



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

97 Piccadilly

15 No. Bedroom Hotel

FOR: Inventive Design Associates Ltd

VERSION A: 4th July 2023

REFERENCE: 2016/0466/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

97 Piccadilly

2016/0466/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found generally acceptable, with a series of recommendations made in section 3.3, if these recommendations are implemented, we would be supportive of a planning application.



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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the city centre area of Manchester, between Piccadilly Gardens to the North and Piccadilly Station to the South.

The site is bound by Paton Street to the North, to the East the site is bound by Back Piccadilly, to the South the site is bound by the adjoining building (Abode Hotels) and to the West the site is bound by Piccadilly.

The site is currently developed and occupied by a Public House, The Brunswick, which fronts on to Piccadilly. The proposed development is the change of use of the upper floors to hotel, with access taken from Paton Street. The proposed use is typical of the local area which features a number of hotels.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2022 to 28th February 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
74	151	312	2403	796	282	67	355	51	84

- 2.1.1 In the local area, the volume of crime is very high, particularly the levels of violence and theft, reflecting the site's location on the edge of the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of such crime and disorder issues. The majority of reported crimes have taken around Piccadilly Gardens, The Village and the Northern Quarter areas.
- 2.1.2 The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises, often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts.
- 2.1.3 Thefts in the local area have mostly been taking place within/around the licenced premises, restaurants and retail premises situated within the Arndale Centre, along Market Street and within Piccadilly Gardens and the Northern Quarter, with offenders primarily targeting mobile phones, wallets/purses and cash. Offenders have mostly used pickpocketing and distraction methods to obtain the personal belongings.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property

Possible Solution - There should be a robust access control system in place (see section 4.4) to ensure that callers to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed entry into the building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

- 2.2.2 Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic key cards/fobs or by exploiting insecure doors.

Possible Solution - Hotel bedroom doors/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. VingCard or similar). Doors should have a door closer to ensure that doors cannot be left ajar accidentally by residents when they leave their room.

- 2.2.3 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tool/implements to gain entry

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

2.3 Risk Factors - Hotels


The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles

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- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
 - Arson
 - Cycle theft
 - Employee theft
 - Theft of/from parked vehicles
 - Violence towards staff
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at Manchester hotels fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offender's time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain entry before targeting insecure doors/ restricted areas.
- Opening secured doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure doors to gain entry to hotel room.
- In cases of unknown point of entry offenders have often gained possession of the hotel room key card and accessed the room, removing personal and business property.

2.5 Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/ Time Range:** The risk of theft at Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend. It is possible that the risk increases at these times when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday and Friday, when they are typically less busy, and they perceive a lower risk of being caught/challenged. The risk of theft is greatest around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Thefts of personal property (such as mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets) are the most routinely stolen items.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Saturday during the afternoon period (12pm – 3:30pm). Offenders often target vehicles during the afternoon, particularly around the city centre, as vehicles are often left unattended for long periods of time, out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is a change of use to part of the ground floor and upper floors of the building to a hotel with 15 no. bedrooms.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed use is appropriate for this city centre location.
- 3.2.2 The hotel is well served by public transport and there are a number of car parks in the local area. It is unlikely that residents or staff will need to park for long periods of time away from the building, which could leave their vehicles vulnerable to criminals.
- 3.2.3 The main entrance to the hotel is positioned on the front elevation of the building, on Patton Street, which can be easily viewed from the surrounding area.
- 3.2.4 The main entrance will be overlooked from the reception area. Allowing staff to view those entering the building.
- 3.2.5 The local area is very busy during the day and at night, reducing the potential for criminals to target the building without being seen.
- 3.2.6 All hotel rooms are located at first floor and above, reducing the potential for noise disturbance late at night.
- 3.2.7 All ground floor uses are self-contained, reducing potential for unauthorised access into the hotel from adjacent properties (or vice versa).

3.3 Recommendations to Enhance the Security of the Development

The following points have been identified for further consideration.

- 3.3.1 The main entrance into the hotel should be automated, with the lock activated by guest key card. It is recommended that doors into hotel bedroom corridors operate on an access control system to reduce the potential for tailgating.
- 3.3.2 An audio link between main entrance door and reception desk should be installed to allow guests to communicate with staff. A remote lock release facility should also be installed at the reception desk to allow staff to release the door, should that be necessary.
- 3.3.3 Guest rooms should be fitted with a 44mm solid core door and a suitable locking system e.g. VingCard system or similar.
- 3.3.4 Guest rooms should be provided with a safe so that residents can secure personal belongings.
- 3.3.5 Access into staff only areas should be restricted to staff. Signage should be provided so that it is clear which areas are restricted to staff, to prevent confusion being used as a legitimate excuse for trying to access these spaces.
- 3.3.6 The building should be covered with a comprehensive CCTV system. There should be coverage of the main entrance, the building elevations, reception/lobby areas, and bedroom corridors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation. These standards should be followed on any new aspects of the building.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Hotel bedroom doors/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. VingCard or similar).
- ☐ Each bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.

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- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
 - ☐ All doors/frames to staff areas/stores/offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows & Building Fabric

- ☐ Ground floor windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ All new ground and upper ground level glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Access Control

- ☐ Access to first floor, and above, should be restricted to hotel residents and staff. Hotel guests should only be able to access the specific floor that they are staying on.
- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Main entrances
 - External doors
 - Stairs/lifts
 - Staff only areas

4.5 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The

remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be all external spaces, car parking areas, circulation spaces, all access/egress points, all bar/till areas, corridors, and reception areas.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security plan should be prepared and maintained consistently to oversee the daily operations of the site.
- 5.1.2 The management should consider membership of the Manchester Hoteliers Association (MHA), who share best practice in security management and recruitment.
- 5.1.3 The maintenance of a development throughout its lifespan plays a critical role in determining its level of security and safety. Neglected aspects of a development have the potential to attract additional criminal activities, commonly referred to as 'the broken window theory.' To tackle such issues, a maintenance plan should be formulated to address the following concerns:
 - Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV)
 - Security (door policy; door staff; staff training; CCTV cameras - monitoring and recording facilities, and their locations; intruder alarm; and cash storage/management).
 - Fire safety, including clearing designated escape routes of all obstacles.
 - Noise management; and,
 - Servicing and waste management (in a secure location) arrangements.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible, and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
21/02/2023	Michael Griffiths	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
22108-101	Existing Plan	14/11/21	
22108-102	Removals Plan	14/11/21	
22108-103	Existing Elevations	14/11/21	
22108-301	Proposed Plans	14/11/21	
22108-302	Proposed Elevations	14/11/21	
22108-OS	Site and Location Plan	04/01/21	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		