



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Plot 10B, First Street

GF Food & Beverage Use & Student
Residential

For: **House of Social 1 Ltd**

Version B: **06/01/23**

Ref: **2022/0439/CIS/02**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Plot 10B, First Street

2022/0439/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported with minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access to back-of-house areas.
- Access controls through the building
- install security certified doors, glazing and windows
- Secure lockers for staff

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design (SBD), accreditation. Should the recommendations as listed within Section 4 of this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

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Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.


The site is on the southern edge of central Manchester. It forms part of the First Street neighbourhood, a regeneration area between Whitworth Street West and the Mancunian Way. Proposals for the area include a mix of leisure, commercial, retail and residential developments, currently at various stages of implementation, set within high quality public realm.

The site has recently been used as a contractor's compound for projects on neighbouring sites. The area is likely to remain busy with construction-related activity while nearby developments are in progress. The relatively transient workforce provides anonymity for potential offenders.


To the south-west of the site on Medlock Street is the Mancunian Way roundabout, connecting to Hulme.

To the east of the site on River St a proposed development site has for some time been hoarded. Hoardings contain a high level of proficient graffiti and a large amount of drug taking litter and paraphernalia, including discarded needles was evident.

The site is well served with public transport services; bus routes on Medlock St/Whitworth St/Oxford St, Deansgate train station & Metrolink stop all within walking distance.



1 – View along River St.



2 – Hoardings on River St



3 – View towards Macintosh Mill




4 – View west along River St.



5 – View north along First St.



6 – Proposed site.



7 – Premier Inn on Medlock St.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2021 – 31st October 2022

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
64	69	141	927	288	66	21	297	43	81

- 2.1.1 The volume of recorded crime in this in the neighbourhood is very high, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft being the most common offences committed. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in, or within close proximity, of the city centre. Crime has taken place throughout the local area, particularly to the north east and west of the proposed site, around Oxford Road and Deansgate.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding and theft are prevalent around Oxford Road and Deansgate Locks. Assaults are mostly taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period, at time when licenced premises are at their busiest and open very late.
- 2.1.3 Theft is common in licenced premises in the area, with mobile phones and purses/ wallets being taken. Offenders have targeted insecure property stored on the back of seats and table tops, as well as employees personal property.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime is concentrated in the car parks around Chester Street and Hulme Street. Theft from a motor vehicle is the most common form of vehicle crime, with smashed glazing being the most common entry point to the vehicle. As well as the use of tools in order to remove vehicle registration plates.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified door-sets have resisted a series of professional attacks (using a variety of tools) including to the door itself, the frame, the locks and the fittings. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, security personnel or passers-by. Consideration should also be given to security-certified shutters (see Section 4) to protect particularly vulnerable doors.

- 2.2.2 **Café/Restaurant Premises:** Theft of personal property from tabletops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution - Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

- 2.2.3 **Café/Restaurant Premises:** Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

Possible solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. They are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.1 **Offenders gaining access through communal entrances to target rooms**

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining unauthorised entry through communal entrances to target resident's rooms:

- communal entrances should be located on the most prominent elevations and be illuminated through the hours of darkness;
- communal entry doors should be self-closing and automatically lock upon closure;
- employ a concierge to supervise entry to the building;
- inner lobby doors and/or the lifts should include access controls to prevent intruders gaining access beyond the lobby;
- install CCTV cameras in the lobby; and
- apartment, cluster-flat and study bedroom doors should be self-closing and self-locking.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **52% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **38% lower** than Greater Manchester and **37% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **35% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **11% lower** than Greater Manchester and **70% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **45% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **29% lower** than Greater Manchester and **13% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **49% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **145% higher** than Greater Manchester and **197% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Monday and Tuesday during the afternoon (11am – 1pm and 3pm – 5:30pm). Offenders often target properties during the day when residents are likely to be away from the property for long periods of the day whilst attending work, creating a perceived low risk opportunity by the offender.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point is recorded as “unknown” it is likely that offenders have exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Smashed glazing in windows using implements.
- Entering apartment buildings by means of force/ exploiting insecure entry points, gaining access to communal areas.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peak on a Tuesday and Saturday during the evening. Offenders often target vehicles during the evening as they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is comprised of 576 student bed residential units over 14 storeys.
- 3.1.2 A controlled reception space serves the ground floor entrance. The ground floor also contains student amenity lounge spaces.
- 3.1.3 The accommodation of the building is located from level 1 to 14. Ground floor and a mezzanine area will provide a food court F+B use. Further resident amenity uses at ground floor will accommodate laundry, gym and cycle storage uses. A small coffee kiosk will operate adjacent to the student entrance/exit.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring vitality to a site which has remained disused for a number of years. The building will present an active frontage to the public elevations around the site, which will help to improve natural surveillance of the surrounding public realm and animate the street scene. Occupation of the ground floor reception spaces is essential to provide the much-needed natural surveillance at street level and enliven the surrounding public realm as intended, which will help to discourage antisocial activity and more serious disorder around the development.
- 3.2.2 The building plot provides ground floor activity in the form of student amenity spaces, gym and reception space uses. In addition to the student uses the building at ground floor will also operate a food hall, providing a variety of food offerings. A small coffeeshop kiosk is located adjacent to the main student entrance/exit. In-turn these uses offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent streets, hotel car park and public realm.
- 3.2.3 The footprint of the building facing onto the public realm is relatively simple and free from deeply recessed concealed areas. Where ground floor amenity spaces have been located, consideration appears to have been taken through the use of external facing materials; glazing, providing good levels of activity.
- 3.2.4 Student amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.
- 3.2.5 The main entrance will be accessed via an electronic access control fob system for residents and staff. The arrangement of the lobby space is greeted and controlled via a concierge.
- 3.2.6 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Access into the building will be managed and controlled by a concierge at reception. An intercom will be provided from the entrance door to the reception desk. Visitors need to sign in at reception from where residents will collect them.
- 3.3.2 Residential post/parcel room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal delivery staff access to internal areas of the residential areas beyond the reception space. Mail boxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement. Due to the significant increase in on-line postal ordering, considerations should be given to appropriate post room area; avoiding parcels/post being left in an unsecure location. Further design details of these ancillary spaces are to be developed.

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- 3.3.3 Given the prolific high levels of graffiti within and around the site, it is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed, protected and supports the removal of graffiti.
 - 3.3.4 All elevations of the new building should be monitored by CCTV with a complementary lighting system to illuminate it throughout the hours of darkness.
 - 3.3.5 **Food Hall Premises:** Staff should be provided with a secure area to store personal belongings (i.e. lockers) within a secure area of the school building which is restricted to staff, such as the staff room.
 - 3.3.6 **Food Hall Premises:** The most frequently occurring crime in restaurants, and licensed premises, is the theft of personal property (i.e. handbags, purses, mobile phones) placed on tables/chairs, or the floor, for this reason it is highly recommended that tables and chairs are designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.
 - 3.3.7 **Food Hall Premises:** Casual access to the rear of the bars/service counters should be restricted (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled) to prevent unauthorised access.
 - 3.3.8 **Food Hall Premises:** Licensed premises are often the scene of violent disorder. A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed so that any incidents will be recorded. The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: the main entrances in to the premises, all bar/service areas, toilet lobbies and customer circulation/seating areas.
 - 3.3.9 **Food Hall Premises:** Restaurants and bars in the area have frequently been targeted by burglars. It is highly recommended that the premises should be covered with a monitored alarm (with response).
 - 3.3.10 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves, visitors to be greeted in reception by the resident.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950. Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P2A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Main Entrance doors
 - Secondary entrance doors off internal lobbies
 - Bin stores
 - Cycle stores
 - Staff-only areas
 - Cluster apartment access

4.6 Landscaping

- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [foyer](#), [stairs](#), [lift lobbies](#), [landings](#), [cycle stores](#), [bin store entrances](#).

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is

also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20/10/2022	Deloitte LLP / TGA	Meeting with architect
28/06/2022	Deloitte LLP	CIS application
10/11/2022	Deloitte LLP	CIS instruction received
07/10/2022	DfS	Site visit
18/11/2022	Deloitte LLP / TGA	Drawings received
16/11/2022	DfS	Invoice issued
15/12/2022	Deloitte LLP	CIS version A issued
06/01/2023	Deloitte LLP	CIS version B issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1172-TGA-XX-ZZ-DR-A-10029-P04	General Arrangement Ground Floor Plan		
1172-TGA-XX-ZZ-DR-A-10030-P04	General Arrangement Mez Floor Plan		
1172-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03003-P03	General Arrangement - Level 02 (Typical)		
1172-TGA-XX-00-DR-A-03016-P03	General Arrangement - Level 15 (Roof Plan)		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Amendments made to 3.3.1 / 4.5 / 4.9	06/01/23

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk