



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Land Adjacent Atlas Business Park,
Simonsway, Wythenshawe

5 No. Industrial Units (39,536sq m)

FOR: Aviva Life & Pensions UK Ltd

VERSION A: 17th January 2023

REFERENCE: 2022/0587/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Land Adjacent to Atlas Business Park

2022/0587/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported with Further Points for Consideration

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed development is suitable for this area, it is in keeping with similar uses in the area, and the layout of the development is broadly acceptable with regards to designing out crime. There are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report including, but not limited to, the below:

- Access into the development from Simonsway should be capable of being controlled.
- Boundary treatments should be carefully considered to maintain a secure site and access around the site.
- Physical security, CCTV, lighting, and access control are vital to the security of the development.

It is highly recommended that these points are considered, along with the remaining points in section 3.3 of the report.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org

draft

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

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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the area of Wythenshawe, within the city of Manchester.

The site is roughly square, and the boundaries are defined by Simonsway to the North, to the East the site boundary is defined by Styal Road, to the South the site boundary is defined by airport car parking Jet Parks), and to the West the site boundary is defined by Atlas business park.

The site is currently vacant with some areas of hardstanding and an access road, with a substation at the main entrance, but in most areas the site is seeded with some shrubbery. The site boundaries are well defined with a high railing.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2021 to 31st November 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
8	<5	9	28	<5	<5	<5	24	5	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is low for Manchester. Less serious wounding and theft from motor vehicle are the highest recorded crime types taking place within the local area, with a hotspot of offences occurring to the east of the site around Heald Green train station.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding has taken place throughout the local area. Assaults, public order offences and harassment have been the highest recorded offences, with domestic disputes and incidents between known associates most commonly reported.
- 2.1.3 Theft from motor vehicle has also taken place across the local area, with a hotspot to the east of the site towards Heald Green train station. Offenders tend to target cars left unattended in car parks or streets and have used objects and implements to smash glazing in car windows to gain access and steal items within.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements/ tools to gain access.

Possible Solution – A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering or attack. Avoid locating openings in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed.

- 2.2.2 Opening secure doors using bodily force and implements/tools to gain entry to property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.3 Open access to service yards has allowed offenders to enter freely before targeting restricted areas.

Possible Solution - Robust boundary treatments will deter access to the site for offenders. The integrity of the boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Gates at the entrance to service areas should be only opened to allow passage of vehicles once the authenticity of the driver has been confirmed. The periphery of the building should be easy to monitor, with no recesses or protrusions that could provide cover for criminal activity. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting, and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.8 and 4.9 can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines or CCTV coverage. Storage / parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing.

- 2.2.4 Theft of staff property or unattended / insecure items of personal property.

Possible Solution - There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed further access to all areas. The reception should be staffed at all times whilst the building is open, and all visitors should be required to report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the site. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work.

2.3 Risk Factors


The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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
2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Industrial): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Manchester industrial premises peaks on Sunday/Monday.

Time Range: During the day, the risk peaks late at night and during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target such commercial premises at these times when it is dark, industrial areas/streets are typically quiet, units are usually closed or operate with fewer staff and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.




2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** At Manchester industrial premises, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements (particularly metal bars and vehicles) in order to gain access.
- In a number of cases, the point of entry was 'unknown'. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers, visitors, or employees before gaining access to back-of-house/staff areas and stealing property unnoticed.
- Doors have been forced open using tools/implements or when they have been left insecure by members of staff.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Offenders have penetrated through walls and roofs to gain unauthorised access.

2.5 Theft (Manchester Industrial): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.





2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft from industrial units in Manchester peaks on Saturday.

2.5.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the late morning/afternoon. There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property within buildings (e.g. cash, bags, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from service yards.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Wednesday and Thursday during the late evening and early morning when it is dark. Offenders have mostly targeted vehicles parked on streets where they are often left unsupervised for long periods of time in areas where footfall is reduced, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development is of for a logistics and light industrial development (Use Class B2, B8 and E(g)(iii)) comprising five no. units totalling 411,300sq ft of floorspace, including ancillary office space, with associated landscaping, amenity space, car parking, cycle infrastructure, refuse storage, substations, and vehicular access off Simonsway

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

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The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.3.1 The proposed industrial units are likely to be staffed at all times, reducing the potential for criminal and antisocial activity.
- 3.3.2 There is only one vehicular access point into the site, allowing traffic entering the site to be monitored and restricted easily.
- 3.3.3 The footprints of the proposed buildings are relatively simple and contain few recesses that could provide concealment for offenders or those antisocially minded.
- 3.3.4 Car parking will be provided for staff and visitors where they can generally be viewed from the industrial units.
- 3.3.5 Bicycle parking will be provided to the front of the industrial units.
- 3.3.6 The adjacent plots are not easily accessible and do not provide opportunities for offenders to gain entry to the site.

3.4 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.4.1 The existing perimeter boundary treatment provides a good level of security and will prevent would-be offenders from easily accessing the site. Any alterations that are made to the boundary (i.e. to accommodate access) should avoid creating insecurities. If a new fence is installed to the perimeter, it should be a 3000mm high close-knit paladin fence (i.e. 358 panel).
- 3.4.2 To deter criminals and those antisocially minded, it is recommended that the proposed main entrance to the business park has a form of vehicular/pedestrian control to restrict access to genuine vehicles during the night when the industrial building can be staffed at lower levels and targeted more frequently.
- 3.4.3 The service yards of the proposed units should be secure. Fence and vehicular/pedestrian gates should be to a height of 2400mm, to prevent them being easily scaled, and of robust construction to prevent them being damaged to gain entry. It is recommended that a close knit paladin fence is used, such as a 358 style panel.
- 3.4.4 The access roads and car parking areas should be illuminated to the minimum standards set out in BS 5489. Bays should be clearly lined any direction markings should be clearly demarcated; to reduce the potential for conflict. Access to the car parking areas associated with the individual units should be restricted with an arm barrier or gates, restricting access to legitimate users, and preventing misuse.
- 3.4.5 Secure bicycle stores should be provided at each unit for staff to securely park bicycles whilst working. It is highly recommended that bicycle parking is provided within secure, weatherproof shelters, with access restricted to genuine users. Cycle parking areas should be illuminated to a high standard.
- 3.4.6 The sides and rears of the proposed units should be secured to restrict access to staff and for maintenance, to prevent access to these areas which cannot be easily seen and could allow an offender to operate. Fence and vehicular/pedestrian gates should be to a height of 2400mm, to prevent them being easily scaled, and of robust construction to prevent them being damaged to gain entry. It is recommended that a close knit paladin fence is used, such as a 358 style panel.
- 3.4.7 Solid block walls, or a similar resilient layer, should be provided behind any lightweight cladding to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.
- 3.4.8 Shutters and sectional overhead doors have been regularly targeted by offenders to gain access to industrial properties in the Trafford area. To prevent shutters or sectional overhead doors being forced open they should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR 2).
- 3.4.9 The site entrance, boundaries, and pedestrian/vehicle routes should be covered by a site wide CCTV system. Illumination throughout the site should be of a high standard to allow good CCTV when it is dark. The proposed units should have the infrastructure should be provided for tenants to be able to easily install alarm systems and CCTV cameras.

- 3.4.10 Signage should be used to direct people through the development - to the appropriate units, parking spaces, service areas and office entrances.
- 3.4.11 Staff lockers should be provided, and in a location where there is a high level of activity and surveillance, so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

4.2 Windows, Curtain Walling, Cladding & Shutters

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.
- ☐ Solid block walls should be provided behind any lightweight cladding to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover each building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.
- ☐ If an alarm isn't installed then the infrastructure should be provided for one to be easily installed.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - External doors
 - Gates

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Vehicular/pedestrian gates should be installed at the main entrance to the development so that pedestrian/vehicular traffic can be restricted and regulated as necessary (i.e. at night-time).
- ☐ Secure boundary treatments (including service yard boundaries) should generally be 2400mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.
- ☐ Any new site boundaries should be a minimum of 3000mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.
- ☐ There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling into secure areas.
- ☐ The site boundary treatment should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
 - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
 - A key operable deadlock
- ☐ Double gates should have lockable (or externally inaccessible) drop bolts to each leaf.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

4.10 Car Parks

- ☐ Lighting to car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489 and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

4.11 Other

- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible, and accountable.

- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
15/12/2022	Thomas Lord	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
20071 PL 201	Proposed Site Plan	11/11/22	H

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
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