



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT: PRELIMINARY

Fallowfield Campus, Wilmslow Road

Student Accommodation

FOR: University of Manchester

VERSION B: 3rd August 2023

REFERENCE: 2023/0332/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FALLOWFIELD CAMPUS, WILMSLOW ROAD

2023/0332/CIS/01

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' Explained

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' has been created to accompany outline planning applications where layout is not considered (i.e. the proposal is only at the 'red line' stage). This part of the process will provide your design team with the contextual crime information, and site-specific design considerations needed to develop the layout and appearance of the proposal.

Reserved Matters Applications

Reserved matters applications, where layout is to be considered, will require a full Crime Impact Statement, which will appraise the design and layout of the developed proposals. Please contact us when work commences on the layout of the scheme for us to develop your preliminary report into a full Crime Impact Statement.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The redevelopment of Fallowfield Campus is a big opportunity to address some of the existing issues with the site, such as the lack of frontages to large stretches of public footways, the designs of some of the buildings, and outdated security measures. There are a number of recommendations made in section 3.2 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered when detailed plans are created.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the Fallowfield area of Manchester.

The site is roughly rectangular and the Northern boundary is defined by Ashburne Hall, to the East the site is bound by University of Manchester Fallowfield Campus, to the South by Mosely Road, and to the West by Wilmslow Road.

The site is large and currently developed as student accommodation (Fallowfield Campus) managed by the University of Manchester. There are a considerable number of buildings on the site, most of which are low rise apartment buildings, with a high rise apartment building to the North-West of the site. The site boundaries are well defined with railing to a mixture of heights, with dense planting behind in some locations.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2022 to 30th June 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
44	12	86	320	84	35	6	25	12	35

- 2.1.1 Over the last 12 months, the volume of recorded crime in this neighbourhood has been high, particularly crimes involving violence, criminal damage, vehicle crime and theft. The Wilmslow Road / Oxford Road corridor, with its concentration of commercial uses, including licensed premises, university and hospital campuses, and car parks, together with high footfall throughout the day and night are all contributory reasons for the high volume of crime. The majority of crime has taken place along Wilmslow Road, particularly to the south of the proposed, as well as around Sherwood Street and Cawdor Road to the west..
- 2.1.2 Violence in the local area has involved assaults, public order offences and harassment. Offences have taken place within the home, as well as public spaces (mostly along Wilmslow Road). Violence has involved domestic disputes and incidents between known associates.
- 2.1.3 Wilmslow Road to the south and Egerton Road has experienced the largest volume of thefts. The increased number of offences have occurred around the retail shops and licenced premises in the area. Offenders have entered the store and removed stock from the businesses, as well as targeting insecure mobile phones and bags.
- 2.1.4 Criminal damage has taken place throughout the local area with offenders mostly targeting dwellings and vehicles. Student properties have been targeted whereby offenders have damaged doors and communal areas, using bodily pressure and implements. Offenders have also targeted fence panels, kicking them and damaging the panel. Vehicles have had glazing smashed and scratched paint work/damaged body work.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments
Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).
- 2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.
Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.
- 2.2.3 Posing as a legitimate customer and gaining access to staff only areas by means of tailgating staff and exploitation of insecure doors.
Possible Solution – Any staff-only areas should operate on an access control system with access restricted to authorised personnel.
- 2.2.4 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments
Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publicly accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.

-
- 2.2.5 Entering premises as legitimate customer and tailgating staff/ exploiting insecure doors to access staff only areas.

Possible Solution – Personnel gates or turnstiles should restrict access from the office foyer into the circulation core of the building. Any external doors should operate on an access control system.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **84% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **136% higher** than Greater Manchester and **142% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **25% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **70% higher** than Greater Manchester and **225% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **85% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **143% higher** than Greater Manchester and **195% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **8% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **52% higher** than Greater Manchester and **84% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Monday and Friday during the late evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties during this time as it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point is "unknown" it is likely that offenders have exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements gain access to garden sheds/garages.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Saturday during the late evening. Offenders often target vehicles during the late evening as they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the vehicle owner for long periods of time creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Design Considerations

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposals are an outline master plan for the redevelopment of Fallowfield Campus.

3.2 Recommendations

- 3.2.1 Students are often targeted by offenders or fall victim to criminality for various reasons including the following:
- Perception of vulnerability, because they are often young and inexperienced, living away from home for the first time, and may not be fully aware of potential risks or safety measures.
 - Students often possess valuable items like laptops, smartphones, tablets, and other electronic devices, making them attractive targets for theft. These items are not only valuable on their own, but they may also contain personal information that can be exploited for identity theft or fraud.
 - Unfamiliar environment for students from rural areas, or overseas, who might be less familiar with the local area, making them more vulnerable to being targeted for criminals.
 - Students may not be very security-conscious or risk averse. For instance, they may leave bedroom or apartment/cluster doors unlocked or fail to take proper precautions when walking alone at night. Student lifestyle often involves socialising and engaging in nightlife, which can expose students to riskier situations, such as alcohol-related incidents, assault, or robbery.

For these reasons it is important that measures are included within the development to limit the potential for students to be targeted by offenders, and that it is managed to a high standard to deter criminals from operating.

- 3.2.2 Presently the site does not have an active frontage to large areas of Wilmslow Road and Mosely Street due to there being dense vegetation behind the railings, which prevents views into and out of the site; additionally, inside the site there are high hedges in some locations further reducing views. The lack of active frontages can make these areas feel unsafe when it is dark because it is not well overlooked and does not provide a deterrent to criminals operating in the area. Although, I note that there is a development exclusion zone and a desire to keep the existing trees/vegetation it is highly recommended that the development of the site allow for views into and out of the site, to allow for surveillance opportunities and deter criminals from operating, and to make the surrounding areas feel safer. If this cannot be achieved by introducing active frontages then it is recommended that landscaping is thinned in some areas to allow views into and out of the site.



- 3.2.3 There are areas around the site where tree canopies, of trees within the site, are limiting the effectiveness of street lighting to the public footway on Wilmslow Road which. Landscaping should be designed so that it does not impede lighting or CCTV coverage.
- 3.2.4 Access into and around the development should, ideally, be restricted to residents/staff/legitimate visitors. The existing boundary generally creates a secure envelope for the site and reduces the number of access points into the site. If the existing boundary is to be retained, then it should be inspected for damage and repaired where necessary. If a new boundary is to be installed, then it should be to a similar height and construction to the existing perimeter treatment and restrict access into the site to a number of positions which can easily be monitored. Pedestrian, and any vehicular gates, into the site should operate on an access control system so that only residents, staff, and legitimate visitors are permitted access to the site. Alternative, there could be central areas of the development which are accessible to the public (i.e. campus office, café, laundrette, through-routes) but access into residential areas of the scheme are restricted.
- 3.2.5 Communal entrances into individual buildings should be positioned in prominent locations so that they can be easily seen on approach by residents, and so that they can be overlooked from nearby buildings – allowing for natural surveillance opportunities. Access control into buildings should restrict access to

residents of that building and there should be another access controlled door between the lobby/reception area and the circulation core of the building. Buildings on the site at the moment have recessed entrances which can generate antisocial behaviour such as congregation, alcohol/drug consumption, and urination. Recessed doorways should be avoided when the scheme is developed.

- 3.2.6 Defensible space should be provided to all to ground floor bedroom windows, in the form of a low boundary (i.e. railing) or shrubbery. This will prevent would-be offenders from easily accessing ground floor windows where they could potentially reach in to steal property or gain entry. Ground floor windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being left insecure by residents.
- 3.2.7 The proposed masterplan shows extensive cycle parking in the form of external cycle stores. Cycle stores should be robust, secure, weatherproof enclosures with access restricted to residents. Cycle stands should be 'Sheffield' style/U-profile, allow both wheels and the frame to be secured. While two-tier systems are allowed, it is essential to ensure that both the wheels and the frame can be securely locked.
- 3.2.8 The public space should be illuminated to a high standard and in accordance with BS 5489 – which should be considered as a minimum standard. A variety of lighting sources should be used to illuminate the environment rather than reliance on one type of lighting which can often lead to pooling/shadowing.
- 3.2.9 The site is currently extensively covered by CCTV which should be upgraded as part of the redevelopment. The landscaped spaces and pedestrian routes should be covered by the CCTV system, which can be monitored by staff to alert them to any misuse of these spaces so they can be managed accordingly to foster safe environment for residents and pedestrians. The lighting scheme should allow the CCTV system to operate effectively, and the landscaping of this area should not impede coverage. Any seating areas within the landscaped area must be covered by CCTV as these areas are most likely to generate antisocial behaviour (i.e. congregation, or alcohol/drug consumption).
- 3.2.10 Vegetation in the proposed public space should be well maintained in order to facilitate the sight lines through the route. Low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2400mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places.
- 3.2.11 Hard landscaping in the public space should be carefully considered so that these areas do not become concealed from view.
- 3.2.12 The seating areas located in the public realm have the potential to attract antisocial behaviour during night-time. To promote natural surveillance and discourage misuse, it is crucial to ensure these areas are illuminated to a high standard. It is also essential to have CCTV coverage of these spaces to enable staff to monitor and promptly respond to any incidents.



4 Useful References

4.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. The latest SBD guidance relating to new residential developments can be found at <http://www.securedbydesign.com/industry-advice-and-guides/>.

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
29/06/2023	Oliver Thomas	CIS application received
27/07/2023	Oliver Thomas	Progress update

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
6952-SRA-XX-XX-	Location Plan	28/06/23	
6952-SRA-XX-XX-	Site Plan	28/06/23	
6952-SRA-XX-XX-	Illustrative Masterplan	16/06/23	
	Parameter Plans	23/06/23	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		