



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Plot N, Mayfield Re-Development

Multi Storey Car Pack (13,500sqm)

For: Mayfield Development Partnership LP

Version B: 26/06/23

Ref: 2019/0173/CIS/03

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Plot N, Mayfield Re-Development

2019/0173/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Application supported

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

In general, the proposed scheme has been found acceptable, but further consideration of some aspects is advised, as stated in section 3.3 of this report, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings
- Secure cycle store provision
- Access control for entrance lobbies
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application subject to the design team suitably addressing the recommendations contained in the report (Sections 3.3, 4 & 5), and will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

e: david.maher@gmp.police.uk

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
2.1	Crime Summary	
2.2	Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
2.3	Risk Factors - Car Park/ Cycle Storage	
2.4	Risk Factors - Retail	
2.5	Risk Factors – Cafes / Restaurants	
2.6	Non-Domestic Burglary Car Park: Risk Analysis	
2.7	Theft Car Park: Risk Analysis	
2.8	Non-Domestic Burglary Bike Storage: Risk Analysis	
2.9	Theft Bike Cycle: Risk Analysis	
2.10	Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises	
2.11	Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis	
2.12	Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	14
3.1	Proposed development	
3.2	Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
3.3	Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	16
4.1	Doors, Windows, Glazing, & Building Fabric	
4.2	Lighting	
4.3	Pay Machines, Help Points, & Signage	
4.4	Lighting	
4.5	CCTV	
5	Management & Maintenance	17
6	Useful References	18
6.1	Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	19
B	Associated Documents.....	19
C	CIS Version History	20
D	Glossary	21

1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is set within the re-generated Mayfield Park, a new public green space within the city centre .

The site is adjacent to a mix of student high-rise residential buildings and a hotel. The site recently housed a number of disused industrial buildings which have been demolished.

The level of public transport links for the area are good with local bus routes on London Rd and Piccadilly train station & Tram stop a 2 minute walk to the north of the site.

At various times across the day, Baring St contains a high number of waiting taxis waiting to pick up at Piccadilly station.




Bond St (adjacent to the Mancunian Way), contains a high number of parked vehicles. Generally people taking advantage of free parking on the edge of the city. There was evidence of shattered car glazing in a number of areas along Bond St suggesting this is a crime hotspot for vehicle crime which has been confirmed by our analysis.

Located below the Mancunian Way, facing the London Rd junction is the ProjektsMCR skate park. A well-used private skate park facility offering a café, meeting rooms and educational facilities.

Due to the nature of the new green space, the park has seen a large number of visitors and local workers using the park across the day. The park is well managed and has continuous on site presence with support team or landscape members.

Across the red line redevelopment plan there are significant level changes.

The site has been boarded up with timber hoarding around the perimeter.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
12	29	71	285	129	49	7	96	15	17

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate for the local area is average for the Manchester district. In the local area, the most frequently occurring offences over the last 12 months have been vehicle crime, less than serious wounding and theft. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 The majority of less serious wounding is taking place to the north west of the proposed site, around Piccadilly and Fairfield Street junction. The majority of assaults are occurring during the late hours of the evening and into the early hours of the morning during the weekend, when there is an increase in visitors into the city centre and licenced premises have longer opening times. In most instances the victim and offender are intoxicated when the assault takes place.
- 2.1.3 The majority of thefts are occurring around Piccadilly train station, particularly at the junction of London Road and Fairfield Street, offences of theft have also occurred at Mayfield Depo. The thefts are mostly of personal property, bags and mobile phones, with pick pocketing being the most common method, as well as the removal of insecure bags and phones stored on tables and backs of chairs. Offences have also included the theft of council wheel clamps. Offenders have removed clamps from the vehicle and made off with the clamp.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime is mostly taking place around Piccadilly train station which is located north of the proposed site, as well as Hoyle Street to the east of the site. The vehicle crime which is occurring is mostly theft from a motor vehicle, with smashed glazing and the removal of vehicle registration plates using tools. Offenders are mostly targeting vehicles parked securely in private car parks as well as on public streets.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Theft of motor vehicles.

Possible Solution – To minimise the risk of theft of vehicles:

- *include vehicle barriers, which can only be activated with a code, token or key card;*
- *prevent offenders casually entering the car park by installing high, visually permeable, perimeter fencing;*
- *limit the number of entry points to the car park and try to ensure entrances are in a location where there is an element of passive supervision;*
- *employ an attendant should to supervise the car park and assist customers as required;*
- *install a CCTV system; and, install appropriate lighting.*

2.2.2 Theft from motor vehicles.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk of theft from vehicles:

- *prevent offenders casually entering the car park by installing high, visually permeable, perimeter fencing;*
- *limit the number of entry points to the car park and try to ensure entrances are in a location where there is an element of passive supervision;*
- *employ an attendant should to supervise the car park and assist customers as required;*

- signs should be erected to remind customers not to leave valuable visible with their vehicle;
- CCTV cameras should monitor the car park; and, the site should be illuminated in accordance with the British Standards for car parking lighting.

2.2.3 Criminal / accidental damage to motor vehicles.

Possible Solution - To minimise the risk damage to vehicles in the car park:

- prevent desire lines forming between cars by clearly defining pedestrian routes that are connect directly to car park entry points and pay points;

do not located pay points in areas where pedestrians may come into conflict with vehicles; and, if defined, parking bays should large enough to accommodate larger vehicles.

2.2.4 Opening of secured doors using implements such as crowbars or hammers at retail premises.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

2.2.5 Forcing open shutters using crowbar-like implements or by ramming with vehicles at retail premises.

Possible Solution – Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

2.2.6 Retail/Restaurant/Café: Entering the property as a legitimate customer and then moving into restricted areas, usually through insecure counters or doors.

Possible Solution – There should a be robust access control system in place (see Section 5.1) to ensure that public access is not possible to staff-only areas. All individual back-of-house rooms/offices/stores etc. should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. CCTV covering till points should be incorporated into the interior design of the space.

2.2.7 Retail/Restaurant/Café: Offenders targeted insecure personal property, namely mobile phones, cash and bags.

Possible Solution - Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

2.3 Risk Factors - Car Park/ Cycle Storage

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

-
- Cash robbery/attacks on vending machines
 - Controlled access (staff/user only)
 - Safety of children
 - Loitering groups
 - Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
 - Robbery
 - Employee theft
 - Theft of personal belongings at work
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property




2.5 Risk Factors – Cafes / Restaurants

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence / conflict if licensed
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary Car Park: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against Car Park, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at car parking premises in Manchester peaks on a Monday and Saturday during the early hours of the morning (3am – 6am). Offenders target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is usually dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that there is a lower risk of being caught or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open shutters using implements in order to gain entry.
- Tailgating residents/ employees into secure car parking areas.
- Posing as a legitimate visitor to residential apartments and by means of tailgating staff/ exploitation of insecure doors gain access to communal areas.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors

2.7 Theft Car Park: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against car park, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at car parking facilities in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week peaking on a Thursday and Sunday during the morning and into the afternoon (9am – 2:30pm). Offenders have targeted parked vehicles and by means of broken glazing, gained entry to vehicles and removed personal belongings.

2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary Bike Storage: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against Bike Storage facilities recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at car parking premises in Manchester peaks on a Monday and Saturday during the early hours of the morning (3am – 6am). Offenders target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is usually dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that there is a lower risk of being caught or identified.

2.8.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the building.
- Forcing open shutters in order to gain access to the building, using bodily pressure and tools.
- Exploitation of insecure doors,
- Using tools in order to obtain bicycles.

2.9 Theft Bike Cycle: Risk Analysis




The data below relates to thefts within/against Bike Storage facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at bike storage facilities in Manchester peaks on a Tuesday and Wednesday during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders have targeted bicycles stored within communal buildings and within residential car parking. Tools have been used to remove the bicycles - chains often cut.

2.10 Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.10.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.10.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.11 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.11.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.

2.12 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.12.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Wednesday and Saturday during the afternoon (11am – 3pm). Offenders often target vehicles during the afternoon, as vehicles particularly around the city centre are left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Erection of an 11 storey car park to provide 487 parking spaces with basement cycle parking comprising circa 450 spaces alongside active basement and ground floor usage (Use Class E). The application is for a S.73 amendment to permission 132255/JO/2021 which was approved on July 29 2022.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The redevelopment of the site will provide an interesting and diverse use, offering employment opportunities, pedestrian activities and another interesting piece of architecture and open public space within this district of the city.
- 3.2.2 The building proposes several ground floor activities increase the levels of pedestrian and public uses. In-turn these offer the advantage of good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 Crime around the Mayfield area is average for the city centre. There will be an onsite private management/security team patrolling the area regularly which will deter offenders from operating in the area and, potentially, from targeting the proposed multi-storey car park.
- 3.2.4 Facilities with multiple entrances and exits can often provide offenders and those antisocially minded with various escape routes, facilitating offending. The plans indicate that customers will be directed through a single entrance/exit (the pay machine lobby) rather than having a choice of multiple entrances/exits.
- 3.2.5 The design of the proposed cladding system at ground floor will make it difficult to deface (i.e. by spray painting graffiti).
- 3.2.6 Bays and directional markings will be clearly demarcated.
- 3.2.1 The site will be covered by a comprehensive monitored CCTV and lighting system.
- 3.2.2 Security measure carefully incorporated into the environment and building design can ensure that buildings and the environment is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime or safety. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The car park should include access controls on all entrances – vehicular and pedestrian. Access should only be available to those holding an appropriate ticket/permit. Electronically operated barriers/doors should secure the vehicles entrance and exit, whilst electronic locks should secure the pedestrian doors.
- 3.3.2 All external pedestrian doors should include door closers which fully engage the locking mechanisms upon closure. Escape doors should be used for escape purposes only and not for general circulation. Escape doors should be signed and alarmed to deter customers from using these routes.
- 3.3.3 Staff should be present throughout the day to conduct regular patrols of the facility.
- 3.3.4 Payment machines should be covered by CCTV cameras. Cashless ticket machines should be installed, however if cash ticket machines are present they should be emptied regularly and cash should be stored in a safe certified to the relevant Loss Prevention Standard. If there is a cash room within the car park where the safe is located it should have solid blockwork walls (or reinforced studwork walls) and the door set should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.

-
- 3.3.5 Help points should be positioned on each floor so that users of the facility can speak to a member of the security team if necessary (i.e. in the case of an emergency).
 - 3.3.6 The car park should be illuminated in accordance with to BS 5489 – see table L1 below.
 - 3.3.7 Parking bays should be generous enough to accommodate large vehicles (i.e. SUV, Crossover & 4x4) to reduce the potential for conflict between users.
 - 3.3.8 Clear signage should direct traffic and pedestrians to the appropriate exit.
 - 3.3.9 There should be a comprehensive CCTV system covering the parking facility. Cameras should cover all pedestrian and vehicular entrance points, all parking floors, and the building elevations.
 - 3.3.10 Access into staff only areas should be restricted to staff. Signage should be provided so that it is clear which areas are restricted to staff, to prevent confusion being used a legitimate excuse for accessing staff only areas.
 - 3.3.11 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors, Windows, Glazing, & Building Fabric

- ☐ External doors (including escape doors) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ All external and internal doors into lift/stair lobby areas must have viewing windows incorporated. The glazing within these doors must be laminated (see below) and the push and pull door furniture must be robust.
- ☐ Ground floor glazing must incorporate laminated glass with a minimum of 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.2 Lighting

- ☐ The way in which any parking facility is lit has a major impact on crime. Increased lighting levels in darks areas can reduce the fear of crime and reduce the opportunity for an offender to commit crime. The whole of the car park should also be lit to an adequate and uniform level and in accordance with BS 5489, see table L1 below.

Table L1: Lighting requirements for multi-storey/enclosed car parks

Areas	Av. lux	Min. lux	Uniformity
Parking bays and lanes	75	50	0.6
Ramps, corners and junctions	150	75	0.5
Vehicular entrances/exits	75 (night) 300 (day)	n/a	n/a
Pedestrian areas (stairs, lobbies etc)	100	50	0.5
Open roof level	30	10	0.33

Please Note:

- The Av (average) lux is the maintained average horizontal illuminance on the floor
- The Min (minimum) lux is the minimum horizontal illuminance at any location
- Reference should be made to BS 5489 part 9, for further information and guidance
- There may be scope for compromise on the above levels due to external factors

Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide

(or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ To assist with the spread of lighting within the car park decks, the surface materials should have a light-coloured finish.
- ☐ Special attention should be given to the levels of lighting around payment machines to ensure that people are not in darkness or shadow when handling cash.

4.3 Pay Machines, Help Points, & Signage

- ☐ Payment machines. These should be located in obvious positions where they can be easily observed and covered by CCTV. Do not site them in places where a person could be trapped or feel threatened

by others (who may just be queuing to pay). Site managers should carry out comprehensive risk assessments in relation to cash handling, appropriate to the method of payment.

- ☐ Help points should be positioned on each floor so that users of the facility can speak to a member of the security team if necessary (i.e. in the case of an emergency).
- ☐ Effective signage should be used throughout the site to direct users to spaces and exits, and include safety and security information. Security information is important to assist people in feeling comfortable using the facility and should be provided at all pay machines. This should include information about how the car park is managed and what to do / who to contact in case of emergency, or simply if they wish to report a broken lamp or offensive graffiti.

4.4 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.5 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ There should be a comprehensive security regime in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All

staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.



The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Regular inspection, repair and servicing of security features (lighting, signage, access controls, barriers, CCTV, pay machines, and help points).
- Security staff should conduct regular patrols of the facility
- Litter / graffiti removal

- 5.1.1 Landscaped/amenity areas around the site perimeter should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Useful References

6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 6.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
18/06/19	Deloitte	CIS application submitted
13/03/19	Deloitte	Development proposal meeting
06/08/19	Deloitte	Client confirmation
28/03/19	DfS	Site visit
04/09/19	DfS	CIS completed
23/05/23	Deloitte	Revised scheme presentation meeting
28/06/23	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
SK0027	Ground Floor Plan		
SK0028	Typical Floor Plan		
0436-SEW-ZZ-00-DR-L-001100		09/06/23	
0436-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-L-001104		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-00-DR-A-001100		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-01-DR-A-001101		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-02-DR-A-001102		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-03-DR-A-001103		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-04-DR-A-001104		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-05-DR-A-001105		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-06-DR-A-001106		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-07-DR-A-001107		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-08-DR-A-001108		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-09-DR-A-001109		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-10-DR-A-001110		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-B1-DR-A-001099		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001001		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001002		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001201		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001202		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001204		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001301		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001302		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001303		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001304		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001310		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001311		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001312		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001313		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001320		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001352		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001353		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001354		09/06/23	

0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001355		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-001356		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-006150		09/06/23	
0439-SEW-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-007150		09/06/23	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Scheme amended to incorporate additional uses at GF	26/06/23

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk