

SECURITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT

The Christie

Scanning and Imaging Facility

FOR: Day Architectural Limited

VERSION A: 17th March 2023

REFERENCE: 2008/0589/ENV/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Christie Hospital

2008/0589/ENV/01

SECURITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT

The purpose of this document is to achieve the following objectives, to facilitate the creation of secure, and safe, developments:

i. A visual audit of the site and surroundings, identifying environmental cues and features relevant to the security of this development.

ii. Consultation with relevant stakeholders, in order to obtain an understanding of crime and disorder issues in the locality of the development site.

iii. Comprehensive crime pattern analysis of the area surrounding the site to identify the actual risks to this development.

iv. Identification of risks specific to the proposed, likely, or potential use of the buildings or development.

v. Identification of risks specific to the proposed, likely, or potential user groups of the building(s).

vi. Identification of any detrimental effects the development may have on the existing community/local area.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposed development will replace the existing building presently on the development site and will be of a similar use, which is acceptable for this area. The proposed development has many positive features that will reduce the potential for crime and antisocial behaviour, as well as provide a frontage on to Wilmslow Road which will be beneficial. The Christie have an onsite security team which can respond quickly to any incidents of potential threats. The specific proposed use is unlikely to targeted by offenders but the nature of this type of building, with patients and visitors coming and going regularly, could potentially allow an offender to access the building before targeting staff/patient property or trying to gain access to staff-only areas. For this reason it is highly recommended that a robust access control system is employed across the building and secure lockers are provided for staff and patients. It is also recommended that the recommendations made in section 3.6 of this report and implemented where possible and the physical security of the building is aligned with section 4 of this report.



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
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Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent site, edged in red. The site forms part of The Christie hospital site, located in the Withington area of Manchester. The site is presently developed as the Holt building.

The site is roughly rectangular and the and the principal elevation fronts on to Wilmslow Road to the East. The site is bound by existing buildings of The Christie to the North, South, and West, including the Paterson Redevelopment Project to the South which is almost complete.

Opposite the site on Wilmslow Road is the Manchester Cancer Research Centre. Typically, the local area is residential in nature with commercial developed concentrated on Wilmslow Road.















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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2022 to 28th February 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
48	13	54	293	40	7	<5	31	8	25

2.1.1 The overall crime rate for the local area is average for the Manchester district, with less serious wounding, domestic burglary and vehicle crime most commonly reported. The majority of offences have taken place to the north of the proposed site where Withington Village is located, along Wilmslow Road which is the main arterial route in the area.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the local area, particularly around Wilmslow Road to the north of the site where Withington Village is located. Assaults, harassment, and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings occurring in the area. The majority of offences occurring in this area have occurred during the late evening/ early hours of the morning and over the weekend period when licenced premises are closing and at their busiest. Those less serious woundings which have occurred to the east and west have mostly involved domestic disputes, occurring within the home.

2.1.3 The majority of domestic burglaries have taken place in the west of the proposed site around Everett Road and to the north of the site, around Arnfield Road. The most common M.O (modus operandi) is approaching the rear of the property and forcing open windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements.

2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the area mostly consists of theft from motor vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle. Vehicle crime has mostly occurred to the north of the proposed site, around Heaton Road and Arnfield Road. The most common M.O has been smashed glazing to gain access to the vehicle and steal personal items, as well as theft of vehicle registration plates using tools. Offenders have also damaged paint and body work to vehicles using bodily pressure and tools.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Offenders gaining access to buildings open to the public before stealing property left insecure

Possible solution – An access control system (see Sections 4.1/4.4) should be employed to dissuade members of the public from entering unauthorised/sensitive areas and areas where patient and staff belongings are vulnerable. All doors separating public, communal, and staff-only areas should benefit from good levels of surveillance and CCTV coverage (see Section 4.9).

2.2.2 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure

Possible Solution - Although the location of doors should be considered (ideally placed where they can be readily observed, so that potential criminals would be more easily detected), it is inevitable that some will be located where they will benefit from lower levels of natural surveillance. All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. The use lighting, CCTV, and security patrols can also deter criminals.

2.2.3 Windows have been prised open, glazing has been smashed to gain entry or have been targeted when left insecure

2.2.4 *Possible Solution – All ground floor/easily accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3).*

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2.2.5 Breaking glazing in doors and windows, mainly to the front of the premises, using implements to gain access.

Possible Solution – Any ground floor or easily accessible glazing should contain a pane of laminate glazing, which cannot be easily smashed or shattered to gain entry.

2.2.6 Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.

Possible Solution – Personnel gates or turnstiles should restrict access from the office foyer into the circulation core of the building. Any external doors should operate on an access control system.


2.2.7 Forcing open shutters using implements and bodily force to gain access.

Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a recognised security standard (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2). Shutters certified to a burglary resistant standard are able to withstand prolonged, opportunist, attacks by criminals. An intruder alarm should be installed to alert security staff of any burglary attempts.


2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary (Healthcare): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against healthcare facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.


Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.3.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Saturday during the early hours of the morning into the late morning. Offenders are likely to operate at these times when staff are busy tending to patients and they can attempt to gain unauthorised access to restricted areas/rooms to steal property unnoticed.

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
2.3.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Posing as a legitimate visitor, gaining access to restricted areas by means of insecure doors, and tailgating staff.
- In entry points recorded as "unknown", it is likely that offenders have targeted insecure doors.


2.4 Theft (Healthcare): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against healthcare facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range




2.4.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at hospitals in Manchester remains consistently high across the week, but is slightly lower on Wednesday and Saturday. The risk of theft at hospitals in Manchester is highest during the day, peaking between 12.30pm and 5pm. During these times, hospital sites are at their busiest, with patients attending appointments and members of the public visiting friends and family. This allows offenders to gain anonymous access to hospital sites. Bags, cash, mobile phones and IT equipment belonging to patients and staff are the most routinely stolen items.


2.5 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.5.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Thursday during the late evening (8pm – 10:30pm) and early morning hours (12am – 3:30am). Offenders often target vehicles during the night when it is dark, streets are quieter and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or identified.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 Demolition of existing Christie Holt Building for new facility for an Advanced Scanning & Imaging Centre development.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The building will front onto Wilmslow Road which is one of the main arterial routes through the area. The road is busy during the day and at night, with both vehicular traffic and pedestrians.

3.2.2 The main entrance into the development will be taken from the front elevation of the building which can easily be viewed from the public highway where it will be subject to high levels of passive surveillance.

3.2.3 The main escape core exits onto Wilmslow Road in a highly visible location.

3.2.4 The adjacent Paterson Building has achieved Secured by Design and has a high level of robust security features, any access into this building from the Paterson Building should not compromise the security of this development.

3.2.5 Access to the Northern elevation of the building will be restricted close to the front elevation of the building, avoiding the creation of a recessed area/secluded space.

3.2.6 Frequently used rooms will be positioned on the front elevation of the building at ground floor level, providing an active frontage with Wilmslow Road.

3.2.7 There is a large multi-storey staff car park to the rear of the Manchester Cancer Research Building, reducing the burden on street parking.

3.3 Local Impact of the Development

Identification of any detrimental effects the development may have on the existing community.

3.3.1 The proposed development will replace an existing building and it is unlikely that there will be any adverse effects on the local area, businesses, and residents. On-street parking in the area has historically been an issue; however, there is a new multistorey car park onsite and parking restrictions in the local area. If the numbers of staff or visitors increase, there could be pressure on parking in the local area.

3.4 Risk Factors

Identification of risks specific to the proposed, likely or potential use of the buildings or development, and user groups of the building(s) are as follows

3.5 Risk Factors – Healthcare/Medical Facilities

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Safety of medical records and drugs
- Theft of personal belongings (patients and staff)
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to private space/restricted areas
- Acts of criminal damage, and theft, during the construction period.

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3.6 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and should be addressed.

3.6.1 The office reception should be staffed during standard office hours (i.e. 8am-6pm) to allow visitors to be vetted before being permitted access into the building. There should be a video/audio intercom on the main entrance to allow staff to vet visitors to the building when the main reception is not staffed. Out of normal working hours the main entrance doors should be secured with an access control entry system for staff members to enter.

3.6.2 Staff should be provided with lockers so that they can store their personal items whilst working, to reduce the potential for theft. There should be secure lockers available to patients/visitors to store their belongings when necessary. Any lockers positioned in public areas of the building should be well overlooked or subject to CCTV coverage.

3.6.3 Doors into drug stores, or rooms where personal records are stored, should be certified to BS PAS 24. Walls should be of solid masonry construction or include a resilient layer in the wall. The door should be alarmed when the building is closed. Controlled drugs should be secured in a BS 2881 storage cabinet. Doors into drug or record stores should operate on auditable access controls.

3.6.4 Access controlled speed gates, turnstiles, or similar, should restrict access from publicly accessible space into any circulation areas that are restricted to staff. Patients/visitors should be accompanied when entering non-public areas of the building.

3.6.5 Individual offices/labs/scanning facilities should be locked when not in use and operate on an access control system so that members of the public, or unauthorised personnel, cannot access these areas unless permitted. All areas and rooms restricted to staff should be clearly signed to deter intrusion under the guise of being lost.

3.6.6 All external doors should be illuminated to a high standard, to deter loitering and criminal activity. All external service and emergency escape doors should be certified to the relevant security standards (i.e. LPS 1175 SR2).

3.6.7 The building should be covered with a comprehensive CCTV system which can be monitored by security staff. Key areas for CCTV coverage would be the main entrance to the building, reception area, circulation cores, doors into sensitive areas, external doors, the building elevation, and the service yard.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

☐ All external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 (including any access control system). It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery, with signage to deter casual use.

☐ Any revolving/sliding doors should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 or BS ENV 1627 (RC2+).

☐ The internal entrance doors into each floor should be secured with self-closing, solid-core doorsets (minimum 44mm thick) operated by staff key-fob/card.

☐ All other internal doors/frames to individual rooms, offices, stores, back-of-house areas, utility/plant rooms etc. should be solid core with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortice deadlock or similar, so that they can be secured when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows

☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.

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☐ Any ground floor and other easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

☐ All accessible glazing (i.e. below a height of 2000mm from external ground level) must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any lightweight cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

☐ Any louvres at ground floor level to plant areas/refuge stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed or damaged. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required (see https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for SBD approved suppliers).

4.4 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or proximity reader/fob, and not numeric keypads which can be easily observed and are rarely changed. The following doors should operate on access control:

- The main entrance into the building
- All other external doors
- The internal doors off the main entrance lobby
- The internal entrances into each floor
- All individual scanning/imaging rooms
- Drug stores
- The doors leading to any staff-only areas/facilities and back-of-house areas

☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should ideally be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff key-fobs/cards should be capable of being quickly activated or disabled when required, to ensure they are not misused. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work.

4.5 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to all new vehicular/pedestrian routes, in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ External lighting must also be provided to all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.

☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or up to upper floor windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.6 CCTV

☐ The proposed development should be covered with a comprehensive, high quality, digital, CCTV system. Cameras should be positioned to maximise coverage and to cover high risk areas such as: main entrances, external elevations, reception areas, public areas of the building, emergency escape doors, and any rooms with valuable equipment/medical records/controlled drugs.

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5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

5.1.2 An operating/maintenance plan should also be prepared, focussing on issues such as:

- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. any boundary treatments, lighting, access controls, CCTV cameras, alarm system etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees.

5.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, music equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.4 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

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A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
08/02/2023	Jaclyn Kelly	SNA application received
14/03/2023	Jaclyn Kelly	Progress update

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1282-21-DAY-XX-00-DR-A-03-0901	Site Boundary Plan	14/12/22	A
CASICD-DAY-XX-00-DR-A-200001	Level 00 – Proposed GA Plan	17/02/22	G
CASICD-DAY-XX-01-DR-A-200101	Level 01 – Proposed GA Plan	17/02/23	E
CASICD-DAY-XX-02-DR-A-200201	Level 02 – Proposed GA Plan	17/02/23	E
CASICD-DAY-XX-03-DR-A-200301	Level 03 – Proposed GA Plan	17/02/23	E
CASICD-DAY-XX-04-DR-A-200401	Level 04 – Proposed GA Plan	17/02/23	E

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
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