



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

112 Kenyon Lane

37 Apartments

For: **Adelphi (Kenyon Lane) Developments Ltd**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **06/07/20**

design**for**security

Ref: **2020/0381/CIS/01**

112 Kenyon Lane

2020/0381/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor Design Changes Advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable in principle, but further consideration of certain aspects is recommended as stated in section 3.3 of this report, in order to gain our full support for this development at planning stage. These include:-

- *Landscape treatment (inc. boundaries), of amenity spaces*
- *Boundary treatments of dwellings & amenity areas*
- *Apartment entrance lobby*
- *Gated access to car park*

Our support for this scheme is subject to the above issues being satisfactorily addressed, as described within the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report and require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design (SBD), accreditation.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken within and around the site.

The site is located on Kenyon Lane and houses a dominant old cinema building with service yard to the side and rear. The building has not been used as a cinema for a number of years.

The building is located within a predominantly residential area of Moston.

The proposed site shares its neighbouring boundaries with a chapel on the east and DIY builders merchant on the west and a redundant scout hut to the south.







There is a small number business facing onto Kenyon Lane, dentists, newsagents funeral services all in close proximity to the site.

Parking in the area is in high demand with on-street parking dominant.

Boundary treatments around the site are a combination of historic brick walls and metal railing and/or weld mesh fencing.

Directly in front of the site on Kenyon Lane is a bus stop. The bus routes provide services within the local area.

A Metrolink tram stop is located approx. 1km south west of the site providing links to Manchester or Rochdale.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
115	18	133	222	45	26	10	82	26	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high for Manchester with Less serious wounding, domestic burglary and vehicle crime being the highest recorded offences taking place within the area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding has taken place throughout the local area, with hotspots occurring around Ashley Lane to the south and Dale Avenue to the north. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded offences taking place, with domestic disputes and offences between known associates being the most common M.O (modus operandi). Offences have largely taken place within dwellings and residential streets, as well around the local educational facility.
- 2.1.3 Domestic burglary has taken place throughout the local area as it is made up of residential estates; Brendon Avenue and Waverley Road to the south and west of the proposed site have experienced a large volume of offences. Offenders have mostly targeted the rear of properties, smashing glazing and forcing entry. The rear of properties are often targeted as they are usually not overlooked, reducing the possibility that the offender will be seen.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area is high, with theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle being the most commonly reported vehicle crime taking place. Offenders have targeted the small residential streets around Kenyon Lane and Lightbrowne Road. Offenders have used implements in order smash glazing, causing damage to the vehicle and gaining access to objects within the vehicle. Offenders have also used tools in order to remove vehicle parts and vehicle registration plates. Sharp implements have been used in order to cause damage to paint work and body work.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors into apartment blocks before allowing them access to the building (also see section 4.1). The main communal entrances should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access.

- 2.2.2 Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements (mostly to the rear of the property).

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points. Windows to accessible elevations should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and protect them from attack and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

-
- 2.2.4 Offenders targeted entrance apartment doors by 'tailgating' or posing as legitimate visitors, before forcing open individual apartment doors or targeting those left insecure by residents.

Possible Solution - All individual apartments should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2018.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **29% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **126% higher** than Greater Manchester and **250% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **10% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **72% higher** than Greater Manchester and **105% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **8% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **57% higher** than Greater Manchester and **111% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **25% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **128% higher** than Greater Manchester and **239% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Tuesday and Thursday during the evening (6pm – 8:30pm). Offenders often target properties in the evening when it is dark and there is less foot fall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the garden shed.
- Posing as a tradesperson and entering the property, removing items.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Monday and Sunday during the late afternoon and into the evening. Offenders often target vehicles in the afternoon and evening when they are left unsupervised for long periods of time, creating low risk opportunities for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises the demolition of the existing cinema building for the construction of a new build apartment development containing 37 apartments for the over 55 age residential market.
- 3.1.2 The development will incorporate 15 parking spaces, cycle store and garden amenity for residents.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The layout of upper floor corridors is relatively free of projections or recesses that could impede sight lines. Doors within communal corridors should contain a glazed element to improve informal surveillance. Individual apartment entrance doors are positioned flush with the corridor walls removing the potential for concealment.
- 3.2.2 Cycle stores for residents' use are provided within the grounds. Entry to the stores must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosures should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels, and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).
- 3.2.3 The apartments should have habitable room windows to their front elevations, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.4 The building will be served by on-site parking spaces, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals.
- 3.2.5 Amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The communal entrances must be well lit, be fitted with security-certified doors and fitted with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob. There should also be an audio-visual link to each apartment, so that residents can remotely allow *bona fide* visitors.
- 3.3.2 Access in to the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the reception area only prior to providing access further into the building.
- 3.3.3 To minimise the risk of offender's tail-gating legitimate residents/visitors, a secondary set of lobby doors into the main entrance should be incorporated and should also include access controls. Access controls will need to be used at all the communal entrances to restrict entry into the development to residents and their authorised visitors.
- 3.3.4 A secure gated entrance boundary should be formed to the car parking undercroft. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- 3.3.5 The boundary treatments to the proposed rear parking court are vitally important to secure it and to preventing unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides and rear of the site, including the amenity areas, should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access

(Refer to 4.5). Care should be taken to ensure ground level changes do not inadvertently facilitate scaling boundaries or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates.

- 3.3.6 Communal facilities, amenity and rear parking court. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.7 Defensive planting (incorporating densely branched, thorny shrubs) can be used to great effect on the public side of publicly accessible boundaries to deter scaling and damage.
- 3.3.8 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for larger vehicles.
- 3.3.9 Parking. There is insufficient space on the site to accommodate vehicles for all residents and visitors. Any increased parking demand is likely to impact on adjacent properties and could create conflicts between residents and neighbours which can escalate into antisocial or criminal behaviour. Residents may be obliged to park in more remote locations where they and their vehicles will be at higher risk. In order to avoid unauthorised vehicles parking within the site the report requires an access control gate is incorporated to the vehicle entry/egress point.
- 3.3.10 A secure lockable bicycle storage unit to provide sufficient space for all residents a place to keep bikes safe and secure. Providing space for all residents will reduce the need for residents to carry bikes through to apartments or locking bikes to railings outside the development. Bicycles which are locked externally can become a target for vandalism and theft.
- 3.3.11 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Any external french/double doors or sliding doors to easily accessible balconies or terraces should also be certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2 and should include laminated glazing (see below).
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems

- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

☐ A secure gated entrance boundary should be formed to the car parking undercroft. Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.

☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:

- LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
- STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
- Sold Secure Gold

☐ PAS 68: 2013

4.6 Landscaping

☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by

4.7 Lighting

☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).

☐ Lighting in the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.

☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **Main entrances, foyer, stairs, lift lobbies, landings, cycle stores, bin store entrances.**

4.9 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
17/06/20	Calderpeel architects	Application received
18/06/20	Calderpeel architects	Client confirmation
25/06/20	GMP	Invoice issued
29/06/20	DfS	Site visit
07/07/20	DfS	CIS completed
13/12/22	DfS	CIS revised, completed and issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
P19-008-02-01-002-A	Proposed: Site Plan	Mar 20	A
P19-008-02-03-001-A	Proposed: Ground Floor Plan	Mar 20	A
P19-008-02-03-002-A	Proposed: First and Second Floor Plan	Mar 20	A
P19-008-02-03-003-A	Proposed: Third Floor Plan	Mar 20	A
P19-008-02-05-001-A	Proposed: Elevation 01	Mar 20	A
P19-008-02-05-002-A	Proposed: Elevation 02	Mar 20	A
P19-008-02-01-001	Existing: Site Plan	Mar 20	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor amendments to the proposed scheme	13/12/22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk