



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Neptune Mill

Office Led Mixed-Use Development (2,052.2 sqm)

FOR: Capital and Centric (Rush) Limited

VERSION B: 10th May 2023

REFERENCE: 2023/0139/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Neptune Mill

2023/0139/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. Having reviewed the proposals I am not too concerned with the proposed development. The proposed mixed-use office led development is appropriate for this area and will complement the nearby apartment developments by generating activity during the day when residents are often out (i.e. at work). Robust security features, access control, and CCTV have been included in the proposals and these, alongside good management, will contribute to the success of the scheme. There are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located on the periphery of the Manchester city centre area, in close proximity to Great Ancoats Street to the North and Piccadilly Station to the South.

The site boundaries are loosely defined by Chapeltown Street (North), Crusader Mill (East), to the South the site is bound by Baird Street, and to the West the site is bound by Congou Street and a vacant building (formerly Cathay Foods Co). The site is currently developed as a historic warehouse building and is currently being used as offices.

Between the site and the adjacent Crusader Mill building is a wide passageway that some of the ground floor apartments of Crusader Mill front on to, this space was also used for car parking for a small number of cars on the day of visiting the site. The local area is a mix of residential and commercial uses. Large residential developments in the area include Crusader Mill and the Phoenix apartment building to the East, Piccadilly Village to the North, and developments such as the Oxygen Building beyond. There are also a number of car parks nearby, serving the area and Piccadilly Station.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2022 to 28th February 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
41	53	131	451	213	57	13	230	27	30

- 2.1.1 The volume of crime in the local area is high, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft being most commonly reported. This is typical for sites located within close proximity of city centres where there is a high concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher risk of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have taken place throughout the area local area, particularly to the west of the proposed site towards the Piccadilly areas of the city. There is also a hotspot of offences to the east of the site around New Islington tram stop. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded types of less serious wounding taking place, with the majority of offences taking place over the weekend period and during the late evening/early hours of the morning.
- 2.1.3 Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime occurring in the area, with offences concentrated on the streets and car parks to the west and south of the site, around Piccadilly Station, the Northern Quarter and Piccadilly. Offenders have targeted vehicles left unattended by smashing glazing to gain access and remove items from within, as well as removing vehicle parts and vehicle registration plates.
- 2.1.4 Thefts have also taken place throughout the local area, with the majority of offences occurring to the west along London Road and south around Piccadilly Station. Offenders have primarily used pickpocketing and distraction methods to obtain personal belongings, as well as targeting insecure bags and mobile phones.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Opening secure doors (all door types) using bodily pressure and implements to access the premises.
Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.2) which are designed to withstand a prolonged attempt to gain entry.
- 2.2.2 Breaking glazing in doors and windows, mainly to the front of the premises, using implements to gain access.
Possible Solution – Any ground floor or easily accessible glazing should contain a pane of laminate glazing, which cannot be easily smashed or shattered to gain entry.
- 2.2.3 Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.
Possible Solution – Personnel gates or turnstiles should restrict access from the office foyer into the circulation core of the building. Any external doors should operate on an access control system.
- 2.2.4 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.
Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals.

2.3 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

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- Burglary
 - Violence towards staff
 - Theft of personal belongings at work
 - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
 - Unauthorised access to buildings / private space
 - Arson
 - Cycle theft

2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property




2.5 Risk Factors – Café

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings

2.6 Burglary Risk Analysis – Offices

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night / into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries committed in Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors, or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors and windows behind them.

2.7 Theft Offices: Risk Analysis




The data below relates to thefts within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours / staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.8 Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.8.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.8.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.9 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.9.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.

2.10 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.10.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Wednesday during the afternoon (13:00-15:00). Offenders often target vehicles during the afternoon as they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

The existing building is a four storey plus attic structure of loadbearing masonry external walls and stair cores. It is currently used as offices. It is proposed to keep the building in use as an office as well as creating an inclusive ground floor social hub for businesses and residents in the community providing food and beverage / commercial units (continued Use Class E). The proposed works will result in external and internal works to refurbish the building and will result in the following Gross Internal Area (GIA's):

- Ground (commercial use - potential uses include a general store, food / coffee bar and social hub (all within the existing Use Class E).): 406.3 sqm
- First Floor (office use): 410.4 sqm
- Second Floor (office use): 410.7 sqm
- Third Floor (office use): 411.0 sqm
- Fourth Floor (office use): 413.8 sqm
- Total: 2,052.2 sqm

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed ground floor commercial space will provide an active frontage to Baird Street and Congou Street, which aren't particularly well overlooked due to the lack of buildings opposite.
- 3.2.2 The warehouse building currently has a number of retrospective security measures such as window grilles, steel doors, and barbwire. The redevelopment of the building will allow security measures to be designed into the scheme and remove more unsightly measures.
- 3.2.3 The proposed main entrance will be taken from a good location opposite Crusader Mill, allowing for mutual surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.4 There are a number of recently developed large residential developments in the local area, which have increased the activity and vitality of the local area. The proposed office building and ground floor commercial space will generate additional, non-residential development, in the area.
- 3.2.5 Although the concrete fence to the West of the site has been defaced, the buildings that are in use do not appear to be defaced.
- 3.2.6 The building footprint is relatively simple and doesn't contain any recessed spaces or other features that could potentially conceal an offender.
- 3.2.7 There will be a shipping container adjacent the building for bicycle parking.
- 3.2.8 Access control will restrict access to the lifts and stair core, restricting movement through the building to staff/authorised persons.
- 3.2.9 Infrastructure will be provided for tenants to install alarms and CCTV systems.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 There should be a video/audio intercom on the main entrance to allow staff to vet visitors to the building when the main reception is not staffed and to allow visitors access into the building.
- 3.3.2 A large number of thefts in office developments are of personal items from desks/workspaces. It is highly recommended that lockers are provided when the offices are being fitted out by tenants.
- 3.3.3 The building should be covered by a monitored alarm system.

-
- 3.3.4 There should be a comprehensive CCTV system that covers the main entrance, external doors, accessible elevations, office lobby, and ground floor space.
 - 3.3.5 The main entrance, external doors, and the accessible elevations of the building, should be illuminated with dusk-till-dawn lighting, to deter antisocial behaviour such as congregation/loitering.
 - 3.3.6 Any planting/trees should be carefully considered so that it does not impede sightlines or provide concealment for an offender.
 - 3.3.7 Where possible, given the heritage/listed status of the building, any new external doors, windows and glazing should conform to burglary resistant standards (see section 4 for more details).

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

Where possible it is highly recommended that any new doors, windows, glazing, or other security features, be certified to the following security standards. Due to the heritage/listed status of the building, there might not be suitable products that meet these standards and in this case we recommend that the developer contact Design for Security to agree an alternative product or mitigation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to RC2, BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows and Shutters

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to RC2 or BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Shutters (if provided) must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.
- ☐ Individual office suites should be fitted with a monitored alarm system (as above) or there should be the infrastructure for one to be easily installed by the end user.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Main entrance

- External doors
- Lift/circulation core
- Staff only\BoH areas

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes and car parking areas in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
27/03/23	Rachel Jones	CIS application received
19/04/23	Andrew Bargh	Progress update
28/04/23	Rachel Jones	CIS updated
10/05/23	Rachel Jones	CIS updated

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
CD 1001 (P2)	Proposed Site Plan		
CD 1002 (P2)	Proposed Ground Floor		
CD 1003 (P2)	Proposed 1 st Floor		
CD 1004 (P2)	Proposed 2 nd Floor		
CD 1005 (P2)	Proposed 3 rd Floor		
CD 1006 (P2)	Proposed 4 th Floor		
CD 1007 (P2)	Proposed Roof Plan		
CD 1008 (P2)	Proposed South Elevation		
CD 1009 (P2)	Proposed North Elevation		
CD 1010 (P2)	Proposed East and West Elevation		
353 CD 1011 (P2)	Proposed Section AA		
353 CD 1012 (P2)	Proposed Section BB		
	Design and Access Statement	April	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor updates	10/05/23

