



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Charlotte Street, Manchester
14 No. Apartments and Restaurant
(386.9sqm)

FOR: ARE Assets W Ltd

VERSION A: 23rd November 2022

REFERENCE: 2013/0472/CIS/03

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

Charlotte Street, Manchester

2013/0472/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed development is broadly acceptable with regards to designing out crime and there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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
1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the city centre area of Manchester.

The site is located on the junction of Charlotte Street (North) and Portland Street (East). To the South the site is bound by the adjoining building (46 Portland Street), and to the rear (West) the site is bound by Reyner Street.

The site is located in a prominent area of the city centre, close to Piccadilly Gardens to the North, the Village area to the East, to the South is the Oxford Road corridor, and to the West is China Town. Portland Street is very busy at all times of the day, in the evening and at night with both vehicular and pedestrian traffic.

The site is currently developed by Fraser House which occupies the site. Fraser House is a Grade II Listed building, constructed c. 1855, and was originally used as a textile warehouse. The building has previously been occupied by a restaurant (Ciao Bella) but is currently vacant. Lower ground floor windows are protected with ornamental wrought iron railings. Openings to the rear of the building have had shutters installed and some have been boarded over.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2021 and 31st October 2022.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
50	201	353	2394	2227	321	63	349	61	148

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is high; however the location of the proposed site should be taken into consideration. The proposed site is located within the city centre where there is a high concentration of retail outlets, bars and restaurants which increases the amount of crime and disorder in the area. Less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest reported crimes in the area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are taking place throughout the area, with a particularly high concentration taking place to the east of the proposed site, around Princess Street, Sackville Street and Faulkner Street. This area holds a particularly high concentration of bars and restaurants. Assaults and public order offences are the highest recorded less serious woundings, with offences mostly taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period, when licenced premises see a high number of attendances.
- 2.1.3 Thefts again are taking place throughout the local area with a majority of offences taking place to the east of the proposed site. Offenders are using distraction methods and pick pocketing techniques in order to obtain mobile phones, wallets, and bags from victims. Offenders have targeted insecure bags and mobile phones, left on tables or on the back of chairs.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the area has mostly consisted of theft from a motor vehicle, with offenders targeting securely parked vehicles in private car parks or using on street parking facilities. Smashed glazing and overriding the central locking system have been the most common entry point, with personal items removed from within the vehicle. Offenders have also targeted vehicle registration plates and catalytic converters.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments
Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).
- 2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.
Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.
- 2.2.3 Posing as a legitimate customer and gaining access to staff only areas by means of tailgating staff and exploitation of insecure doors.
Possible Solution - Any staff-only areas should operate on an access control system with access restricted to authorised personnel.
- 2.2.4 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments
Possible Solution - All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.

2.2.5 Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the doors/windows behind

Possible Solution - Any shutters should conform to a recognised security standard such as LPS 1175 SR 2.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems





2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.5 Crime Rate Comparison


The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **74% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **67% lower** than Greater Manchester and **66% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **56% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **112% higher** than Greater Manchester and **305% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwelling is **14% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **13% higher** than Greater Manchester and **37% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **186% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **371% higher** than Greater Manchester and **472% higher** than England & Wales.

2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.






2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Tuesday and Friday during the afternoon and into the evening. Offenders often target properties during the evening when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as "unknown" it is likely that offenders have exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Entering apartment buildings by means of tailgating residents/ insecure doors and gaining access to communal areas.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements.

2.7 Burglary Risk Analysis – Retail Premises

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.7.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed, and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.7.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.8 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Friday and Saturday during the morning and through into the evening, peaking over the afternoon period (1pm – 3pm). Offence's peak over the weekend period due to the increased number of visitors into the city. Vehicles are left unattended for long periods of time, creating low risk opportunities for offenders.

2.9 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.9.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses, and bags.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is of a restaurant at ground and lower ground floor, with 14 no. apartments on the first floor and above.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The main entrance to the restaurant will be positioned in a prominent location on Portland Street where it will subject to high levels of surveillance during the day and at night from those passing by on foot and in vehicles.
- 3.2.2 The communal entrance to the apartments will be taken from the Charlotte Street elevation where it can easily be seen on approach. Charlotte Street is a well trafficked street both by pedestrians and those in vehicles.
- 3.2.3 There will be an internal bike store for residents of the apartment building to secure their bicycles.
- 3.2.4 The entrances to the building, and the door to the rear of the building, are not recessed and unlikely to be misused by those antisocially or criminally minded.
- 3.2.5 The proposed uses are appropriate and in keeping with uses in the local area.
- 3.2.6 The proposed apartments are provided above ground floor level and the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night) are less likely.
- 3.2.7 Lower ground floor windows are protected with iron railings, protecting glazing from accidental or malicious damage.
- 3.2.8 The external fire escape stairs cannot be access from street level and won't be used as part of the proposed fire strategy.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Apartments

- 3.3.1 The main communal entrance to the apartments should be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175. If the existing doorset is retained, the first-floor door into the circulation area of the apartments should be certified to this standard. These doors should be capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- 3.3.2 Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- 3.3.3 The bicycle store should be restricted to residents, operating on an access control system or with keys issued to residents. Both wheels and the frame should be capable of being secured.

Restaurant

- 3.3.4 The opening hours of the restaurant should be in keeping with similar uses in the local area and reflect the residential nature of the building at first floor and above.
- 3.3.5 The main entrance door, if retained, should include a lock that complies with BS 3621. The door should be capable of being locked in multiple points to prevent it from being forced open by an offender.
- 3.3.6 The secondary entrance door from the lobby into the main restaurant area should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24 or PS 1175 SR2).
- 3.3.7 The premises should be covered with an intruder alarm and CCTV system. If the unit is to be fitted out by a tenant then there should be the correct infrastructure to allow for an alarm to be easily installed.
- 3.3.8 In order to minimise potential issues in the restaurants, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:
 - The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.

- Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrance should be easily observed by staff.
- All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- Large amounts of cash should not be stored in the premises overnight and signage should be installed to indicate this. Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till/bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of the service counter should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled).
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points. A clear pathway to and from the toilets to the seating areas is desirable.
- There should be few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required. Where any aspects are difficult to meet due to the building being listed it is recommended that an alternative is agreed.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ To prevent tailgating there should be two certified access-controlled doors (certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2) between publicly accessible space and apartment entrance doors.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters are recommended but not essential.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product. A secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all floors of the building should be implemented. In a development of this size it is recommended that a secure postal lobby is created, allowing postal workers access to deliver mail to individual mailboxes without gaining access to the entire building.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Main entrance doors
 - Secondary entrance doors off internal lobbies
 - Bicycle store

5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The main entrance door should have a multipoint locking system that complies with BS 3621.

5.2 Windows, Shutters & Curtain Walling

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

5.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.4 Alarms & CCTV

- ☐ It is highly recommended that the premises is covered with a comprehensive alarm and CCTV system.
- ☐ If an alarm and CCTV system are not installed then the infrastructure for an easy installation should be provided for the future tenant.

6 External Features

6.1 Lighting

- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Elevations of the building should be illuminated, particularly to the rear elevation which is partially secluded from view.

6.2 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals.

7 Management & Maintenance

- 7.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 7.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

-
- 7.1.3 A comprehensive security regime for the individual units must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing the building, including staff arrival and departure.
 - Management of deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
 - Details of staff security training.
 - Location and management of any smoking areas.
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. access control systems, alarm systems, CCTV cameras, and lighting.
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti and litter; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 7.1.4 All high value equipment within publicly accessible areas (e.g. computers, televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 7.1.5 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left in the street for extended periods/overnight. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.
- 7.1.6 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

8 Construction

- 8.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible, and accountable.
- 8.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

9 Useful References

9.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 9.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
31/10/2022	Tom Flanagan	CIS application received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	Feasibility Study	Oct 22	C

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		