



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Hyde Road

Self-Storage (7,428sqm)

For: **Crown Advisory**

Version B: **25/04/23**

Ref: **2022/0509/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

---

# Hyde Road

2022/0509/CIS/01

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Development Supported – Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- External lighting
- Site wide CCTV
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti
- Management & maintenance regime

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

**Please note:** Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition for Secured by Design is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

**David Maher** *Dip Arch*  
Consultant

e: david.maher@gmp.police.uk

---

# Contents

|   |                                                   |    |
|---|---------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1 | Visual Audit.....                                 | 4  |
| 2 | Crime Statistics & Analysis.....                  | 5  |
|   | 2.1 Crime Summary                                 |    |
|   | 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)    |    |
|   | 2.3 Risk Factors                                  |    |
|   | 2.4 Industrial Units Burglary Risk Analysis       |    |
|   | 2.5 Industrial Units Theft Risk Analysis          |    |
|   | 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis                  |    |
| 3 | Layout Appraisal.....                             | 9  |
|   | 3.1 Proposed development                          |    |
|   | 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal              |    |
|   | 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations            |    |
| 4 | Physical Security .....                           | 11 |
|   | 4.1 Doors                                         |    |
|   | 4.2 Windows, Curtain Walling, Cladding & Shutters |    |
|   | 4.3 Glazing                                       |    |
|   | 4.4 Alarms                                        |    |
|   | 4.5 Access Control                                |    |
|   | 4.6 Boundaries                                    |    |
|   | 4.7 Landscaping                                   |    |
|   | 4.8 Lighting                                      |    |
|   | 4.9 CCTV                                          |    |
|   | 4.10 Other                                        |    |
| 5 | Management & Maintenance .....                    | 13 |
| 6 | Construction .....                                | 13 |
| 7 | Useful References .....                           | 14 |
|   | 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)                       |    |

## Appendix

|   |                           |    |
|---|---------------------------|----|
| A | Contact register .....    | 15 |
| B | Associated Documents..... | 15 |
| C | CIS Version History ..... | 15 |
| D | Glossary .....            | 16 |

# 1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site lies on the south-eastern edge of Manchester city centre. The local area is a mix of residential and industrial & commercial; having developed with small-scale textile factories, warehousing, and wholesale businesses.

The site is currently being used as a car sales commercial business. To the rear on Apsley Grove, the neighbouring sites contain commercial businesses.



Due to the proximity to city centre and Manchester Arena, there is considerable demand for car parking space in the area. As a result, parking in isolated locations within this area is reflected in the high crime rates for Vehicle crime, less serious wounding, and robbery.

There are what appear to be several vacant plots and buildings in the area; these are frequently neglected and can become a target for ASB and criminal activity. In turn this creates the impression that the environment is not cared for, and that abuse is tolerated.

A variety of measures have been used to protect premises from unauthorised access via the introduction of metal bars and security shutters to ground floor windows and doors and barbed wire.

To the immediate right of the site is a public footpath which is strewn with litter.

Apsley Grove is poorly managed and litter is contained along the street. The general impression is unmanaged & enhances feelings of insecurity.



7 – Residential building on Apsley Grove.




6 – Public footpath from Hyde Rd to Apsley Grove.



5 – Adjacent businesses on Hyde Rd.




1 – View towards the site from Hyde Rd.



2 – View west along Hyde Rd.



3 – Commercial unit opposite the site.



4 – View east along Hyde Rd.

## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> October 2021 to 30<sup>th</sup> September 2022.

### 2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| 13                | 21                    | 75              | 286                   | 92    | 28      | 6                | 50                       | 26                     | <5            |

- 2.1.1 The general volume of recorded crime in the local area is high, with the most prevalent types of crime being vehicle crime, less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft (including of fuel and of personal items, such as mobile phones, bank cards etc.). These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding has taken place throughout the local area, particularly to the west of the proposed site. Offences have mostly occurred within residential properties and streets, involving domestic disputes and incidents between known associates.
- 2.1.3 Thefts have occurred throughout the area particularly around a fuelling station located on Ardwick Green South. Offenders have fuelled their vehicles and made off without payment. Offenders have also targeted vehicle clamps belonging to Manchester City Council. In residential areas offenders have targeted parcels which have been left outside the property.
- 2.1.4 Theft from a motor vehicle has most commonly been reported, whereby offenders have smashed glazing or targeted insecure vehicles, removing items from within. As well as removing vehicle registration plates using tools.

### 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

#### 2.2.1 Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements/ tools to gain access.

*Possible Solution – A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering or attack. Avoid locating openings in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed.*

#### 2.2.2 Opening secure doors using bodily force and implements/tools to gain entry to property.

*Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.*

#### 2.2.3 Open access to service yards has allowed offenders to enter freely before targeting restricted areas.

*Possible Solution - Robust boundary treatments will deter access to the site for offenders. The integrity of the boundary treatments should be evaluated and regularly checked for defects. Gates at the entrance to service areas should be only opened to allow passage of vehicles once the authenticity of the driver has been confirmed. The periphery of the building should be easy to monitor, with no recesses or protrusions that could provide cover for criminal activity. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting, and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.8 and 4.9 can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines or CCTV coverage. Storage / parking areas close to boundaries should also be avoided as they may mask any damage to perimeter fencing.*

#### 2.2.4 Theft of staff property or unattended / insecure items of personal property.

---

*Possible Solution - There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed further access to all areas. The reception should be staffed at all times whilst the building is open, and all visitors should be required to report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the site. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work.*

#### **2.2.5 Damaging fencing and gates using tools in order to access the industrial unit.**

*Possible Solution – A robust boundary treatment should be used to define the site perimeter. The boundary treatment should be capable of withstanding opportunistic attacks with hand tools. Boundary treatments should be installed on hardstanding so that offenders cannot crawl under and of a height sufficient to deter climbing.*

*Gates should be of robust material and to the same height as surrounding boundaries. The gap between the gate and the ground should be minimised to reduce the potential of an offender crawling under. The design of the gate should not include any horizontal bars or exposed hinges that could assist climbing.*




### **2.3 Risk Factors**

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Controlled access (staff/user only)
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Robbery
- Employee theft
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

## 2.4 Industrial Units Burglary Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at industrial units in the Manchester area peaks on a Monday and Sunday during the evening and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target industrial properties in the evening and early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements (mostly metal bars and vehicles) in order to gain access to doors and windows located beneath.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Posing as a legitimate customer/ visitor and accessing restricted areas.
- Forcing open perimeter fencing and gates using tools and vehicles.
- Climbing onto the roof of the building and using tools in order to remove tiles and enter the property.
- Removing bricks from the wall using tools in order to gain access.

## 2.5 Industrial Units Theft Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against industrial units, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft from industrial units in the Manchester area peaks on a Saturday during the morning and into the afternoon (9am – 4pm). There are two common occurrences of theft – the theft of personal property from within buildings (e.g. cash, bags, wallets/purses etc.) and the theft of tools, materials and plant stolen from service yards.

## 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Wednesday - Saturday during the afternoon (1pm – 3:30pm). Offenders often target vehicles during the afternoon as vehicles are likely to be left unattended, out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

---

## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal seeks to develop land currently used as a commercial business for car sales.
- 3.1.2 The proposed development will provide 1 Class B8 units with office and storage space. The scheme has been arranged so the main entrance frontage will face surrounding streets.
- 3.1.3 On site car parking will form part of the proposals providing a total of 20 spaces; 4 spaces accessed off Hyde Road and 16 off Aspley Grove.
- 3.1.4 A bin store and bicycle store will be provided and accessed from Aspley Grove.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.
- 3.2.2 The proposal provides a new use and the redevelopment of the site. Greater opportunities for additional natural surveillance within and around the sites will support a safer community.
- 3.2.3 Access to the sides and rear of the units should be controlled using fence lines aligned with the front or side elevations of the buildings, to create an obvious division between the communal frontage of the site and the more secluded areas behind the buildings, where an intruder could operate without fear of detection. It is recommended the installation of lockable side gates should be implemented to create an obvious divide between site and units across the scheme.
- 3.2.4 Given the development sites location and the current level of illegal 'fly-tipping' around the vicinity it is important that all boundaries are covered under a site wide CCTV system. A management plan should be developed and submitted, incorporating regular removal and cleaning the pavements of litter and graffiti. Removal of litter on a weekly basis will challenge the 'Broken window' theory whereby it becomes the norm & acceptable that litter & graffiti is allowed to happen. Removal of these issue help create a sense of pride and community within the area in-turn helping to create an atmosphere of order and lawfulness, thereby preventing more serious crimes from happening.
- 3.2.5 It is essential that all the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and visitors.

### 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

- 3.3.1 Review of boundaries. New boundary fencing should be 2.4m high minimum (see section 4.9). This should include the division between the site and the neighbouring premises.
- 3.3.2 Access to the sides and rear of the units should be controlled using fence lines aligned with the front or side elevations of the buildings, to create an obvious division between the communal frontage of the site and the more secluded areas behind the buildings, where an intruder could operate without fear of detection. It is recommended the installation of low-level knee railings / hoops should be implemented to create an obvious divide between site and units across the scheme.
- 3.3.3 Protection of buildings and fence lines from vehicular movements. Perimeter fencing and buildings should be protected from accidental vehicle damage by installation of wheel stops in parking bays or installation of crash barriers, bollards or kerbing. Areas for vehicle movement within the site should be well-defined and distinguished from parking areas and pedestrian routes – parking bays must be demarcated to clearly indicate where parking is permitted / not permitted.

- 
- 3.3.4 Access into the site/building outside of normal hours, when the building is not staffed, should be carefully considered. A comprehensive access control system should control access into both the car parking area and into the building, to ensure that only genuine users can gain access. The access control system used should be fully auditable, so that access logs can be examined in the event of any incidents.
- 3.3.5 The car parking area and all external doors should be illuminated to a high standard during the night to facilitate safe use of the facility, deter offenders or those antisocially minded from targeting the site/building, and facilitating passive surveillance of the development.
- 3.3.6 The development should be covered with a comprehensive CCTV system. At a minimum the system should cover the car parking area, all entrances to the building, the reception area, and the circulation cores of the building.
- 3.3.7 The building should be covered with a monitored alarm system which can be activated when the building is unstaffed. The alarm should be zoned that only areas required for out-of-hours use are disarmed when customers use the facility outside of staffed hours.
- 3.3.8 Shutters and sectional overhead doors have been regularly targeted by offenders to gain access to industrial properties in the Salford area. To prevent shutters or sectional overhead doors being forced open they should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR 2).
- 3.3.9 Solid block walls, or a similar resilient layer, should be provided behind any **lightweight** cladding to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.
- 3.3.10 Given the prolific high levels of graffiti within and around the site, it is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed protected and supports the removal of graffiti.
- 3.3.11 **Further Recommendations**
- CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements into and out of the site as well as each building. An audible warning system should be employed to alert to intruders that they have been detected and a response has been generated. To facilitate the CCTV system, dusk until dawn lighting should be provided for the site, particularly around the access doors/gates and loading bays. Signage should be located at the site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be recorded.
  - Staff lockers should be provided, and in a location where there is a high level of activity and surveillance, so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
  - Internally, the buildings should be capable of zoning so that entry to parts of the premises can be effectively controlled. Movements in and out of the buildings should be confined to specific areas and access controls used to ensure only authorised staff can enter controlled areas.
- 3.3.12 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and visitors.

---

## 4 Physical Security

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.*

### 4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2.

### 4.2 Windows, Curtain Walling, Cladding & Shutters

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.
- ☐ Solid block walls, or a similar resilient layer, should be provided behind any **lightweight cladding** to a height of 2400mm to prevent attacks to the cladding to gain access to buildings.

### 4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

### 4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the entire building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

### 4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - External doors
  - Gates
  - Staff only area

### 4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Secure boundary treatments should generally be 2400mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.
- ☐ There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling into secure areas.

- 
- ☐ The site boundary treatment should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
  - ☐ Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
    - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
    - A key operable deadlock
  - ☐ Double gates should have lockable (or externally inaccessible) drop bolts to each leaf.

#### 4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

#### 4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

#### 4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

#### 4.10 Other

- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures. For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: [http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS\\_Cycles.pdf](http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/DFS_Cycles.pdf)
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire-resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

## 5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security and maintenance regime for the management of the units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing the units, including staff arrival and departure.
- Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
- Details of staff security training.
- Location and management of any smoking areas.
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, lighting etc.
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc.
- A weekly physical check of all perimeters fencing to check for evidence of breaches; and
- Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- All high value equipment within communal areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

## 6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

---

## 7 Useful References

### 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact register

| Date     | Contact With | Summary of Contact               |
|----------|--------------|----------------------------------|
| 11/10/22 | Client       | Application submitted            |
| 10/03/23 | Client       | Client confirmed CIS report      |
| 24/10/22 | DfS          | Invoice issued                   |
| 22/02/23 | DfS          | Site visit                       |
| 23/02/23 | DfS          | CIS complete                     |
| 24/04/23 | Client       | Minor amendments to the proposal |
| 25/04/23 | DfS          | CIS Revised & issued             |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No.  | Drawing Title                                             | Date     | Rev |
|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|----------|-----|
| A1414(01)001 | Existing Location Plan                                    | 23/09/22 | P1  |
| A1414(02)001 | Proposed Site Plan                                        | 05/10/22 | P2  |
| A1414(02)002 | Proposed Floor Plans                                      | 08/10/22 | P3  |
| A1414(02)003 | Proposed Elevations                                       | 05/10/22 | P2  |
| A1414(02)004 | Proposed Elevations                                       | 05/10/22 | P2  |
| A1414(02)005 | Existing and Proposed Street Elevations- Proposed Section | 08/10/22 | P3  |
| A1414(02)006 | Proposed Boundary Treatments                              | 23/09/22 | P1  |
| A1414(02)007 | Proposed Bin Store                                        | 23/09/22 | P1  |
| A1414(02)008 | Proposed Signage Detail                                   | 23/09/22 | P1  |
| A1414(02)009 | Proposed Roller Shutter Detail                            |          |     |
|              |                                                           |          |     |
|              |                                                           |          |     |
|              |                                                           |          |     |
|              |                                                           |          |     |
|              |                                                           |          |     |
|              |                                                           |          |     |
|              |                                                           |          |     |
|              |                                                           |          |     |
|              |                                                           |          |     |
|              |                                                           |          |     |
|              |                                                           |          |     |
|              |                                                           |          |     |
|              |                                                           |          |     |

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made                              | Date     |
|---------|---------------------------------------------|----------|
| A       |                                             |          |
| B       | Minor amendment to the area and ramp access | 24/04/23 |

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.*

#### BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.*

#### ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

*The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:*

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

*This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.*

#### STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

#### STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

#### EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

*A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.*

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

#### CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

#### CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

#### INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

### Useful Websites

#### Design for Security

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### Secured by Design

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### RIBA Product Selector

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### LPCB – Red Book Live

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### Crime Reduction (Home Office)

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

[www.designagainstcrime.org](http://www.designagainstcrime.org)

#### Building for Life

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

#### CLG (Communities and Local Government)

[www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)