



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Plot M, Mayfield Re-development

Office (25,300sqm) including flexible (3,700sqm)

For: Mayfield Development Partnership Ltd

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: 25/09/19

designforsecurity

Ref: 2019/0173/CIS/04

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# Plot M, Mayfield Re-development

2019/0173/CIS/04

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Minor Design changes/security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- Include access controls to cycle store/changing rooms.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

**Please note:** Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



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# Contents

|   |                                                  |    |
|---|--------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1 | Visual Audit.....                                | 4  |
| 2 | Crime Statistics & Analysis.....                 | 5  |
|   | 2.1 Crime Summary                                |    |
|   | 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)   |    |
|   | 2.3 Risk Factors - Offices                       |    |
|   | 2.4 Risk Factors – Restaurant/ Café              |    |
|   | 2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary Offices: Risk Analysis |    |
|   | 2.6 Theft Offices: Risk Analysis                 |    |
|   | 2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis                 |    |
| 3 | Layout Appraisal.....                            | 10 |
|   | 3.1 Proposed development                         |    |
|   | 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal             |    |
|   | 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations           |    |
| 4 | Physical Security .....                          | 11 |
|   | 4.1 Doors                                        |    |
|   | 4.2 Shutters                                     |    |
|   | 4.3 Windows                                      |    |
|   | 4.4 Glazing                                      |    |
|   | 4.5 Alarms                                       |    |
|   | 4.6 Access Control                               |    |
|   | 4.7 Lighting                                     |    |
|   | 4.8 CCTV                                         |    |
| 5 | Management & Maintenance .....                   | 13 |
| 6 | Construction .....                               | 13 |
| 7 | Useful References .....                          | 13 |
|   | 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)                      |    |

## Appendix

|   |                           |    |
|---|---------------------------|----|
| A | Contact register .....    | 15 |
| B | Associated Documents..... | 15 |
| C | CIS Version History ..... | 15 |
| D | Glossary .....            | 16 |

# 1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The area is dominated by the road infrastructure of the Mancunian Way. The site is adjacent to a mix of student high-rise residential buildings and a hotel. The site recently housed a number of disused industrial buildings which have been demolished.

The level of public transport links for the area are good with local bus routes on London Rd and Piccadilly train station & Tram stop a 2 minute walk to the north of the site.

Baring St contains a high number of waiting taxis waiting to pick up at Piccadilly station.



Bond St (adjacent to the Mancunian Way), contains a high number of parked vehicles. Generally people taking advantage of free parking on the edge of the city. There was evidence of shattered car glazing in a number of areas along Bond St suggesting this is a crime hotspot for vehicle crime which has been confirmed by our analysis.

Located below the Mancunian Way, facing the London Rd junction is the ProjectsMCR skate park. A well-used private skate park facility offering a café, meeting rooms and educational facilities.

Currently there are limited natural surveillance opportunities of the existing streets within the Mayfield area resulting in high vehicle crime figures.

Across the red line redevelopment plan there are significant level changes.

Large sections of the proposed site have been boarded up with timber hoarding.



## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> July 2018 to 30<sup>th</sup> June 2019.

### 2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| 18                | 29                    | 48              | 130                   | 67    | 47      | 9                | 226                      | 34                     | 14            |

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate for the local area is average with the exception to vehicle crime which is high. In the local area, the most frequently occurring offences over the last 12 months have been vehicle crime, less than serious wounding and theft. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of less serious wounding is taking place to the north west of the proposed site, around Piccadilly and Fairfield Street junction. The majority of assaults are occurring during the late hours of the evening and into the early hours of the morning during the weekend, when there is an increase in visitors into the city centre and licenced premises have longer opening times. In most instances the victim and offender are intoxicated when the assault takes place.
- 2.1.2 The majority of thefts are occurring around Piccadilly train station, particularly at the junction of London Road and Fairfield Street. The thefts are mostly of personal property, bags and mobile phones, with pick pocketing being the most common method. Offences have mostly occurred on public transport or whilst waiting for public transport.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime is mostly taking place around Hoyle Street and Fairfield Street which is located east of the proposed site, as well as Store Street and Boad Street which is located to the north west of the proposed site. The vehicle crime which is occurring is mostly theft from a motor vehicle, with smashed glazing and sharp instruments to bypass the locks being the most common M.O's (modus operandi). Offenders are mostly targeting vehicles parked securely in private car parks as well as on public streets.

### 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Glazing in windows and doors has been broken to gain access.

*Possible Solution – Any glazing at ground floor, or in easily accessible areas, should include a laminated pane to prevent it from being smashed or shattered easily. Where feasible, ground floor window frames should be certified to the PAS 24 standard, fitted with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Shutters to particularly vulnerable openings should be powder coated, perforated and be certified to LPS 1175 security rating 1 and installed internally.*

- 2.2.2 Doors have been forced open using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the premises.

*Possible Solution – Although the location of doors should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.*

- 2.2.3 Offenders have posed as legitimate customers/ visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property.

*Possible Solution - There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to the building/site are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access. All individual rooms*

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should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

2.2.4 Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

*Possible Solution - Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular community access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruder.*

2.2.5 Shutters have been prised open to target doors/ windows located behind them.

*Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see appendix 2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.*

2.2.6 Criminal damage and theft from motor vehicles parked securely on streets and private car parks.

*Possible Solution – The site should be secured with the installation of appropriate boundary fencing (see Section 4.5) and trees/shrubs should be used to supplement the perimeter fencing, to reduce the risk of missiles being thrown over and damaging vehicles (see Section 4.8). CCTV with an audio link and loudspeakers should also be used to monitor the site and make audible warnings to any intruders (see Section 4.7).*

## 2.3 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft

## 2.4 Risk Factors – Restaurant/ Café


The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises

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- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

## 2.5 Non-Domestic Burglary Offices: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night/into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries against Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors. Windows behind them.

## 2.6 Theft Offices: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.6.1 **Day/ Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours/staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

## 2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon (1pm – 7pm). Offenders target vehicles over the weekend period when there is a greater volume of people attended the city centre for long periods of time, thus leaving vehicles unattended and reducing the risk of offenders being caught or identified.

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## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Development of Plot M of the adopted Mayfield Masterplan to deliver an office-led development (Use Class B1) with ground floor retail and event space uses.
- 3.1.2 All to be accommodated within a ground plus eleven storey block, including the creation servicing arrangements, cycle storage and associated immediate hard landscape works.
- 3.1.3 The cycle store will form a feature to the south east corner at mezzanine level which addresses the external public cycle route around the Mayfield development.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The reception lobby has been laid out to allow staff at the desk to effectively monitor personnel entering or leaving the building through the main entrance. Reception staff will also have a good view of the area immediately in front of the building allowing activity in this area to be easily supervised.
- 3.2.2 The development has addressed the entirety of the ground floor and changes in levels; in an attempt to create activity and active frontages where possible.
- 3.2.3 Glazed elevations to most of the public elevations will help to enliven the street scene and enhance natural surveillance of and from the building.
- 3.2.4 The main ground floor reception space has been designed as an extension of the public realm. This approach supports the intension of ownership and good natural surveillance of the internal reception space and immediate external public realm.
- 3.2.5 The main pedestrian entrances to the buildings are located in prominent locations and are readily apparent on approaching from the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.6 All doors and shutters appear to be flush with the external elevations of the buildings, removing areas of potential concealment that could be subject to abuse. The main entrance doors into the commercial office reception are accessed via two revolving doors.
- 3.2.7 Staff access to upper floors appears to be controlled by turnstiles and visitors would be required to report to the reception desk before being admitted.
- 3.2.8 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

### 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

- 3.3.1 Landscape generally. Any landscape features (hard or soft) should not impede natural surveillance off/from the adjacent buildings or reduce the effectiveness of lighting or any CCTV systems. Future soft landscaping growth and maintenance must be taken into account at the design stage. Hard landscape features should be designed to withstand casual acts of vandalism, and the potential impact of skateboarding on street furniture should be taken into account. Consideration should be given to the level of maintenance likely to be carried out when selecting landscape materials, in particular robustness and ease of repair or replacement following damage.
- 3.3.2 Ground floor glazed elevations to the retail premises should be protected from ram-raid type attacks by creative use of hard landscape features in the adjacent public realm, or installation of anti-ram bollards / re-enforced steel risers.

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- 3.3.3 Level changes. The proposal will introduce some external changes in level across the site and the developer should be careful not to inadvertently allow retaining features to facilitate climbing aids that would allow easy access into otherwise secure areas.
  - 3.3.4 Collection of rubbish should not involve leaving bins on the street for long periods of time following a waste collection.
  - 3.3.5 Access beyond the reception lobby should be controlled so that intruders cannot easily reach restricted parts of the building. Access to the stair core and lifts from the entrance lobby should require passage through access-controlled turnstiles or doors. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobbies.
  - 3.3.6 It should not be possible for the staff/visitors of one office floor/suite to access another. All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Access to plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only).
  - 3.3.7 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day and night. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in/around the entrance lobbies. If the building is to be open at any time without a concierge or security presence in the lobby area, the main entrance doors should be secured and one of the single-leaf entrance doors should be controlled by means of a video access control system linked to each individual office suite (allowing staff to vet callers before allowing them entry).
  - 3.3.8 Subdivision of Floor Space. Where the upper floor office areas are subdivided into smaller individual units, each suite of offices should be capable of separation with their own individual access controls.
  - 3.3.9 Any short-stay cycle parking should be located within sight of entrances and overlooked by reception staff and CCTV.
  - 3.3.10 Post. Reception and distribution of post within the building should be considered. Incoming post and deliveries should be processed at one single point, in an area that can be easily isolated. Post rooms should not be located close to main exit routes as this could affect prompt evacuation.
  - 3.3.11 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

## 4 Physical Security

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.*

### 4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.

### 4.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:

- LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
- STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

### 4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

### 4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

### 4.5 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

### 4.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
  - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
  - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
  - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
  - Cycle store

### 4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards and car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

### 4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

## 5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
  - Litter removal
  - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
  - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

## 6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

## 7 Useful References

### 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications

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and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact register

| Date     | Contact With | Summary of Contact           |
|----------|--------------|------------------------------|
| 2908/19  | Deloitte     | CIS application submitted    |
| 18/09/19 | Deloitte     | Development proposal meeting |
| 30/08/19 | Deloitte     | Client confirmation          |
| 18/09/19 | DfS          | Site visit                   |
| 25/09/19 | DfS          | CIS completed                |
|          |              |                              |
|          |              |                              |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No.                 | Drawing Title                 | Date     | Rev |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|----------|-----|
| A283-MCO-XX-ZZ-DR-A-01201   | North Elevation               | July 19  |     |
| A283-MCO-XX-ZZ-DR-A-01202   | East Elevation                | July 19  |     |
| A283-MCO-XX-ZZ-DR-A-01203   | South Elevation               | July 19  |     |
| A283-MCO-XX-ZZ-DR-A-01204   | West Elevation                | July 19  |     |
| A283-MCO-EE 00-DR-A-(01)101 | Proposed L00 Ground Plan      | 05/07/19 |     |
| A283-MCO-EE 01-DR-A-(01)104 | Proposed L01 First Floor Plan | July 19  |     |
| A283-MCO-EE ME-DR-A-(01)104 | Proposed L00 Mezzanine        | July 19  |     |
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PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made | Date |
|---------|----------------|------|
| A       |                |      |
|         |                |      |

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.*

#### BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.*

#### ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

*The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:*

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

*This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.*

#### STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

#### STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

### EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

*A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.*

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

*Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).*

#### CPTED

*Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*

#### CRS

*Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)*

#### INPT

*Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.*

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

*A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.*

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

*A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.*

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

*The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.*

### Useful Websites

#### Design for Security

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### Secured by Design

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### RIBA Product Selector

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### LPCB – Red Book Live

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### Crime Reduction (Home Office)

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

[www.designagainstcrime.org](http://www.designagainstcrime.org)

#### Building for Life

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

#### CLG (Communities and Local Government)

[www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)