CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

CLAYTON HOTEL, OUTWOOD LANE, MANCHESTER AIRPORT

6,755sqm. EXTENSION TO HOTEL (184 no. ADDITIONAL BEDROOMS)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Dalata Hotel Group PLC

VERSION A: 09/01/20

REFERENCE: 2019/1008/CIS/01

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CPT
CRIME PREVENTION TEAM

Clayton Hotel, Outwood Lane, Manchester Airport

URN: 2019/1008/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The narrow space between the eastern elevation of proposed extension and the existing hotel building should be gated, to prevent unauthorised access to a hidden area that could be exploited by offenders to attack accessible bedroom windows unseen. Consideration should also be given to additional fencelines/gates to the west of the proposed extension and the north of the existing building, to prevent unauthorised access to the new landscaped courtyard and the more hidden sides/rear elevations of the hotel.
- The control of access into and around the hotel – including to the main entrance, onto bedroom levels and to all back-of-house/staff-only areas.

Given the proposed development is an extension to an existing, non-Secured by Design (SBD) building, it will not be eligible for the full SBD Award. Nevertheless, we are happy to endorse this development if the above issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other SBD-compliant physical security measures are incorporated into the proposed scope of works.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is bounded by Outwood Lane to the west, a railway line to the north, the Crowne Plaza Manchester Airport hotel to the east and Hotel Road to the south, within the Manchester Airport complex. It is currently occupied by a part 4 storey/part 9 storey hotel that was previously extended in 2003, with surrounding surface parking.

The southern and eastern portions of the site are occupied by pay & display parking areas, comprising of 320 no. spaces. The site/car park is accessed off Hotel Road to the south, with vehicle arm barriers at the access/egress points.

The existing site is enclosed with a mixture of welded-wire mesh fencing, railings and walls – separating it from the adjacent road, railway and hotel. Once within the site, all elevations of the building are accessible. The rear of the hotel building also includes some enclosed plant/refuge areas and there is a sub-station/enclosure to the immediate west of the site enclosed with high welded-wire mesh fencing and barbed wire.

The hotel entrance lobby and reception lies approximately central within the building, fronting onto a small drop-off/parking area. The parking areas to the southern and eastern most parts of the site are somewhat remote from the building itself and benefit from lower levels of direct overlooking.



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2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	<5	58	69	110	<5	<5	50	27	6

2.1.1 The most prevalent types of crime in the local area are theft, vehicle crime and less serious wounding. Thefts in the local area are mostly taking place within the airport terminal, with luggage and handbags being the most common targets. Offenders have also made off from nearby petrol stations without paying. Vehicle crime in the area is high, with theft from a vehicle and criminal damage being the highest reported incidents. Offenders target vehicles parked in the many surrounding car parks, as they are often left unsupervised for extended periods of time while people are away. Incidents of less serious wounding have also mostly taken place around/within terminal buildings and have mainly consisted of assaults and public order offences, with domestic incidents being the most common type of offence.

2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed hotel extension, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.

2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.

Manchester Hotel Burglary – Day Range



Manchester Hotel Burglary – Time Range



Manchester Hotel Burglary – Point of Entry



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2.2.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of burglary at Manchester hotels fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning. It is likely that offenders target hotels at these times when guests are likely to be out of their rooms or when staffing levels are likely to be lower – allowing offenders time to attempt to gain unauthorised access without being detected.

2.2.2 Point of Entry: In the majority of burglaries at Manchester hotels, the point of entry has not been determined. It is likely that these burglaries have occurred when offenders have entered hotels posing as legitimate guests and gained access to back-of-house areas or hotel rooms without using force – possibly when they have been left insecure by guests/cleaners or by using stolen or forged keys/cards. Doors have also been forced open, using bodily pressure and implements/tools to gain entry.

2.3 Theft (Manchester Hotels): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against hotels, recorded in the Manchester area.

Hotel Theft – Day Range



Hotel Theft – Time Range



2.3.1 Day Range: The risk of theft at Manchester hotels generally increases over the weekend. It is possible that the risk increases at these times when hotels typically have more guests and the opportunity to carry out such offences is greater. However, offenders do also target hotels between Monday and Friday, when they are typically less busy and they perceive a lower risk of being caught/challenged.

2.3.2 Time Range: The risk of theft is greatest around lunchtime and in the evening/early hours of the morning. This is when hotel restaurants, bars and gyms are likely to be at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Thefts of personal property (such as mobile phones, bags and purses/wallets) are the most routinely stolen items.

2.4 General Risk Factors

2.4.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary of hotel rooms
- Robbery to business
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Violence towards staff
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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2.5 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting hotels in Manchester are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Offenders, posing as guests or legitimate customers, accessing staff-only/restricted areas to steal property

  Possible Solution - The main reception should be located to have full view of everyone entering and leaving the premises and all routes to bedrooms and staff areas. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour. Access controls should be used to restrict access to vulnerable areas and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work (see Sections 4.1/4.2).

- Offenders entering rooms using forged or stolen electronic key-cards/fobs or by exploiting insecure doors

  Possible Solution - Auditable electric locking systems (such as Vingcard, Salto or similar) should be used, which can be easily activated/disabled electronically by reception staff.

- Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tool/implements to gain entry

  Possible Solution - All external doors and individual bedroom doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Access controls should also be utilised to prevent non-guest access to bedroom areas/floors (see Sections 4.1/4.2) and CCTV covering access corridors should be monitored at the staffed reception desk to ensure there can be an immediate response to any issues recorded (see Section 4.9).

- Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

  Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 5). The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.

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3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 6,755sqm. 10 storey extension to the existing hotel, comprising of 184 no. additional bedrooms, with associated reconfigured car park and landscaping.

3.1.2 The proposed extension will feature a new entrance lobby/reception, staff office, red bean roastery, meeting rooms and W/Cs at ground floor level and guest bedrooms to upper floor levels. There will also be some amendments to the existing building to accommodate the works, including existing bedrooms re-purposed as back-of-house areas and existing meeting rooms re-purposed as bedrooms.

3.1.3 The existing parking areas to the south and east of the building will be reconfigured to accommodate the proposed extension. A new 2.5 storey car park is being considered to the north-east of the site, the detailed design of which are to be confirmed.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed development will result in additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.

3.2.2 The hotel reception area is located directly adjacent to the main entrance of the hotel, providing staff with good views of all people entering/leaving the building and external circulation areas.

3.2.3 The layout of the hotel corridors within the proposed extension provides clear views along them and contain few recessed areas, which may conceal criminal activity.

3.2.4 The hotel bedrooms will be provided well above street/car park level, reducing the potential impacts of noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).

3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.



3.3.1 The location of the proposed extension will create a narrow space between it's eastern elevation and the existing hotel building that will not be capable of being directly overlooked by reception staff (due to there being high level windows only). This will create a hidden area that could be exploited by offenders to attack accessible bedroom windows unseen. It is highly recommended that this narrow space is gated to prevent unauthorised access to all but staff (see illustration opposite and Section 4.6 for more information). If the route is to provide emergency egress from the building, the gate should incorporate panic hardware that allows for this that cannot be reached/operated from the external face of the gate (again, see Section 4.6 for more information). Consideration should also be given to additional fencelines/gates to the west of the proposed extension and the north of the existing building to prevent unauthorised access to the new landscaped courtyard and the more hidden sides/rear elevations of the hotel (see opposite for illustration).

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3.3.2 The control of access into and around the hotel is paramount to the security of the development. The reception desk within the entrance lobby must be staffed at all times and should have a full, unimpeded view of everyone entering/leaving the building. A high, wide reception desk increases the distance between reception staff and any potential aggressive visitors and aids surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby. The main entrance doors to the hotel should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if/when required (e.g. into the evening/at night) to prevent unauthorised access or nuisance/anti-social behaviour in/around the entrance lobby. The access stair core and lifts serving all levels of the extension should only be accessible/operable by guest key-card, ensuring that non-guests cannot access bedroom floors and guests can only gain to their particular floor and no other (see Sections 4.1/4.2). The escape stair core should be for staff use and emergency escape purposes only.

3.3.3 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to be Secured by Design (SBD) compliant.

4.1 Doors

☐ All new external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.

☐ I note that the new main entrance to the hotel will be formed by glazed sliding doors. These should be tested and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS EN 1627 RC2, incorporating laminated glazing (see below) and multi-point locking (preventing sliding and lifting when secure). Reception staff should be able to remotely secure and control access through the main entrance door if/when required (e.g. into the evening/at night).

☐ The lifts to the proposed extension should only be accessible/operable by guest key-card, ensuring that non-guests cannot access bedroom floors and guests can only gain to their particular floor and no other. The doors into the access stair core and the escape stair core at each level should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 and fitted with electromagnetic locks (permitted as part of the certification) connected to the fire alarm, so that guests at one level cannot access other levels. The doors to the escape core should be alarmed and clearly signed to deter casual use. Once the escape core is accessed by a member of the public, the only means of egress should be at ground floor level. Staff access/egress into or from the access stair core should be controlled via fob/swipe card.

☐ All new individual hotel bedroom doorsets/frames should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), self-closing and secured with 3 hinges and an electronically operated lock, controlled by Vingcard, Salto or similar. They should also be fitted with door viewers and chain limiters.

☐ Internal doors/frames to any back-of-house offices, laundry, plant areas or stores should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by staff fob/key-card. The ground floor meeting rooms should also be capable of being locked when unoccupied. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Access Controls

☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff swipe card/fob or by guest key-card, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- The main entrance doors to the hotel – operated remotely by reception staff and via guest/staff key-card.
- The lifts and doors to the access stair core serving all bedroom floors – operated by guest/staff key-card.
- The doors to the escape stair core - operated on access and egress by staff key-card only.
- All doors to the back-of-house offices, laundry, plant areas and stores (on all levels) – operated by staff key-card only.

☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff and guest key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by staff to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

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4.3 Windows

- [ ] All new windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

- [ ] All new ground floor and any other easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- [ ] All new ground glazing must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. All upper floor glazing should incorporate an internal pane rated as at least P1A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarm

- [ ] All new internal and external escape doors should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to a 24/7 intruder alarm system.

- [ ] Alarm activations should be relayed to the hotel reception, so staff can investigate or call the authorities as appropriate.

4.6 Boundaries

- [ ] The narrow space between the eastern elevation of the proposed extension and the existing hotel building should be gated at its outermost point (see Section 3.3 for illustration), to prevent unauthorised access to where bedroom windows could be vulnerable to attack unseen. The gate should be of metal railing construction and should be 1800-2100mm high. If the gate must allow for emergency egress, any panic mechanism on the internal face of the gate should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the gate.

- [ ] Consideration should also be given to additional 1800-2100mm high railings, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates to the west of the proposed extension and the north of the existing building (also see Section 3.3 for illustration), to prevent unauthorised access to the new landscaped courtyard and the more hidden sides/rear of the hotel.

- [ ] Care should be taken to ensure that any railing/welded-wire mesh panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as adjacent low walls, lighting columns, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.

4.7 Lighting

- [ ] Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all new external doors.

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☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows/balconies. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 Car Park

☐ The existing vehicle arm barriers to the vehicular access and egress points to the site should be retained to discourage offenders.

☐ Lighting to all new surface parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%. Lighting to any new multi-storey parking levels and stairwells should have an average lux level of 75-100, with a uniformity level of no less than 50%, avoiding any areas of pooling/shadowing and supporting any CCTV system installed. Light coloured walls and ceilings can help reflect lighting and create a safe and non-threatening environment.

☐ The surface of any new parking areas should be even tarmac/concrete. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime. Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed. Traffic calming measures should be incorporated to limit the speed of vehicles within the site.

☐ Any new pay machines should be located in busy and well-overlooked areas, so as to maximize surveillance over them, and not in secluded areas where they cannot easily be monitored or where a potential offender could conceal themselves nearby. Non-cash payment and pre-payment methods should be encouraged.

4.9 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: all new external doors, the main entrance lobby, café servery/seating areas, all new lift/stair lobbies and corridors on each floor and all new parking areas.

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4.10 Other

- ☐ Each new guest bedroom should have a small wall or floor safe, operated by a personal identification number (PIN) selected by each new guest.
- ☐ There should be no features of the proposed extension (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows.

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5 Internal Layout Guidance for Red Bean Roastery

It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1.1 Cafes/restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in cafes/restaurants generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent cafes/restaurants means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

5.1.2 Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.

5.1.3 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

5.1.4 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).

5.1.5 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.

5.1.6 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

5.1.7 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



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5.1.8 Public toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

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6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the hotel must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the development. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made east for people to raise concerns or report observations.

6.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV etc.)
- Litter/graffiti removal

6.1.3 The hotel management should consider membership of the Manchester Hoteliers Association (MHA), who share best practice in security management and recruitment.

6.1.4 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

6.1.5 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

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A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
19th November 2019	LRW Architects	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
25th November 2019	LRW Architects	Request for additional information
26th November 2019	LRW Architects	Confirmation of instruction/fee. Receipt of D&A Statement and photos of existing site
2nd to 4th December 2019	LRW Architects	Email correspondence re: progress
19th December 2019	LRW Architects	Email correspondence re: timescales
9th to 10th January 2020	LRW Architects	Email correspondence with Architect re: report completion & payment
10th January 2020	GMP Finance Dept.	Cheque has been received and banked today, should have cleared by 13/01

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
L(90)03	Location Plan	24/10/19	-
L(90)01	Existing Site Plan	23/10/19	A
L(90)02	Proposed Site Plan	08/11/19	D
L(26)01	Ground Floor Existing Plan	22/10/19	-
L(26)02	First Floor Existing Plan	22/10/19	-
L(26)03	Second Floor Existing Plan	31/10/19	-
L(26)04	Third Floor Existing Plan	31/10/19	-
L(26)05	Fourth Floor Existing Plan	31/10/19	-
L(26)06	Fifth Floor Existing Plan	31/10/19	-
L(26)07	Sixth Floor Existing Plan	31/10/19	-
L(26)08	Seventh Floor Existing Plan	31/10/19	-
L(26)09	Eight Floor Existing Plan	31/10/19	-
L(26)10	Roof Existing Plan	31/10/19	-
L(26)11	North, South and East Existing Elevations	22/10/19	-
L(26)12	West Existing Elevations	22/10/19	-
L(20)01	Ground Floor General Arrangement Floor Plan	13/11/19	B
L(20)02	First Floor General Arrangement Floor Plan	22/10/19	-
L(20)03	Second Floor General Arrangement Floor Plan	22/10/19	-
L(20)04	Third Floor General Arrangement Floor Plan	22/10/19	-
L(20)05	Fourth Floor General Arrangement Floor Plan	22/10/19	-
L(20)06	Firth Floor General Arrangement Floor Plan	22/10/19	-
L(20)07	Sixth Floor General Arrangement Floor Plan	22/10/19	-
L(20)08	Seventh Floor General Arrangement Floor Plan	22/10/19	-
L(20)09	Eighth Floor General Arrangement Floor Plan	22/10/19	-
L(20)10	Roof Level General Arrangement Floor Plan	22/10/19	-
L(20)11	North and South Elevations	22/10/19	-
L(20)12	East and West Elevations	22/10/19	-
L(20)13	Sections AA and BB	30/10/19	-
L(20)14	Sections CC and DD	30/10/19	-
LRW_7840_L(00)_33	Design & Access Statement	Nov 2019	-

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PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

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D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24-1, 2016
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS 202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk

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