



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Greenheys Lane, Manchester Science Park
Commercial and Research/Development

For: **Bruntwood SciTech Limited**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **31/03/23**

design**for**security

Ref: **2023/0118/CIS/01**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported with minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- Service vehicle entrance/egress access
- Secure cycle store provision
- Access control for entrance lobbies
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition for Secured by Design certification is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

David Maher *Dip Arch*

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors - Offices	
	2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis – Offices	
	2.5 Theft Offices: Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	9
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	11
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Shutters	
	4.3 Windows	
	4.4 Glazing	
	4.6 Alarms	
	4.7 Access Control	
	4.8 Lighting	
	4.9 Landscaping	
	4.10 Communal Areas	
	4.11 Gates	
	4.12 CCTV	
5	Management & Maintenance	14
6	Construction	14
7	Useful References	14
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	15
B	Associated Documents.....	15
C	CIS Version History	15
D	Glossary	16

1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is bounded by Greenheys Lane to the west and Pencroft Way to the east. To the north are two ecclesiastical buildings and smaller commercial buildings. To the immediate southern boundary is a public footpath connecting Greenheys Lane to Pencroft Way. The public realm along this southern boundary is relatively new and creates a vibrant piece of public realm. Across the footpath is Manchester Science Park (MSP), a combination of commercial office buildings.





West of Greenheys Lane is made up of low-rise residential properties, a combination of social and private housing estate.

The site is overlooked by relatively recently constructed commercial office buildings. To the east of Pencroft Way is a new office development and public realm which connects into the wider Manchester University campus.

The majority of building plots within the MSP wider boundary have car parking. At the centre of the MSP is the Old Abbey Taphouse pub.

The site is near central Manchester (approx. 3km). Princess Road is well served with several public transport bus routes. A series of footpaths connect into the University campus and a short walk to Oxford Road and further bus routes.

The site is presently used partially as a surface car parking area and mixed-use commercial space.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2022 to 28th February 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
30	11	63	257	65	19	<5	29	10	47

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area is average for the Manchester division, with less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage being most commonly reported. Offences have occurred throughout the local area, with hotspots of offences situated at Booth Street West, and at the junction of Boundary Lane and Burlington Street to the north of the site. There is also a hotspot of offences on Oxford Road near to the University of Manchester Students' Union to the east, and around Acomb Street.
- 2.1.2 Assaults, public order offences and harassment have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place in the area. Offences have mostly occurred within commercial premises in the area and at the hotspot of offences at the junction of Boundary Lane and Burlington Street. Offences have mostly involved domestic disputes and incidents between known associates.
- 2.1.3 Thefts in the local area have mostly been taking place within/around the restaurants and retail premises around the site, mainly at locations along Oxford Road. Offenders have primarily targeted mobile phones, wallets/purses and cash by using pickpocketing and distraction methods to obtain the personal belongings, as well as targeting parcels and bags left unattended.
- 2.1.4 Criminal damage to properties has been the highest recorded criminal damage offence taking place. Offenders have damaged the front doors of dwellings and have also targeted the glazing in windows and doors of properties and vehicles by using implements to smash them. There have also been numerous cases of vandalism by graffiti being used for the purpose of defacing properties.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Secure windows and doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools to gain access to the building.**

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Avoid locating openings in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed.

- 2.2.2 **Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.**

Possible Solution - Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Portable equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular visitor access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

- 2.2.3 **Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property.**

Possible Solution - There should be a robust access control system in place to ensure that visitors to the buildings are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed further access into the building. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work.

- 2.2.4 **Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.**

Possible Solution - All ground floor or otherwise accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Windows in secluded locations may require additional protection from criminal damage, such as shutters or grilles.

2.2.5 Shutters have been prised open to target doors / windows behind them.

Possible Solution - All shutters should be certified to a recognised burglary-resistant standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR 2). Shutters certified to this standard can resist most attempts by offenders to gain access with the use of force. In high risk situations, shutters rated to a higher standard of resistance should be installed, and retractable bollards can be used to protect section overhead doors and shutters.

2.2.6 Entering premises and removing personal items (mostly mobile phones and bags) belonging to customers.

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with ‘Chelsea Clips’ to reduce the opportunities to steal bags / coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.


2.3 Risk Factors - Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Burglary Risk Analysis – Offices

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night / into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries committed in Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors, or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors and windows behind them.

2.5 Theft Offices: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



Day / Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours / staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Thursday during the afternoon and at midnight. Offenders often target vehicles during the afternoon as they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner. Offenders also tend to target vehicles late at night when there is less footfall and it is dark, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Full Planning application for construction of a 7-storey building comprising commercial floorspace across 6 occupiable floors (Use Class E), plus plant level above; in addition to associated cycle parking, hard and soft landscaping, access and servicing and other associated works.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will seek to create a connected community through enhancing existing routes and links across the public realm; in doing so this will allow economic growth for the area through the proposed developments and forged new links.
- 3.2.2 The proposals should provide good levels of ground floor activity; in-turn the building uses will offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent community space and public realm.
- 3.2.3 The main public realm circulation routes appear obvious, leading people directly to where they need to go. The proposals are intended to integrate with surrounding circulation routes.
- 3.2.4 The proposed development will result in an increase in footfall in the area, improving vitality across the wider area, providing additional natural surveillance, which can help promote a greater sense of safety on the street.
- 3.2.5 Glazed elevations to most of the public elevations will help to enliven the street scene and enhance natural surveillance of and from the building.
- 3.2.6 The reception lobbies have been laid out to allow staff within to effectively monitor personnel entering or leaving the building through the main entrance. Reception staff will also have a good view of the area immediately in front of the building allowing activity in this area to be easily supervised.
- 3.2.7 The layout of internal communal spaces is generally free of projections or recesses that could impede sight lines. Doors within communal corridors should contain a glazed element to improve informal surveillance.
- 3.2.8 Cycle storage for building users is provided in a designated space within the ground floor. Entry to the cycle store area must be restricted to genuine cyclists only and requires access-controlled doors.
- 3.2.9 The recognised approach to creating a safer public realm and cycle corridors supports an environment in which people want to live, work and visit.
- 3.2.10 Security measure carefully incorporated into the environment and building design can ensure that buildings and the environment is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime or safety. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The layout appears generally free of obstacles to vision allowing people to see and be seen within the area and maintains sight lines across the site. Planting and street furniture has been aligned to avoid creating potential hiding places and avoids blocking sight lines. However, the choice of trees and other plant species should allow some visible permeability through the canopies and foliage so that people cannot be concealed within the public spaces.
- 3.3.2 Street furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.

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- 3.3.3 The junctions between newly formed traffic free/controlled pedestrianised zones and existing traffic roads should be carefully considered. Maintenance of newly installed control measure (rising bollards, lighting, gates and all access control features), should be incorporated into the management & maintenance procedures.
 - 3.3.4 Lighting should provide good visual guidance and orientation, and support visibility for pedestrians, cyclists as well as for motorists. Due to the poor spread of light, bollard lighting is not encouraged.
 - 3.3.5 Consideration for safe bicycle storage should be embedded within the landscape design. Short-stay cycle parking stands should be located where they can be readily observed. The location of cycle stores within proposed buildings should consider the position, inherent physical security and safety of cyclists using the facility.
 - 3.3.6 Access beyond the reception lobby should be controlled so that intruders cannot easily reach restricted parts of the building. Access to the stair core and lifts from the entrance lobby should require passage through access-controlled turnstiles or doors. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required, to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/antisocial behaviour in / around the entrance lobbies.
 - 3.3.7 The reception should be staffed during standard office hours (i.e. 8am-6pm) to allow visitors to be vetted before being permitted access into the building. There should be a video/audio intercom on the main entrance to allow staff to vet visitors to the building when the main reception is not staffed. Out of normal working hours the main entrance doors should be secured with an access control entry system for staff members to enter.
 - 3.3.8 Access into and around the office building should be governed with an auditable access control system. Access into the circulation core of the building should be restricted to staff and legitimate visitors, with speed gates restricting access to the lift/stair cores or with an access control system to operate the lifts.
 - 3.3.9 All individual office levels or suites should be fitted with self-closing access-controlled doors, operated by staff swipe cards/fobs or by intercoms linked to individual receptions and all rooms within office suites should be capable of being deadlocked when unoccupied. Access to plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only). Where the upper floor office areas are subdivided into smaller individual units, each suite of offices should be capable of separation with their own individual access controls.
 - 3.3.10 The building should be covered by a monitored intruder alarm with response (see section 4.6 for more details).
 - 3.3.11 Individual office suites/floor plates should have a secure door set (i.e. BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR 2). Individual offices and ground floor/basement commercial units should have the infrastructure so that any tenants can easily install an intruder alarm.
 - 3.3.12 Post. Reception and distribution of post within the building should be considered. Incoming post and deliveries should be processed at one single point, in an area that can be easily isolated. Post rooms should not be located close to main exit routes as this could affect prompt evacuation.
 - 3.3.13 Current drawings show cycle parking and changing for building users is contained in dedicated rooms. Entry into these spaces should be strictly limited via the access-controlled system under the building management system ensuring only genuine cyclists can gain access. Racks within the cycle stores should allow bikes to be locked by the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com).
 - 3.3.14 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ All internal doors / frames to staff areas / stores / offices should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys / passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Curtain Walling

- ☐ Secured by Design recognises four distinct types of glazed wall systems. These are:
 - Large glazed units connected by 'spider clamp' system.
 - Glazed units directly retained within a framing system (usually aluminium)
 - Framed windows installed within a separate framing system.
 - Framed windows connected to other framed windows to create a window wall.
- ☐ Glazed curtain walling must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining glass must include one or more of the following:
 - Security glazing tape
 - Dedicated security sealant or gasket

- A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)

☐ Framed windows (3 and 4 above) used within the construction of a window wall must be certified to one of the following requirements:

- BS PAS 24:2016
- STS 204 Issue 3: 2012

☐ LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1

4.6 Alarms

☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.7 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- All external doors where regular staff access is required.
- Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
- Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
- Cycle store

4.8 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards and car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

4.9 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1200mm in height; unless greater height would see such landscaping features provide a specific security benefit. Tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

☐ Street furniture should be designed to withstand casual acts of vandalism. When selecting or designing street furniture, consider how easily and quickly items can be repaired or replaced following damage.

When commissioning bespoke street furniture and public artworks it is also important to be mindful of the potential for attack and ease of repair. These features are best positioned where there is plenty of formal and informal surveillance, so any criminal acts are more likely to be witnessed.

- ☐ To avoid compromising the security of buildings gardens/balconies, street furniture must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments or onto first floor balconies. Security can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close to fencing.
- ☐ Tree Establishment. Avoid the use of tree stakes by using an underground guying system. Irrigation systems / pipes should include tamper-proof coverings to avoid potential criminal damage / blockage.
- ☐ Use of loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Surfaces that could be vulnerable to graffiti should be formed of a resistant material or have a resistant coating applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal, e.g. 'easy-on' (see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).
- ☐ Cycle stands intended for short-stay use should enable cyclists to secure both wheels and the frame and obtained from an SBD-approved supplier.
- ☐ Security Bollards
 - Fixed and raising bollards should be successfully tested to PAS 68-1:2013
 - Bollards providing passive protection should be successfully tested to BS 170-1

4.10 Communal Areas

- Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

4.11 Gates

- ☐ Design of Gates. Gates will need to prevent people from clambering (or being tempted to climb) round them. Consideration should be given to inclusion of an emergency release button / device to allow anyone trapped inside to get out and reduce potential for entrapment (this should be beyond reach of people outside the gate and should also include an alert relay to the CCTV control room on activation of the gate at these times).
- ☐ Ease of repair. It is likely that gates will be subject to criminal damage to make them difficult to close or lock. The design should be sufficiently robust to withstand this kind of attack, but also should be capable of rapid repair. Use of bespoke components may create delays in obtaining replacements.
- ☐ There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the gate, to reduce the potential for crawling into the secure area.

4.12 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

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- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
 - ☐ Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
 - ☐ Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
 - ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
22/02/2023	Deloitte	CIS instruction received
28/03/2023	Deloitte	Fee / authorisation confirmed
28/03/2023	Deloitte/BDP	Scheme presentation
05/04/2023	DfS	Site visit
30/03/2023	GMP	Invoice issued
12/04/2023	GMP	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
GRE-BDP-ZZ-XX-DR-A-00-005	Project Red and Blue line	July 22	P04
P3001624 - REP01	5 Greenheys Development GMP Meeting_P01	April 23	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk