



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

7 BRADSTONE ROAD, CHEETHAM HILL, MANCHESTER

3 no. WHOLESALE RETAIL UNITS WITH SHARED UPPER FLOOR STORAGE
(TOTALLING 8,293sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Me at my Property Ltd.

VERSION A: 29/07/2022

REFERENCE: 2022/0278/CIS/01

7 Bradstone Road, Cheetham Hill, Manchester

URN: 2022/0278/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The proposed scheme includes sheltered, hidden areas that could be exploited by offenders – both during operational hours (when the site is open) and out-of-hours/when the site is closed. Secure perimeter fencing/gates are essential to the security of the scheme. The narrow routes to the side/rear of Units A & B should also be secured with secondary fencing/gates to prevent unauthorised access.
- Many of the proposed vehicle parking spaces will be located along the blank facades of Units B and C, meaning they will not be overlooked and could be potentially vulnerable to being targeted by offenders unseen. Vehicle spaces should be overlooked from windows within the units or by monitored CCTV where this is not practical. All parking areas, particularly undercroft areas, should be well-lit.
- If the building is to be occupied by multiple tenants, the upper floor ancillary storage spaces should be separated by secure internal walls to prevent unauthorised access between storage areas/units.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit


The site fronts onto Bradstone Road in the Cheetham Hill area of Manchester, to the west of Cheetham Hill Road and to the north-east of Bury New Road.

The site contains a vacant two-storey warehouse building, which was formerly occupied by a wholesale retailer. The building has been extensively damaged by fire and the remaining site is formed by hard standing and overgrown weeds/scrub vegetation, with metal gates off Bradstone Road to the south-west.

To the immediate south of the site is a wholesale warehouse accessed off Bradstone Road, beyond which are number of wholesale retail units/warehouses fronting onto Broughton Court. The land to the north and east of the site was formerly a car breakers yard accessed off Bridcam Street and is now vacant and overgrown. There are currently plans to redevelop the site for industrial/office use. To the west of the site is a warehouse/office building with a large loading bay door immediately adjacent to the site entrance off Bradstone Road, where there is a large amount of litter and overgrown weeds.

The buildings surrounding the site (as well as the vacant, fire damaged building occupying the site itself) are heavily fortified with shutters, external bars/grilles, barbed wire along the eaves of the buildings, vehicle barriers/bollards etc. Service yards and parking areas are primarily enclosed with high Palisade fencing and gates, many of which also have barbed wire above them – indicating that they may have experienced crime and disorder issues in the past. Such unsightly, overt measures can be visually intrusive and can raise the fear of crime. The surrounding streets also currently have a large amount of dumped materials/litter and there is established scrub vegetation/weeds in places – such features can create the impression that the environment is not cared for and that abuse is tolerated.

Cheetham Hill lies to the north of Manchester city centre. The area surrounding the site is commercial in nature including a number of warehouse/distribution/storage buildings and wholesale retail units, as well as Strangeways Prison which lies to the south-west and the Manchester Fort Shopping Park which lies to the east of the site. The streets in the surrounding area are busy with parked vehicles and vehicular traffic during the day, although they are much quieter at night and pedestrian footfall is particularly low – resulting in limited overlooking and surveillance opportunities and leaving the buildings vulnerable to attack and unauthorised access unseen.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2021 to 30th June 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary


Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
16	52	41	231	55	18	7	39	30	<5


- 2.1.1 In the last 12 months, the general volume of crime in the local area has been relatively high, with the most prevalent types of crime being less serious wounding, vehicle crime, theft and non-domestic burglary.
- 2.1.2 Recorded incidents of less serious wounding have taken place throughout the local area, with particular hotspots around/off the main arterial routes of Cheetham Hill Road (A665) to the east and Elizabeth Street/Queens Road (A6010) to the north, as well as around/off Knowsley Street/Empire Street to the south. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded types of less serious wounding offences in the area, with the majority of assaults occurring within domestic settings and the majority of public order offences taking place between unknown associates at places of work or at public transport stops.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime offences in the local area have been concentrated in approximately the same locations, at nearby retail parks as well as on streets and informal surface car parks on the edge of the city centre - where vehicles are usually left unsupervised for long periods of time, meaning offenders can target them without fear of being detected (see Section 2.4 for more information).
- 2.1.4 Thefts in the local area have mostly occurred around/off Cheetham Hill Road and the retail parks to the north-east, where insecure bags and mobile phones have been targeted by offenders using pick pocketing methods. Thefts of bags/personal property have also occurred on public transport. Offenders have also targeted personal property belonging to employees, as well as property belonging to businesses, at nearby commercial premises.
- 2.1.5 The majority of non-domestic burglaries have occurred on the streets surrounding the site – particularly around/off Broughton Street and Derby Street. Offenders have targeted offices and wholesale retail outlets, primarily forcing open shutters and smashing glazing to gain entry. Offenders have targeted premises in the late evening and early hours of the morning, when they are likely to be closed and activity/footfall in the area is likely to be low.
- 2.1.6 As this CIS relates to proposed wholesale retail units, the more detailed analysis below will focus on retail burglary and theft in the Manchester area, as well as local vehicle crime.

2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late and night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.



- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
 - Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
 - Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
 - A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
 - Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

2.3 Theft (Retail): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Thefts of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the locale peaks on Wednesday and Friday. During the day, the risk peaks during the late afternoon/early evening – when owners are more likely to be away from their vehicles for long periods of time (e.g. while at work, while visiting city centre shops/attractions/events etc.) and offenders can target them without fear of being disturbed.
- 2.4.2 Vehicles parked within open communal areas or on the street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure garages/parking facilities.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Burglary
 - Robbery
 - Shoplifting
 - Violence towards staff
 - Theft of personal belongings at work
 - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
 - Arson
 - Employee theft
 - Loitering groups
 - Theft of/from parked vehicles
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Manchester retail premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.5, 4.7 & 4.8) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by. Advice on glazed panels can be found below.

- Windows have also been prised open and glazing within them (and doors) has been smashed by offenders

Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours (see Section 4.3).

- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 4.1).

- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 4.3).

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to demolish the existing building and build 3 no. new ground floor whole retail units and connected, open plan ancillary storage areas at first and second floor level, with associated one-way access route, parking areas and cycle/bin stores.
- 3.1.2 A new 2400mm high perimeter boundary and gates are proposed to enclose the site, as well as an enclosed bin store and cycle store to the west, close to the site entrance. The gates will be open during the day, to prevent vehicles from queuing along Bradstone Road. Once inside the site, there will be a one-way access road around Unit C and running between Units B & C for access and servicing. Parking for 38 no. vehicles will be located in the partially sheltered areas around the perimeters of the buildings, with a lorry parking area located between Unit A and the proposed bin store.
- 3.1.3 The building itself will consist of a brick plinth to the ground floor, with glazed entrances to each of the units fronting onto the access road off Bradstone Road. The first and second floors of the building will be formed by metal cladding, with upper floor windows above the entrance facades and to the lightwells above the access road between Units B & C.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The development will bring greater levels of activity and surveillance to the area, particularly during the day.
- 3.2.2 The principal elevations of the units will be partially overlooked from Bradstone Road.
- 3.2.3 The site will be enclosed with perimeter fencing and gates to secure it out-of-hours/when the units are closed.
- 3.2.4 The glazing frontages of the units will overlook some of the proposed parking spaces and the principal access route into the site.
- 3.2.5 The building will be sufficiently tall enough to prevent unauthorised access to the roof of the structure.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The proposed scheme includes sheltered, hidden areas that could be exploited by offenders – both during operational hours (when the site is open) and out-of-hours/when the site is closed. The site must be enclosed with high security perimeter fencing, to ensure all access and egress to/from the site is via Bradstone Road when the site is operational, where surveillance opportunities are maximised. Boundary treatments should be particularly robust to the north and east, where they adjoin the currently vacant site that could provide an access/escape route for offenders to utilise unseen. Secondary fencelines/gates should also be incorporated to prevent unauthorised access to the narrow spaces to the rear of Units A and B (see




illustration above). Given the crime levels in the locale and the lack of activity/surveillance in the general area at night, the site must be securely enclosed and gated to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). If not, offenders could target hidden doors, windows, shutters and walls unseen and operate for long periods of time without fear of being detected. The sheltered spaces could also be vulnerable to fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues if left accessible. Given the size of the site, which includes a number of units and could have multiple users (which can make manual gates difficult to manage and could leave them vulnerable to being left insecure), consideration should be given to the vehicular gates being automatically operated, i.e. left open during operational hours and then secured/operated via access controls outside of normal working hours (e.g. 6pm-7am) - see Section 4.5 for more information.

- 3.3.2 Many of the vehicle parking spaces within the site will be located along the blank facades of Units B and C, meaning they will not be overlooked and could be potentially vulnerable to being targeted by offenders unseen. It is highly recommended that windows are added to the facades of the units where possible/practical (which must be shuttered out-of-hours) to allow surveillance over parked vehicles. Where this is not possible, parking spaces should be covered by CCTV monitored by staff within the units (see Section 4.8) – ensuring there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded. Lighting levels must be adequate and uniform (see Section 4.7), with no areas of pooling or shadowing. Light coloured walls and ceilings to the sheltered, undercroft areas will help reflect lighting and create a safe and non-threatening environment.
- 3.3.3 The internal layout of all the units should be carefully considered so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Any internal aisles or product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrances of the units. All staff-only areas and upper floor ancillary storage areas should be fitted with access controls to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.1). If the building is to be occupied by multiple tenants, the ancillary storage spaces should be separated by secure internal walls to prevent unauthorised access between storage areas/units (see Section 4.3).
- 3.3.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doorsets should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas within the units/building should not be publicly accessible. Internal doors to ground floor or upper floor storage rooms/areas, staff rooms or offices should be solid-core and self-closing - fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with keys (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times). Any cash offices should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a certified doorset to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ All ground floor and any easily accessible upper floor windows should be secured with shutters out-of-hours, certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, externally mounted shutters should have shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric


- ☐ All glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any areas of cladding to the ground floor of the buildings, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ If the building is to be occupied by multiple tenants, the ancillary storage spaces at first and second floors should be separated by secure internal walls, formed by either robust masonry construction or incorporating timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal/mesh, in order to prevent unauthorised access between storage areas/units.
- ☐ Ideally, any glazed elevations of the units should be protected by anti-ram bollards or re-enforced steel risers, to deter against ram-raided type attacks.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover each of the units, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team). The alarms themselves should have two secure signalling paths (one being GSM radio back-up).

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The perimeter of the site should be defined/enclosed with 2400-3000mm high 358 gauge welded-wire mesh fencing (which has small apertures to deter scaling and cutting), with anti-tamper fixings to secure the panels to posts (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers). The narrow routes to the side/rear of Units A & B should be secured with secondary fencelines/gates to prevent unauthorised access when the site is operational. If panic mechanisms are required on the internal face of any pedestrian gates for emergency egress purposes, they should be fitted so that they cannot be reached/operated from the external face of the gates.
- ☐ The site entrance off Bradstone Road should be fitted with 2400-3000mm high vehicular gates to secure the whole site at night/when the units are not in use. Consideration could be given to automatic vehicular gates, which close and operate via access controls (controlled by staff card/fob on access and egress) outside of normal working hours (e.g. 6pm to 7am), meaning they cannot be left insecure at night.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and any gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ The proposed bin store should be enclosed with 2100mm high walls, railings or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and self-closing, 'slam-to-lock' gates (e.g. with an automatic deadlocking mortice latch that cannot be left insecure).
- ☐ The proposed cycle store should be enclosed with 2100mm high railings (to allow surveillance through) and a self-closing, 'slam-to-lock' gate. See Section 4.10 for more information.
- ☐ Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features (such as lighting columns, street furniture etc.) immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible. The site boundary treatment should also be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that condition of the fencing along the perimeter of the site is regularly inspected for signs of damage/attack and is repaired immediately if any incidents are experienced. Where exposed, the perimeter fencing to the service yards should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails, to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary.



4.6 Parking Areas

- ☐ All parking areas should be lit to adoptable standards (see Section 4.7 below). They should also be covered by CCTV (see Section 4.8).
- ☐ The surface of the parking areas should be even tarmac or concrete. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions, turning circles and service areas clearly signed.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ All access routes and parking areas within the site should be adequately and uniformly lit (in accordance with BS 5489 - see table opposite for undercroft areas), avoiding any areas of pooling/shadowing and supporting any CCTV system installed. Light coloured walls and ceilings to undercroft areas can help achieve this.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should also be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

Table L1: Lighting requirements for multi-storey/enclosed car parks

Areas	Av. lux	Min. lux	Uniformity
Parking bays and lanes	75	50	0.6
Ramps, corners and junctions	150	75	0.5
Vehicular entrances/exits	75 (night) 300 (day)	n/a	n/a
Pedestrian areas (stairs, lobbies etc)	100	50	0.5
Open roof level	30	10	0.33

Please Note:
•The Av (average) lux is the maintained average horizontal illuminance on the floor
•The Min (minimum) lux is the minimum horizontal illuminance at any location
•Reference should be made to BS 5489 part 9, for further information and guidance
•There may be scope for compromise on the above levels due to external factors

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [Acceptable Standard](#) that will allow for [Identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

[Acceptable Standard](#) - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

[Identification](#) – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are [Overview](#) and [Recognition](#), which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the main entrance to the site, all external circulation routes/parking areas, all building facades and the main entrances, sales counters and internal circulation spaces of each unit.](#)

It is highly recommended that CCTV coverage over any vulnerable parking areas is monitored by retail unit staff, to ensure there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded.

4.9 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

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- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
 - ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
 - ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots. These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.10 Other

- ☐ There must be no features of the building envelopes which create sheltered/hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.
- ☐ There should be no features of the buildings (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows.
- ☐ The cycle parking area should include 'Sheffield' type stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: [Downloads – Design For Security](#).
- ☐ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place while retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the scheme must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the units. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of the units, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash storage/management within the premises;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices;
 - Management of stock deliveries and waste collection;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access controls, lighting, alarm system, CCTV cameras etc; and
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of any graffiti, litter etc.
- 5.1.2 Any high value equipment within the offices (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items in each unit.
- 5.1.3 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site and the units, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff only/back-of-house areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
26 th May 2022	Fob Design UK Ltd	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
30 th May 2022	Fob Design UK Ltd	Quote issued
1 st July 2022	Fob Design UK Ltd	Confirmation of instruction/fee
29 th July 2022	Fob Design UK Ltd	Email sent to Agent re: report completion & payment
2 nd August 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PL-01	Location Plan	Apr '22	-
PL-03	Ground Plan	Apr '22	-
PL-04	First Floor Plan	Apr '22	-
PL-05	Second Floor Plan	Apr '22	-
PL-06	Elevations	Apr '22	-
-	Planning Statement	Apr '22	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk