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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2

Thursday, 30 January 2003

B E F O R E:

MR JUSTICE COLLINS

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NORTH DEVON DISTRICT COUNCIL

(CLAIMANT)

-v-

THE FIRST SECRETARY OF STATE

(DEFENDANT)

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MR DH FLETCHER (instructed by North Devon District Council, Civic Centre, Barnstaple, Devon
EX31 1EA) appeared on behalf of the CLAIMANT

MR M GIBBONS (instructed by Treasury Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the DEFENDANT

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J U D G M E N T

1. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: This appeal raises a short but not at all easy point of construction of two classes set out in the Use Classes Order of 1987. The two classes are contained in Part C and are: Class C2, which is headed "residential institutions", and Class C3 which is headed "dwelling houses". The question is whether the situation in this case fell within C2 or C3. There is a subsidiary question relating to whether even if it was within C2, nonetheless there was a material change of use from its C3 use as a dwelling house. That, of course, is a question which depends entirely on the facts of this individual case.
2. The facts are straightforward and, indeed, are agreed. The premises in question are an address in Barnstaple in North Devon. They comprise a semi-detached 3 bedroom dwellinghouse in a residential area. A company called Southern Childcare Limited runs a business operating registered children's homes. Since 2000, as a result of provisions contained in section 40 of the Care Standards Act 2000, which amended section 63 of the Children Act 1989, children's homes which provide for three or less children are required to be registered. That was not the position before that change in the law.
3. I gather from the information before me that there are a number of such small homes, that is to say homes catering for three children or less, which have sprung up. The reason for that is not entirely clear. It may have something to do with a lack of foster parents, or with the increased concern about the welfare of children and the need for them to be looked after in small units rather than in the larger children's homes that used to be in existence in the past. In any event, the local planning authority, in this case North Devon District Council, are concerned about the effect on residential areas of these homes, and are concerned that there should be the possibility of planning control to deal with applications to set up these homes in residential areas.
4. In February 2000 Southern Childcare Limited began to use the premises to provide residential care for two children aged between 10 and 17. The Inspector who eventually had to decide on the issue described the premises. Outside was a semi-detached 3 bedroom house which looks like any other house in the street. Internally, it is in good decorative order; there is a small office downstairs, otherwise it is laid out as an ordinary house. The children sleep in individual bedrooms. There is the usual kitchen and bathroom facilities.
5. Southern Childcare Limited provide in the premises residential care for two children placed in their care by various local authorities. Two non-resident staff are on duty at all times and the house is under the supervision of a team of 6 or 7 adult carers who operate 8-hour shifts. The result is the children are never unsupervised whilst in the building. That means of course that the various carers will come and leave at the beginning and end of their shifts but otherwise the building is to all intents and purposes used as any other family house would be with two children there: shopping trips are needed; children have to be taken to school; the children assist to an extent in the preparation of meals and so on.
6. Because there was a question raised as to whether the use required planning permission, Southern Childcare Limited applied under section 191 of the Planning Act for a certificate of lawful use. That application was refused by the local planning authority. Southern Childcare Limited appealed and an inspector determined the appeal in their favour on 5th August of last year. Against that decision the Council appeals to this court.
7. I should go straightaway to the relevant provisions in the Use Classes Order. The purpose behind the Use Classes Order is well-known and is conveniently set out in Circular 13/87, issued by the Department in May 1987 when the Use Classes Order was about to come into effect. The purpose is set out in paragraph 3, and it is there indicated:

"The aim of the new Order is twofold:-

- (i) to reduce the number of classes while retaining effective control over changes of use which, because of environmental consequences or relationship with other uses, need to be subject to specific planning applications and;
- (ii) to ensure that the scope of each class is wide enough to take in changes of use which generally do not need to be subject to specific control.

It serves no-one's interest to require planning permission for types of development that generally do not damage amenity. Equally, the Secretaries of State are in no doubt that effective control must be retained over changes of use that would have a material impact, in land-use planning terms, on the local amenity or environment."

That is doing no more in reality than setting out the general approach to planning control, but it helpfully indicates the rationale behind the Use Classes Order. By section 55 of the Act, provided that a use falls within a particular designated class, then no planning permission is needed for any change which falls within the same class.

8. The two classes are C2 and C3. C2 reads:

"Use for the provision of residential accommodation and care to people in need of care (other than a use within class C3 (dwelling houses)).

Use as a hospital or nursing home.

Use as a residential school, college or training centre."

C3 reads:

"Use as a dwellinghouse (whether or not as a sole or main residence)

(a) by a single person or by people living together as a family, or

(b) by not more than 6 residents living together as a single household (including a household where care is provided for residents)."

It will be noted that there is reference to care in both C2 and C3. Care is in fact defined in paragraph 2 (the interpretation clause of the Order) this:

"'care' means personal care for people in need of such care by reason of old age, disablement, past or present dependence on alcohol or drugs or past or present mental disorder, and in class C2 also includes the personal care of children and medical care and treatment."

It is to be noted that that definition appears to exclude the personal care of children from the definition of care except in class C2. In class C3 there is reference (in the parenthesis to C3(b)) to care provided for residents. That care will not by the definition clause include care of children. Of course if the children happen to be disabled or to suffer from mental disorder, then care for them will fall within class C3(b), but it is not suggested that the children with whom this case is concerned would fall within that category. They are children who, for whatever reason, have been put into the care of the local authority, and the local authority is

required to find somewhere for them to live and to be cared for during their minority.

9. The application by Southern Childcare Limited was "use as a dwelling providing care for up to 3 children living together as a single household with care provided by up to two non-resident staff." So it appears that the application was based on the contention that the children would constitute the single household living together and thus fall within C3(b), and that the non-resident staff would provide care but would not be regarded as part of the household because that would not be necessary.
10. When the matter came before the Inspector he considered the correct construction of the Order between paragraphs 12 and 19 of his determination. I do not propose to read them in any detail, but some parts I shall cite because they indicate the way in which the Inspector approached his task. In paragraph 16 he said:

"Living together incorporates dining together, sharing the kitchen, lounge and garden etc. A functioning family (parents and children/adopted children/foster children) is almost by definition a caring unit. Whilst clearly a husband and wife with two foster children would be considered as falling within Class C3(a) of the UCO, there is a close similarity with the situation on the appeal site except that the carers (guardians) whilst present all the time, are not resident in the same way as a husband and wife. The dictionary definition of a household is 'the occupants of a house regarded as a unit'. Although the care element in a household is less than that for a family there are joint shared responsibilities, the security of the house, the buying of food, the preparation of meals, the paying of bills and the maintenance of the property are some examples. There has to be a thread of care running through a household for it to function effectively."

In paragraph 19 he states:

"If one includes the children and the adults on the appeal premises, there are then four residents living together as a single household. The High Court judgment in the case of *R v Bromley London Borough Council ex parte Sinclair* [1991] 3 PLR60 has accepted that staff providing care for residents need not themselves be resident. 'Care' as defined in Art 2 does not come into play on the appeal site and I find that the use is within the constraints of Class 3(b) of the UCO; namely the use as a dwellinghouse by not more than six residents living together as a single household."

It seems to me that the natural meaning of what the Inspector says in paragraph 19 is that he is regarding (and what he sets out in paragraph 16 supports this conclusion) the household as being the children plus the carers. But, in his view, the case of *Sinclair* means that carers need not be resident carers, in the sense that they need not have the premises as their residence, and live there as well as the children. That, in his view, is not necessary; provided they are present on the premises then they can be regarded as part of the household. It is true that when he came to give the lawful development certificate it was in these terms:

"The use of the premises as a dwelling house providing care for up to two children living together as a single household with care provided by up to two non-resident staff."

That, of course, is more consistent with the way in which the application was framed. Nonetheless the natural meaning of paragraphs 16 and 19 seem to me to point clearly in the direction that the Inspector is finding that the household includes both children and carers, but

that carers do not need to be resident carers.

11. Mr Fletcher contends that that is wrong, and that insofar as *Sinclair* may appear to support that approach it is wrongly decided. He submits that the purpose behind the division of classes C2 and C3, insofar as it applies in the circumstances of this case, is that small homes used for care in the community should not be regarded as falling outside the class as a dwellinghouse merely because there are carers, provided that those carers are resident. He submits that if one looks at the natural meaning of the words used in the Use Classes Order and couples that with the guidance given by the Circular, that conclusion is inevitable. The Circular in paragraph 5 states:

"The new Order is also intended to clarify the circumstances in which the establishment of small community care homes and hostels will require planning permission. For example, it provides that development is not involved when a dwellinghouse becomes used as a small community care home, provided that all the residents live together as a single household and that they number no more than 6 including resident staff."

That certainly on its face appears to me to be more consistent with the approach that Mr Fletcher submits is the correct one.

12. In paragraphs 25, 26, and 27 the Circular deals specifically with classes C2 and C3. In discussing C2 in paragraph 25 it states:

"The *residential institutions class* combines classes XX11 and XIV of the 1972 Order. Apart from educational establishments, the characteristic of the uses contained in this class that sets them apart from those in the hotels and hostels and dwellinghouses classes is, in the case of the former the provision of personal care and treatment, and in the case of the latter that the residents and staff do not form a single household."

In paragraph 27, which deals with class C3, it is said:

"The new *dwellinghouses class* groups together use as a dwellinghouse - whether or not as a sole or main residence - by a single person or any number of persons living together as a family, with use as a dwellinghouse by no more than 6 persons living together as a single household. The key element in the use of a dwellinghouse for other than family purposes is the concept of a single household. In the case of small residential care homes or nursing homes, staff and residents will probably not live as a single household and the use will therefore fall into the residential institutions class, regardless of the size of the home. The single household concept will provide more certainty over the planning position of small group homes which play a major role in the Government's community care policy which is aimed at enabling disabled and mentally disordered people to live as normal lives as possible in touch with the community ... Local planning authorities should include any resident care staff in their calculation of the number of people accommodated. The class includes not only families or people living together under arrangements for providing care and support within the community, but also other groups of people such as students, not necessarily related to each other, who choose to live on a communal basis as a single household."

That again, Mr Fletcher submits, and I agree, points in the direction of resident care staff and

small residential homes and, indeed, the reference to the need for certainty over the planning position of small group homes playing a major role in the Government's community care policy, gives a clue why the definition of "care" as not including children should be applicable to C2 and not to C3 because children do not fall into the community care policy because they are not disabled or mentally disordered.

13. It seems to me that it is essential that all the words of the Order are given some meaning. There is no doubt that unless the circumstances here mean that it falls within C3, the activity in question would clearly fall within C2, because it is use for the provision of residential accommodation and care to people in need of care. The definition of "care" which is applicable to C2 includes care of children. So unless it falls within Class C3, it clearly will fall within C2. The question, therefore, is whether it does fall within C3.
14. It is not contended that it falls within C3(a) and the Inspector did not so find. Clearly, it is not being used by people living together as a family. The question therefore is whether it falls within C3(b). There are certainly not more than 6 residents. But are they living together as a single household, including a household where care is provided for residents? The parenthesis does not directly apply because care does not include care of children. Thus, it is not a household where care is provided for residents. The first question, as it seems to me, is what is the meaning in the context of C3(b) of "household"?
15. It is submitted by Mr Gibbon that the children can constitute the household. The children are living together as a single household and, therefore, it is a dwellinghouse. The parenthesis does not apply and, on the straightforward meaning of the words, you have here not more than 6 residents living together as a single household. Of course if any of the carers were resident, then they would have to be brought into account, but there would be no problem because obviously a resident carer would be properly regarded as part of the household, but the absence of a resident carer does not prevent it being a household.
16. It seems to me that the Inspector's approach was, in this respect, correct, inasmuch as he was regarding the household as needing more than just children. Children need to be looked after. They cannot run a house. They cannot be expected to deal with all the matters that go to running a home. Sometimes, of course, one recognises they are forced to do so, but as a matter of principle and approach the whole point of these homes is that the children are regarded as needing full-time care from an adult, someone to look after them, someone to run their lives for them and someone to make sure that the household operates as it should. It seems to me that in the context "household" means more than merely the bodies. You have to consider whether the bodies are capable of being regarded in the true sense as a household. The same would apply to those who suffer, for example, from physical or mental disability and who need care in the community. They, if they are not capable of looking after themselves, would not be regarded as a household, hence the need for the carer, hence the need for that addition to make it a household within the meaning of the relevant class.
17. One has to have regard to the need that they be living together as a single household. The question then arises whether carers who do not live but who provide, not necessarily through the same person, a continuous 24-hour care can be regarded as living together. In my view, the answer to that is no. Consistent with the approach indicated by the Circular, what is required is indeed residential care with a carer living in full-time and looking after those in the premises who otherwise would be unable to live as a household.
18. Now that I recognise is an approach which may well not accord with that set out by Popplewell J in the *Sinclair* case, which I have already mentioned. In that case the Council proposed to use a house as a family home for three mentally handicapped persons. Twenty-

four hour a day supervision was to be provided by social workers attending on a rota basis. They would not be living at the property although a room would be used as a bedroom by the care assistant who was there at night.

19. An application for judicial review of the decision that the proposed use was within Class C3(b), and so did not require planning permission, was made by a local resident. Permission had been refused on paper and the matter came before Popplewell J as a renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review. He cited Class C3(b), the relevant parts of paragraphs 25 and 27 of the Circular and went on at page 62B:

"The order does not say that the staff have to live together as a single household. It says the residents 'living together as a single household'. The residents here are the three residents and the staff come in from time to time. I do not find anything in the order which takes into account the presence of the staff as being involved in the concept of a single household. The bracketed words are simply '(including a household where care is provided for residents).'

I do not take the view that the staff have to be living together with the residents. I am of the view that this can properly be determined as a Class C3(b) case."

I am afraid I cannot agree with that approach. It seems to me that the concept of living together as a household means that, as I have put it, a proper functioning household must exist and, in the context of a case such as this, that must mean that the children and a carer must reside in the premises. Otherwise, as it seems to me, it clearly falls within Class C2. It is apparent that the size of the institution is irrelevant for the purposes of C2. If it falls within that definition it is not to be regarded as a dwellinghouse, then whether there are 1, 2, 10 or 15 children makes no difference to the Class. It does, however, clearly make a difference in planning terms when one considers the second point, which is whether there was, in the context of this case, a material change of use.

20. Although it may sound somewhat illogical, it is accepted by both Mr Fletcher and Mr Gibbon that, notwithstanding that this may fall within Class C2 rather than Class C3, nonetheless planning permission may not be required if the change of use was not a material change of use. I am bound to say that if an Inspector is satisfied that the use falls within C2 rather than C3, then it would appear that there is prima facie a change of use. Nonetheless, the Inspector is entitled, as indeed are the local planning authority, to consider whether that change of use was material. It will only be material if, as a matter of fact and degree in the circumstances of an individual case, the change of use was material.

21. The Inspector understandably deals with this very briefly. In paragraph 20 he states:

"In the alternative, the Council state that the change of use is a significant factor which when weighed with other changes to the character of the use of the premises amounts to a material change of use. Since I have found that the use is as a dwelling house, the alternative does not fall to be considered. There is nevertheless no indication from my consideration of all the representations and from my detailed inspection of the site and the surroundings, that there has been a change of use from a dwelling house which could, as a matter of fact and degree, be considered as being a material one."

Mr Fletcher attacks that on the basis that it is unreasoned, and the Inspector appears to be saying from the use of the word "could" that there is not even an arguable case that there has been a change of use.

22. The parties put forward extensive submissions to the Inspector and he clearly had them before him and had regard to them. The Council dealt with materiality over some four pages of its submissions. It set out what it submitted were the principles referred to and cases in support, in particular in paragraph 6.9 of its submissions. It made the point that the case law established that whether there had been a material change was a question of fact and degree and the fact that, in the broadest sense, the property continued to be used for residential purposes did not mean that there could not have been a material change of use. The court in the case of *London Borough of Richmond upon Thames v Secretary of State* [2001] JPL 84 indicated that matters which could be planning considerations might include the effects on the residential character of the area, strain on the welfare services and reduction on the stock of private accommodation available for renting. Points were made about traffic movements and various other factors were put forward.
23. True it is that the Inspector dealt very briefly with those matters. But it is plain that he had before him all the relevant submissions and all the relevant representations. He had inspected the site and he had considered all the issues. He sets out at the beginning of his determination a description of the site and surroundings and of the background. It would have been better, no doubt, had he referred in more detail to the submissions which had been made and explained why he rejected them. Nevertheless, it is, in my view, clearly implicit in what he says that he had considered them and that he had rejected them as being matters which indicated a material change of use.
24. Mr Fletcher accepts that it would have been open to the Inspector to have decided that the change of use was not material but he should, if he was to reach that conclusion, have indicated more clearly why. I do not dissent from that proposition in the sense that I too would have preferred that he had indicated more clearly why. But one has to be careful in accepting a reasons challenge. It seems to me that if, in reality, it is plain that the Inspector has considered the matters and has reached a decision, which in law was open to him, then it would take a very strong case to quash that purely on the ground that the reasons were not as extensively set out as they should have been.
25. The only matter which has given possible cause for concern is the use of the word "could." But, in my view, it does not bear the construction which Mr Fletcher suggests is the possible one. All that the Inspector is saying is that in his judgment the matters put forward do not mean that the change of use is a material one. It is true he does not express himself as happily as he might, but as a matter of pure English reading that sentence does not, in my view, lead one to conclude that he had misdirected himself in approaching it on the basis of arguability rather than fact.
26. Accordingly, in my view, the Inspector was wrong to regard this as falling within C3(b) rather than C2, and that the Council's contentions are and were correct. C3 does require at least one residential carer, together with of course those who are being cared for. On the facts of this case, and I emphasise limited to the facts of this case, the Inspector was correct to decide that there was no material change of use in the circumstances.
27. Accordingly, although it may be expressed slightly unhappily in the context of my decision, and indeed in the way the Inspector approached it in his decision, the use for up to two children, with care provided by up two non-resident staff at these premises, and only at these premises, is, in the circumstances, a lawful use.
28. Accordingly, for those reasons, I dismiss this appeal.

29. MR GIBBONS: My Lord, in the light of that may I seek brief instructions before I make any further submissions?
30. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: Yes .
31. MR GIBBONS: My Lord, the question of costs arises from my point of view. Now the usual situation clearly, as your Lordship is aware, not only because the principal argument today is on Use Classes Order but also the Inspector, clearly I am entitled to make the formal submission that I have succeeded even though there has not been----
32. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: Yes, but nowadays we split costs rather more, do we not?
33. MR GIBBONS: My Lord, you have anticipated my very next observation, which is, if your Lordship is inclined, as it were, to take the CPR approach to this rather than the more old-fashioned approach.
34. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: I think I have to, do I not?
35. MR GIBBONS: Clearly, my fallback position would be no order as to costs.
36. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: I am thinking along those lines.
37. MR FLETCHER: My Lord, I am very happy with my learned friend's fallback position.
38. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: I think that in the circumstances, and having regard to the issues, I know it is palm tree to some extent, but costs almost always is. I think no order for costs is the fair order. No further applications?
39. MR FLETCHER: No, my Lord.