



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Embassy Village, Castlefield Arches,
Manchester, M15 4LE

40 Single-Occupancy Residential Pods

For: **Deloitte**

Version A: **31/07/2023**

Ref: **2020/0639/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security



Embassy Village, Castlefield Arches, Manchester

2020/0639/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Robust control of access in/and around the buildings.
- Secure cycle store provision in a visible location
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will support the application subject to the design team suitably addressing the recommendations contained in the report (Sections 3.3, 4 & 5), and will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located in the St George's / Castlefield district on the southwestern edge of central Manchester.


The neighbourhood is a former industrial district, and remnants of this remain in the form of small commercial premises, but most of the area has been transformed with former industrial buildings either converted or replaced to create a residential district in a mix of new buildings and conversions. There are still some vacant plots in the vicinity.

The Mancunian Way separates the site from the city centre, but connections have been improved with pedestrian and cycle routes recently upgraded over St George's traffic island and Water Street. There are various sheltered and concealed spaces in the locality that can provide cover for disorder.

The proposed development is located on an island site, with the eastern boundary adjoining the inner ring road and other boundaries facing watercourses. Formal access to the site for pedestrians and vehicles is off the ring road.

There are lock gates at the western end of the site, on the disused link between the Bridgewater Canal and River Medlock / Irwell. Anti-climb measures have been incorporated to the canal gates removing the opportunity to traverse the gates and gain entry into the site.

Most of the site lies beneath arches of viaducts carrying frequent metrolink trams and national rail services.




7 – Evidence of drug taking & paraphernalia within the site.



6 – Graffiti & litter within the site.




5 – North side of the existing site & level changes.



1 – Existing site viewed from the Mancunian Way.



2 – Existing anti-climb measures to canal basin.



3 – Existing main site entrance.



4 – Arches within the site.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2022 to 30th June 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
47	34	102	352	122	14	8	159	17	21

- 2.1.1 The crime rate in the local area is low for Manchester, with an exception to vehicle crime, which is high. The proposed site is located on the edge of the City Centre, where there is a high volume of retail outlets and licenced premises which accounts for an increase in crime and disorder within the area. Less serious wounding theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded offences within the local area, with hotspots occurring to the north, south and east of the proposed site, around Ellesmere Street, Castle Street and around the Deansgate / Castlefield Metrolink stop.
- 2.1.2 Those violent offences which occurred to the east and south of the proposed site taking have mostly occurred in the late evening and early hours of the morning, over the weekend period when licenced premises in the area have a greater footfall. Those offences occurring to the north, have mostly involved assaults, harassment and public order offences during a domestic incident involving partners or house mates.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime in the area is high; however, this is likely because of the large car parks located in the area. Vehicles parked within close proximity of the City Centre are mostly used by commuters leaving vehicles unattended for long periods of the day and creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Residential** - Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. The main entrances should be located in a highly visible position and well-lit to deter offenders from trying to break-in. Apartment doors should not be positioned in recesses and should be readily-visible along the internal corridors / landing.

- 2.2.2 **Residential** - Exploitation of insecure windows and doors (mostly to the front of the property).

Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to prevent tailgating by intruders. The main entrances should be located in a highly visible position and well-lit to deter offenders from trying to break-in. Apartment doors should not be positioned in recesses and should be readily visible along the internal corridors. Additionally, where postal deliveries are made to an internal rack of mailboxes, a double door entry system should be used and the secondary door set should also be certified to recognised security standard (see section 4) and include a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system (N.B it is not acceptable for postal / delivery personnel to have free access inside the block). French windows / sliding doors opening on to insecure space at ground level should be avoided.

- 2.2.3 **Residential** - Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution - All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Doors / windows in secluded elevations may benefit from additional security measures such as shutters / grilles – these should be certified to recognised security standards.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

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- Domestic burglary
 - Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
 - Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
 - Theft of, or from, vehicles
 - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
 - Anti-social behaviour
 - Neighbour disputes
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
 - Unauthorised access to private spaces
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **63% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **52% lower** than Greater Manchester and **51% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **74% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **65% lower** than Greater Manchester and **32% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **59% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **46% lower** than Greater Manchester and **34% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **19% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **33% higher** than Greater Manchester and **61% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Tuesday, during the afternoon (11:30am – 2pm). Offenders often target properties during the day when residents are likely to be away from the property for long periods of the day, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as unknown it is likely that offenders have exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Saturday during the late evening. Offenders often target vehicles during the late evening as they are often left unattended and out of sight of the vehicle owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises installation of 40 residential pods to provide living accommodation, with associated social facilities and amenity space for residents and staff accommodation.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will generate activity at a currently vacant site that has been subject to criminal damage, other anti-social behaviour, and abuse. Redevelopment for residential use and reanimation of the site should help to create a sense of ownership and responsibility and could improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The proposed development will result in an increase in footfall in the area, improving vitality across the wider area, providing additional natural surveillance, which can help promote a greater sense of safety on the street.
- 3.2.3 There is only one formal access point to the site, which allows security features to be focused on this location. Pedestrians are required to pass through a lobby with controlled doors at each end overseen by staff. The reception / care team office provides a good level of surveillance of people entering the building. Vehicular gates will be locked, and staff will be required to supervise opening and closing.
- 3.2.4 Facilities with multiple entrances and exits can often provide offenders and those antisocially minded with various escape routes, facilitating offending. The plans indicate that users will be directed through a single entrance/exit, rather than having a choice of multiple entrances/exits.
- 3.2.5 The existing canal lock gates adjacent to the site appear to have had good levels anti-climbing measures fitted.
- 3.2.6 Staff will be present on the supported living premises on a 24-hour basis, 7 days a week.
- 3.2.7 The development will incorporate communal social and amenity spaces allowing friendships to develop and building a sense of community within the site.
- 3.2.8 A comprehensive CCTV system will be installed to allow building managers to monitor movement in the communal spaces and assist in identification of intruders (see section 4.9).
- 3.2.9 The proposal has the support of the local policing team.
- 3.2.10 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Climbing aids. There should be no features of the structures (existing or proposed) which may facilitate unauthorised climbing up to higher levels / windows. The position of street furniture, tables and chairs should be carefully considered in relation to this issue.
- 3.3.2 Sight lines around stairs and entrances. The arrangement of the living units and stairs providing access to upper-level units should not create any areas of potential concealment around the entrance doors and windows.
- 3.3.3 Outdoor furniture / seating. The location of external seating / tables should be positioned away from the existing apartment block to the south of the site (across the canal link), in order to minimise potential nuisance to residents of the neighbouring block.

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- 3.3.4 Access to unused areas. The railway arches provide many opportunities for concealment. Access to any parts of the site that are not in use should be controlled using a robust fencing system / gates (see section 4.6).
 - 3.3.5 Residential post & parcel room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal or grocery delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential blocks beyond the main entrance gate. Postal workers should not be given unfettered access to the entire the site as this could potentially leave apartments and residents vulnerable. (See Section 4.1 for more information).
 - 3.3.6 Given the prolific high levels of graffiti within and around the site, it is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed, protected, and support the removal of graffiti, a resistant coating applied to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings.
 - 3.3.7 Short-stay cycle parking. Any cycle parking intended for visitors should be located within sight of entrance and / or well-overlooked from inside the offices. Cycle stands should be specifically covered by any CCTV system in place.
 - 3.3.8 Lighting to access road and pedestrian routes around the site. Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness.
 - 3.3.9 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
 - 3.3.10 Site management. The success of this development will be largely dependent on implementation and maintenance of effective management of the site to ensure that the facility does not cause detriment to the locality. Site user behaviour inside and outside the living units is likely to affect other local residents, which can generate conflicts and has potential to develop into more serious criminal behaviour and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with residents / visitors who behave inappropriately.
 - 3.3.11 Local ambiance. The developer should engage with partners to endeavour to improve the context of the site, e.g. removal of accumulated rubbish on neighbouring premises, trimming / pruning of vegetation, minor repairs and upgrading of damaged structures, removal of potential climbing aids from around the site.
 - 3.3.12 The site adjoins Network Rail property which is policed by British Transport Police. BTP employ their own Designing Out Crime officers, and the contact for this area is Gillian McKinnon - Gillian.McKinnon@btp.pnn.police.uk.
 - 3.3.13 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in Section 4 is incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Office and housing unit entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Internal doors / frames to all offices, security rooms, stores and plant rooms should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff key-fob. Similarly, the basement cycle stores should be enclosed within secure rooms or railing enclosures, fitted with gates or solid-core doors (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by resident / staff key-fob.
- ☐ Any doors into a medicine / drug stores, or rooms where personal records are stored, should be certified to BS PAS 24. The door should be alarmed when the building is closed. Controlled drugs should be secured in a BS 2881 storage cabinet. Doors into drug or record stores should operate on auditable access controls.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Any ground or first floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any louvres to servicing areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas / doors should operate on access control:
 - Main communal entrance doors / gates
 - Inner doors off lobby / access to stairs and lifts
 - Bin store
 - Any communal cycle stores within the site
 - Staff-only areas

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Secure boundary treatments should be a minimum of 2400mm high, and formed of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations. Particular attention should be paid to detailing the sections of fencing adjoining the canal and river to prevent climbing around the end of the fence line.
- ☐ There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling in to secure areas.
- ☐ Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard / soft landscaping features immediately adjacent to any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels / sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **All access-controlled doors and gates, including main entrance gates, lobby / foyer, amenity space, cycle stores, site boundaries.**

4.10 Other

- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Graffiti on surfaces. This kind of abuse is particularly prevalent in the vicinity of the site. Expanses of blank wall exposed to public areas should be formed of a graffiti-resistant surface or have a resistant coating applied at the outset to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.
- ☐ Any Mail boxes and cycle stands should be obtained from a supplier approved by Secured by Design and installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions (see www.securedbydesign.com).
- ☐ All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors / televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- ☐ Provision should be made for residents and staff to store valuable personal items.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ The application does not involve major physical changes to the buildings. As such the success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the site which should include the behaviour of residents and visitors to the site.
- ☐ A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews / exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- ☐ The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, signage, access controls, alarms, CCTV, boundary treatments)
- ☐ Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- ☐ The site managers should engage in regular liaison with local neighbourhood policing team.
- ☐ Regular reviews of the effectiveness of site management should be held to address any security issues arising in and around the site.

Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

- ☐ Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20/07/23	Deliotte LLP	CIS application received
20/07/23	Deliotte LLP	Client confirmation
19/07/23	Deliotte LLP	Design team presentation
20/07/23	DfS	Site visit
23/07/23	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
13095-AEW-XX-XX-PP-A-0005-S2-P02-	Embassy Village Planning Adjustments	19/07/23	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk