times and late at night. The areas outside the premises should be well-illuminated without creating areas of shadow or pooling. A monitored CCTV system covering all elevations of the premises is also recommended.
- 3.3.4 Basement access ramp. The entrance to the basement via this ramp should be controlled using an electronically operated high speed shutter or gate located flush with the outer elevation of the building.
- 3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance

in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob allowing secure entry and exit.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems

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- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
- All external doors where regular staff access is required.
 - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
 - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
 - Cycle store

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:
- LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
- ☐ PAS 68: 2013

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

5.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

5.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

5.4 Glazing

- ☐ All glazing up to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.5 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

5.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
 - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
 - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)

5.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

- ☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

5.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

-
- 6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
03/02/2023	Deloitte & SH Arch.	Project presentation
01/02/2023	Deloitte	CIS instruction received
13/02/2023	Deloitte	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
14/02/2023	GMP	Invoice Issued
14/02/2023	GMP	Site visit
02/03/2023	SH Arch.	Additional drawings issued
01/03/2023	GMP	CIS completed
03/03/2023	GMP	CIS issued
03/04/2023	GMP	Front cover amended & CIS issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

[illegible]

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Front cover amended	03/04/23

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk