

RED BANK OUTLINE PLANNING APPLICATION

Crime Impact Statement

February 2023



Far East
Consortium



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Red Bank, Victoria North

Outline Application for 3250 No. Apartments, Primary
School & Medical Centre

FOR: FEC Northern Gateway Development Ltd

VERSION A: 13th February 2022

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The proposal is an outline application for a development of a predominantly residential development of up to 3,250 no. apartments, with associated ground floor commercial uses, medical centre, and primary school. The site is currently vacant, and the mixed-use nature of the scheme will generate elevated levels of activity during the day and night. Land adjacent the site is being developed as a public park which will also attract people to the area, which can minimise the opportunities for criminals and those antisocially minded. The rate of residential burglary in the local area is higher than the average for Manchester and Greater Manchester therefore it is important that measures to reduce the risk of crime are incorporated into the design of the development. A number of recommendations are made in section 3 of this report, to reduce the potential for crime and anti-social behaviour, and these should be considered when more detailed plans are drawn up.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located on the outskirts of Manchester city centre on the boundary of Collyhurst and Cheetham Hill.

The proposed site boundaries are loosely defined by Red Bank to the West, by Danzic Street/ Dalton Street to the East. The site extends from Packaging Products (Coatings) Ltd and other industrial units on Collyhurst Road to the North and NOMA/Manchester city centre to the South.

The site has been largely cleared and there is an approved planning application for a park adjacent the development site. There are a number of residential developments under construction, or have planning permission, on Danzic Street to the South of the site.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2022 to 31st December 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
55	39	62	208	133	11	6	111	28	7

- 2.1.1 The overall crime level in the local area is moderate when compared with the city of Manchester as a whole, with the exception of vehicle crime which is higher than average. The area around the site contains large areas of undeveloped land, vacant plots and major transport corridors, where criminal activity is less likely to be witnessed or reported. Less serious woundings, theft and vehicle crime have been the highest recorded crimes in the area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings are taking place throughout the local area with a high concentration taking place to the northwest of the proposed site around Stocks Street, North Street and Cheetham Hill Road. These offences have mostly consisted of assaults and public order offences, within dwellings as well as business premises and streets. Offences occurring in businesses have involved offenders entering then physically / verbally assaulting employees. Offences that have occurred on the street have usually been carried out by unknown offenders and are more likely to occur in the evening and early hours of the morning.
- 2.1.3 Thefts in the local area have mostly taken place to the south of the proposed site, towards Victoria Station, around Lord Street. Thefts have mostly involved pick pocketing and distraction methods with mobile phones and purses/bags mostly targeted.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area is high, with vehicles parked in private car parks and using on street parking most frequently targeted. Theft from motor vehicles have been the highest recorded offence, with smashed glazing being a common entry point and vehicle registration plates removed.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Houses:** Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly located to the front of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.
- Possible Solution - All external door sets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (see section 4.1). Rear doors should be positioned within the secure rear boundary to restrict access to residents. Ground floor and easily accessible windows should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24)*
- 2.2.2 **Houses:** Exploitation of insecure windows and doors, mostly to the rear of the property.
- Possible Solution - Front doors should have split spindles or a fixed external handle so then cannot be opened from outside without a key. Rear doors should be positioned in secure rear gardens with appropriate boundary treatments. Ground floor windows should have restrictors installed so that they cannot be opened from the outside if left insecure.*
- 2.2.3 **Houses:** Breaking glazing in windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property), using implements.
- Possible Solution – All ground floor glazing should include a pane of laminate glazing to prevent it from being easily smashed or shattered to gain entry (see section 4.3)*
- 2.2.4 **Schools:** Use of tools/implements to smash glazing in windows to force entry.
- Possible Solution – Ground floor windows should be certified to the relevant burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24) and be restricted in opening to 100mm. All glazing in ground floor doors and windows should contain a pane of laminate glazing to prevent it from being easily smashed.*
- 2.2.5 **Schools:** Doors were forced open by targeting locks or glazing smashed in door windows.
- Possible Solution - External doors should be certified to an appropriate burglary resistant standard (see section 4.1 for more details). A secure boundary should prevent offenders from gaining access to external*

doors, particularly those that are not overlooked and subject to natural surveillance from adjacent streets. Glazing should be laminated so that it cannot be easily smashed. Laminated glazing does not smash or shatter which could afford entry to offenders.

- 2.2.6 **Schools:** Mobile phones, wallets and bags were targeted for theft from pupils/staff and visitors when left insecure.

Possible Solution – Staff and pupils should be able to secure individual property, i.e. in lockers. Class and staff rooms should be capable of being secured when not in use.

- 2.2.7 **Schools:** Forced open secure shutters using bodily force and implements.

Possible Solution – Any shutters should be certified to a relevant security standard i.e. LPS 1175 SR2.

2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.

- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **23% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **58% higher** than Greater Manchester and **62% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **56% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **40% lower** than Greater Manchester and **14% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **29% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **7% lower** than Greater Manchester and **14% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **77% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **191% higher** than Greater Manchester and **253% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Wednesday and Thursday during the afternoon and into the evening (2pm – 8pm). Offenders often target residential properties during the afternoon and evening as residents are likely to be away from the property for extended periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.
- 2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
 - In cases where the entry point is recorded as “unknown” it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure windows and doors.
 - Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
 - Entering communal areas of buildings by means of tailgating residents/ exploiting insecure doors, with postal rooms and carparks/ bike storage facilities.

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary Educational Facility: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at education facilities in the local area peaks on a Thursday, Friday, and a Sunday. The risk is high throughout the day, peaking in the late evening and early hours of the morning (9pm – 5am). Offenders target educational facilities during the evening when it is dark, streets are quieter as the risk of being caught / identified lessens.
- 2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
 - Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain access to the premises.
 - Exploitation of insecure doors and windows to gain entry to the property.
 - Climbing perimeter fencing to gain access to the grounds and approaching secure sheds use implements and bodily pressure to gain access.
 - Climb onto roofing and remove tiles to gain entry to the premises.
 - Force open shutters using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
 - Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to the property.
 - In cases where the point of entry is unknown, offenders have often posed as legitimate students/ visitors and entered restricted areas by means of insecure doors.

2.7 Theft Educational Facility: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against educational facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018-2019.

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- 2.7.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities peaks on a Tuesday during the morning and into the afternoon (8am – 4pm.) The thefts carried out involve thefts of personal items, mostly mobile phones and bags, as well as equipment owned by the facility, mostly laptops and computing equipment.

2.8 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area is high with offences peaking on a Wednesday throughout the day, peaking between 12pm – 3pm). Offenders target vehicles throughout the week in the city centre, as there is an increase of people visiting and working in the city, which leads to an increase in vehicles within car parks. Offenders target these vehicles because they are likely to be left for prolonged periods of time with little footfall in the area, making it unlikely that the offender will be seen or apprehended.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed outline application is for up to 3,250 residential units, residential amenity space, commercial ground floor uses, primary school, and medical centre

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will increase residential activity in the area which can reduce the prevalence of criminal and antisocial behaviour.
- 3.2.2 The mix of uses in the proposals, and the proposed park adjacent, will generate activity throughout the day which can deter criminals from operating.
- 3.2.3 There are a number of residential developments under construction, or proposed, in the local area, allowing for mutual security opportunities.

3.3 Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Apartments

- 3.3.1 Communal entrances to the apartment buildings should be positioned where they can easily be seen by residents on approach. It is highly recommended that apartment buildings are designed so that buildings overlook each other to facilitate natural surveillance.
- 3.3.2 Secure car parking should be provided for the residents of the apartments, either within a basement/undercroft parking area, or within a secure car park which is overlooked by the building with access restricted to residents.
- 3.3.3 Bicycle parking should be provided within a secure, accessed control room, with the apartment building.
- 3.3.4 A successful lighting scheme deters and reveals potential intruders and reduces the fear of crime. Lighting levels should be good, but not oppressive and evenly distributed. Lighting should be provided to all roads/footpaths, parking areas and to the front/rear of all dwellings.
- 3.3.5 Any proposed landscaping features (hard or soft) in front of dwellings/buildings or around parking areas should not impede natural surveillance off/from the buildings/spaces or create climbing aids over any boundaries.
- 3.3.6 The phasing of building works and bringing into use parts of the scheme while others are undeveloped or under construction can significantly affect security. Uncompleted access roads/footpaths should be secured until such time as they are completed, and surveillance opportunities are maximised from occupied buildings or dwellings. Care should also be taken to ensure that any hoardings erected around

development sites do not create secluded passageways and blind spots or become targets for criminal damage. It is recommended that while construction work progresses and occupancy levels of completed properties are low, an on-site security presence is maintained.

- 3.3.7 Ground floor commercial uses should not cause conflict with the residential uses above (i.e. licensed premises should not be open too late that it might be antisocial for residents).

Primary School

- 3.3.8 The school building should not feature any recessed areas/doors, projecting features, or similar, which could allow an offender to be concealed from view.
- 3.3.9 Accessible roofs of school buildings have often been exploited by criminals across Greater Manchester to gain unauthorised access, particularly where there are single-storey elements, where eaves are lower or where buildings are publicly accessible out-of-hours – making access easier. The eaves of any single storey building elements should be as high as possible, in order to discourage unauthorised access to the roof. The design of the eaves should also discourage climbing e.g. with rounded/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc.
- 3.3.10 There should be no other features of the building or nearby hard/soft landscaping features that may provide climbing aids onto the roof. Any rooflights or first floor windows accessible from single-storey roof areas should be to the same physical security standards as those at ground floor level.
- 3.3.11 The entire site should be enclosed within a 2400mm high perimeter fence line, in order to prevent unauthorised access to the car park, building and play areas at night/when the school is closed. There should also be secondary fence lines incorporated (which could be lower) that enclose the external pupil/play areas to the sides and rear of the building during operational hours - ensuring that members of the public cannot bypass the main entrance reception and gain unauthorised access through any other doors, external spaces, or service areas.
- 3.3.12 A limited number of gates and entrances should be opened and supervised at peak times in the morning and in the afternoon only, after/before which the external student/play areas surrounding the building should be secured and all visitors, parents, pupils and staff should use the main entrance.
- 3.3.13 The reception/admin office adjacent to the main entrance should be staffed at all times when the building is in use, allowing staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering and exiting the building. All visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school. The entrance lobby should work as an 'air lock' during the day, with both the external and the internal door controlled by reception staff.
- 3.3.14 If the building has a potential community use, then the design should allow for areas of the school to be used whilst the rest of the building is secure. Areas for community use should be capable of being accessed easily from the main entrance, or there should be a dedicated entrance. Any alarm system should be capable of being zoned to allow for the rest of the school to be alarmed when not in use.
- 3.3.15 The landscaping design should be carefully considered so that it does not impede sightlines, CCTV coverage, or lighting. Shrubbery should be low-level (i.e. no higher than 1000mm) and tree canopies should not fall lower than 2400mm to allow good views.
- 3.3.16 Accessible roofs of school buildings have often been exploited by criminals across Greater Manchester to gain unauthorised access, particularly where there are single-storey elements, where eaves are lower or where buildings are publicly accessible out-of-hours – making access easier. The eaves of any single storey building elements should be as high as possible, in order to discourage unauthorised access to the roof. The design of the eaves should also discourage climbing e.g. with rounded/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. and there should be no other features of the building or nearby hard/soft landscaping features that may provide climbing aids onto the roof. Any rooflights or first floor windows accessible from single-storey roof areas should be to the same physical security standards as those at ground floor level.

Medical centre

- 3.3.17 The main entrance should be located where it can easily be seen from the public footway/highway to allow for natural surveillance opportunities. Access to the sides/rear of the building, and any staff car parking areas, should be restricted.
- 3.3.18 Staff should be given flexibility over permitting access through the primary entrances at various times of the day and night. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff when required.

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- 3.3.19 Doors into drug stores, or rooms where personal records are stored, should be certified to BS PAS 24. Walls should be of solid masonry construction or include a resilient layer in the wall. The door should be alarmed when the building is closed. Controlled drugs should be secured in a BS 2881 storage cabinet. Doors into drug or record stores should operate on auditable access controls.
 - 3.3.20 Corridors in the building where clinical, treatment, or staff rooms are located should be restricted to staff. Patients should wait within the waiting rooms provided and be allowed access to the corridor required by a member of staff (physically, or remotely).
 - 3.3.21 The building should be covered with a monitored alarm system, so that the building can be alarmed when not in use.

4 Construction

- 4.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 4.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

5 Useful References

5.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 5.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20/01/2023	Ed Harvey	CIS application received
13/02/2023	Ed Harvey	Project update

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
RDB-MLM-00-0-DR-AR-211417	Parameter Plan P1 – Development Plots & Public Realm		
RDB-MLM-00-0-DR-AR-211418	Parameter Plan P2 - Movement		
RDB-MLM-00-ZZ-DR-AR-211419	Parameter Plan P3 - Use		
RDB-MLM-00-RF-DR-AR-211420	Parameter Plan P4 – Building Heights		
RDB-MLM-00-0-DR-AR-211421	Parameter Plan P5 – Site Levels		
RDB-MLM-XX-XX-DR-AR-009001	Site Boundary Plan		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		