



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Great Jackson Street
Paddle Tennis (1,550sqm)

For: **Renaker Build Ltd**

Version A: 10/08/23

Ref: 2023/0042/CIS/03

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported / minor security additions advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to expose any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime within the proposal.

The proposed development is welcomed. The design of the scheme is very positive from a pedestrian safety perspective, with an interest in maintaining a safe and secure environment.

Given the high levels of crime in the area currently, it is also likely that offenders will be attracted to the development. Consequently, the site and the premises within it will need to be secure, with security an integral element of the design and management of the development.

The information provided for assessment by the applicant is minimal, but the following issues have been identified as potential generators of insecurity, and must be addressed as described within the report (see Section 3.3 for more details):

- Secure staff & user cycle hoops location
- Installing fencing and gates to secure the perimeter of the site when the development is closed for business.
- Installing appropriate lighting, CCTV and intruder alarm systems
- Storage containers that meet the LPS 1175 standard (or to the principles of LPS 1175) should be used.

Our support for this scheme is subject to the above issues being satisfactorily addressed, as described within the report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

David Maher *Dip Arch*

Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located on the southern edge of central Manchester, approx. 1km from Albert Square; close to the conference facilities at Manchester Central and the Bridgewater Hall and good walking/cycling distance to the university districts.

The area contains a mix of development types, comprising residential, commercial, and hotel buildings.

The existing buildings on the site have now been demolished, land has been cleared to the west of Great Jackson Street, to the east of Great Jackson Street is the temporary marketing suite, Gaddum House and temporary site cabins.


Most of the perimeter is enclosed with a weld-mesh fence or boarded.

The A57(M) Mancunian Way is less than 100m from the southern edge of the site with a slip road adjacent to the southern section of the site. The A57(M) forms the boundary between M/cr City & Hulme district. A footpath leads to a pedestrian footbridge crossing the A57(M). Unfortunately, the bridge has been a notable crime & ASB generator.


To the north and east of the site are two established residential developments; 'Deansgate Sq' & 'Crown St'. Both developments provide high quality public realm & architecture and incorporate a good maintenance strategy.




7 – Pedestrian footbridge over the A57(M) Mancunian Way.



6 – View northeast across the site.



5 – Existing disused building on Great Jackson St.




1 – Existing structure on site with graffiti.



2 – Great Jackson St is a popular for on-street parking.



3 – Existing public realm at Deansgate Square.



4 – Servicing street and public realm at Deansgate Square

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2022 to 31st July 2023.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
54	32	118	684	186	49	22	241	33	28

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is relatively high, with less serious wounding, vehicle crime and theft being the highest recorded crimes. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are mostly taking place to the north and south of the proposed site, around Deansgate metrolink stop and Jackson Crescent. The assaults in the area are mostly taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period, which is when licenced premises have a larger attendance and are open for longer periods. The assaults are mostly carried out by unknown offenders.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime in the local area is mostly taking place around Ellesmere Street and Bridgewater Viaduct. Theft from a Motor vehicle is the highest occurring vehicle crime with smashed glazing being the most common entry point to the vehicle. The area in which vehicle crime has occurred has a large number of car parking facilities and on street parking, which increases the number of opportunities for offenders.
- 2.1.4 Thefts have occurred around the north and east of the proposed site, around Deansgate/ Castleford Metrolink stop and to the north around Liverpool Road, where pickpocketing has been most commonly used to obtain goods. Thefts have also occurred around the licenced premises in the area, with mobile phones and purses/ wallets being taken.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 M/cr Sports Facilities: Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.8 and 4.9) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, users or passers-by.

- 2.2.2 M/cr Sports Facilities: Windows have also been targeted, with offenders prised them open, removing the beading/glazing or smashing the glazing to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- 2.2.3 M/cr Sports Facilities: Offenders have gained access to insecure rooms/areas unnoticed, before targeting school equipment.

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. All visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school. Reception staff should be given flexibility over permitting access into the building at different times of the day. Effective access controls within the buildings should assist in restricting entry to vulnerable areas.

2.2.4 M/cr Sports Facilities: Shutters have been forced upwards to gain unauthorised access or to access doors/windows behind them.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of user / staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of / from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery / attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2022.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **61% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **50% lower** than Greater Manchester and **49% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **54% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **37% lower** than Greater Manchester and **20% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwelling is **57% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **43% lower** than Greater Manchester and **31% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **13% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **86% higher** than Greater Manchester and **126% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.




2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Monday and Wednesday during the afternoon (2pm - 5pm) and early hours of the morning (12am – 3:30am). Offenders often target properties during the day when residents are likely to be away at work, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified. Offenders are also likely to target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Offenders posing as legitimate residents/visitors and entering restricted areas through insecure doors or tailgating residents.
- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as unknown, offenders have typically targeted insecure windows and doors.

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.





2.6.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon / early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.6.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.7 Theft (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing / locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.8 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Thursday and Saturday during the afternoon (14:00pm – 18:00pm). Offenders tend to target vehicles at this time as they are often left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal seeks to develop a site for a temporary paddle courts facility = 1,550sqm.
- 3.1.2 A small number of containers will be installed and organised to provide a reception space and ancillary uses.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The new development will create a controlled entrance area allowing staff to observe user movement in, out and around the proposal. Increasing the staff control of the entrance and improvements in natural surveillance within the scheme provides a safe and enjoyable experience for all users.
- 3.2.2 The increased activity, improved lighting and natural surveillance associated with the development will greatly enhance the experience of the range of users and pedestrian in this section of Manchester.
- 3.2.3 Opening the views across the zones and plots will facilitate mutual surveillance between the courts and the public realm spaces around.
- 3.2.4 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.
- 3.2.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Secure the boundaries of the development with suitable high robust fencing. Particularly where the fencing line abuts the new containers.
- 3.3.2 Containers used to accommodate the business and any storage containers used should meet the LPS 1175 standard (or at least adhere to the principles of LPS 1175 certification), to allow management staff too securely store stock and close up the units overnight.
- 3.3.3 Avoid measures that could aid climbing onto the roofs of units as a means to by-pass formal security measures.
- 3.3.4 Providing secure cycle parking for staff and customers.
- 3.3.5 Provide a secure place for staff to store personal property whilst working.
- 3.3.6 Provide a secure area for refuse storage at the rear of the site.
- 3.3.7 Install a CCTV system to monitor the site throughout the day and night. External areas around the buildings should be capable of surveillance by staff from inside the premises. Where direct views are not possible, a monitored CCTV system should be visible on a screen at the reception point.
- 3.3.8 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- 3.3.9 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Ideally, entrance and service doors should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2 or be steel doors within a steel frame with two locking points to each door leaf.

4.2 Locks

- ☐ Locks generally should meet the BS 3621 or 8621 standard.
- ☐ Padlocks should meet the Secure Gold™ standard.

4.3 Roller Shutters

- ☐ Wherever applicable and feasible, roller shutters should meet the LPS 1175 standard. If hinged shutters are used to protect window openings they should be secured with locks that meet one of the above standards.

4.4 Access Control

- ☐ Access into service areas and the back of house of the larger units should, should be controlled. The use of numeric key pads is ideal for high traffic doors and gates. It is understood that, generally, lock and key will be the most common method of controlling access. Doors and gates to secure areas should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

4.5 Glazing

- ☐ Laminate glass should be used in all glazed openings
- ☐ Glazed openings should be protected with retractable shutters when closed for business.

4.6 Intruder Alarm

- ☐ Ideally, a monitored intruder alarm system should be installed to all units.

4.7 Boundaries

- ☐ Where the development has openings for egress these points should be secured with a gate/fencing at least 2400mm high or to match the height of the approved sports facilities boundary treatment; and include self-closing, self-locking, service doors/gates of a similar height and design.

4.8 Refuse Store

- ☐ The gates/doors to the store should be secured with a padlock or integrated lock.

4.9 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to illuminate the entrance gates, courtyard, and entrance doors of the units. Fittings should produce 'white' light.

4.10 CCTV

- ☐ The CCTV system should be capable of monitoring the front of each unit, customer entrance gates/shutter and service access gates, the courtyard, licensed premises internally and externally, the sales counter within the retail units, and the approaches to the development from the north and south. Recording equipment may be securely stored on-site or off-site. Images should, ideally, be monitored but at least recorded and stored for 28 days by a suitable monitoring/management company.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
08/08/23	Deloitte LLP	CIS instructed
08/08/23	Deloitte LLP	CIS confirmed
09/08/23	DfS	Site visit
11/08/23	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
Club de Padel (GJS) - DAS		12.07.23	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk